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Abstract 
The neutrality of evaluation processes has been widely discussed in both 
the academic and practitioner literature. The abstraction of assessment 
mechanisms from the reality of public policy arguably seems naïve and 
disconnected from the actual role of evaluation. It is in exactly this context 
that this thesis explores the politics of evaluation in terms of both an 
internal process and an external procedure within accountability 
frameworks. By focusing on the political nature of evaluation in healthcare 
in Mexico and the United Kingdom this thesis sheds new light on the 
complex relationships and inter-dependencies that dominate the 
architecture of modern governance. The core finding of the research 
presented in this thesis is that the hidden politics of evaluation matters 
because of the way in which the institutional framework provides actors 
with spaces of discretion that allow them to influence the process and 
outcomes of evaluation. This finding, and the research that underpins it, 
adds to our understanding in terms of the potential gap between what 
might make ‘good policy’, as opposed to what might make ‘good politics.’  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The evolving nature of the modern state has encouraged the promotion of 
internal and external mechanisms of control through which the general public, 
as well as politicians, officials, and interest groups, can evaluate the capacity of 
the state to respond to social demands. In the context of modern governance, 
the use of evaluation techniques has arisen as a common instrument to identify 
the effectiveness of public policy. However, the politics1 involved in evaluation 
requires being analysed in depth in the sense of grasping how various actors 
involved might influence the evaluation process and its outcomes to promote 
their interests, to seek political advantage, or to produce changes within the 
structure of the state.2 
The ‘audit explosion’ described by Power and the adoption of tools such as 
monitoring and evaluation are only some examples of the way in which 
managerial models can modify how policy is conceptualised, implemented, and 
assessed.3 Regarding the latter, it is useful to reflect upon the political values 
that drive evaluation.4 The definition of ‘success’ and the criteria used for its 
identification in public policy are ideological constructions resulting from 
negotiations between various actors. 
The purpose of this thesis is to expose the hidden politics of evaluation and 
therefore the relationship between evaluation on the one hand and politics on 
the other, by looking at the evaluation policies implemented in two different 
countries: the United Kingdom (UK) and Mexico. Through four case studies the 
                                                        
1 This thesis adopts the concept of politics proposed by Lasswell (who gets what, when and how) 
understood as the way in which stakeholders of evaluation pursuit their interests under the 
conditions imposed by the institutional framework. A more detailed development of the concept 
of politics can be found in Chapter 2, section 2.3. 
2 Actors involved in evaluation can include ‘the commissioners or funders (who may set the 
parameters for the work and the expectations for its outcome), the key audiences for the work, 
those involved in advisory panels (who may influence the quality standards applied), and 
participants in the evaluation (who may bring a range of knowledge and views to bear, as well 
as influence how easily it can be conducted.’ Lonsdale, J. 2008. "Balancing Independence and 
Responsiveness: A Practitioner Perspective on the Relationships Shaping Performance Audit." 
Evaluation 14(2):227-48. P. 228. 
3 Power, M. (1997). The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
4 Weiss, C. H. 1973. "Where Politics and Evaluation Research Meet." American Journal of 
Evaluation 14(1):93-106. 
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role of those actors involved in the use or deployment of evaluation processes 
and findings is analysed. The focus on the political nature of evaluation in 
healthcare in these countries allows the bringing of new light on the complex 
relationships and interdependencies that dominate the architecture of modern 
governance. It adds to our understanding in terms of the potential gap between 
what might make ‘good policy’, as opposed to what might make ‘good politics’. 
As it is discussed throughout this thesis, the political nature of evaluation has 
been acknowledged by the scholars in the field.5 Evaluation entails the adoption 
of political values that affect its processes and outcomes. However, in the 
practical domain this political nature has been hiding behind the technocratic 
label given to evaluation, seen as an objective and a rational instrument to 
analyse different features of public policy.6 Therefore, it seems relevant to 
uncover the politics imbued in the process of defining the success or failure of a 
policy, as well as in the use, dismissal, or promotion of the outputs of this 
activity. Politics in the context of this thesis refers to the way in which actors use 
their resources and power to influence how evaluation is planned, conducted, 
and disseminated. 
Evaluation as a risk-reduction mechanism and as an aid for accountability 
processes can be located both within and outside the government sphere. 
Internally, evaluation can serve the purpose of verifying and controlling the 
performance of organisations and individuals. Externally, it can provide 
legislative bodies and civil society (predominantly) with an instrument for 
holding the government to account and scrutinising the effectiveness of public 
policy. 
Due to the centrifugal pressures of New Public Management (NPM) reforms, 
governments around the world require more sophisticated tools to obtain 
reliable and objective information about their actions. Evaluation provides a 
                                                        
5 Banner, D. K. 1974. "The politics of evaluation research." Omega 2(6):763-74, Palumbo, D. J. 
1987. The Politics of Program Evaluation. California, US: SAGE, Weiss, C. H. 1973. "Where Politics 
and Evaluation Research Meet." American Journal of Evaluation 14(1):93-106. 
6 This idea relates to the evidence-based policymaking approach, which ‘indicates the continuing 
force of optimism about the potential to achieve social progress through the application of 
reason.’ Sanderson, I. 2002. "Evaluation, Policy Learning and Evidence-Based Policy Making." 
Public Administration 80(1):1-22. P. 19. 
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centripetal pressure that resonates with the idea of ‘filling in’ the ‘hollowing out’ 
and yet there is very little known about evaluation processes and even less 
about the politics of evaluation.7 This idea of the ‘hollowed-out state’ in the 
context of evaluation is relevant because the information derived from this 
activity intends to provide technical knowledge for improving control and 
diminishing risk.8 The potential application of evaluation tools demands a more 
detailed analysis in terms of politics because its outputs can be perceived by 
stakeholders as either an aid or a threat to their agendas. Therefore, the 
implementation of evaluation systems may imply the establishment of 
adversarial relationships among stakeholders as a result of the conditions 
needed for the functioning of these systems, i.e. cooperation, negotiation, 
resources, or control. 
This thesis is based on the argument that the institutional framework 
established for evaluation limits the way in which politics influences the 
process. The rules and procedures underpinning evaluation can predict and to 
some extent shape the behaviour of the actors involved. The study of two 
different scenarios reveals how different institutional arrangements may 
produce a different configuration of power, e.g. by allowing an actor a privileged 
position in the control of the process. 
The core finding of this research is that the hidden politics of evaluation 
matters because of the way in which the institutional framework provides 
actors with spaces of discretion that allow them to influence the process 
and outcomes of evaluation. In the UK, for example, the institutional 
framework provides government ministries with an important amount of 
discretion for the evaluation of their policies and it favours the participation of 
                                                        
7 ‘Hollowing-out’ refers to the idea ‘that government is losing its ability to govern because of 
increasing domination by autonomous, self- organising policy networks.’ Taylor, A. (2000). 
Hollowing out or filling in? Taskforces and the management of cross-cutting issues in British 
government. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 2(1), 46-71. P. 46.  
8 ‘Filling in’ the ‘hollowing out’ of the state through policy evaluation can be linked to the idea 
that ‘governments or other public organisations, like local authorities, have at their disposal a 
toolbox that allows them to deploy different instruments in various combinations for the 
circumstances they face, the state or public authority gives those in office a set of facilities other 
actors do not have.’ John, P. (2011). Making Policy Work. New York, U.S.:Routledge. P. 7. 
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external actors in the process.9 In this case, it is also possible to identify a strong 
audit system with which work is perceived as legitimate and highly influential 
in the debate about the effectiveness of government.10 In contrast, the Mexican 
case is characterised by an excessively centralised evaluation policy, with which 
the Federal Government exercises control over core elements of the process. 
This seems to interfere with the objectivity and independence of this activity, 
particularly in a context in which evaluation has been given a legitimising 
function. The research findings suggest that although the institutional 
framework can determine rules and procedures for the interaction of 
stakeholders, discretionary spaces found in this framework are used for 
pursuing particular agendas. The implication of this core finding is that it is not 
only impossible to depoliticise evaluation, but it is also undesirable. As is argued 
in this thesis, politics may be either a positive or negative force for evaluation 
that needs to be acknowledged, understood, and integrated into its rationale in 
a more open manner; the hidden politics of evaluation needs to be brought into 
the open to foster its utility as a governance tool. 
1.1 What? The Focus of this Research 
Public policy can be understood as ‘a statement by government – at whatever 
level – of what it intends to do about a public problem.’11 It entails the use and 
allocation of public resources and the development of different actions to 
address problems that affect society.12 In most cases, these decisions will 
benefit a large section of society, while other sectors of the population might be 
neglected due to the intended or unintended effects of a policy.13 As a result, the 
analysis of public policy has emerged as a sub-discipline of political science that 
studies the different activities undertaken by governments. 
                                                        
9 The Evaluation of Nurse and Pharmacist Independent Prescribing, for example, comprised the 
development of a multi-stakeholder workshop ‘to consider and prioritise the preliminary study 
findings and implications’, while it also involved a survey to 358 pharmacist independent 
prescribers. See: Department of Health. 2011a. "Evaluation of nurse and pharmacist 
independent prescribing." London, UK.  
10 Talbot, C., and J. Wiggan. 2010. "The public value of the National Audit Office." International 
Journal of Public Sector Management 23(1):54-70. 
11 Birkland, T. A. 2011. An Introduction to the Policy Process: Theories, Concepts, and Models of 
Public Policy Making. New York, US: M.E. Sharpe. P. 9. 
12 Miyakawa, T. 1999. The Science of Public Policy. London, UK: Routledge. 
13 See: Weimer, D. L., and Vining, A. R. (2004). Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice (4th ed.). 
New Jersey, U.S.: Pearson Prentice Hall. 
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As one of the stages of the policy process, evaluation aims to assess different 
aspects of public policy, such as its impact, its cost-effectiveness, and its results. 
As Picciotto states, ‘evaluation determines the merit, worth and value of things 
[…] it consists in collecting relevant evidence, identifying suitable evaluative 
standards and using methods of analysis that are valid and fair.’14 It represents a 
tool of governance that allows stakeholders to cope with the political pressures 
found in the public sector, both in terms of policy improvement as well as for 
accountability purposes.15 Evaluation can provide elements to oversee and 
control public organisations, to promote coordination within the public sector, 
and to establish clear criteria for defining the success or failure of a policy. 
This PhD thesis is located within the field of policy analysis and, more 
specifically, within evaluation studies. Its main purpose is to contribute to the 
evaluation studies literature by addressing the relationship between evaluation 
and its political context. Reflecting on this topic allows understanding the 
potential uses that actors can make of evaluation to pursue their interests. 
Politicians, for example, can find in evaluation a valuable asset for them ‘to claim 
credit and avoid blame from voters.’16 Nonetheless, the analysis of the hidden 
politics of evaluation is not constrained to the political use of findings. As 
discussed in this thesis, the political influence that actors can exercise over the 
evaluation process will depend on their agenda, the resources at their disposal, 
and the rules established for the performance of this activity. 
The political nature of evaluation needs to be studied in more detail for different 
reasons. The conditions in which evaluations are designed and implemented are 
underpinned by the values defended by the actors that control totally or 
partially the process, but what does the hidden politics of evaluation imply? In the 
first place, politics demands looking at the way in which power is disseminated 
among actors involved in evaluation. This refers, for example, to how politicians, 
                                                        
14 Picciotto, R. (2005). Policy Coherence and Development Evaluation: Issues and Possible 
Approaches Fostering Development in a Global Economy. A Whole of Government Perspective. 
Paris, France: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. P. 4. 
15 Peters, B. G. 2015. Advanced Introduction to Public Policy. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
16 Hood, C. 2002. "The Risk Game and the Blame Game." Government and Opposition 37(1):15-37. 
P. 17. 
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operators, and evaluators exercise their power to shape the way in which policy 
is assessed. This allocation of power can be perceived in how resources are 
applied and how rules and procedures are established. Undeniably, evaluation is 
underpinned by a political logic, because as Weiss stated, policies are political 
constructions.17 Nonetheless, in practice the politicisation of evaluation is 
frequently disguised behind technocratic, rational, and objective dimensions 
associated with it. As discussed in Chapter 2, the recognition of the political 
nature of evaluation does not seem to be acknowledged (at least not explicitly) 
in the establishment of arrangements and conditions for the performance of this 
activity, even though political relationships influence the conduction of this 
activity. 
Another important issue to highlight are the conditions that the institutional 
framework establishes for actors to exercise their power. Not only the rules, 
procedures, and institutions set for evaluation are the results of political 
arrangements, but also the outcomes of these agreements will also define the 
extent to which actors can participate, i.e. selecting programmes to evaluate. 
From this perspective, the understanding of the relationship between 
evaluation and politics can be summarised in two major points: 
 Politics can be understood as the way in which actors involved in evaluation 
can exercise their power and resources to shape the process according to their 
interests. 
 Despite the acknowledgement of the political component of evaluation, in 
practice there is little recognition of how the set of rules established for 
evaluation is affected by the political interests of the actors involved in this 
process. 
Evaluation might affect the interests of multiple stakeholders. Consequently, the 
allocation of power for deciding how evaluation is designed and implemented 
can be subject to political struggles for the prioritisation of those issues that are 
particularly relevant for a group, i.e. efficiency. Moreover, evaluation outputs 
can influence key political decisions such as the allocation of funding, the 
continuity of a programme, or the designation of a public officer. This gives 
evaluation an important leverage in the public sector, and a positive or negative 
evaluation can therefore become a weapon for political purposes. 
                                                        
17 Weiss, C. H. 1973. "Where Politics and Evaluation Research Meet." American Journal of 
Evaluation 14(1):93-106. 
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This thesis discusses the relationship between the political nature of evaluation 
and the institutional framework. This is understood to be the set of rules 
defined for the performance of evaluation that influence how power and 
resources are allocated, as well as the interaction among stakeholders. The 
actors that have access to the definition of these rules have a privileged position 
in relation to others. For instance, evaluation commissioners have the 
prerogative to define how an evaluation will be conducted and the methods that 
will be used. 
The major purpose of this research is to generate new knowledge to fill the gap 
between evaluation on the one hand, and politics on the other by addressing 
three main elements: 
 The areas of the evaluation process susceptible to political influence 
 The manifestation of the political nature of evaluation in the empirical context 
 The effect of the institutional framework in the political relationships that are 
established as a consequence of evaluation 
Although the focus of this thesis is on evaluation, auditing is also considered a 
relevant object of study because of its role as a control/scrutiny mechanism, 
particularly at present when its conceptualisation has transcended the financial 
dimension and has become closer to evaluation.18 The theoretical differences 
between ‘audit’ and ‘evaluation’ are more perceivable in terms of scope, 
methods, and rationale.19 According to Leeuw these distinctions are related to 
three major elements: the variables investigated, the methods and techniques 
used and the underlying concept of these activities.20 Regarding the variables 
investigated, auditing ‘emphasizes the process of checking or verifying records 
to find out whether they are consistent with agreed-upon standards.’21 
Evaluations instead focus on ‘goal achievement and the intended and 
unintended side effects of policies and programs.’22 
                                                        
18 Pollitt, C., and H. Summa. 1996. "Performance Audit and Evaluation: Similar Tools, Different 
Relationships?" New Directions for Evaluation 1996(71):29-50. 
19. See: Chelimsky, E. Ibid."Auditing and Evaluation: Whither the Relationship?":61-67.  
20 Leeuw, F. L. Ibid."Auditing and Evaluation: Bridging a Gap, Worlds to Meet?":51-60. 
21 Brooks, R. A. Ibid."Blending two cultures: State legislative auditing and evaluation."15-28. P. 
16. 
22 Leeuw, F. L. Ibid."Auditing and Evaluation: Bridging a Gap, Worlds to Meet?":51-60. P. 51. 
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The methods used in auditing are predominantly financial, such as cost-benefit 
analysis or value for money (VFM) studies23, while evaluation has been 
supported by the use of social research methods for its development.24 Finally, 
it might be in the rationale of both activities when the most notorious 
differences arise: 
Auditing, conceived as an accounting instrument, focuses 
fundamentally on the processes and on the verification of a series of 
criteria within an established analytical framework, highlighting the 
deviations found and providing information about the non-
compliance of the norms and the relationship between activities and 
resources. Evaluation, on the other hand, has focused its attention on 
the results of programmes and policies in the aim of generating 
evidence about their effectiveness.25 
Making this distinction clear at this point is necessary because the findings 
derived from these activities are useful for identifying the pertinence of the 
decisions and actions taken in the context of policymaking. Moreover, both the 
process and the outputs of evaluation and auditing are susceptible to political 
influence. Looking at how these instruments interact in the practical domain is 
important because its integration or dissociation will impact on the overall 
effect of control mechanisms in the public sector and on its vulnerability to 
political influence. 
In the context of the 21st Century, the study of the politics of evaluation is crucial 
for observing the extent to which the state has become smarter by not only 
taking advantage of the managerial and political benefits that both audit and 
evaluation offer, but also by being able to address the potential challenges that 
politics represents for the adoption of these instruments.26 
                                                        
23 Chelimsky, E. 1985. "Comparing and Contrasting Auditing and Evaluation: Some Notes on 
their Relationship." Evaluation Review 9(4):483-503. 
24 Shaw, I., J. C. Greene, and M. M. Mark. 2006. Handbook of Evaluation: Policies, Programs and 
Practices. London, UK: SAGE. 
25 Gris Legorreta, P. C. 2013. "Auditoría y Evaluación: ¿Hacia un tercer enfoque?" XIII Certamen 
Nacional de Ensayo Sobre Fiscalización y Rendición de Cuentas. P. 56. 
26 The use of evaluation and performance monitoring information in the public sector has been 
an important initiative of international organisations such as the WB, the IADB and the OECD. 
See Curristine, T., Z. Lonti, and I. Joumard. 2007. "Improving Public Sector Efficiency: Challenges 
and Opportunities " OECD Journal on Budgeting 7(1):1-42. 
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1.1.1 Research Questions and Hypothesis 
The core question at the heart of this thesis is therefore: What is the relationship 
between the political nature of evaluation and its institutional framework? 
The hypothesis proposed in this thesis is that the institutional framework can 
affect the degree of political influence in policy evaluation and the consequences 
for the utility and legitimacy of this activity. Decisions and actions taken in the 
context of the evaluation are subject to the political influence of those key actors 
participating in this process. They are not only involved in the development of 
evaluations and the use and dissemination of findings, but also in the 
establishment of rules and procedures that shape their behaviour in the context 
of this activity. The relevance of the core theme of this thesis is that it allows 
understanding how different institutional arrangements for evaluation lead to 
different outcomes, e.g. how rules defined for the commissioning of evaluations 
affect the level of discretion that evaluators have for their task. The nuances of 
this hypothesis are addressed in detail by looking at how health policy is 
evaluated in two different contexts. 
The political arrangements that take place during evaluation may be promoted 
or limited by the boundaries established by the institutional framework. This 
concerns its potential as input for the political discussion and for the 
construction of arguments. Changes in the way in which public organisations 
deliver services can also be shaped by the evidence provided by evaluation. It 
can be conceived as a tool of governance to support the position of stakeholders 
in a context in which political values and beliefs are constantly in conflict. While 
evidence ‘helps policymakers make better decisions, and achieve better 
outcomes…’27 the use of evaluation has not always derived a successful outcome 
because there are organisational, political, and managerial variables that might 
have influence.28 For this reason, understanding the role of politics in evaluation 
can generate new knowledge about why sometimes evaluation findings are not 
                                                        
27 Davies, P. 2012. "The State of Evidence-Based Policy Evaluation and its Role in Policy 
Formation." National Institute Economic Review 219(1):R41-R52. P. R42. 
28 Jones, H. 2012. "Promoting evidence-based decision-making in development agencies." 
Overseas Development Institute. 
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reflected as better policies or greater accountability.29 
The research question represents a general guideline for the development of 
this thesis; nonetheless, to reach a more specific level of analysis it is necessary 
to disaggregate it into more operational elements (Table 1.1). These questions 
will be addressed through a thematic framework proposed for the analysis of 
the politics of evaluation (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2). The development of 
secondary questions highlights the relevance of the institutional framework in 
relation to the political nature of evaluation processes. The linkage between the 
secondary questions is based on the identification of key elements of the 
evaluation process that can bring new light to the study of the political nature of 
evaluation. This refers, for example, to the characteristics of evaluation 
instruments, the resources available for evaluation, the utility perceived by 
stakeholders, and the conflicts that arise between the administrative and 
political dimensions of evaluation. 
                                                        
29 It is possible to find in the literature several critiques to the evidence-based policymaking 
approach in relation to its incapacity to promote better outcomes in government. See for 
example: Greenhalgh, T., and J. Russell. 2009. "Evidence-Based Policymaking: A Critique." 
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 52(2):304-18, Marston, G., and R. Watts. 2003. "Tampering 
With the Evidence: A Critical Appraisal of Evidence-Based Policy-Making." The Drawing Board: 
An Australian Review of Public Affairs 3(3):143-63. 
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Table 1.1 Secondary Research Questions to Explore the Hidden Politics of Evaluation 
Key 
Variables 
Six Secondary Research 
Questions 
Relevance Section of the 
thesis in which 
the question will 
addressed 
Institutions 
1. Are there efficient 
institutional frameworks that 
assure an effective 
assessment of public policy? 
The institutional framework in which an evaluation policy is 
implemented defines not only the general premises that need to be 
followed, but also the expected use of the evaluation results and the 
actors responsible and accountable for this activity. 
See sections 4.1 
and 5.1 
Values 
2. Which values are promoted 
by the different stakeholders 
involved in evaluation? How 
do these values interact? 
As a political activity, evaluation is underpinned by different values 
(e.g. economy, efficiency), it seems relevant to identify them and 
understand how these interact in an arena where multiple 
stakeholders intervene and values might be in conflict. 
See sections 4.2 -
4.3 and 5.2-5.3 
Outputs 
3. Does the evaluation policy, 
in both countries produce (in 
a systematic way) relevant 
and convenient information 
that can be used for the 
policymaking process? 
One way to identify the political influence of evaluation is to analyse 
the kind of results it generates. By studying and comparing the 
outputs of evaluation it will be possible to understand if it produces 
objective information or if there can be identified biased results that 
might favour the interests of stakeholders. 
See sections 6.1 
and 6.2 
Outcomes 
4. When the outputs of 
evaluation are used, is there 
any effect on the 
improvement of 
policymaking? 
The ultimate goal of evaluation is to produce knowledge that can be 
used in the policymaking process; however, the political interests of 
the stakeholders of evaluation might determine its use or misuse. 
See section 6.3 
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Table 1.1 Continued 
Key 
Variables 
Six Secondary Research 
Questions 
Relevance Section of the 
thesis in which 
the question will 
addressed 
Culture 
5. Which is the role of policy 
evaluation in order to 
consider it useful for the 
policymaking process? 
After analysing the different areas in which it can be identified the 
influence of politics in evaluation, it is relevant to discuss the role of 
evaluation in a context of political pressures and of opposed interests, 
particularly with the purpose of formulating recommendations for 
strengthening the policymaking process. 
See section 7.3 
Politics 
6. In terms of ‘good policy’ 
and ‘good politics’, which of 
these issues predominate in 
the evaluation agenda of both 
countries? 
The political influence in policy evaluation has an effect on the use of 
the evaluation findings, therefore, it is important to identify in which 
extent this influence has conditioned the utility of evaluation in both 
case studies. 
See section 7.1 
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1.1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
To address the research questions of this thesis it is important to describe its 
structure and the general content of the seven chapters (Table 1.1). The first 
chapter is an introduction in which the main topics of the thesis are presented; 
the scope and the core questions that will guide the development of the thesis 
are established. The second chapter is dedicated to the theoretical framework. It 
presents the state of the art in relation to the analysis of governance, public 
policy, and evaluation studies. This framework allows the identifying of the 
most relevant discussions found in the literature for the study of the politics of 
evaluation. The transformations that have occurred within the structure of the 
state have fostered the development of new control mechanisms in which 
evaluation processes play an important role. Consequently, it is important to 
understand how the political nature of evaluation relates to the new processes 
of governance, and more importantly, how the politicisation of evaluation affects 
its role as a mechanism of control in policymaking and accountability processes. 
The third chapter establishes the methodological framework of the research. It 
describes the tools implemented, the justification of the cases selected, and the 
possible limitations that need to be considered when looking at the findings. 
The methodology applied in this research is particularly relevant because of the 
intangibility of politics. The identification of key variables to study this 
phenomenon allows a more structured grasping of the areas of the evaluation 
process by which politics can influence the way stakeholders can shape this 
process. The fourth chapter focuses on the description of the UK evaluation 
system to make explicit the legal and organisational framework in which this 
activity occurs. It focuses on the process for evaluating and auditing public 
policy, programmes, and organisations. This chapter also describes the case 
studies selected for the UK: the Cancer Strategy and the Care-Quality 
Commission (CQC). The fifth chapter replicates this description for the Mexican 
case and the selected case studies: the Integral Quality Health System 
Programme (SICALIDAD) and the Health Caravans Programme. 
The sixth chapter presents the analysis of the four case studies guided by the 
thematic framework outlined in Chapter 2 for uncovering the hidden politics of 
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evaluation. This chapter compares and contrasts the evaluation process in both 
countries, taking into consideration the rules, i.e. governance, established for 
this purpose. 
The final chapter is dedicated to the presentation of the conclusions and the 
formulation of policy recommendations. The latter concerns fundamentally the 
strategies and mechanisms to strengthen the linkage between evaluation and 
policymaking, formulated on the basis of the empirical findings produced by this 
thesis. These recommendations identify the different roles that the stakeholders 
of evaluation should play to build a solid system that produces reliable feedback 
for policymaking. It presents the conclusions of both the theoretical and 
empirical analysis and it outlines the parameters of a future research agenda. 
1.2 Why? The Purpose and Claims for Distinctiveness 
The importance of a PhD thesis relies on its capacity to expand the existing 
knowledge in a particular field through the generation of new information 
(theoretical and empirical) that can contribute to the comprehension of 
different social phenomena. Considering that the study of the hidden politics of 
evaluation is an area of the evaluation studies field that has been little explored 
from an empirical approach, in contrast to other topics in the field, this thesis is 
pertinent in terms of analysing its implications for the theoretical and practical 
contexts. Although since the late seventies different scholars have 
acknowledged the political nature of evaluation, research about this topic has 
been mostly limited to the analysis of the political pressures that evaluators face 
and the way they respond to these.30 The overall impact of evaluation as a 
mechanism for political legitimation and control of the policymaking process 
has not received much attention. 
Two elements are worth highlighting in terms of the originality and 
distinctiveness of this thesis. The first one is that it conceptualises evaluation as 
                                                        
30 See: Hedrick, T. E. 1988. "The Interaction of Politics and Evaluation." American Journal of 
Evaluation 9(3):5-14, Palumbo, D. J. 1987. The Politics of Program Evaluation. California, US: 
SAGE, Weiss, C. H. 1973. "Where Politics and Evaluation Research Meet." American Journal of 
Evaluation 14(1):93-106. 
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a tool for governance that allows stakeholders to cope with the increasing 
demands for accountability, transparency, and effectiveness in a context 
characterised by a fragmented bureaucracy, the delegation of a government’s 
power, and a more intensive participation of external actors. For instance, the 
rising interest of governments in evaluating their policies has represented an 
important source of business for universities, think tanks and consultants.31 
Programme operators are interested in the identification and recognition of the 
goals achieved and ‘in building long-term support for the program.’32 Politicians 
find in evaluation evidence for supporting their decisions.33 This evinces the 
multiple uses that evaluation can have according to the demands and 
requirements of the actors involved.34 
The second issue is that this thesis adopts a more holistic approach to the 
political nature of evaluation by looking at its process and the interaction with 
the institutional framework. This provides two important benefits. On the one 
hand, it transcends the analysis of the hidden politics of evaluation based on the 
perception or experience of particular stakeholders, e.g. evaluators. Instead, it 
aims to present a more integrated analysis of how key elements of evaluation 
can be politically influenced by different stakeholders. On the other hand, it 
reveals how the establishment of rules and procedures for evaluation can shape 
the behaviour of stakeholders. This last point is relevant because the level of 
political influence in the process may have implications for the utility and 
legitimacy of evaluation. 
1.2.1 Motivations of the Research 
The drivers for the development of this research can be synthesised in two main 
motivations. The first one regards my professional development, primarily 
focused on the public sector. As a former official in the Mexican evaluation 
                                                        
31 See: PWC. 2012. "The Business of Evidence. A report prepared for the Market Research 
Society." London, UK. 
32 Weiss, C. H. 1973. "Where Politics and Evaluation Research Meet." American Journal of 
Evaluation 14(1):93-106. 
33 Sanderson, I. 2002. "Evaluation, Policy Learning and Evidence-Based Policy Making." Public 
Administration 80(1):1-22. 
34 Feinstein, O. N. 2002. "Use of Evaluations and the Evaluation of their Use." Evaluation 
8(4):433-39. 
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agency, I identified the potential of evaluation processes to foster change in 
public organisations. At the same time, this experience also allowed me to 
recognise how the acknowledgement and management of the political factor can 
maximise the benefits of evaluation. The second motivation relates to the 
academic perspective. As stated, there are substantial gaps in the knowledge 
about the political nature of evaluation. Consequently, it represents an 
important motivation to contribute to the evaluation studies field by providing 
empirical evidence about the relationship between the politics of evaluation and 
the institutional framework. This research recognises the need for studying this 
phenomenon from an integrated perspective and not merely from the point of 
view of practitioners and evaluators, which although is clearly valuable is 
insufficient for its holistic comprehension. 
This research also aims to feed the discussion with information about the role of 
evaluation as a control and risk-reduction mechanism. Undeniably, political 
institutions around the world are suffering a credibility crisis that has provoked 
a serious disengagement between citizens and political institutions.35 This is 
perceivable in the two countries on which this thesis focuses. According to a 
recent survey, in Mexico 65% of the interviewees declared having a small 
interest in politics.36 The UK presents a similar situation. The latest British 
Social Attitudes survey shows that 64% of the people considered themselves to 
be having either some, not much, or no interest at all in politics.37 This suggests 
that governments need to develop mechanisms to rebuild trust in society and 
that evaluation can play a useful role in the legitimisation of public action. The 
selection of these two contexts provides new insights into how (and why) 
evaluation mechanisms have developed under different institutional 
arrangements and the results that these have produced in the context of 
governance. 
                                                        
35 This represents ‘a major governance problem, reflecting a decline in the legitimacy of 
government and, thus, problems in developing and implementing policy.’ Fawcett, P., and D. 
Marsh. 2014. "Depoliticisation, governance and political participation." Policy & Politics 
42(2):171-88. P. 171. 
36 Secretariat of the Interior. 2012. "Fifth National Survey about Political Culture and Citizen 
Practices." Mexico City. 
37 NatCen Social Research. "British Social Attitudes Survey 32." London, UK. 
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1.2.2 Relevance of the Thesis 
The relevance of this thesis needs to be explicit in order to establish its specific 
contribution to knowledge. This can be summarised by two aspects. 
Theoretically, it is relevant because the institutional conditions that shape the 
way in which the hidden politics of evaluation is manifested have been little 
explored: 
1. Although a large research literature on evaluation studies exists,38 
there has been very little analysis of the relationship between politics 
and politicians, on the one hand, and policy and evaluation mechanisms 
on the other.39 The existing knowledge base has focused on the 
development of strategies for coping with the political context in which 
evaluation takes place.40 
2. Despite the fact that there is large literature on the notions of 
‘hollowing out’ and ‘filling in’ in relation to governance, none of this has 
focused specifically on the issue of evaluation as a potential risk-
reduction mechanism that may contribute to the ‘filling in’ of the 
‘hollowing out’ of the state.41 
3. The effectiveness of policymaking relies on a series of external factors 
other than just the technical capacity of public agencies. The differences 
in the resources at disposal among the actors involved, i.e. politicians, 
operators, can influence the arrangements produced for the design, 
implementation, and evaluation of policies. In this context, this thesis 
will focus on generating new knowledge about the role of politics in the 
use of evaluation as a mechanism for strengthening policymaking and 
accountability, i.e. to what extent evaluation findings provide more 
elements for decision-making. 
4. The case study comparison will provide evidence about how 
institutional frameworks influence the results obtained from the 
                                                        
38 See Contandriopoulos, D., and A. Brousselle. 2012. "Evaluation models and evaluation use." 
Evaluation 18(1):61-77, Cunill-Grau, N., and S. M. Ospina. 2012. "Performance measurement and 
evaluation systems: Institutionalizing accountability for governmental results in Latin America." 
New Directions for Evaluation 2012(134):77-91, Weiss, C. H. 1998a. Evaluation: Methods for 
Studying Programs and Policies. UK. 
39 For example, The SAGE Handbook of Governance that contains the most relevant 
contemporary discussions about governance does not include policy evaluation as a topic of 
discussion. Bevir, M. (Ed.). (2011). The SAGE Handbook of Governance. London, UK: SAGE. 
40 See Mohan, R., and K. Sullivan. 2006. "Managing the Politics of Evaluation to Achieve Impact." 
New Directions for Evaluation 2006(112):7-23. Bovens, M., P. 't Hart, and S. Kuipers. 2006. "The 
Politics of Policy Evaluation." in The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, edited by M. Moran, M. 
Rein, and R. E. Goodin. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, Datta, L. E. 2011. "Politics and 
Evaluation: More Than Methodology." American Journal of Evaluation 32(2):273-94, Guenther, J., 
E. Williams, and A. Arnott. 2010. "The politics of evaluation: evidence-based policy or policy-
based evidence?" in NARU Public Seminar Series. Darwin, Australia. 
41 See Holliday, I. 2000. "Is the British State Hollowing Out?" The Political Quarterly 71(2):167-
76, Rhodes, R. A. W. 1994. "The Hollowing Out of the State: The Changing Nature of the Public 
Service in Britain." Ibid.65:138-51, ibid., Taylor, D. 2005. "Governing Through Evidence: 
Participation and Power in Policy Evaluation." Journal of Social Policy 34(04):601-18. 
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adoption of evaluation systems. 
5. Finally, the focus on evaluation studies offers a lens through which an 
examination may be made of evaluation studies in Mexico and the UK 
that may help underline the value of governance as a conceptual 
framework. 
In terms of empirical evidence, this thesis focuses on the implications of the 
hidden politics of evaluation in the relationships between stakeholders in a 
particular context. This can provide information about elements that can foster 
its utilisation, not only for the improvement of policy, but also for the 
development of arguments vis-à-vis the political debate. Some other identifiable 
empirical contributions are: 
1. Evidence about the influence of stakeholders in the development of 
evaluation tools, which are not value-free and can predetermine the 
results. 
2. Evidence about the role of sponsors and commissioners of evaluation 
and the consequences for independence and objectivity. 
3. Information about the market of evaluators, the incentives created by 
these markets and their effect on the quality and reliability of 
evaluation studies. 
4. Evidence about the political use of evaluation, e.g. the manipulation of 
evaluation results, the use of evaluation results for attacking or 
discrediting political adversaries, the non-utilisation of evaluation 
results in the policymaking process due to political reasons, and its 
connection to the institutional framework. 
5. Identification of variables associated with the institutional framework 
that influences the politics of evaluation can serve as a basis for the 
discussion of its role in the political debate about the effectiveness of 
public policy. 
The comparison and contrasting of two different evaluation processes can bring 
new light on the nexus between evaluation and politics and explain why this 
occurs. On the one hand, the UK case is paradigmatic in the sense that NPM 
reforms emphasised the values of efficiency and efficacy in the public sector 
although the adoption of evaluation tools has been inconsistent across time. On 
the other hand, the main outputs of the Mexican evaluation policy are an 
interesting element of analysis as the Federal Government has devoted 
important efforts to the institutionalisation of this practice, but little attention 
has been given to its actual contribution. This raises questions about whether 
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evaluation in this country has permeated the rationale of public organisations 
or if it has been adopted as another centrally imposed management tool. The 
specific characteristics of these cases are an additional motivation for the 
performance of this research, which is described in more detail in the next 
section. 
1.3 How? Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
Although both theoretical and methodological frameworks are explained in 
detail (see Chapters 2 and 3) it is important to briefly introduce their general 
content. The identification and analysis of the body of knowledge about the 
hidden politics of evaluation and the process undertaken for the obtaining of 
empirical evidence are crucial for contextualising the findings obtained. 
1.3.1 Generalities of the Theoretical Framework 
The literature comprises the existing knowledge about a specific topic that 
enables the development of new theories. In order for this thesis to represent a 
theoretically informed and a policy-relevant document, it is important to make 
explicit the linkages between theory and research. 
The theoretical framework of this research is based on three pillars: (1) 
governance, (2) public policy, and (3) evaluation studies, which when combined 
provide a structured approach to the hidden politics of evaluation. Governance 
as ‘the new method by which society is governed’42 is useful for grasping the 
different transformations that the state has suffered lately, not only in its 
nature, but also in the appearance of new actors participating in the public 
sphere.43 The connection with the use of evaluation tools regards the need of 
governments for mechanisms of control and legitimisation of public action. This 
gave evaluation a new meaning because, as Taylor argues, ‘From being a 
contingent instrument of administration, evaluation has become a central 
legitimating device for a new form of politics.’44 Under these conditions, 
                                                        
42 Rhodes, R. A. W. 2007. "Understanding Governance: Ten Years On." Organization Studies 
28(8):1243-64. P. 1246. 
43 Moran, M. 2003. The British Regulatory State: High Modernism and Hyper-innovation. Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press. 
44 Taylor, D. 2005. "Governing Through Evidence: Participation and Power in Policy Evaluation." 
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evaluation has become a mechanism for governments to regain control through 
the establishment of indicators, evaluation criteria, and methods for their 
policies. The knowledge developed within the evaluation studies field generates 
the required tools for a clearer comprehension of its potential uses in the public 
sector. This thesis aims to provide a broader panorama by focusing on 
governance as a new paradigm that acknowledges the participation of non-
governmental actors and new configurations of power.45 In this context, 
evaluation can be perceived as a mechanism to respond to the government 
crises that have led to the transformation of the state. 
The main link between these bigger socio-political shifts and the core of this 
research is that the changes that governments face have promoted the 
development and adoption of mechanisms to overcome these new challenges. 
Policy evaluation sits as a tool directed to improve different areas of public 
policy. These linkages between theory and research can be summarised as 
follows: 
1. Governance implies the presence of ‘inter-organizational networks by 
interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game and significant 
autonomy from the state.’46 Governments do not take unilateral decisions; 
hence, there is a strong need to legitimate public action. Evaluation, as an 
instrument for generating evidence about the effectiveness of the public action, 
serves this legitimisation purpose, not only through discursive methods, but 
also by providing theoretically ‘objective’ evidence about the government’s 
accomplishments. 
2. The politicisation of evaluation in the context of the policy process needs to be 
analysed from an empirical perspective by looking at its effects on the planning 
and execution of evaluation, as well as on the use of its findings. 
3. The use given to evaluation findings is subject to the political influence of the 
stakeholders of evaluation. Thus, it seems relevant to look at the perennial 
debate between ‘good policy’ and ‘good politics’ in the context of the two 
selected countries. 
4. Finally, the hidden politics of policy evaluation as the core of this research is a 
factor of the policy process that the theory has only partially explored. This 
research aims to focus on those areas in which there is political influence, as 
well as to identify the positive outcomes of acknowledging the political nature 
of evaluation. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Journal of Social Policy 34(04):601-18. P. 602. 
45 Cabrero, E., and Nava, G. (Eds.). (1999). Gerencia Pública Municipal: Conceptos Básicos y 
Estudios de Caso. México, D.F.: Miguel Ángel Porrúa-CIDE. 
46 Rhodes, R. A. W. 1997. Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and 
Accountability. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press. P. 15. 
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1.3.2 Overview of the Methodology 
The elusiveness of the political factor existing in evaluation highlights the need 
for methodological tools that can capture the influence of contextual variables 
and the interaction of different stakeholders in the process.47 Recently, there 
has been an important effort from scholars to explain how politics can threaten 
evaluation in terms of its integrity. It has been acknowledged that conditions of 
independence and impartiality need to be preserved in order for evaluation to 
be considered credible and robust.48 However, the political component of 
evaluation implies a broader range of considerations that concern the level of 
influence that different actors have in the process and outcomes of evaluation.49 
The development of a comparative study based on a qualitative approach will 
allow making inferences about the political nature of evaluation in two contexts 
in which evaluation is ruled by different procedures and institutions, i.e. the 
existence of a central agency devoted to the evaluation vis-à-vis a model when 
government departments adopt this function. The focus of the research is the 
comparison of four case studies (two per country) that belong to the health 
sector. The main purpose is to study a set of variables—purpose, resources, 
process, outputs, and outcomes—to explore the influence of the institutional 
framework in the politics of evaluation. The main tool for obtaining evidence, 
aside from documentary analysis, is the performance of circa 40 semi-
structured interviews to stakeholders of evaluation. 
An important point to discuss in this introduction is the rationale for the 
selection of the case studies. Different institutional arrangements have shaped 
the way in which evaluation systems are developed and implemented in both 
countries, which are the result of their particular political and administrative 
conditions.50 Mexico, as an emergent democracy, offers an interesting 
                                                        
47 See Schwartz, R. (1998). The Politics of Evaluation Reconsidered. Evaluation, 4(3), 294-309.  
48 Lipsky, D. B., R. L. Seeber, A. C. Avgar, and R. M. Scanza. 2007. "Managing the Politics of 
Evaluation: Lessons from the Evaluation of ADR Programs." Pp. 116-29 in Proceedings of the Fift-
Ninth Annual Meeting of the Labor and Employment Relations Association. 
49 This can be observed in the level of influence that operators can have in the selection of 
methods. See: Chelimsky, E. 2012. "Valuing, Evaluation Methods, and the Politicization of the 
Evaluation Process." New Directions for Evaluation 2012(133):77-83. 
50 Appendix A provides an overview about the main differences between the political systems of 
these countries. 
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perspective of how the use of evaluation tools has been crucial for the 
establishment of political balance. The promotion of evaluation in this country 
has been linked to the need for institutionalising these efforts within the Federal 
Government.51 The case of the UK provides a different lens, through which the 
role of evaluation in policymaking and for accountability in the context of a 
more developed and stable democracy may be understood.52 Although the 
socio-political differences between these countries are not the focus of this 
thesis, it is important to understand how rules and institutions operate for the 
performance of evaluations. An interesting issue, for instance, is looking at the 
relationship between the audit institutions in these countries and the legislative 
body.53 
The selection of cases within the health sector responds to the fact that there is 
an important range of evaluation outputs susceptible to analysis. In both 
countries, health and education are among the most developed policy areas in 
terms of evaluation.54 Regardless of how policy is implemented in each country, 
these cases allow the observation of how health policy is evaluated and how 
‘success’ is defined. Also, the values that guide evaluation, the constraints 
imposed by the institutional framework, and the use given to findings are 
interesting variables to contrast between countries. 
In terms of the methodological process, this research can be divided into three 
main phases. The first one was the construction of the theoretical framework 
that required bibliographical research to identify the most relevant concepts 
that sustain the hypothesis. This stage allowed operationalising the concept of 
                                                        
51 Castro, M. F., G. Lopez-Acevedo, G. Beker Busjeet, and X. Fernandez-Ordonez. 2009. "Mexico's 
M&E System: Scaling Up from the Sectoral to the National Level." Washington, D.C., US: The 
World Bank. 
52 Heady, F. 2001. Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective. New York, US: Marcel 
Dekker. 
53 The case of the UK was studied by the OECD who describes the relationship between the NAO 
and the PAC. See: OECD. 2002. "Relations Between Supreme Audit Institutions and 
Parliamentary Committees." in Sigma Papers. 
54 In the case of the UK, for example, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) 
and the Education Endowment Foundation (EEF) are organisations directed to generate 
evidence for policymaking. In the Mexican case, health and education sector are also prominent 
areas where evaluation is an important asset. The National Institute of Public Health (INSP, its 
acronym in Spanish) and the National Institute for the Evaluation of Education (INEE, its 
acronym in Spanish) are constantly producing evidence to inform public decision. 
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evaluation in key variables for the analysis. In addition, it involved the 
characterisation of the institutional framework for evaluation operating in both 
countries. The second phase comprised the collection and systematisation of 
data, through documentary analysis and interviews. The last phase was the 
analysis of the data that allowed observing the influence of politics in the 
evaluation process. Here, case studies were compared through the lenses of the 
thematic framework proposed in this thesis. 
This overview of the theoretical and methodological framework shows that the 
core of the research concerns the institutional framework and the political 
nature of evaluation. The nuances of this discussion will be illustrated through 
the findings obtained from the case studies and their relation to the theory. The 
next chapter is dedicated to the development of the theoretical framework by 
looking at key elements of the literature about governance, public policy, and 
evaluation studies.  
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Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework 
This chapter presents the most relevant theoretical discussions about the 
hidden politics of evaluation that sustain the core argument of this thesis. The 
connection between evaluation and politics demands a broader development 
than the one found in the evaluation studies field.55 It requires widening the 
perspective to elucidate how evaluation has gained relevance in the reform of 
the public sector and in the transformations of the state. This literature review 
addresses three major arguments: 
1. The transition from government to governance promoted the 
adoption of monitoring, evaluation, and audit systems to 
strengthen policymaking and to support accountability by giving 
stakeholders more elements to participate in the political arena, 
e.g. by promoting changes, preserving the status quo, etc. 
2. The second argument concerns the role of these activities as an 
aid for stakeholders to interact in a context of uncertainty and 
limited resources. 
3. Both evaluation and auditing are underpinned by a political logic 
that neither can nor should be ignored, as it affects both the 
process and the outputs of these activities. 
This theoretical framework relies on three pillars: governance, public policy, 
and evaluation studies. The first section is dedicated to the key discussions of 
governance, public policy, and underlining the linkage between evaluation and 
performance management. The second section presents the theoretical grounds 
of evaluation and its institutionalisation. The final part discusses the existing 
knowledge about the political nature of evaluation. This chapter aims to 
highlight the way in which the political context fits into the transforming 
processes of the modern state and how it has promoted evaluation as a 
mechanism for strengthening decision-making, reducing uncertainty, 
controlling risk, and legitimising public action. 
2.1 Governance, Public Policy, and Performance Management 
The purpose of this section is to tease out those elements of governance, public 
policy, and performance management that relate to the hidden politics of 
evaluation. The central argument of this thesis is that the institutional 
                                                        
55 Palumbo, D. J. 1987. The Politics of Program Evaluation. California, US: SAGE, Weiss, C. H. 1973. 
"Where Politics and Evaluation Research Meet." American Journal of Evaluation 14(1):93-106. 
30 
 
framework affects the way in which politics and evaluation interact. Uncovering 
the hidden politics of evaluation demands taking a step back to identify the role 
of evaluation in governance and, more specifically, within policymaking. 
Evaluation participates in the transformation of the state by providing evidence 
for different stakeholders to act according to their interests, while contributing 
to democratic values such as participation and transparency.56 This 
transformation entails the establishment of new cooperative networks for the 
identification of goals and causal effects of public policy, as it occurs, for 
example, in the different ways in which social programmes benefit people.57 
Beyond its merely instrumental use, there are important consequences to 
acknowledge about evaluation systems. In a context in which governments have 
lost the monopoly of public action, evaluation systems have inevitably affected 
the relationships between participants, specifically in the control over the 
evaluation processes, i.e. between commissioners and evaluators.58 The 
fragmentation of power in the public sphere has fostered the use of evaluation 
to reduce uncertainty and to legitimate public action.59 Considering the 
characteristics of the modern state (reviewed in this section), evaluation plays 
an important role in the development of new configurations of power for 
governments to respond to the demands of stakeholders.60 
2.1.1 Governance 
The term ‘governance’61 explains the transformation of the state due to the 
challenges imposed by the context and its impact ‘on present and future levels 
of human wellbeing, political stability, and democratic vitality.’62 As the need for 
                                                        
56 Stame, N. 2006. "Governance, Democracy and Evaluation." Evaluation 12(1):7-16. 
57 See: Hasenfeld, Y., K. Hill, and D. Weaver. "A Participatory Model for Evaluating Social 
Programs." San Francisco, CA: The James Irvine Foundation. 
58 Themessl-Huber, M. T., and M. A. Grutsch. 2003. "The Shifting Locus of Control in Participatory 
Evaluations." Evaluation 9(1):92-111. 
59 Pollitt, C. 2006. "Performance Information for Democracy: The Missing Link?" Ibid.12:38-55. 
60 House, E. R. Ibid."Democracy and Evaluation."119-27. 
61 See also: Pierre, J., and B. G. Peters. 2000. Governance, Politics and the State. Basingstoke, UK: 
Palgrave Macmillan, Rhodes, R. A. W. 1997. Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, 
Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press, Richards, D., 
and M. J. Smith. 2002. Governance and Public Policy in the United Kingdom. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press. 
62 Duit, A., and V. Galaz. 2008. "Governance and Complexity—Emerging Issues for Governance 
Theory." Governance 21(3):311-35. P. 311. 
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public intervention is dynamic, governments have been forced to adapt 
themselves to new conditions, i.e. economic crises and more active civil society, 
and to rethink how policy is designed, implemented, and evaluated.63 
The transition from government to governance relates to the discussions about 
the role of governments after World War II. For the decades that followed, 
public sectors were ‘increasingly seen as rigid and bureaucratic, expensive and 
inefficient.’64 As a response, a series of reforms of the public sector took place in 
countries like the UK, New Zealand, and Australia,65 the core of which was … 
… to restrain expenditure […] increasing the productivity of public services 
–‘getting more for less’, or raising efficiency […] moulding public services 
more closely in accordance with the convenience and preferences of their 
users […] strengthening ‘transparency’, usually on the assumption that 
transparency is a feature of democratic governance and that more of it 
should strengthen public confidence in the workings of the State.66 
Most of the drivers of these reforms were related to crises of efficiency and 
legitimacy.67 In Mexico, for example, citizens’ perception about corruption 
relates to the legitimisation crisis faced by the state.68 An important component 
of the Federal Government reform plans has been the adoption of instruments 
that could improve the effectiveness of public policy and accountability.69 These 
crises highlighted the need for introducing more rationality into policymaking 
and for new mechanisms of accountability.70 This provoked a shift in the 
conceptualisation of the state,71 in terms of how control mechanisms were 
                                                        
63 Howlett, M. 2000. "Managing the "hollow state": procedural policy instruments and modern 
governance." Canadian Public Administration-Administration Publique Du Canada 43(4):412-31. 
64 Pierre, J., and B. G. Peters. 2000. Governance, Politics and the State. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan. P. 5. 
65 Bevir, M., R. A. W. Rhodes, and P. Weller. 2003. "Traditions of Governance: Interpreting the 
Changing Role of the Public Sector." Public Administration 81(1):1-17. 
66 Pollitt, C. 1999. "The Changing Context." in Performance or compliance?: Performance Audit 
and Public Management in Five Countries, edited by C. Pollitt, X. Girre, J. Londsdale, R. Mul, H. 
Summa, and M. Waerness. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. P. 53-54. 
67 Cabrero, E., and G. Nava (Eds.). 1999. Gerencia Pública Municipal: Conceptos Básicos y Estudios 
de Caso. Mexico City: Miguel Ángel Porrúa-CIDE. 
68 Bailey, J., and P. Paras. 2006. "Perceptions and Attitudes about Corruption and Democracy in 
Mexico." Mexican Studies 22(1):57-82. 
69 Former President Ernesto Zedillo (1995-2000) established the Public Administration 
Modernisation Programme which recognised that Mexican citizens demanded ‘the continuous 
improvement of government services, more transparency and honesty in the government’s 
actions and in the use of public funds, also a more comprehensive accountability process...’ 
"Public Administration Modernisation Programme 1995-2000." Mexico City, Mexico. 
70 The World Bank. 1992. Governance and development. Washington, D.C., US: The World Bank. 
71 Fukuyama, F. 2013. "What Is Governance?" Governance 26(3):347-68. 
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designed and implemented.72 Efficiency became a core value of governance and 
it fostered measures such as administrative simplification, results-oriented 
government, and a focus on outcomes.73 This intended ‘to improve management 
performance by freeing them from centralized controls over the management of 
resources.’74 It also demanded a new configuration of processes within 
government, the establishment of more direct relationships with non-
governmental actors, and the implementation of new models of scrutiny that 
can adapt to this new scenario.75 According to Rhodes, governance … 
… refers to a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new 
process of governing […] It refers to self-organizing, inter-organizational 
networks characterized by interdependence, resource exchange, rules of 
the game and significant autonomy from the state.76 
The core element of this definition is the identification of networks composed 
by new actors that ‘ignore conventional public/private sector boundaries [and] 
link in relations of mutual dependence.’77 This demanded new schemes of 
operation, based on reciprocity and cooperation which gave evaluation a new 
meaning within governance models.78 Under these conditions, private and 
public actors interact in the policy process.79 However, their level of 
engagement varies according to the context. For example, in the UK the British 
Medical Association is constantly approaching the government to make it aware 
of its concerns.80 In contrast, until very recently, the Mexican Federal 
Government has faced more contesting voices in relation to its policies.81 
                                                        
72 Considine, M. 2002. "The End of the Line? Accountable Governance in the Age of Networks, 
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73 Osborne, D., and P. Plastrik. 1998. Banishing Bureaucracy: The Five Strategies for Reinventing 
Government. New York, US: Plume. 
74 Aucoin, P. 2012. "New Political Governance in Westminster Systems: Impartial Public 
Administration and Management Performance at Risk." Governance 25(2):177-99. P. 178. 
75 Johnson, C., and C. Talbot. 2007. "The UK Parliament and performance: challenging or 
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76 Rhodes, R. A. W. 1997. Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and 
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77 Moran, M. 2003. The British Regulatory State: High Modernism and Hyper-innovation. Oxford, 
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78 Hanberger, A. 2006. "Evaluation of and for Democracy." Evaluation 12(1):17-37. 
79 Héritier, A., and D. Lehmkuhl. 2008. "The Shadow of Hierarchy and New Modes of 
Governance." Journal of Public Policy 28(1):1-17. 
80 See for example: ITV News. 2015. "British Medical Association chief warns next government 
against introducing charges on the NHS." London, UK. 
81 A clear example of this was the strong criticism that former president Calderón (2006-2012) 
received in relation to the ‘drug war’ he started and that led to a substantial increasing of the 
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The characteristics of the governance model can also be observed in the 
inclusion of concepts like transparency and accountability, now constantly 
merged in the public discourse.82 Evaluation is seen as a mechanism for giving 
voice to those actors usually marginalised and for opening new spaces for 
debating the effectiveness of public policy.83 The basis on which stakeholders 
can interact, negotiate, and participate have been modified because ‘the 
boundaries between public, private and voluntary sectors became shifting and 
opaque.’84 
Evaluation processes gain importance because of this shift in the role of the 
state. On the one hand, the scarcity of resources and the multiplicity of social 
demands require policymakers and politicians to make decisions based on 
robust and credible evidence.85 On the other hand, the presence of new actors in 
the public dynamics implies establishing new instruments for evaluating the 
results delivered by governments and to hold them accountable.86 
The work of Flinders is useful for making the connection between evaluation 
and governance clearer. This author identifies four core variables that can guide 
this discussion: control, coordination, accountability, and power.87 This 
framework helps grasp the concept of governance, transcending its adoption as 
a pre-established model and seeing it as an evolution of the conceptualisation of 
the public sector.88 Also, it allows highlighting the relevance of the institutional 
framework by looking at the rules for the distribution of responsibilities for the 
conduction of the policy process. 
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84 Rhodes, R. A. W. 2007. "Understanding Governance: Ten Years On." Organization Studies 
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While in the past government was considered a key actor, in governance it 
becomes a player in the political arena, retracted from different spheres of the 
public sector. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) recognises that ‘governments have progressively withdrawn from 
commercial activities, ownership of industries and service provision.’89 This has 
created new spaces of power that have become at dispute with different 
stakeholders. The adoption of more indirect control mechanisms adopted by 
governments resonates with the discussions about depoliticisation. According 
to Flinders and Buller, depoliticisation can be understood as: 
The range of tools, mechanisms and institutions through which politicians can 
attempt to move to an indirect governing relationship and/or seek to persuade the 
demos that they can no longer be reasonably held responsible for a certain issue, 
policy field or specific decision.90 
This does not imply an absence of politics. On the contrary, it refers to the 
adoption of new schemes of organisation that exceed the governmental sphere, 
as it was traditionally conceptualised—rigid and inflexible structures, vertical 
hierarchies, and direct control lines.91 Hay coincides with this position: 
Depoliticisation is not about less politics, but about a displaced and submerged 
politics – a politics occurring elsewhere, typically beyond sites and arenas in which 
it is visible to nonparticipants and hence amenable to public – perhaps even 
democratic – scrutiny.92 
Here, this concept facilitates comprehending how governments exercise control. 
Depoliticisation ‘reduces government responsibility for policy while also leaving 
it less subject to political discretions, deliberations and interventions.’93 
However, as Fawcett and Marsh recognise, there is little notion about how this 
discretion is used and how interests are transformed into inputs and outputs of 
the political process.94 This is pertinent for discussing evaluation in the context 
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of what Wood and Flinders call government depoliticisation.95 Evaluation is 
associated with the application of technical instruments to analyse different 
dimensions of public policy. This technocratic label, in a sense, establishes some 
distance from government and it delegates this function to other stakeholders 
(think tanks, academicians, etc.) who can provide an ‘unbiased’ judgement of 
policy and can—or at least attempt to—reduce the risk of politicisation.96 
The adoption of new mechanisms of governing produces new arrangements 
among stakeholders, in which evaluation and audit can play an important role. 
The obsolescence of traditional control mechanisms is perhaps one of the 
reasons that promoted the rise of these systems.97 The relationship between the 
allocation of resources and the use of incentives, for example, is a scheme 
clearly focused on the measurement of performance.98 This affects the levels of 
control because of the fragmentation of the bureaucratic body, the emergence of 
autonomous agencies and the appearance of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs).99 This decentralisation shows that ‘the government swapped direct for 
indirect controls and central departments are no longer either necessarily or 
invariably the fulcrum of a network.’100 
This can be perceived, for example, in the creation of specialised agencies and 
decentralised bodies.101 According to Talbot, this is the result of public-reform 
trends that impose new challenges in terms of control.102 There is an explicit 
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attempt of decentralising and maintaining some distance between central 
government and key policy areas, despite the linkage being still observable 
through the mechanisms of control adopted, e.g. by giving technical but not 
financial autonomy. Therefore, the boundaries between public and private 
spheres become even more blurred: 
In the last thirty years, the capacity of the state to control or direct society 
and the extent to which institutions of central government retain a 
monopoly on political power have become a much more contested issue 
[…] governance has become the established concept within political science 
which is used to portray the changing nature of the state in recent times.103 
Governance ‘enables […] to understand better the role that non-governmental 
actors play in producing policy outcomes.’104 Evaluation and auditing represent 
control mechanisms through the use of evidence and the establishment of 
criteria for measuring performance, a central element of the NPM approach.105 
As Boardman suggests, governance highlights the relevance of evaluating ‘both 
processes and outcomes’ to have more instruments for decision-making.106 The 
question that arises here is: How should control be allocated in terms of the 
design and implementation of evaluation and audit systems? This means: Who 
will evaluate? Who will be evaluated? Whose criteria will predominate? These are 
all political questions that can be addressed through the establishment of rules 
and agreements, but they require a profound understanding of how these 
systems interact with the political context. 
Coordination can be understood as the capacity of aligning an actor’s behaviour 
towards a desired outcome. In governance, the accomplishment of goals 
depends on the capacity of coordination. Actors are required to interact with 
acknowledging that ‘The image of hierarchical relationship between 
government and citizenry is displaced by the idea of multiple parallel spaces in 
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which power is encountered and negotiated.’107 Actors (with uneven 
capabilities and power) need evidence to sustain their positions and agendas 
and the alignment of their behaviour is difficult to accomplish.108 The means 
through which political goods can be measured demand incorporating the logic 
of multiple stakeholders who require risk-reduction tools to promote these 
agendas, based on robust information.109 
Networks between actors have promoted the discussion about the rise of new 
mechanisms of coordination.110 This leads to reflecting upon how this ‘creates 
tensions between institutions’ new and traditional roles.’111 For example, 
Painter observed that the 2010 Coalition’s reform project was: 
An adaptation to emergent realities of ‘networked community governance’, 
as the centre of gravity moves from state not only to markets but towards 
civil society, a context in which services are increasingly ‘co-produced’ 
through a variety of informal and formal configurations, rather than being 
provided hierarchically through state bureaucracies.112 
 broader spectrum of stakeholders shows how evaluation and auditing relate to 
the identification of results produced by these networks.113 Also, it leads to 
reflecting on their role in the control and implementation of evaluation systems. 
It imposes the challenge of determining the use that will be given to evaluation, 
ranging from a tool for evidence-generation to a central element in the 
construction of the political discourse.114 Cooperation, therefore, regards also 
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the creation of incentives that shape the behaviour of stakeholders. Under this 
idea, evaluation policies require cooperation not only for the implementation of 
evaluation instruments, but also for the use/dissemination of findings and for 
the overall credibility of the system. 
The third variable discussed by Flinders is accountability. This concept has 
provoked the reconfiguration of processes in the logic of politicians and 
practitioners, as well as the use of incentives to shape individuals’ behaviour.115 
Considering the decomposition of the term proposed by Schedler, there are two 
elements of accountability. First, Answerability, seen as the obligation of public 
servants and politicians to inform systematically about their decisions and 
actions. Both in the Executive and Legislative branches, accountability systems 
produce information about the progress made in policymaking and about the 
effective use of public funds. Nonetheless, as Romzek and Dubnick reflected on 
it, the idea of answerability is more complex because it entails coping with the 
expectations created around public organisations.116 
Enforcement, the second element, is the capacity of sanctioning any public 
servant who infringes the law or who does not fulfil his/her obligations.117 
Evaluation, as an instrument for explaining and justifying public action, can be 
susceptible to politics because of this component. Accountability has given 
evaluation a window of opportunity to become more imbued in the logics of 
public organisations.118 At the same time, it imposes the challenge to reflect 
upon the use of evaluation data in accountability systems.119 
Evaluation and audit systems in the context of governance allow ‘framing our 
expectations of government programs, policies, and public services.’120 This 
                                                        
115 For further knowledge about incentives within accountability see: Ackerman, J. M. 2005. 
"Social Accountability in the Public Sector. A Conceptual Discussion." edited by Social 
Development Department. Washington, D.C., US: The World Bank. 
116 Romzek, B. S., and M. J. Dubnick. 1987. "Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons from the 
Challenger Tragedy." Public Administration Review 47(3):227-38. 
117 Schedler, A. 2008. ¿Qué es la rendición de cuentas? Mexico City. 
118 Carman, J. G. 2009. "Nonprofits, Funders, and Evaluation: Accountability in Action." The 
American Review of Public Administration 39(4):374-90. 
119 Benjamin, L. M. 2008. "Evaluator’s Role in Accountability Relationships: Measurement 
Technician, Capacity Builder or Risk Manager?" Evaluation 14(3):323-43. 
120 Chouinard, J. A. 2013. "The Case for Participatory Evaluation in an Era of Accountability." 
American Journal of Evaluation 34(2):237-53. P. 248.  
39 
 
comprises identifying and disseminating the achievements made by public 
organisations, but also the changes that policy has produced in the population, 
e.g. increased quality of life, which can be highly politically profitable. Therefore, 
evaluation can be used for internal purposes, i.e. organisational learning, as well 
as externally, i.e. political recognition.121 
The contribution of evaluation to democracy is linked to its capacity to support 
accountability by providing evidence for informing and justifying actions, and 
also for enlightening the policy process.122 These instruments represent an 
important source of political legitimacy by making explicit commitment to 
democratic values like transparency and accountability, particularly in contexts 
with deficits of credibility and trust in the state.123 
Although governance represents a more fertile ground for the establishment of 
an accountability/evaluation relationship, the institutional framework needs to 
incorporate safeguards that can give legitimacy to this bond by securing the 
conditions for the performance of evaluations, the validity of the methods used, 
and the appropriate dissemination of the findings.124 However, the effectiveness 
of this binomial is not automatic; conflicts may arise because of the different 
nature of these concepts (evaluation and accountability).125 
This finds echoes in Dubnick’s work about ‘the promises of accountability’.126 
According to this author, ‘We cannot – and should not – continue to rely on the 
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assumed relationship between accountability and performance that underlies 
much of the NPM reform agenda.’127 While it is true that evaluation and 
performance systems can be important inputs for accountability, the 
construction of indicators and evaluation tools, the arrangements for the 
conduction of the process, and for the use and dissemination of findings are 
aspects that need to be understood carefully, particularly in terms of how this 
information will allow the identification of responsibilities and the 
establishment of sanctions. The connection between accountability and 
performance, as Dubnick recognises, is an assumption that needs to be studied 
in detail.128 In particular, it is worth reflecting on how evaluation can help 
accountability to keep its promises— borrowing Dubnick’s term.129 This means: 
To what extent can evaluation be a vehicle for generating evidence about a 
government’s performance, by actually producing reliable and useful information? 
And more importantly: How is evaluation data translated into meaningful 
evidence about an organisation or an individual’s performance? Without 
reflecting on this, evaluation’s contribution to accountability faces the risk of 
becoming a purposeless activity. 
Dubnick’s work is also useful for establishing a link between the ‘accountability 
space’ and the ‘evaluation space’.130 Following this author’s ideas, the 
development of relationships between those who claim for evaluation and those 
who are evaluated creates a space of interaction that is susceptible to control. 
This makes sense, for example by looking at the accountability function of 
evaluation. The control of the process of evaluation would be linked to the 
interests of stakeholders in shaping the outputs that will feed into 
accountability systems. As a result, uncovering the hidden politics of evaluation 
implies also identifying how this ‘evaluation space’ is allocated among 
                                                        
127 Dubnick, M. J. 2005. "Accountability and the Promise of Performance: In Search of the 
Mechanisms." Public Performance & Management Review 28(3):376-417. P. 402. 
128 Dubnick, M. J., and H. G. Frederickson. 2011a. Accountable Governance: Problems and 
Promises. London: Routledge. 
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130 —. 2011. "More over Daniel: We need some 'accountability space'." Administration & Society 
43(6):704-16. 
41 
 
stakeholders in terms of who will determine the design, conduction, and 
dissemination of this activity. Moreover, this gains importance in governance 
when evaluation is no longer a purely governmental affair and other 
stakeholders have a more active role in this activity.131 The identification of this 
‘evaluation space’ can be seen, following Dubnick’s ideas about accountability, 
as the output of the interaction between different actors, e.g. evaluators and 
commissioners, in the collective construction of the meaning of evaluation, of 
the criteria that will be established, and more importantly, of the way in which 
its outputs will feed into other processes within and outside the government’s 
sphere. Here, the locus of the politics of evaluation would be on the disputes for 
accessing this space. 
The last variable identified by Flinders is power. Incorporating new actors in the 
public arena has redefined the way in which power is allocated.132 This 
dissemination of power is incompatible with former hierarchical structures that 
have ‘given way to complex networks in which power is a fluid positive-sum 
concept and a resource held by all actors.’133 Therefore, power depends on the 
actors’ capacity to obtain and exchange resources, to share information, and to 
promote their interests. The political arena is a continuous struggle of power 
and a constant reallocation of it.134 Interests represented in public policy reflect 
those issues that get into the public agenda and whoever are the winners and 
losers after a decision is made. This helps understanding the ability of each 
actor to pursue an agenda and how the institutional framework affects the 
allocation of power. Harrison et al. reflect upon the multiple interests involved 
in evaluation by looking at the UK’s health sector: 
One might see government pushing for measures of efficiency and cost-
effectiveness (what is achieved per unit of resource input) and the medical 
profession and other provider organizations advocating instead 
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measurement of population health needs and of growth in services.135 
This shows how conflicting interests might clash and that the outcome of this 
grating will affect the design and course of an evaluation (see Section 2.3.2), but 
in addition it shows how the allocation of power in governance has shifted. This 
resonates with what Sbragia calls ‘the two faces of the state’.136 She recognises: 
‘There has been a shift of power within the state—some have increased their 
power at the expense of others.’137 Evaluation and audit systems are entangled 
in this phenomenon because these activities can show that political decisions 
taken might have been suboptimal.138 The recognition of the political nature of 
evaluation as the identification of the relationships of power established as a 
consequence of this activity139 acknowledges that power is constantly in conflict 
and that evaluation must be ‘seen as socially located and understood as 
politically contested.’140 
In this new configuration of power, evaluation offers stakeholders the capacity 
to establish reciprocal relationships, based on the idea of ‘objective’ and 
legitimate evidence. Although there is no such thing as value-free evaluation, 
stakeholders can agree on the definition of criteria for evaluating policy and 
interacting on this basis. The values of rationality and neutrality given to 
evidence are key to understanding the implications of evaluation as a power 
tool in policymaking.141 This resonates with Zapico-Goñi’s ideas: 
                                                        
135 Harrison, S., D. J. Hunter, and C. Pollitt. 1990. The dynamics of British health policy. 
London,UK: Unwin Hyman. P. 121. 
136 This refers to the distinction between those actors that are essential for generating benefits 
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137 Sbragia, A. M. 2000. "Governance, the State, and the Market: What Is Going On?" Governance 
13(2):243-50. P. 247. 
138 Heider, C. 2011. "A Conceptual Framework for Developing Evaluation Capacities: Building on 
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edited by R. C. Rist, M. H. Boily, and F. Martin. Washington, D.C., US: The World Bank. 
139 See: Chelimsky, E. 1995. "The Political Environment of Evaluation and What it Means for the 
Development of the Field: Evaluation for a New Century: A Global Perspective." American 
Journal of Evaluation 16(3):215-25, Melkers, J., and D. Roessner. 1997. "Politics and the Political 
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Programs." Evaluation 4(3):294-309. 
140 Taylor, D. 2005. "Governing Through Evidence: Participation and Power in Policy 
Evaluation." Journal of Social Policy 34(04):601-18. 
141 For instance, the evidence-based policymaking model ‘advocates a more rational, rigorous 
and systematic approach, and moves beyond traditional notions of research to adopt a broader 
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Evaluations can have a strong influence in the process of justifying a 
particular policy recommendation or in the competition for jurisdiction 
over an issue within a democratic institution […] there must be some 
shared agreement on the nature of evaluation and how it is to be 
conducted.142 
This does not remove values and beliefs from the political discussion, but it uses 
the power vested in this activity to support the positions of stakeholders.143 
This power can also be perceived in their influence over the evaluation 
process.144 
In addition to the variables discussed by Flinders, there are two other elements 
relevant to the core theme of this thesis. The first one is efficiency as a value that 
underpins policymaking. Reforms to improve the performance of organisations 
were part of the early issues that contributed to the development of this 
concept.145 International organisations promoted reforms to ‘make markets 
work efficiently and corrective interventions where there are market 
failures.’146 These reforms recognised the importance of injecting competition 
into the delivery of services and the incorporation of mechanisms to increase 
efficiency, i.e. ‘one stop window counter’ and e-government147, whose aim was 
… 
… to modify the Weberian bureaucratic model of the state […] based 
on a series of principles, including the impersonal nature of working 
relations, the standardization of working procedures and routines, 
civil servant recruitment and promotion based on technical and 
professional progress, rationality in the division of labour and the 
establishment of authority hierarchies.148 
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This involved important organisational changes and modifications in terms of 
politics. The institutionalisation of evaluation is a clear example of the adoption 
of an instrument focused on the idea of increasing efficiency through the 
generation of evidence ‘to improve policy performance of the governance 
arrangements in question.’149 Nonetheless, the modification of the status quo 
may provoke reactions from the different stakeholders involved in policy. As 
Prince states: ‘Reinventing government is about politics as much as 
administration.’150 This raises questions about how evaluation fits in this new 
model in which efficiency is a central element for government, but not 
necessarily for all stakeholders. 
Adaptability is the other element worth discussing. It can be defined as the 
ability of the state to overcome new challenges in a successful way and the 
capacity of institutions to adjust to new conditions. This idea sits within what 
Duit and Galaz labelled as flexible governance. For them, this kind of governance 
‘has well-developed capacities for exploration’ as it can adjust its processes and 
institutions to a new context.151 In the words of Lobel: ‘The new governance 
model also requires adaptability and constant learning, recognizing the 
inevitability and fertility of change while treating ambiguity as an opportunity 
rather than a burden to overcome.’152 What this reveals is the relevance of rules 
for the interaction of stakeholders and the capacity of public organisations to 
internalise new processes and to adopt new routines. It also comprises the 
political willingness of stakeholders to respect the new set of rules agreed. In 
this context: ‘An evaluation system can help construct a new research 
governance structure: evaluation becomes one driver of institutional change.’153 
Evaluation needs to operate in a context that allows the recognition of its 
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legitimacy when stakeholders agree on the validity of the criteria to evaluate 
and the reliability of findings. 
The support to accountability by evaluation and auditing mechanisms, for 
instance, is limited by the capacity of organisations to modify their processes, 
bureaucratic routines, and legal frameworks to establish new channels of 
communication for stakeholders.154 Another element that illustrates this 
regards the way in which evaluation fits into the new roles of the state. If, as 
Flinders points out, the state has moved ‘from a provider to a commissioner of 
public services’,155 it is worth reflecting on how these new functions need to be 
evaluated when government cannot be labelled as the direct provider of public 
services and its responsibilities have shifted; criteria for evaluation and 
accountability need also to be reconsidered. 
This discussion about governance and the transformation of the state sheds new 
light about the conditions that have fostered the use of evaluation. The 
emergence of new actors in the public sphere demands that new institutional 
arrangements regulate their interaction, including control and risk-reduction 
mechanisms. Moreover, the uneven distribution of power and the adoption of 
new schemes of control have also promoted evaluation as a means to adapt to 
new models of governing. As an umbrella concept, governance shows the 
current conditions in which evaluation takes place, both as a managerial and as 
a political instrument. Regarding the latter, evaluation can represent a means 
for strengthening democracy ‘through specific evaluation approaches that 
reinforced participation, warranted transparency, promoted public welfare.’156 
The linkage between evaluation and democracy is discussed more carefully 
later in this chapter. The next section focuses on evaluation within the policy 
process. 
2.1.2 Public Policy Analysis 
The attention of social problems through different mechanisms of government 
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intervention has been systematically studied.157 Policy analysis emerged as an 
attempt to comprehend the government’s response to these problems. Public 
policy is seen as ‘the product of the activity of an authority invested with public 
power and governmental legitimacy’158 or, as Knoepfel et al. define it: 
A series of intentionally coherent decision or activities taken or carried out 
by different public and sometimes private actors, whose resources, 
institutional links and interest vary, with a view to resolving in a targeted 
manner a problem that is politically defined as collective in nature.159 
It can also be conceptualised as a materialisation of those decisions produced by 
the political process translated into specific actions and programmes.160 Most 
definitions recognise the existence of an issue that affects the public interest 
and the need for intervention, when government is identified as the responsible 
actor because it holds legitimate public power. 
The analysis of public policy can focus on different areas, e.g. on the 
relationships established between stakeholders or on the mechanisms to 
address public problems.161 The existing approaches are ‘attempts at analysing 
how public policies typically evolve or should evolve.’162 These present both 
advantages and disadvantages; however, it is possible to carry out a robust 
analysis acknowledging and making explicit their limitations. 
The policy-cycle approach is useful for studying the role of evaluation in 
policymaking. It conceptualises policy as a set of stages163 by looking at the 
different moments that occur after a political decision is made and before a 
                                                        
157 See: Hill, M. J. 2005. The Public Policy Process. London, UK: Routledge, John, P. 1999. Analysing 
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policy outcome is obtained.164 The policy process is seen as “the expression of 
the popular will as an ‘input’ into the political system leading through various 
processing stages to a policy ‘output’”(Figure 2.1).165 
Figure 2.1. Stages of the Policy Cycle 
Source: Knoepfel et al., 2011. Public Policy Analysis. Policy Press. P. 32. 
Despite no consensus existing about the number of stages, most authors agree 
on stating that the policy cycle starts when a problem gets into the political 
agenda; followed by the formulation of a possible solution (chosen among 
different alternatives); then by the implementation of the decision, and 
concluding with the evaluation of the process.166 This conceptualisation is not 
new but it is still relevant for the analysis of the performance of governmental 
bodies at different levels (local, national, and supranational).167 It is also useful 
for grasping the process by disaggregating it into more simplified elements as it 
‘has proven to provide an excellent heuristic device.’168 Although as Daniell et al. 
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recognise: 
The policy cycle—and rational decision-making processes more 
generally—are often criticized as rarely reflecting what happens in 
reality […] However, the stages noted above still prove useful in 
practice to orientate needs and thinking around different forms of 
policy analysis.169 
Another critic of this approach was Lindblom, who was sceptical about seeing 
public policy as a linear process as he considered that it implies handling 
complex social problems.170 This was also acknowledged by Jann and Wegrich 
in relation to the distance that stands between this model and the reality: 
While the policy cycle framework takes into account the feedback 
between different elements of the policy process […] it still presents 
simplified and ideal-type model of the policy process […] these 
processes do not evolve in a pattern of clear-cut sequences; instead 
the stages are constantly meshed entangled in an ongoing process.171 
The limitations of this approach have been recognised.172 The complexity of 
looking at policy as a process relies on the fact that stages do not occur 
sequentially, these are interrelated and may even occur simultaneously.173 
These stages have been studied individually and collectively.174 For the 
purposes of this thesis, only a succinct description of each stage is provided, 
including a brief introduction to evaluation, which although it is conceptualised 
as the last stage of the process, in practice it is an activity intended to feed back 
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into the whole cycle. Its contribution can be perceived from the fact that 
evaluation evidence can guide policymakers to making more informed decisions 
and to reflect on those made. It is a ‘powerful tool to reframe an issue once 
thought to be resolved by policymakers.’175 
The agenda-setting stage can be considered the initial part of the process. This 
‘is the list of subjects of problems to which governmental officials are paying 
some serious attention at any given time.’176 It involves the acknowledgement of 
a public problem and the need for a government’s intervention. Its connection 
with the hidden politics of evaluation is that during this stage, negotiation of 
interests takes place: 
Even though the agenda is not just shaped by group power, but by outside 
events or by luck, agenda setting models do not say that ideas have an 
independent existence, merely that a variety of factors conjoin in numerous 
and diverse ways to shape the political agenda.177 
Multiple actors with different interests can determine the problems that get into 
the public agenda and that might influence the process.178 This involves not only 
their capacity to promote a particular issue but also to transmit effectively the 
logic and the values behind it.179 The characterisation of policy problems will 
define the nature of the criteria for evaluation and its suitability.180 Evaluation 
can provide evidence to support the inclusion (or exclusion) of a particular 
issue in the agenda,181 i.e. by encouraging innovation,182 and also to identify and 
quantify policy problems. 
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Policy formulation regards the establishment of alternatives of solution 
according to the resources available and the expected goals from government’s 
intervention.183 It ‘defines the legal bases for the objective intervention, 
instruments, and the operational arrangements of the public action.’184 The core 
of this stage is decision-making, which can be studied from different 
perspectives. The bounded rationality approach developed by Simon establishes 
that the selection of alternatives is based on the maximisation of the decision-
maker’s values and it takes place after an exhaustive analysis of the 
alternatives.185 In contrast, the incremental model proposed by Lindblom 
suggests that a policy decision has to be made, based on a successive limited 
comparisons approach to reduce the risk of failure.186 
Evaluation outputs are expected to provide elements to reduce uncertainty in 
the decision-making and the risk inherent to the context in which policy 
occurs.187 This information can also be used for making diagnostics that 
strengthen the design of policy instruments.188 As Sanderson suggests: 
‘Evaluation is required to assess and understand how policies have worked (or 
not) and why, so that lessons can be learned to inform improvements.’189 This 
will help reducing the uncertainty that stakeholders face and adjust their 
decisions in the future. 
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Policy implementation,190 one of the most studied stages of the policy cycle,191 
refers to… 
… the carrying out of a basic policy decision […] Ideally, that decision 
identifies the problem(s) to be addressed, the objective(s) to be pursued 
and in a variety of ways “structures” the implementation process.192 
Sabatier developed the top-down and bottom-up approaches for grasping this 
stage. The top-down approach ‘starts with a policy decision and focuses on the 
extent to which its objectives are attained over time and why.’193 On the 
opposite, the bottom-up approach … 
… starts by defining the network of actors involved in service 
delivery in one or more local areas and asks them about their goals, 
strategies, activities and contracts […] then it uses the contacts as a 
vehicle for developing a network technique to identify the local, 
regional and national actors involved in the planning, financing and 
execution of the relevant governmental and non-governmental 
programs.194 
This gives policy analysts different lenses for understanding how policy is 
transformed into outputs. From the systemic perspective, it is possible to look at 
this as a relationship between inputs and outputs. However, according to 
Birkland, this perspective does not explain clearly how these outputs are 
transformed, because it ‘treats the political system as a black box.’195 He 
highlights the importance of dissecting what happens during the execution of 
political decisions. The principal-agent model is a useful tool for comprehending 
                                                        
190 The work of Pressman and Wildavsky is a key reference for the analysis of the main 
challenges that policymakers face during implementation, particularly about how a specific 
policy can easily fail due to a number of factors that were not (or could not be) considered 
during the formulation stage. Pressman, J. L., and A. B. Wildavsky. 1984. Implementation: How 
great expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland or, why it's amazing that federal 
programs work at all, this being a saga of the Economic Development Administration as told by 
two sympathetic observers who seek to build morals on a foundation of ruined hopes. California, 
US: University of California Press. 
191 See Barrett, S. M., and C. Fudge (Eds.). 1981. Policy and Action: Essays on the Implementation 
of Public Policy. London, UK: Methuen, Mazmanian, D. A., and P. A. Sabatier. 1983. 
Implementation and Public Policy. Illinois, US: University Press of America, Palumbo, D. J., and M. 
A. Harder (Eds.). 1981. Implementing Public Policy. Massachusetts, US: Lexington Books. 
192 Mazmanian, D. A., and P. A. Sabatier. 1983. Implementation and Public Policy. Illinois, US: 
University Press of America. P. 20. 
193 Sabatier, P. A. 1997. "Top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation research." in 
The Policy Process. A Reader, edited by M. Hill. London, UK: Pearson Prentice Hall. P. 281. 
194 Ibid. P. 281. 
195 Birkland, T. A. 2011. An Introduction to the Policy Process: Theories, Concepts, and Models of 
Public Policy Making. New York, US: M.E. Sharpe.  
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the relationship between policy-designers and operators.196 This model 
explores the interaction between two individuals (the principal and the agent) 
in which the principal … 
… would like to delegate a task to the agent, he wants to determine 
what (minimal) reward he should offer the agent to ensure that 1) 
the agent accepts to perform the task, and 2) the agent performs the 
task in a satisfactory way.197 
The discretionary behaviour of street-level bureaucrats198 responds to the 
challenges that they face when implementing and which existence was not or 
could not have been considered during formulation.199 This stage represents an 
area of the process where control may be diluted and that might affect how 
incentives work in the public sector.200 There, evaluation can analyse the 
activities and processes that take place during implementation. The dichotomy 
between the top-down and bottom-up approaches shows that the main 
challenge for policymakers is overcoming the potential difficulties that emerge 
during implementation and strengthening the communication and information 
channels between them and street-level bureaucrats.201 Evaluation can give 
principals more elements for coping with the discretionary behaviour of agents, 
reducing for them the risk of distorting objectives. Evaluation can also dissect 
the operation of a programme to identify those elements that can be 
improved.202 This finds echoes in the discussions about efficiency, as evaluation 
findings can expose unnecessary processes with which important savings can 
                                                        
196 This resonates with the concept of ‘street-level bureaucrats’ which refers to the influence 
that is exercised by those public officers in charge of the execution of a decision taken at the top 
of the organization and how this affects the policy output. See: Peters, B. G., and J. Pierre. 2012. 
The SAGE Handbook of Public Administration. Los Angeles, US: SAGE., Ellis, K. 2011. "‘Street-level 
Bureaucracy’ Revisited: The Changing Face of Frontline Discretion in Adult Social Care in 
England." Social Policy & Administration 45(3):221-44, Lipsky, M. 1971. "Street-Level 
Bureaucracy and the Analysis of Urban Reform." Urban Affairs Review 6(4):391-409. 
197 Van Ackere, A. 1993. "The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional 
fields." European Journal of Operational Research 70(1):83-103. P. 83. 
198 Laws, D., and M. Hajer. 2006. "Policy in Practice." in The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, 
edited by M. Moran, M. Rein, and R. E. Goodin. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
199 Hill, M. J. (Ed.). 1997. The Policy Process: A reader. London, UK: Routledge. 
200 Dixit, A. 2002. "Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review " 
Journal of Human Resources 37(4):696-727. 
201 Bache, I., L. Reardon, I. Bartle, M. Flinders, and G. Marsden. 2014. "Symbolic Meta-Policy: 
(Not) Tackling Climate Change in the Transport Sector." Political Studies 63(4):830-51. 
202 Lion, C., P. Martini, and S. Volpi. 2006. "Evaluating the Implementation Process: A 
Contribution within the Framework of the European Social Fund (ESF) Programme." Evaluation 
12(3):313-29. 
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be made. Politicians for example, would have more arguments to legitimise 
decisions about budget cuts. This also resonates with the idea of the ‘black box’ 
about the need to identify and analyse all substantive activities that need to be 
performed to achieve the expected result.203 The identification of key 
problematic procedural areas is perhaps one of the most substantial 
contributions of evaluation to implementation, and knowing why policies 
succeed or fail is a permanent concern for policymakers;204 moreover, 
understanding how stakeholders interact during implementation matters in 
terms of the democratic credibility of the process.205 
As the core theme of this thesis, evaluation is discussed extensively later in this 
chapter. Only a succinct overview is presented to introduce this concept. 
Evaluation ‘represents a mechanism to identify policy results, its justification 
and its effectiveness.’206 It can be defined as … 
… the systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed 
project, program, or policy, including its design, implementation, and 
results […] to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, 
development efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability.207  
A central element of these definitions is the capacity of evaluation to obtain 
reliable information about different aspects of policy, although evaluation can 
serve multiple purposes.208 Reviewing the policy process allows identifying the 
contribution of evaluation in terms of its capacity to measure outcomes that can 
                                                        
203 An interesting example is the work of Alexander who studied the use of evaluation in the 
National Health Service (NHS) by describing ‘apparent differences in the impact of three health-
service evaluations.’ In her study, Alexander highlights the relevance of the people involved in 
the evaluation and how this affects the implementation of recommendations. Alexander, H. 
2003. "Health-Service Evaluations: Should We Expect the Results to Change Practice?" 
Ibid.9(4):405-14.  
204 Barrett, S. M. 2004. "Implementation Studies: Time for a Revival? Personal Reflections on 20 
Years of Implementation Studies." Public Administration 82(2):249-62. O'Toole, L. J. Jr. 2000. 
"Research on Policy Implementation: Assessment and Prospects." Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 10(2):263-88. 
205 Bache, I., and R. Chapman. 2008. "Democracy through Multilevel Governance? The 
Implementation of the Structural Funds in South Yorkshire." Governance: An International 
Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions 21(3):397-418. 
206 Guerrero, J. P. 1995. "La evaluación de las políticas públicas: enfoques teóricos y realidades 
en nueve países desarrollados." Gestión y Política Pública IV(1):47-115. P. 49. 
207 Zall Kusek, J., and R. C. Rist. 2004. "Ten Steps to a Results-Based Monitoring and Evaluation 
System." edited by The World Bank. Washington, D.C., US. P. 12. 
208 See Segone, M. (Ed.). 2008. Bridging the gap. The role of monitoring and evaluation in 
evidence-based policy making: UNICEF. 
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provide evidence about how governments deliver.209 Also, it has been useful for 
looking at the specific contributions of evaluation to the different stages of the 
process.210 
Evaluation transcends the task of verifying the accomplishment of goals or 
objectives. It produces important amounts of evidence directed to different 
purposes, some of them political.211 Evaluation can represent an important 
asset for stakeholders when policy ends are in conflict, e.g. efficiency vs. 
equity.212 In the light of governance, the policy process, as the translation of 
political decisions into action, is now constrained by the interests of multiple 
stakeholders. Consequently, risk-reduction and control mechanisms acquire 
more relevance. In terms of control, it is useful to deepen the relationship 
between evaluation and performance management, developed in the next 
section. 
2.1.3 Performance Management 
Performance-management systems have introduced monitoring tools for 
generating information about different aspects of public policy, particularly 
through the use of indicators.213 A monitoring and evaluation system … 
… provides government officials, development managers, and civil society 
with better means for learning from past experience, improving service 
delivery, planning and allocating resources, and demonstrating results as 
part of accountability to key stakeholders.214 
In conjunction with evaluation, performance measurement215 is one of the 
                                                        
209 Rotberg, R. I. 2014. "Good Governance Means Performance and Results." Governance 
27(3):511-18. 
210 See Gris Legorreta, P. C. 2011. "La evaluación de políticas públicas como instrumento para la 
rendición de cuentas." Trimestre Fiscal 99:89-103. 
211 Saunders, M. 2012. "The use and usability of evaluation outputs: A social practice approach." 
Evaluation 18(4):421-36.  
212 Winship, C. 2008. "Policy Analysis as Puzzle Solving." in The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
213 According to the WB, a performance management system has as its primary objectives ‘to 
learn, to steer and control and to provide accountability.’ Dorotinsky, W. 2011. Implementing 
Results Based Budgeting in Thailand. Washington D.C., US: The World Bank. P. 6. 
214 The World Bank. 2004. Monitoring & Evaluation: Some Tools, Methods & Approaches. 
Washington, D.C. P. 5. 
215 Frequently, the terms ‘performance management’ and ‘performance measurement’ are used 
indistinctively. This is a common misinterpretation, performance management refers to the set 
of tools and instruments (e.g. human resources systems, technology, etc.) used to the 
accomplishment of organisational goals, performance measurement is considered a tool of 
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pillars of the NPM directed to assess public policy and to identify goals.216 Both 
activities sit within the performance-management model that overviews 
governmental activity.217 Nonetheless, it is important to distinguish these two 
activities as they aim at different purposes and are implemented through 
different methods (Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1. Main Differences between Performance Monitoring and Evaluation 
 Performance monitoring Evaluation 
Focus On organisations On policies and programmes 
Time Periodic Episodic 
Methods Mainly quantitative Mixture of qualitative and 
quantitative 
Who Mostly conducted or 
commissioned by Finance, 
Operations, or even  
Personnel branches 
Mostly conducted or 
commissioned by policy 
branches 
Source: Talbot, C.,2010 Performance in Government. The Evolving System of Performance and 
Evaluation Measurement, Monitoring, and Management in the United Kingdom. The 
World Bank. P. 12. 
The differences observed by Talbot serve the purpose of deepening into the 
distinction between outputs and outcomes.218 While monitoring is supposed to 
focus on the efficiency of public services (outputs), evaluation concentrates on 
the identification of the effects (outcomes). This distinction can be observed 
through the example of the Cold Weather Plan for England whose purpose was 
‘to enhance resilience in the event of severe cold weather.’219 This implies the 
execution of different activities undertaken by health and social-care agencies 
that interact with risk groups of the population who are more vulnerable to the 
effects of cold weather. The monitoring of this plan could focus on measuring 
the number of influenza vaccinations provided to prevent the risk of disease. 
This establishes a connection between inputs and a quantifiable output. In 
terms of outcomes, the interventions directed to foster the participation of 
                                                                                                                                                             
performance management.  
216 Talbot, C. 2010h. Theories of Performance: Organizational and Service Improvement in the 
Public Domain. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
217 Hunter, D. E. K., and S. B. Nielsen. 2013. "Performance Management and Evaluation: 
Exploring Complementarities." New Directions for Evaluation 2013(137):7-17. 
218 Talbot, C. 2010a. "Performance in Government. The Evolving System of Performance and 
Evaluation Measurement, Monitoring, and Management in the United Kingdom." Washington 
D.C., US: The World Bank. 
219 Public Health England. 2014b. "Cold weather plan for England 2014." London, UK. 
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women in the labour market are useful for illustrating the role of evaluation. A 
long-term effect (outcome) could be women’s financial independence, which is a 
much more complex variable to quantify and that might imply a subjective 
judgement.220 
Performance measurement fits into the idea of control that takes place in the 
public sector.221 Van Dooren et al. recognise five major stages of performance 
measurement (see Figure 2.2 below). These are consistent with the five 
elements observed by Pollitt (activity, measurement, data, criteria, and use) that 
manifest its logic as an instrument for the generation of evidence that can feed 
into other systems, i.e. evaluation and accountability.222 Evaluators, for example, 
can use indicators as an aid for making their judgements about a policy, 
regardless of engaging in more complex studies for analysing policy.223 
Figure 2.2 An Ideal-typical Model of the Performance Measurement Process 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: van Dooren et. al, 2010. Performance Management in the Public Sector. Routledge. P. 55.  
Taking into consideration the ideas about ‘post-bureaucratic organisations’224, 
the focus on the identification of outcomes instead of processes gives evaluation 
                                                        
220 An additional example of measuring outputs and outcomes is provided by the analysis of the 
“Stop AIDS Love Life” campaign in Ghana carried out by the John Hopkins University. From this 
experience, it was identified as an output to be measured ‘the number of HIV tests performed’ 
which is a result derived from an activity; while as an outcome they identified ‘health behaviour’ 
as a consequence to the exposure to the campaign and the knowledge transmitted through the 
different media (pamphlets, TV, radio, etc.). The John Hopkins University. 2006. "Monitoring 
Outputs and Outcomes And Introduction to Study Design." 
221 Behn, R. D. 2003. "Why Measure Performance? Different Purposes Require Different 
Measures." Public Administration Review 63(5):586-606. 
222 Pollitt, C. 2013. "The logics of performance management." Evaluation 19(4):346-63. 
223 Hunter, D. E. K., and S. B. Nielsen. 2013. "Performance Management and Evaluation: 
Exploring Complementarities." New Directions for Evaluation 2013(137):7-17. 
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and auditing more leverage, while it also imposes the need for developing 
instruments for organisations to make explicit its contribution to the public 
sector. This is also underpinned by the idea that organisations need to be 
‘fuelled by influence rather than power.’225 Therefore: How can this influence be 
widened? This question highlights the relevance of building evaluation and audit 
systems considered legitimate by stakeholders. It transcends the role of 
performance management as a mechanism of monitoring public policy, as it 
involves using that information for making judgements. 
Performance monitoring is embedded in a logic of technical and objective use of 
information, but the politics involved needs to be taken into account for 
understanding the behaviour of the actors that participate in the production and 
use of performance data, e.g. to look at how ‘politicians may use the formulation 
of performance measures to make their political priorities explicit, while agents 
use them to guide their priorities and performance.’226 Pollitt’s ideas about the 
‘sub-logics’ of performance management can help evince some of the political 
issues involved in this instrument. Some of these ‘sub-logics’ expose the 
discretion that actors exercise in the design and use of targets and indicators, 
e.g. cheating—bending or breaking the rules.227 
Although the implementation of these systems is intended to increase efficiency 
in the public sector, an ample range of scholars has questioned its utility.228 
This, according to Propper and Wilson, might be associated with some design 
flaws: 
First, there is some consensus that gross outcomes or levels based on 
PM [performance measures] do not provide a sufficiently accurate 
                                                                                                                                                             
characteristics important to mention: results-oriented, citizen-centred, competitive, non-
departmental and decentralized structure, among others. Kernaghan, K. 2000. "The Post-
Bureaucratic Organization and Public Service Values." International Review of Administrative 
Sciences 66(1):91-104. 
225Finlayson, A. 2012. "Cameron, Culture and the Creative Class: The Big Society and the Post-
Bureaucratic Age." The Political Quarterly 82(S1):35-47. P. 42. 
226 Bjørnholt, B., and F. Larsen. 2014. "The politics of performance measurement: ‘Evaluation use 
as mediator for politics’." Evaluation 20(4):400-11. P. 404. 
227 Pollitt, C. 2013. "The logics of performance management." Ibid.19:346-63. 
228 See: McLean, I., D. Haubrich, and R. Gutiérrez-Romero. 2007. "The Perils and Pitfalls of 
Performance Measurement: The CPA Regime for Local Authorities in England." Public Money & 
Management 27(2):111-18, Moynihan, D. P. 2006. "Managing for Results in State Government: 
Evaluating a Decade of Reform." Public Administration Review 66(1):77-89.  
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picture of the relative performance of public sector organisations… 
Second, a single PM is not sufficient. Public sector organisations often 
have multiple stakeholders who have differing, and sometimes 
conflicting, goals… 
Third, the intended purpose for each potential measure should 
dictate both its form and the decision whether to publicly disclose 
the resulting performance information.229 
The core question that arises here is: Which can be considered the reliable 
mechanisms to assess an organisation’s performance in relation to the political 
power that it holds? This means: To what extent can self-imposed indicators 
reflect accurately the achievements made by an organisation? And more 
importantly: How does this information feed into evaluation processes for judging 
a policy? As an input for the development of evaluations, performance-
management information needs to be taken into account, considering these 
political nuances.230 
This overview of performance measurement is helpful for looking at its 
relationship with evaluation and how these activities are involved in the politics 
of the public sector.231 This first part of the theoretical framework highlights the 
current conditions in which evaluation takes place (governance), the 
contribution of this activity to policymaking, and the complementarity that 
characterises the relationship with performance monitoring. These discussions 
are relevant for understanding at the macro-level of the relationship between 
politics and evaluation. For a specific level of analysis, the next section is 
devoted to the key discussions about evaluation and its institutionalisation. 
  
                                                        
229 Propper, C., and D. Wilson. 2003. "The Use and Usefulness of Performance Measures in the 
Public Sector." CMPO Working Paper Series 03(073). P. 19. 
230 In Mexico, for example, the use of performance measurement indicators is a core element of 
some mandatory evaluations (i.e. SPE). 
231Posner, P. L., and R. Schwarzt. 2011. "Accountability Institutions and Information in the 
Policy-Making Process." in Accountable Governance: Problems and Promises, edited by M. J. 
Dubnick and H. G. Frederickson. London, UK: Routledge. 
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2.2 Evaluation Studies 
Understanding the role of evaluation within governance and, more specifically, 
within the policy process, helps filling the gap existent in the knowledge about 
how and why the political nature of evaluation matters. This section aims to 
drill down into the discussion about evaluation as a mechanism that is 
embedded in a political reality that affects its performance and use. Looking at 
the hidden politics of evaluation from the perspective of the institutional 
framework contributes to the knowledge about the conditions that favour or 
hinder political influence and, more importantly, how the rules established for 
evaluation shape the relationships among stakeholders. 
The theoretical development of evaluation has increased during the last decade, 
as the necessity to value the effectiveness of the public action has become more 
recurrent in the public sphere.232 Although there is vast literature concerning 
evaluation,233 about both its theoretical and practical grounds,234 it is neither 
necessary nor possible to provide an exhaustive theoretical framework. Instead, 
this section aims to present the most relevant topics about its state of the art, its 
utilisation, and the relevance of its institutionalisation. 
2.2.1 Policy Evaluation: The State of the Art 
It is possible to identify two major contributions of evaluation to the public 
sector. The first one is its capacity to identify the effects of public policy, e.g. 
impact evaluation.235 The second is its role as a mechanism for strengthening 
policymaking by using the information that it produces to make the necessary 
                                                        
232 Henry, G. T., and M. M. Mark. 2003c. "Toward an Agenda for Research on Evaluation." New 
Directions for Evaluation 2003(97):69-80, Rossi, P. H., and S. R. Wright. 1977. "Evaluation 
Research: An Assessment of Theory, Practice, and Politics." Evaluation Review 1(1):5-52.  
233 See Frederiksen, L. F., F. Hansson, and S. B. Wenneberg. 2003. "The Agora and the Role of 
Research Evaluation." Evaluation 9(2):149-72, Nagel, S. (Ed.). 2002. The Handbook of Public 
Policy Evaluation. California, US: SAGE.  
234 In terms of the theoretical bases of evaluation, it is relevant to refer to the work of Alkin, M. C. 
2013. Evaluation Roots: A Wider Perspective of Theorists' Views and Influences. California, US: 
SAGE. The study of evaluation practice can be understood through the work of Schwandt, T. A. 
2002. Evaluation Practice Reconsidered. New York, US: Peter Lang. 
235 See Morton, M. H. 2009. "Applicability of Impact Evaluation to Cohesion Policy." in An Agenda 
for a Reformed Cohesion Policy, edited by European Commission, The World Bank. 2009. 
"Making Smart Policy: Using Impact Evaluation for Policy Making. Case Studies on Evaluations 
that Influenced Policy." Washington, D.C., US. 
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adjustments.236 The evaluation studies literature identifies multiple applications 
for evaluation in the public sector.237 However, for the purposes of this research, 
this review focuses on three key themes: the conceptualisation of evaluation, 
the utilisation of its findings, and its institutionalisation. Different authors have 
understood evaluation in multiple ways.238 While some think of it as an 
evidence-generator mechanism,239 others focus on its role as a tool for 
measuring the effectiveness of public policy.240 Its conceptualisation has 
changed over time as more empirical evidence has been obtained about its 
contribution to policymaking.241 
Like other concepts in the policy-analysis literature, there is no unique 
definition of evaluation. For Picciotto, evaluation ‘consists in collecting relevant 
evidence, identifying suitable evaluative standards and using methods of 
analysis that are valid and fair.’242 This definition puts the generation of 
evidence and the use of robust mechanisms for its obtaining at the core of the 
concept, but it also leads to reflecting about who will determine the validity and 
fairness of these mechanisms. In contrast, Parsons emphasises the objective and 
systematic analysis of policy effects.243 Authors like Albaek, instead, have given 
more weight to objectivity: 
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The role of evaluation research in rational policymaking is to deliver 
factual, objective knowledge (i.e. causal but not value premises for decision 
making) […] evaluation research will produce objective and value-free 
knowledge in so far it is based on quantitative positivist social science 
research procedures.244 
As a mechanism for reducing uncertainty in decision-making, evaluation 
‘involves the determination of the impact of policies on target for the direct and 
timely use of those responsible for a policy intervention.’245 From these 
definitions it is possible to see evaluation … 
As a tool directed to identify the value or merit of public policy; 
As a mechanism to obtain reliable information that can be used for the 
decision-making process; 
As an instrument to observe the effects of public intervention; 
As an examination of the achievement of goals set by public programmes. 
Evaluation offers different alternatives to explain why public programmes have 
succeeded or not. Its increasing use in the public sector can be explained by 
several reasons.246 The first one is its role as a theory-testing activity247 that 
allows analysing the possible deviations between what the theory states about 
the operation of a programme and the results obtained.248 A good example of 
this can be found in social programmes directed to fight malnutrition. Theory 
states that fortified milk might have a positive effect on reducing children’s 
malnutrition;249 yet, evaluations have shown that this effect is difficult to 
measure as other factors might intervene, e.g. genetics, quality of milk. The gap 
between the assumptions made in the design of a programme and the outputs 
obtained is not a minor issue. Evaluation allows policymakers to analyse the 
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Chilean Children Fed Fortified Milk Provided by the Complementary National Food Program." 
Nutrition 20(2):177-80. 
62 
 
conditions that might affect policy and to make decisions based on data. 
However, the way in which this information is produced is an important 
element to study. 
This reveals three important elements regarding the hidden politics of 
evaluation. First, that evaluation is linked to ideas of rationality, objectivity, and 
neutrality, which can provide it with a meaning of a highly technical and 
apolitical activity. Secondly, that there is a set of actors involved in public policy 
whose interests and preferences can influence the process. Thirdly, that public 
policy is not the result of a unique decision; it encompasses different values that 
need to be taken into consideration when evaluating.250 Like other stages of the 
policy process, evaluation is embedded in a political context, its 
conceptualisation as a technical one with the political values at stake.251 
Therefore, the rationality label given to evaluation can be a mechanism to 
disguise the politics involved in this activity. 
Evaluation looks at the relationship between inputs and outputs which entails a 
series of theoretical assumptions. According to Rossi and Wright, the first 
assumption is that policy goals are well defined and set the basic premises for 
an accurate design of the evaluation. 252 This means that there is a clear 
understanding of the policy problem and of the best policy solution available.253 
In practice, policymaking is not a straightforward process. It demands the 
interaction of different actors and the establishment of networks, not always 
driven by rational purposes.254 
The second assumption is that evaluation takes place in a political context; so it 
is exposed to the influence of the stakeholders. Although evaluation was 
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developed under the presumption that it would bring more rationality into 
policymaking, in practice this is difficult to achieve as this process is not entirely 
rational. The use of evidence can provide policymakers with more elements for 
the design and implementation of policies, but not every decision is based on 
the information produced by evaluation.255 The main argument underpinning 
this idea is that if policymakers obtain reliable and timely information they will 
use it to make better decisions, but this does not occur de facto. Multiple factors 
can intervene and it is a discretionary decision for the way in which each 
stakeholder establishes his/her priorities (including using evaluation). 
Consequently, evaluation is expected to provide evidence for decision-making, 
but what kind of effects do we expect to observe and how can those effects be 
observed? The adoption of the evidence-based policymaking approach has been 
largely studied and analysed.256 Scholars have also acknowledged the political 
component that is embedded in this approach: 
The production of evidence for policy making is by its nature a 
political process. But just as the political process of problem solving 
cannot be based exclusively or even predominantly on "evidence", 
neither can the production of evidence be based on "science" 
alone.257 
Constraining the discussion of policy effectiveness to technical arguments might 
limit the range of applications of evaluation research to this process.258 As a 
discipline derived from the social sciences, evaluation has developed 
quantitative and qualitative approaches for assessing different features of 
policy. Policymakers around the world have access to an important range of 
tools for the evaluation of their policies.259 The selected approach will 
determine the nature of the results obtained,260 the method to apply, and its 
                                                        
255 Rutter, J. 2012. "Evidence and Evaluation in Policy Making. A problem of supply or demand?", 
edited by Institute for Government. 
256 See for example: Oliver, K., T. Lorenc, and S. Innvær. 2014. "New directions in evidence-based 
policy research: A critical analysis of the literature." Health Research Policy and Systems 12(1). 
257 The LSE GV314 Group. "Evidence-based politics. Government and the production of policy 
research." P. 19. 
258 du Toit, A. 2012. "Making Sense of 'Evidence'. Notes on the Discursive Politics of Research 
and Pro-Poor Policy Making." in Working Paper 21. Bellville: PLAAS, UWC. 
259 See The World Bank. 2004. Monitoring & Evaluation: Some Tools, Methods & Approaches. 
Washington, D.C. 
260 The literature about evaluation models is vast, as it is not the main focus of this research for 
further knowledge on this topic it is advisable to refer to the work of Stufflebeam who 
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impact on the robustness and legitimacy of evaluation.261 These two factors are 
central for the political acceptance of an evaluation. The robustness of the 
methods is crucial for sustaining the findings and recommendations of an 
evaluation. As Chelimsky discusses: 
Stronger methods allow us more confidence in the value judgments we 
make about a particular intervention, and weaker ones (which may be the 
only alternatives feasible in a particular design situation) force us to 
pepper those judgments with needed caveats.262 
From an overall perspective, the evaluation process comprises a series of 
technical and political decisions constrained by the interests of the stakeholders 
involved. This relates back to the secondary questions of this research about the 
kind of instruments existent for evaluation and the values behind it. The utility 
of evaluation is still a central element of the body of literature in evaluation, as it 
is addressed in the next section. 
2.2.2 The Utilisation of Evaluation 
Utilisation is perhaps the most analysed topic regarding evaluation.263 The 
allocation of resources for evaluation is expected to generate benefits in return. 
However, the mere performance of an evaluation does not mean per se that 
outputs will be used, but what does ‘use’ mean? 
Use is generally understood to refer to a direct action that has occurred as a 
result of an evaluation (i.e. instrumental use) or to something that is newly 
learned about a programme, its participants, its operations, or outcomes 
through an evaluation (i.e. conceptual use); the action or learning can take 
place as a result of evaluation findings, or as a result of participation in 
evaluation procedures (i.e. process use) […] in some cases, the concept of 
                                                                                                                                                             
developed a taxonomy of the most relevant evaluation models applied for programme 
evaluation. See: Stufflebeam, D. 2001. "Evaluation Models." New Directions for Evaluation 
2001(89):7-98. 
261 The robustness of the evaluation model is linked to the extensive discussion in the literature 
about experimental and quasi-experimental models for evaluation. The work of Campbell and 
Stanley explores relevant concepts for the evaluation studies field such as external, internal, and 
construct validity of this kind of approaches. Campbell, D. T., and J. C. Stanley. 1966. 
Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research. Chicago, US: Houghton Mifflin. 
262 Chelimsky, E. 2012. "Valuing, Evaluation Methods, and the Politicization of the Evaluation 
Process." New Directions for Evaluation 2012(133):77-83. P. 78 
263 See: Ginsburg, A., and N. Rhett. 2003. "Building a Better Body of Evidence: New Opportunities 
to Strengthen Evaluation Utilization." American Journal of Evaluation 24(4):489-98, Leviton, L. 
C., and E. F. X. Hughes. 1981. "Research On the Utilization of Evaluations: A Review and 
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use is used to refer to waving the flag of evaluation to claim a rational basis 
for action (or inaction), or to justify pre-existing positions (i.e. symbolic 
use).264 
Recent literature about utilisation has attempted to reach a more specific level 
of identification of its potential uses (see Figure 2.3 below).265 The output of an 
evaluation becomes an input for policymaking and, as discussed, it can 
represent an important asset for supporting decisions in multiple policy 
areas.266 It is also an instrument for discussion in the partisan political arena 
because the evidence derived from robust research processes can inform 
decisions about the creation, conservation, or termination of programmes.267 As 
Roche and Kelly suggest: ‘The most immediate challenge for programs focused 
on working politically is therefore to demonstrate during the program life that 
they are leading to tangible outcomes and benefits for people.’268 This 
underlines the legitimising function of evaluation. Governments need to 
demonstrate that their policies are benefiting the population and that resources 
are being well spent. This makes explicit the connection between evaluation and 
auditing, as well as between evaluation and accountability. These are 
complementary activities that rely on the technical capacities of each 
instrument to generate evidence.269 
                                                        
264 Henry, G. T., and M. M. Mark. 2003a. "Beyond Use: Understanding Evaluation’s Influence on 
Attitudes and Actions." American Journal of Evaluation 24(3):293-314. P. 294. 
265 See Boyer, J. F., and L. I. Langbein. 1991. "Factors Influencing the Use of Health Evaluation 
Research in Congress." Evaluation Review 15(5):507-32, Feinstein, O. N. 2002. "Use of 
Evaluations and the Evaluation of their Use." Evaluation 8(4):433-39, Saunders, M. 2012. "The 
use and usability of evaluation outputs: A social practice approach." Ibid.18:421-36. 
266 See for example the work of Gudmundsson, H. 2003. "The Policy Use of Environmental 
Indicators - Learning from Evaluation Research." The Journal of Transdisciplinary Environmental 
Studies 2(2):1-12.  
267 Molas-Gallart, J. 2012. "Research Governance and the Role of Evaluation: A Comparative 
Study." American Journal of Evaluation 33(4):583-98. 
268 Roche, C., and L. Kelly. 2012. "The Evaluation of Politics and the Politics of Evaluation." 
Developmental Leadership Program. P. 6. 
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of normative analysis, but in being able to use a variety of other methodological approaches as 
well.’ Rist, R. C. 1995. "Management Accountability: The Signals sent by Auditing and 
Evaluation." in Policy Evaluation, edited by R. C. Rist. Hants, England: Edward Elgar Publishing 
Company. P. 383. 
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Figure 2.3 Potential Uses of Evaluation  
 
Source: Based on Vanlandingham, G. 2011. "Escaping the Dusty Shelf: Legislative Evaluation 
Offices’ Efforts to Promote Utilization." American Journal of Evaluation 32(1).  
Empirical evidence has shown that the utilisation of evaluation results might be 
affected by different variables other than the recognition of its potential 
benefits.270 Leviton and Hughes, for example, highlight: 
The relevance of evaluation to the needs of potential users; 
The extent of communication between potential users and producers of 
evaluation; 
The translation of evaluations into their implications for policy and 
programmes; 
The credibility or trust placed in evaluations; 
The commitment or advocacy of individual users.271 
In general, ‘The relevance, quality and credibility of evaluation are three of the 
most important factors explaining evaluation use [in addition to] evaluation 
implementation and policy setting.’272 These factors relate to the generation of 
data and information about a policy at a convenient time and expressed in terms 
that can be easily understood by decision-makers or users. The robustness and 
effectiveness of the technical instruments used for evaluation contribute to the 
                                                        
270 See Iriti, J. E., W. E. Bickel, and C. Awsumb Nelson. 2005. "Using Recommendations in 
Evaluation." American Journal of Evaluation 26(4):464-79, Lawrenz, F., A. Gullickson, and S. Toal. 
2007. "Dissemination. Handmaiden to Evaluation Use." Ibid.28(3):275-89, McDavid, J. C., and I. 
Huse. 2012. "Legislator Uses of Public Performance Reports." Ibid.33(1):7-25, Weiss, C. H. 
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271 Leviton, L. C., and E. F. X. Hughes. 1981. "Research On the Utilization of Evaluations: A Review 
and Synthesis." Evaluation Review 5(4):525-48. P. 525. 
272 Hanberger, A. 2011. "The real function of evaluation and response systems." P. 330. 
1 
•Instrumental use [Recommendations derived from 
evaluation are implemented]  
2 
•Enlightenment use [The information provided by the 
evaluation eventually has an influence in the decision 
makers over time] 
3 
•Process use [Evaluation has a research function directed 
to promote organizational learning by stakeholders] 
4 
•Symbolic use [Results are interpreted mostly for political 
reasons]  
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credibility of the results.273 This inevitably leads to reflecting on the political 
support given to evaluation, both to its process and outputs. Contandriopoulos 
and Brousselle point out two core dimensions of evaluation that concern its 
political nature: ideology and polarization. Ideology refers to the linkage 
between an evaluation output and the user’s preferences.274 If there is no 
connection between these elements, information is more likely to be dismissed 
or misused. The political risks associated with deciding on the basis of evidence 
is another element related to the ideology of stakeholders.275 Involving 
stakeholders in the process of evaluation seems to be an important element for 
aligning the user’s beliefs with the findings.276 Therefore, establishing common-
beliefs systems could promote not only the utilisation of findings, but also the 
systematic performance of evaluations and its inclusion in organisational 
routines. 
Polarization refers to the divergent interests that exist in the public sphere that 
can lead to political confrontation.277 For example, an evaluation output could 
simultaneously find approval from one group and rejection from another. The 
level of polarization affects utilisation and might be explained by the political 
sensitivity around a policy issue. The ideas of Schwarz and Struhkamp about the 
relationship between evaluation and trust are pertinent for understanding this 
more clearly. For them: ‘Trust is a mechanism to reduce complexity […] is used 
to come to decisions despite incomplete information.’278 Evaluation findings are 
used to support decisions in a policy area and to face criticism from political 
                                                        
273 Credibility can be understood as ‘a judgement by others […] that the evaluation is both 
competent and objective.’ Chelimsky, E. 1995. "The Political Environment of Evaluation and 
What it Means for the Development of the Field: Evaluation for a New Century: A Global 
Perspective." American Journal of Evaluation 16(3):215-25. P. 219. See also: Heilman, J. G. 1983. 
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Evaluation 18(1):61-77. 
275 Rutter, J. 2012. "Evidence and Evaluation in Policy Making. A problem of supply or demand?", 
edited by Institute for Government. 
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adversaries. Consequently, trusting the process is crucial for this purpose. The 
central idea is to reduce polarization to promote the acceptance of evaluation 
findings and the legitimisation of an evaluation system.279 
Identifying those key factors for the use of evaluation is not an easy task and it 
requires shaping evaluation results according to the characteristics of the 
potential users, i.e. policymakers, politicians, media, etc.280 As evaluation can 
drive changes in an organisation, there will be interests to cope with. The 
pertinence of the information and the credibility of the results are considered 
fundamental for utilisation. Credibility is a necessary condition for its 
legitimacy, particularly in the political context in which evaluation takes place, 
when it is necessary to establish a relationship between evaluators and 
evaluands to foster utilisation.281 
Values like independence and objectivity are supposed to bring more rationality 
into policymaking through the use of robust and ‘neutral’ evidence. The 
utilisation of evaluation results is based on the reliability of evidence and 
preserving this quality is imperative. To expect a total separation between 
evaluation and politics seems naïve. Evaluators are constantly facing pressures 
during their tasks, and protecting their independence can signify an important 
challenge, not always guaranteed by the institutional framework.282 
Independence generates the adequate conditions for the design of an 
evaluation, for the collection and analysis of data, and for the reporting and 
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Evaluation 14(2):227-48.  
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dissemination of findings ‘in a balanced, fair, and faithful manner.’283 This 
struggle for independence has fostered the debate about the advocacy role of 
evaluators.284 These challenges imply dealing continuously with the interests of 
stakeholders and their power to influence the process.285 Isolating evaluation 
from those factors seems unlikely. Nonetheless, the inclusion of relevant 
stakeholders in the process, the use of a robust methodology, and promoting an 
appropriate dissemination of the findings, i.e. clarity on the scope and 
limitations, and timing, are strategies that can foster the utility of evaluation.286 
These issues are usually addressed by the institutional framework and can 
show the extent to which these rules establish the necessary conditions for the 
effective conduction of evaluations. Its objective is giving evaluation more 
formality and generating safeguards for the potential manipulation of the 
process. The question that arises here is: To what extent can formal rules and 
procedures eliminate discretion? As Hogwood and Gunn state, most of the 
political sensitivity of evaluation is related to the fact that ‘the co-operation 
(rather than simply compliance) of public officials and clients is often 
required.’287 Consequently, the establishment of rules and procedures might 
incentivise compliance, but this is not enough, as evaluation needs to be 
internalised as a managerial and political practice. The institutional framework 
can formally foster—or even impose—the use of evaluation. However, the 
actual effect of this use in policymaking requires transcending the managerial 
sphere and transmitting the political power that it holds for stakeholders. 
The theoretical discussions presented in this section set the basis for 
understanding why politics matters for the utilisation of evaluation. Its political 
nature is manifested in the level of utilisation of findings, in the inclusion of 
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stakeholders, and in the alignment of their beliefs and values. Independence and 
credibility of evaluation become central for its legitimisation as a tool of 
governance. The next section addresses the formalisation of evaluation through 
the establishment of rules and institutions for its performance. 
2.2.3 The Institutionalisation of Evaluation 
The adoption of evaluation tools has made evident the need to develop formal 
actions to guide its utilisation within public organisations. This includes 
establishing the objectives of the evaluative activity, the scope of its influence, 
and the allocation of resources directed to this purpose. In other words, it 
concerns setting criteria or formal rules for its development. According to Mark 
et al. an evaluation policy is a set of ‘high-level rules embedded in the legislation 
that are used to guide the practice of evaluation.’288 Trochim understands this 
concept as ‘any rule or principle that a group or organization uses to guide its 
decisions and actions when doing evaluation.’289 The core element that 
differentiates these conceptualisations is the formality or explicitness of the 
rules that guide evaluation. While Mark et al. consider that these rules can take 
the form of regulation or a legislation bill, Trochim is more flexible by 
recognising that an evaluation policy can arise from informal guidelines and 
implicit principles. Nonetheless, he emphasises the importance of having 
written evaluation policies, because this … 
… can be thought of as a type of communication mechanism […] a signal to 
the entire organization and its stakeholders, communicating what 
evaluations should be done, what resources expended, who is responsible, 
how they should be accomplished, and so on.290 
The establishment of formal rules for evaluation is strictly related to what 
Varone et al. define as the institutionalisation of evaluation: 
Understood as a ‘systematization’ of the expected, if not compulsory, 
recourse to evaluation, which can also be measured by its level of 
implementation within public administrations, political bodies and policy 
networks.291 
                                                        
288 Mark, M. M., L. J. Cooksy, and W. M. K. Trochim. 2009. "Evaluation policy: An introduction and 
overview." New Directions for Evaluation 2009(123):3-11. Pp. 4-5. 
289 Trochim, W. M. K. Ibid."Evaluation policy and evaluation practice."13-32. P. 16. 
290 Ibid. P. 17. 
291 Varone et al. propose an index for measuring the degree of institutionalization of evaluation, 
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The underlying idea of an evaluation policy is the way in which rules and 
guidelines ‘are expressed in legislation, regulations, and expenditures.’292 Even 
though evaluations can be carried out based on informal guidelines, the 
relevance of an explicit evaluation policy is making a statement about different 
variables that in practice can represent major challenges, e.g. dissemination. 
This gives evaluation more leverage as a priority topic in the public agenda; it is 
embedded in a wider range of policies directed to improving and strengthening 
policymaking, e.g. transparency policies. 
The institutionalisation of evaluation can have different meanings according to 
the elements considered important by the stakeholder in charge of its design. 
There is no consensus about what an evaluation policy must include. The 
American Evaluation Association Policy Task Force, for instance, has recognised 
seven key areas worth mentioning (Table 2.2).293 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
considering variables such as organisations directed to evaluation and the existence of an 
epistemic community of evaluation. Varone, F., Jacob, S., and De Winter, L. (2005). Polity, Politics 
and Policy Evaluation in Belgium. Ibid., 11(3), 253-273. P. 255.  
292 Datta, L. E. 2009. "Golden Is the Sand: Memory and Hope in Evaluation Policy and Wvaluation 
Practice." New Directions for Evaluation 123:33-50. P. 35. 
293 The World Bank, for example, considers that a successful monitoring and evaluation system 
should focus on three dimensions: utilization, quality and sustainability. Mackay, K. 2007. "How 
to build M & E systems to support better government." Pp. ix, 157 p. Washington, D.C., US: The 
World Bank. Pp. 23-24.  
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Table 2.2 Areas of an Evaluation Policy 
Evaluation 
definition 
How, if at all, is evaluation defined in an agency or in legislation? 
In such contexts, how is evaluation formally distinguished from 
or related to other functions such as program planning, 
monitoring, performance measurement or implementation?  
Requirements of 
evaluation 
When are evaluations required? 
What programs or entities are required to have evaluations? 
How often are evaluations scheduled? 
What procedures are used to determine when or whether 
evaluation takes place? 
Evaluation methods What approaches or methods of evaluation are recommended or 
required by legislation or regulation, for what types of programs 
or initiatives? 
Human resources 
regarding 
evaluation 
What requirements exist for people who conduct evaluations?  
What types of training, experience or background are required? 
Evaluation budgets What are the standards for budgeting for evaluation work? 
Evaluation 
implementation 
What types of evaluation implementation issues are guided by 
policies? For instance, when are internal versus external 
evaluations required and how are these defined? 
Evaluation ethics 
 
What are the policies for addressing ethical issues in evaluation? 
Source: Based on American Evaluation Association, 2007. AEA Evaluation Policy Task Force 
Charge.  
These areas underline the elements of the evaluation process that require 
guidance or control from a particular stakeholder; usually it is the government 
(central or local) who is in charge of this task. Core aspects of the 
institutionalisation of evaluation are vulnerable to political influence. As it will 
be discussed later, the extent to which stakeholders can exercise this control 
depends on the characteristics of the institutional framework.294 The evolution 
of an evaluation policy can be a gradual process, transiting from a set of 
informal guidelines to an integrated and regulated policy instrument.295 This 
was observed by Leeuw in the case of the Netherlands: 
In the 1980s, evaluation blossomed in the Netherlands, and informal 
evaluation policy not only was formulated but began to evolve into formal 
policy. As described below, this dramatic transition can be attributed to 
four 
factors: (1) demands by Parliament, (2) new vigor in the NAO, (3) the New 
                                                        
294 See: Bamberger, M. 1991. "The Politics of Policy Evaluation in Developing Countries." 
Evaluation and Program Planning 14(4):325-39. 
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Public Management movement, and (4) the Dutch administrative culture.296 
The successful implementation of an evaluation policy is multifactorial, it 
includes political commitment and support, as in the case of the Netherlands, 
but also the development of evaluation capacities. In the case of the European 
Union, for instance, fostering the adoption of evaluation tools in member 
countries was also an incremental process in which evaluation was promoted … 
… through transition funding before and soon after EU accession, explicitly 
targeted at capacity development including training of evaluators; by 
sponsoring “twinning arrangements” between experts in evaluation 
(among other specialties) from established member states and their 
opposite numbers among the new members; by organizing evaluation 
network meetings in Brussels, nationally or at the regional level; and by 
providing guidance material and advice, including a series of guides to 
evaluation thinking and practice.297 
Addressing the institutionalisation of evaluation in the context of this research 
matters for two main reasons. The first one is that the creation of rules and 
procedures for evaluation impacts the interaction among stakeholders and, as a 
result, the outputs (how are these going to be generated?) and outcomes (how 
are these going to be used/disseminated?) of this activity. The second is that the 
identification of core elements of the institutional framework provides a more 
effective lens for observing and analysing political influence. The hypothesis of 
this research suggests that the institutional framework can affect the extent to 
which politics can influence evaluation. Consequently, it is important to 
understand how the rules established for evaluation are transformed by 
political pressures. 
The work of Chelimsky is useful for this purpose. She identifies three levels of 
political pressure that act on evaluation policies in the context of governmental 
structures (Figure 2.4).298 
                                                        
296 Leeuw, F. L. 2009. "Evaluation policy in the Netherlands." New Directions for Evaluation 
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Figure 2.4 Political Pressures to Evaluation in Government 
Source: Based on Chelimsky, E., 2009. “Integrating Evaluation Units into the Political 
Environment of Government: The Role of Evaluation Policy.” New Directions for Evaluation, No. 
123, pp 51-66. 
 
Chelimsky concentrates on the politics of evaluation found within the 
governmental sphere. However, as analysed in Chapter 6, political pressures can 
come from many other different sources, i.e. groups of interests and political 
parties. These levels are consistent with the discussion about governance. The 
transformations of the state have affected not only the relationship between 
government and other stakeholders, but also within the governmental 
apparatus itself. Evaluation units are not only the means through which 
evaluation is institutionalised; they are also immersed in the dynamics of power 
and negotiation with evaluated bodies on the one hand, and with evaluators on 
the other. This role as mediator is a safeguard for preserving the independence 
and credibility of evaluation. Nonetheless, it cannot be ignored that these are 
not external or isolated bodies; they are, as any other agency, involved in the 
politics of the public sector. They can be perceived both as an aid for the process 
or as a menace for the interests of stakeholders. 
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Institutionalising evaluation is a way to give this activity more structure and 
coherence, but as Contandriopoulos states: 
It is not enough that the demand for efficiency be perceived by public 
opinion as sufficiently legitimate to have evaluation institutionalized; 
rather, the various actors must incorporate this new social standard into 
their ways of conceiving their own responsibilities and those of others.299 
This shows that evaluation culture also represents a substantial element in the 
institutionalisation of evaluation. It is undeniable that promoting clear rules is 
necessary for incorporating evaluation in the logic of the public sector and for 
having more elements to cope with its political nature. The identification of key 
rules for the functioning of evaluation gives a more precise idea of those areas 
that are more susceptible to politics. The next section exposes the core 
discussions found in the evaluation studies literature about the hidden politics 
of evaluation. 
2.3 The Hidden Politics of Evaluation 
In the context of the study of the hidden politics of evaluation, it is necessary to 
deepen into the concept of politics, which has been studied extensively in the 
literature.300 From Aristotle to contemporary thinkers, politics has represented 
an obsession for scholars from various disciplines, although no consensus about 
its definition has been reached. Lasswell, for example, understands politics as 
who gets what, when, and how.301 This apparently simple definition has nurtured 
numerous debates around the multidimensionality of politics and its 
interpretation.302 In his work, Why We Hate Politics, Hay identifies a dozen 
conceptualisations of politics. Among the most relevant are: 
1. Politics as any and all social interaction occurring within the sphere of 
government; 
2. Politics as government, where government is understood as a formal 
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decision-making process the outcomes of which are binding upon member 
of the community in question; 
3. Politics as public and formal set of processes and rituals through which 
the citizens of state may participate, often at arm’s length, in the process of 
government; 
[…] 
6. Politics as a process of public deliberation and scrutiny of matters of 
collective concern or interest to a community; 
7. Politics as a process for holding to account those charged with 
responsibility for collective decision-making in the community. 
[…].303 
Looking at politics as a means for scrutinising those with the power to influence 
in the public sphere, e.g. government, helps explaining the role of evaluation in 
policymaking. This demands looking carefully at the relationships between 
those stakeholders involved and what this means for the scrutiny power vested 
to evaluation. Politics, therefore, is understood here as the way in which 
stakeholders use their resources (including power) to participate and influence 
the process and outcomes of evaluation according to their own agendas. 
The transition experienced in the conceptualisation of evaluation across time is 
an important element to highlight. From the ideas about the need for objective 
and ‘value-free’ evidence obtained through robust methodologies, scholars have 
moved towards the impossibility—and undesirability—of abstracting 
evaluation from its political context.304 Since the early seventies, academics and 
practitioners have begun debating about the interaction between evaluation 
and politics.305 At that time, most of the discussion focused on the pressures 
faced by evaluators in the field and the reticence of operators to cooperate with 
the process. Since then, the discussion has reached other levels, but it is still at 
an early stage in the development of new knowledge, particularly in terms of 
empirical evidence. Taking this into account, the contribution of this thesis can 
be summarised in three major points: 
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 The study of the political nature of evaluation has been constrained to the 
evaluation studies field. Consequently, little is known about the implications for 
the broader context of the policy process and governance. This thesis aims to 
produce a more comprehensive analysis of what the politics of evaluation does 
mean and how the current conditions in which this activity takes place affect its 
process and outcomes. 
 The hidden politics of evaluation require a more integrated and systematic 
framework for grasping those key factors of evaluation that are affected. This 
thesis proposes a thematic framework to guide this discussion and serves as a 
basis for analysing this topic both theoretically and empirically. 
 Most of the knowledge generated about the politics of evaluation has focused 
on explaining how this affects the practice of evaluation. However, why politics 
affects evaluation has been little explored. In this sense, the emphasis given by 
this thesis to the institutional framework aims to fill this knowledge gap by 
discussing those elements related to the rules and procedures for evaluation 
that affect the relationships that are established as a consequence of this 
activity. 
An additional contribution is the comparative approach adopted by this 
research. Looking at the institutional architecture for evaluation in two different 
countries is useful for understanding how social, political, and administrative 
factors lead to a different set of rules for evaluation and, consequently, to a 
different way in which politics are manifested.306 
2.3.1 General Notions About the Hidden Politics of Evaluation 
The early development of the knowledge about the politics of evaluation was 
mostly based on the perspective of the evaluators, who identified the rationale 
underpinning the commissioning of evaluations and the values at stake.307 They 
faced the conflict of preserving the values associated with their role as 
researchers (independence, credibility, etc.), while promoting evaluation as a 
more influential activity in policymaking.308 
One of the most valued contributions is the work of Weiss, who identifies three 
key ways in which politics affects evaluation: 
First, the policies and programs with which evaluation deals are the 
creatures of political decisions […] Second, because evaluation is 
                                                        
306 The work of Weaver and Rockman is useful for understanding the implications of 
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undertaken in order to feed into decision-making, its reports enter the 
political arena […] Third, and perhaps least recognized, evaluation itself 
has a political stance […] it makes implicit political statements about such 
issues as the problematic nature of some programs and the 
unchallengeability of others, the legitimacy of program goals and program 
strategies, the utility of incremental reform, and even the appropriate role 
of the social scientist in policy and program formation.309 
Undeniably, Weiss’s contribution is remarkable. However, her conceptualisation 
remains too short, considering the transformations that the state has suffered. 
Indeed, public policy is the result of political decisions and evaluation is 
embedded in dynamics wherein values and beliefs can be in conflict. Also the 
nature of evaluation itself increases its political stance, as there are now more 
stakeholders involved. It is no longer a bilateral relationship between 
evaluators and evaluands; civil society and pressure groups are now also 
involved in the scrutiny of policy. Politicians and government officials see the 
potential of evaluation findings as a means for legitimisation and political 
discrediting. Universities, research centres, and private consultants have a 
vested interest in participating in the market of evaluation. NGOs and charities 
are currently important producers of evidence to support or discard the 
statements made by evaluation. Moreover, the media has also found in 
evaluation an important source of information to highlight policy issues and to 
promote the public debate. This reality is much more complex than the one 
described by Weiss in the seventies; nonetheless, she set very significant 
theoretical grounds for the study of the politics of evaluation.310 
The political component of evaluation can be seen both as an advantage and as a 
limitation or, as Datta accurately describes it, as ‘a bad master but a good 
friend.’311 As Hedrick explains, evaluation can benefit from political 
disagreements by supporting the conduction of studies by a third trustable 
party, i.e. independent agencies. On the contrary, it can generate bias in the 
                                                        
309 Weiss, C. H. 1973. "Where Politics and Evaluation Research Meet." American Journal of 
Evaluation 14(1):93-106. P. 94. 
310 The work of Palumbo is also recognised as a substantial contribution to the field, he reflected 
about the different areas in which politics can interfere and, more importantly, what this meant 
for the praxis of evaluation. Palumbo, D. J. 1987. The Politics of Program Evaluation. California, 
US: SAGE. 
311 Datta, L. E. 2011. "Politics and Evaluation: More Than Methodology." American Journal of 
Evaluation 32(2):273-94. P. 274. 
79 
 
scope, implementation, and dissemination of evaluations.312 Bovens et al. 
incorporate the political dimension in their definition of evaluation by seeing it 
as … 
… an inherently normative act, a matter of political judgement […] it can at 
best be informed but never fully dominated by scholarly efforts to bring the 
logic of reason, calculation, and dispassionate truth seeking to the world of 
policy making.313 
For them, recognising the political nature of evaluation allows policymakers and 
politicians to make a better use of evaluation as a tool for the accomplishment of 
their objectives, e.g. legitimising a programme. More recently, the discussion has 
focused on the advocacy role of evaluators314 and the political nature of 
evaluation instruments.315 
The multiple stakeholders involved in policymaking, i.e. civil society, media, and 
political parties, have promoted the idea that evaluation can become an 
instrument for pursuing their interests. As Taylor and Balloch state: ‘Different 
stakeholder views and interests expressed from positions of more or less power 
and these relations of power are capable of being independently grasped.’316 
This has fostered the development of evaluation approaches that incorporate 
this new dynamic. Responsive evaluation, for example: 
… focuses on stakeholder issues and engages stakeholders in dialogues 
about the quality of their practice. The aim is to heighten the personal and 
mutual understanding of stakeholders as a vehicle for practice 
improvement.317 
The need to engage stakeholders in evaluation is not exempt from politics, 
especially considering that they are implicated in asymmetrical power 
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relationships.318 Key discussions about the political nature of evaluation 
concern the modification of its role within the public sector. Karlsson explains 
this as a: 
… shift from an evaluation structure whose function has been to deliver 
material that can be used in the building of various welfare programs, to an 
evaluative function with the purpose of feeding the ongoing administrative 
control and decision-making process.319 
The evidence that evaluation generates can serve different stakeholders to 
support or disqualify a political decision.320 This can explain why participatory 
approaches in evaluation have become more popular by recognising the 
existence of stakeholders and their potential influence.321 Therefore, the 
connection between evaluation and politics can be seen from different 
perspectives. According to Taylor and Balloch, there are two approaches for 
understanding this relationship.322 The first one is rationalistic (scientific 
realism)323 which focuses on the values of objectivity and neutrality and is based 
on the assumption that evaluation is performed with scientific rigour and with 
no political influence.324 Its purpose is to preserve evaluation from political 
pressures by ignoring the possible influence of politics and by constructing 
policy optimums that can be measured through evaluations.325 
The second approach is social constructivism or argumentative evaluation, which 
assumes that there cannot be a division between politics and evaluation.326 The 
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central argument is that knowledge derived from evaluations is subjective and 
contextual. For social constructivists, evaluation generates information built on 
the values and beliefs of the participants and needs to be systematically 
interpreted. In terms of the hidden politics of evaluation the changes promoted 
by evaluation are a consequence of the exchange of perspectives and opinions 
between stakeholders, as Valovirta observes: 
The reason for the importance of argumentation in public policy is simple: 
as the number of actors involved in decision making increases, the need for 
negotiation, discussion and argumentation increases.327 
This perspective recognises the inherent political nature of evaluation and the 
dynamic when it occurs. While the behaviour of stakeholders can be highly 
unpredictable, the existence of institutional arrangements for evaluation helps 
in reducing uncertainty by providing them a clearer idea of how the process 
works (or is supposed to work). The hypothesis established in this thesis 
suggests that the institutional framework influences the interaction between 
politics and evaluation and the way in which an evaluation policy is designed 
and implemented. In line with this, Widmer recognises that ‘the purpose and the 
(intended) utilization should be the starting point in defining the most 
appropriate institutional design.’328 The value given to institutions as elements 
that constrain and to an extent predict the behaviour of stakeholders gains 
more importance, specifically in terms of how these institutions can promote 
the influence of evaluation.329 As Henry notes, evaluation has transited from 
being usually constrained to the executive branch to be part of the legislative 
structure and even an activity performed by NGOs, as now, ‘evaluation ﬁndings 
have to pass scrutiny from a variety of individuals representing numerous 
institutions that have a plethora of interests.’330 This makes clearer the 
connection between evaluation and auditing as mechanisms of internal and 
external control. Consequently, the course of an evaluation relies on the 
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configuration of the different agreements established among stakeholders. As 
any other stage of the policy cycle, evaluation is limited by power and its 
distribution denotes a key element for uncovering the hidden politics of 
evaluation.331 Power can be understood as the capacity of stakeholders to 
exercise their resources, i.e. financial, data, etc. to pursue those interests that 
might be affected by evaluation.332 
Hoefer recognises two perspectives for understanding power in policymaking. 
The first states: ‘Those with power resources, particularly money, are the ones 
who decide what government policy becomes.’333 As many decisions in 
evaluation depend on the availability of resources, its control can represent a 
disguised strategy for affecting the course of an evaluation. The second suggests 
that the ‘use of power is to keep a proposal from being adopted or 
considered’.334 Power is used here to prevent or to provoke a particular 
outcome. In both cases, evaluation can give stakeholders the opportunity of 
both legitimating and supporting a policy or building arguments against it. In 
this last case, a stakeholder’s statement about the convenience or inconvenience 
of maintaining a policy can be supported by evaluation evidence. This is 
consistent with the discussion about the legitimisation function of evaluation, 
even in those cases in which evaluations are intentionally carried out for 
supporting a predetermined position.335 Nonetheless, this support depends on 
the extent to which the whole evaluation system is considered legitimate. As 
House points out: 
Evaluation persuades rather than convinces, argues rather than 
demonstrates, is credible rather than certain, is variably accepted rather 
than compelling.336 
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This discussion provides a general panorama of what the politics of evaluation 
mean. More specifically, the theoretical debate stresses three major arguments 
worth highlighting. The first one is that evaluation is per se embedded in a 
political context, its object of study, the values underpinning it, and the potential 
consequences of its findings are affected by political decisions. The second 
argument is that the increasing number of stakeholders involved in evaluation 
inevitably generates political disputes derived from the multiple interests that 
intervene and the asymmetrical power relationships existent. The third is that a 
gap exists in our knowledge, i.e. scholars have highlighted the politics involved 
in evaluation and the need for practitioners and evaluators to be aware of the 
possible implications in their practice, but there is very little referral to the way 
in which the institutional framework affects the dynamics between politics and 
evaluation and why different institutional arrangements favour or limit this 
relationship. This chapter has mapped the broad intellectual canvas on which 
this thesis exists. It has therefore deployed a fairly broad brush in analytical and 
theoretical terms. The next section offers a more fine-grained approach by 
drawing upon this wider literature in order to design a five-part thematic 
framework that will then be applied in the later empirical chapters. The aim of 
this framework is to develop the analytical tradition and leverage of evaluation 
studies as related to political dynamics. The remainder of this chapter examines 
each theme in detail.  
84 
 
2.3.2 Thematic Framework for Understanding the Hidden Politics of 
Evaluation 
This thesis proposes a thematic framework that provides a more structured 
guide for understanding the hidden politics of evaluation. It represents an 
original and relevant contribution to the existent knowledge in at least two 
senses. On the one hand, it provides a clearer conceptualisation of the way in 
which politics and evaluation interact. On the other hand, the identification of 
key variables related to this interaction facilitates its study within an empirical 
context. 
Despite the intangibility of politics, this framework sets out key themes for 
analysing its relationship with evaluation that can serve as a basis for looking at 
different cases through a structured lens and for setting conditions for 
comparability. Table 2.3 presents this thematic framework based on five core 
elements: purpose, resources, process, outputs, and outcomes; each is developed 
in this section. 
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Table 2.3 Thematic Framework for the Understanding of the Hidden Politics of Evaluation 
Theme Meaning Key Questions Analytical Variables Key Literature References 
Purpose 
The aims and 
ambitions of the 
evaluation process 
(legal obligation, 
legitimacy of 
public decisions, 
identification of 
goals achieved, 
etc.). 
Which is the main 
purpose of the 
evaluation? 
Which are the expected 
results? 
Which will be the effect 
on the policymaking 
process? 
Role given to evaluation 
(support to the policy 
process, legitimisation) 
Bjørnholt and Larsen, 2014; Palumbo, 1987 
Object of evaluation Vartiainen, 2002; Owen and Rogers, 1999 
Scope Mark et al., 2009; Howell and Yemane, 2006; 
Hedrick, 1998 
Timing 
 
Bamberger et al., 2012; Balthasar, 2009; Mohan 
and Sullivan, 2006 
Institutionalization Mark et al., 2009; Trochim, 2009; Datta, 2009; 
Furubo et al., 2002; Contandriopoulos, 1999 
Resources 
The capacity of the 
evaluating 
organisation in 
terms of staff, 
finance, 
knowledge and 
political capital. 
Is there reliable and 
pertinent information to 
perform evaluations? 
Do public agencies have 
the financial resources 
required to perform 
evaluations? 
Do public officials have 
the required skills to 
conduct and manage 
evaluations?  
Funding Fletcher and Dyson, 2013; Bamberger et al., 2012; 
Chelimsky, 2008; De Lay and Manda, 2004 
Data 
 
Bamberger et al., 2012; Guenther, 2008; De Lay 
and Manda, 2004;Chelimsky, 1995; McLemore 
and Neumann, 1987 
Human Resources Desautels and Jacob, 2012; Lopez-Acevedo et al., 
2012; Leeuw et al., 1999; House, 1997 
Methodology Chelimsky, 2012; Green et al., 2007; Patton, 1987 
Time restrictions Salisbury et al., 2010, Mohan and Sullivan, 2006 
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Table 2.3 Continued 
Theme Meaning Key Questions Analytical Variables Key Literature References 
Process 
The way in which 
evaluation studies are 
undertaken and the 
‘tools of government’ 
at the evaluator’s 
disposal. 
Does the evaluation process promote 
independency and objectivity? Are there 
reliable instruments to evaluate public 
programmes and policies? 
Do the professional selected to perform 
evaluations are chosen on the basis of their 
skills? 
Do the politics of evaluation influence the 
process? 
Interaction between 
stakeholders 
Jacob, 2011; Baur et al., 2010 
Chelimsky, 2009; Barbier, 1999 
Role of commissioners The LSE GV314 Group, 2014; 
Palfrey et al., 2012; Chelimsky, 
2009 
Independence Brown and Klerman, 2012; 
Lonsdale , 2008; Chelimsky, 2008 
Credibility Copestake, 2014; Mohan, 2014; 
Sturges, 2014; Bozeman, 2004 
Openness to external 
participants 
(democratization of 
evaluation) 
 
Picciotto, 2015; Hanberger, 
2006; Green, 2001; Ryan and 
Johnson, 2000 
Outputs 
The final assessment 
produced by the 
evaluator and the 
dissemination process 
through which it may 
be debated, assessed 
and acted-upon. 
Does evaluation produce reliable, relevant 
and pertinent information about public 
policy? 
Are the results derived from evaluation 
used? 
Which are the mechanisms for the 
dissemination of results? 
Can it be identified the influence of politics 
in the outputs of evaluation? 
Use Neuman et al., 2013; Balthasar, 
2009; Ginsburg and Rhett, 2003; 
Feinstein, 2002; Weiss, 1998b 
Dissemination 
 
Green et al., 2009; Lawrenz et al., 
2007 
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Table 2.3 Continued 
Theme Meaning Key Questions Analytical Variables Key Literature References 
Outcomes 
The broader long-
term impact and role 
of evaluation within 
the politico-
administrative 
system. 
Are there mechanisms to identify the 
outcomes of evaluation? 
Is it possible to identify evidence about the 
utilization of evaluation results and its effect 
on the improvement of policymaking? 
Is it possible to identify the long-term 
effects of evaluation in the political arena? 
Effects in the 
policymaking process 
Bogenschneider and Corbett, 
2010; Geva-May, 2004 
Development of 
evaluation capacities 
Heider, 2011; Rist et al., 2011; 
McDonald et al., 2003 
Linkage to 
accountability 
Bovens et al., 2014; Cunill-Grau 
and Ospina, 2012; Hoefer, 2000; 
Chelimsky, 1996 
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 Purpose 
The design and planning of an evaluation includes setting its objectives, defining 
the questions to be answered, and establishing the potential target audience.337 
The purpose of evaluation determines the reasons for conducting an evaluation. 
Its omission generates ‘a risk that the evaluation will focus on the wrong 
concerns, draw the wrong conclusions and provide recommendations which 
will not be useful for the intended users of evaluation results.’338 As a first 
approach to the development of an evaluation, the purpose makes a statement 
about the political values and beliefs that will guide this activity. This is a 
privilege limited only to one or a few stakeholders and is one of the reasons why 
it is a key political issue. The actor who controls this variable has the power to 
define important elements of the evaluation, such as the programmes to 
evaluate and the timing. It influences both the expected contribution within 
government, e.g. for practitioners, as well as for other stakeholders, e.g. the 
media. Evaluation is embedded in a political context in which values and beliefs 
affect the decisions made at this stage.339 
While evaluation can be adopted as a mechanism for supporting policymaking, 
it can also have a legitimising function. This is not a minor issue in terms of 
politics. From an instrumental perspective, evaluation can provide insights 
about the functioning of a programme and the way in which processes are 
turned into outputs.340 As a legitimisation mechanism, different actors use 
evaluations to support solutions in which they already believe. This can be seen 
more clearly in the discussion about the adoption of an internal or external 
model of evaluation and the rules that determine its nature.341 While some 
systems favour self-evaluation for different reasons, including a more detailed 
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knowledge of the object of evaluation, others value the independence and 
credibility that an external evaluation is supposed to offer.342 Values are 
prioritised by stakeholders and this affects how rules for evaluation are 
designed.343 The object of evaluation depends also on the definition of the 
purpose. Evaluation can study a policy, a programme, an organisation, or even 
an individual.344 This range of objects reflects the level of analysis and 
specificity that evaluation can reach.345 It also affects the level of cooperation 
obtained for evaluation. Failures found at policy level might be considered less 
threatening that those at individual level. This finds echo in Hood’s ideas about 
‘the blame game’ in terms of the responsibility for the success or failure of a 
policy possibly being diluted in the process.346 
The selection of the object can determine a priori the kind of information that 
will be produced, as ‘the primary use of research is thought by some to be 
motivated by a desire to support prior positions rather than to inform decisions 
in the first instance.’347 The wideness or narrowness of the scope is linked to the 
level of analytical depth. As a political decision, it can be constrained by the 
interests of stakeholders who can aim for the evaluation to look only at those 
variables that might lead to positive findings and avoid vulnerable areas, to 
‘address only one perspective, perhaps intentionally.’348 An important question 
to address regards timing—when to evaluate?—which can be related to political 
convenience. For example, evaluations prior to electoral times can be a 
mechanism for making explicit the goals achieved during a term by a specific 
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actor, e.g. party in office.349 
All these issues are relevant for discussing the institutional framework. Rules 
for evaluation are ‘a signal to the entire organization and its stakeholders, 
communicating what evaluations should be done, what resources expended, 
who is responsible, how they should be accomplished.’350 These will shape the 
behaviour of stakeholders, including those setting the purpose.351 
Blomberg and Waldo state that a clear definition of the purpose and the 
stakeholders’ commitment to it can help evaluation in coping with the political 
context.352 If this commitment exists, stakeholders with different political 
positions are more likely to reach agreements on the basis that information is 
reliable. The predomination of a particular stakeholder in the evaluation 
process allows having control of those variables that might affect their interests 
by reducing the uncertainty associated with the possible outcomes of the 
evaluation.353 This is why the confrontation between stakeholders ‘requires 
political, ethical, and methodological negotiations that become intertwined with 
each other in the cauldron of program-focused decision-making.’354 The 
conduction of these negotiations will be affected by the formal and informal 
rules existent, e.g. who can access this decision. 
Resources 
The planning stage involves deciding about the availability and allocation of 
resources for the performance of evaluations. Regarding this issue, Bamberger 
identifies some key political issues of evaluation in developing countries related 
to the control over the evaluation process and the way in which resource 
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restrictions impact evaluation.355 
Funding, for example, seems to be one of the most effective ways to influence 
the process. The sponsor has the right (explicit or not) to define the terms of the 
evaluation, the variables to consider, and the questions to answer. The power of 
sponsors affects the conditions for the evaluation and promotes the 
establishment of a sort of dominant relationship with evaluators. Seen as 
clients, sponsors can define the characteristics for the product. As House 
observes, in the case of drug evaluations, ‘Academics are bound by detailed 
contracts with sponsors that limit independence in every way.’356 Regardless of 
the sponsor of an evaluation, it is clear that its performance depends on the 
funding provided by this actor.357 
International organisations, for example, ‘must demonstrate the value of their 
investments to justify these expenditures and continue funding.’358 If the benefit 
of evaluation activities is not clearly perceived, Which will be the incentive for 
allocating resources to this end? This concerns the symbolic value given to 
evaluation. Aside from its potential benefits for policymaking and for 
accountability, evaluation can also be seen as a politically profitable activity 
associated with an image of commitment to values like transparency and 
efficiency.359 Consequently, even in a hypothetical scenario of not perceiving 
any instrumental benefit from evaluation, it can still be an issue in the 
government’s agenda because of its political value. 
The relationship between evaluation and funders presents other political 
consequences. According to O’Brien et al., ‘Managers seek to present themselves 
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and their organizations in the most expedient light in particular to funding 
bodies.’360 Evaluation can therefore become a means to pursue a better 
allocation of resources based on evidence about a policy, e.g. efficiency or 
effectiveness. It can represent a bargaining chip between public organisations 
and funding agencies.361 As Fletcher and Dyson accurately state: “We live in a 
political climate that requires ‘evidence’ in exchange for funding.”362 This 
linkage between positive evaluation findings of a programme and the allocation 
of its budget was also identified by Chelimsky.363 The control of funding is a way 
to increase the power of stakeholders by giving them more favourable 
conditions to negotiate.364 This resonates with the question about how 
evaluation evidence is produced and which conditions are put in place to 
generate relevant and useful information: How do decisions about resources 
affect these conditions and, consequently, the outputs of evaluation systems? 
Data, for instance, can be an object of political manipulation at least in two 
senses. The first one concerns the access and disclosure of information needed 
by evaluators to make their judgements. The political context in which an 
evaluation takes place ‘may impose constraints—sometimes going as far as the 
total restriction or classification of information—on evaluator’s access to 
data.’365 This can be an instrument of control for the protection of the 
stakeholders’ interests. Evaluators can face important obstacles in obtaining the 
data, particularly when dealing with a politically sensitive policy.366 According 
to Guenther, this resistance can be explained by two reasons: the fear that 
information will be used to the detriment of the evaluand and the organisational 
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culture that straitens people from disclosing information with external 
parties.367 
The identification of multiple sources of information to develop feasible and 
pertinent research questions is central for the analysis.368 Particularly in 
complex areas like health policy, the collection and systematisation of 
information demands the participation of multiple agencies and governmental 
bodies.369 Consequently, actors need to establish connections to access different 
sources of information. They are therefore obliged to negotiate throughout the 
process to set the conditions for the evaluation. This concerns not only having 
resources, but also defining how these are managed and how stakeholders 
would be able to establish connections that might facilitate their access to 
data.370 The growth of these relationships depends on the trust between 
stakeholders and on their political connections.371 Cooperation, as discussed in 
the section about governance, becomes a key element. 
Another important issue is the potential political manipulation of data, e.g. the 
suppression or modification of information potentially harmful for 
stakeholders. De Lay and Manda observed this in their study about the 
HIV/AIDS crisis in Africa: 
Data may be inaccurate, attributed to the wrong population, or 
threatening to political leaders […] Those engaged in M&E have a 
professional and ethical responsibility to clearly disclaim the limits of 
data sources and the analyses based on them to ensure that the scale 
and scope of problems are as accurately portrayed as possible..372 
Data can become an important element of political control in situations when 
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access to crucial information is delayed, obstructed, or even denied. This 
uncovers that the hidden politics of evaluation as controlling data is a way to 
cope with a potential threat to the power of stakeholders. However, considering 
the conditions that governance imposes, it could be counterproductive to adopt 
a reluctant position to evaluation. Public officials may resist sharing information 
with evaluators, fearing that this might affect them individually, i.e. with job 
security,373 but at the same time data can become an instrument for increasing 
their influence in the process. As Kniker explains, recalling his experience as 
chief of evaluation at the U.S. Department of State, ‘The more data were shared 
with these customers and stakeholders, the more they came to rely and depend 
upon it, gradually making us an invaluable resource.’374 Both the use of data 
for/from evaluation can be subject to politics. On the one hand, controlling the 
access to key data for the evaluation can influence its outputs. On the other 
hand, it can give more leverage to stakeholders to support the decision-making 
process and to reach a more privileged position. 
Human resources for evaluation studies are also susceptible to politics. The 
development of evaluation capabilities within public organisations is recognised 
as a key element for an effective evaluation system.375 It influences the level of 
power and discretion that stakeholders have in the process.376 This relates back 
to the institutional framework. Responsibilities for the conduction of an 
evaluation policy can determine the power that stakeholders will have within 
government, i.e. finance/planning units vis à vis specialised evaluation 
agencies.377 Investing in evaluation capabilities is a political decision. More 
knowledge also means more consciousness about its potential use in the public 
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sector and the idea of the smarter state discussed in this thesis.378 A more 
professionalised evaluation body might impact the level of engagement of 
stakeholders because it concerns the modification of values, beliefs, and 
routines in organisations.379 
The other issue refers to the market of evaluators which has been developing at 
different rates during the last decades. In the early 2000s, Donaldson and 
Scriven stated that evaluation was ‘in a second major boom period in its rather 
short history’ produced by a wide range of policy areas that demanded the 
participation of evaluators.380 In Europe, for example, ‘The number of 
consultancy firms active in the field of evaluation has risen sharply in all 
countries’.381 This relatively recent blooming of evaluation is a consequence of 
the governments’ financial and legitimacy crises and of a stronger demand for 
accountability.382 At all levels (supranational, national, and local), the rise of 
evaluation generated a market of knowledge. In the context of the evidence-
based policymaking approach, as Bogenschneider and Corbett observe, there 
are knowledge- producers and knowledge consumers interacting on a regular 
basis. The information derived from evaluation represents an asset in this 
market.383 
This market is composed by public agencies that commission evaluation studies 
in exchange of a payment. This does not seem any different from the purchase of 
any other product in any other market. However, the way in which actors 
interact does differ. The number of buyers and sellers is reduced and prices 
cannot be determined by the market due to this lack of competiveness. As House 
identified in the case of the United States: 
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There are only a few buyers – the government agencies – […] that contract 
out evaluations, so the market is imperfect on the demand (government) 
side, the market is also imperfect on the supply (contractor) side […] 
typically, only a few firms bid for contracts in most instances.384 
A reduced universe of public agencies commissioning evaluations acts according 
to the conditions set by the legal framework; for example, the public bidding of 
evaluation contracts. The situation in the supply side is similar. Evaluation 
requires specialised expertise and proficiency in the use of methodological 
tools; ergo, very few people can access the market. The increasing demand for 
the development of research has contributed to the growth of the ‘business of 
evidence’ sector.385 Here, it is worth reflecting upon how this situation has 
modified the behaviour of evaluators. Academics have research interests to 
pursue, but as service providers, these interests might shift and produce bias.386 
As an economic activity, evaluation implies a struggle between the interests of 
the buyer (public agencies) and the seller (evaluation firms). The dynamics of 
these relationships of power influences how evaluation is undertaken.387 This 
concerns directly the institutional framework as it has set boundaries and 
control mechanisms for their interaction. For example: To what extent are 
evaluators able to perform their job without interference from politicians and 
public officials? Independence arises here as an important variable, especially in 
relation to the nature and strength of the relationships that are established.388 
The idea of looking at the political influence in the management of resources in 
an evaluation is underpinned by continuous negotiation between evaluators 
and sponsors in terms of independence.389 This will be discussed when 
                                                        
384 House, E. R. 1997. "Evaluation in the Government Marketplace." American Journal of 
Evaluation 18(1):37-48. P. 38. 
385 See: PWC. 2012. "The Business of Evidence. A report prepared for the Market Research 
Society." London, UK. 
386 Luo, H. 2010. "The Role for an Evaluator: A Fundamental Issue for Evaluation of Education 
and Social Programs " International Education Studies 3(2):42-50. 
387 Jacob analysed the role of key actors in evaluation; particularly in the case of the client 
(commissioner) he highlights the political power associated to this actor, in terms of its capacity 
to define the focus and scope of an evaluation, the selection of the evaluator, among other 
relevant decisions. Jacob, S. 2011. "Sharing Power among Evaluation Players: Mission Possible?" 
in Evaluation. Seeking Truth or Power?, edited by P. Eliadis, J. E. Furubo, and S. Jacob. New Jersey, 
US: Transaction Publishers. 
388 Lonsdale, J. 2008. "Balancing Independence and Responsiveness: A Practitioner Perspective 
on the Relationships Shaping Performance Audit." Evaluation 14(2):227-48. 
389 Chelimsky, E. 2008. "A Clash of Cultures: Improving the “Fit” Between Evaluative 
Independence and the Political Requirements of a Democratic Society." American Journal of 
97 
 
addressing the process of evaluation. 
Methodology represents also a technical resource susceptible to politics. The 
tools selected for the collection, systematisation, and analysis of data for 
evaluation will affect both the process and the outputs. The institutional 
framework can also influence the methodological selection by permitting the 
prerogative of this decision to those stakeholders in a privileged position. In 
some cases, this decision is taken by the commissioner; in others, evaluators can 
freely select the tools that they consider most suitable. The application of 
standardised instruments based on a unique methodology can also be an 
element defined by the institutional framework.390 As Norris recognises: 
The increasing tendency of governments to prespecify the characteristics 
of good evaluation by providing guidelines and standards for their 
evaluation contracts stems from an understandable desire for greater 
predictability and control over the content and process of evaluation.391 
Chelimsky states that the methodological selection is constrained by political 
factors. For instance, some agencies maintain strong commitments to certain 
methods, e.g. randomised controlled trials (RCT), generating some resistance to 
test other approaches.392 This can be explained by different reasons, such as the 
preference of stakeholders or organisational routines, but it can also be a 
decision taken on the basis of selecting those methods that can deliver more 
benefits for a particular stakeholder, or that are more aligned with their 
expectations.393 Chelimsky also addresses the case of the single narrative which 
refers to … 
… a narrative that sees increasing numbers of government programs and 
policies embodying a single idea, or positing a simple, one-on-one cause-
and-effect relationship, both of which are established, not by evidence, but 
rather by suppressing existing evidence that is inconvenient to the 
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particular idea or relationship being advanced.394 
This is an important threat derived from the control exercised over the process 
and from the perception of the potential benefits of certain methods.395 This 
resonates with the methodological prejudice discussed by Patton, which occurs 
when evaluators are keen to use those methods more familiar to their 
discipline. This can be a conscious or unconscious way to bias evaluation and it 
can provoke rejection from other stakeholders and affect credibility.396 This is a 
key factor because: 
Methodological credibility has great importance not just in the planning 
and conduct but also in the survivability and use of an evaluation. It is thus 
crucial that evaluators retain control of their methods choices […] 
especially because of political pressures, which are a constant in 
government and against which they must eventually defend those 
choices.397 
This discussion relates back to the concepts of ideology and polarization 
(Section 2.2.2). The beliefs and values of the stakeholders will affect the 
decisions made, and vice versa.398 The level to which this can affect the 
evaluation process will depend on their power and resources, and on the 
conditions set by the institutional framework. A final resource to discuss is time. 
Constraints of this nature can interfere with the work of an evaluator and 
his/her capacity to perform a robust study. As Mohan and Sullivan suggest, this 
involves a negotiation between stakeholders for establishing a suitable time 
framework.399 The control of time, usually by commissioners, is a political way 
to limit the scope of a study and to exercise power. Contracts for evaluation 
serve as a mechanism to define ex ante the conditions that will rule the 
relationship between commissioners and evaluators, including the time 
available for the analysis. Evaluators are constrained to work under this 
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framework without the possibility of expanding the focus of their work, 
affecting their methodological choices.400 
According to Salisbury et al., time is a variable that creates tension because 
policy-makers need useful information in a relatively short time span, and 
evaluators can see this as ‘risking running counter to methodological 
robustness.’401 This will be discussed later in the outputs of evaluation. 
However, stakeholders will demand differentiated products according to their 
needs and interests. Politicians might give a higher value to practical findings 
that allow them to get advantage of a political momentum than to a robust 
academic paper with little practical application. This might produce conflicts 
among stakeholders,402 but its solution is a matter of defining priorities, 
negotiating, and eventually, the predomination of someone’s interests. 
Process 
Rules for the commissioning, conduction, and supervision of an evaluation 
provide stakeholders the power to influence this process. It is possible to 
identify two major institutional designs for evaluation (see Section 2.2.3). The 
first one gives the prerogative to public organisations, i.e. ministries, for 
carrying out internally or commissioning to an external party the development 
of evaluation. The second implies the existence of an evaluation agency that acts 
as an intermediary between evaluators and evaluands.403 In both models, the 
relationships established can become extremely political because they are based 
on the resources and power of stakeholders, determining the extent to which 
they are willing to cooperate. 
One of the most political connections occurs between commissioners and 
evaluators. This interaction leads to what House labels as ‘socialization’ 
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between public agencies and evaluation firms.404 According to this author, both 
parties have privileged information that they might not be able to obtain in a 
more competitive market and that creates distortions that might influence the 
results. Major consequences of this ‘socialization’ can be differentiated in 
relation to the actor. Public agencies, for example, can benefit from finding out 
which firms are reliable and are able to manage their contracts. They can also 
identify who can successfully perform the work according to their standards 
and who is more likely to establish ‘informal agreements’ to fulfil the 
requirements set by the legal framework. As firms depend largely on the 
contracts provided by public agencies, they are willing to adapt their work team 
to fulfil their needs. What is more, this ‘closeness’ allows firms to know the 
administrative procedures of the public sector and to obtain relevant 
information about budget, relationship with other agencies, etc. This can lead to 
a bigger influence in their thoughts and beliefs, and bias in the results of 
evaluation.405 Overall, excessive closeness entails the risk of affecting the 
objectivity of the process. 
This can also be perceived in the pressure that public agencies exercise on 
evaluators. According to the LSE GV314 Group, in the UK this occurs at three 
major stages of the process: the design and planning stage, the management of 
the evaluation, and the report of the findings. Their study shows: 
The most effective constraint appears to be found when government 
specifies the nature of the research to be done at the outset. No other form 
of constraint has as powerful an effect on the degree to which the overall 
conclusions the researchers reach support government policy.406 
What arises from this discussion is that as multiple interests are vested in 
evaluation, stakeholders will attempt to influence the process through different 
means. However, this cannot be too explicit as it would damage the credibility of 
a study and possibly the reputation of the stakeholder. Instead, influence is 
disguised as minor interventions, e.g. methodological decisions, data control, 
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etc., that in the aggregate can affect the outputs. 
Another interesting element of this relationship is the assumption of the costs of 
evaluation. This means: Who pays for the development of a study? Balthasar 
recognises it as an important factor that impacts the distance between 
evaluators and evaluands. As the institutional framework determines who will 
assume the cost of evaluations, this affects the content of the contract.407 This 
exposes the relevance of the institutional framework in relation to the rules for 
the conduction of sub-processes of evaluation and the implications for 
independence through the control of payments. As discussed, independence and 
credibility are highly interiorised values, both in evaluation and auditing.408 
Lonsdale defines independence in evaluation as ‘an ability to determine what, 
how and when work is undertaken without undue interference.’409 It relies 
fundamentally on the capacity of evaluators to make a judgement based on 
objective evidence and to report it free from constraints or impositions of 
others. Nonetheless, this is not only a safeguard for the robustness of a study, 
but also it has political implications. Evaluation will produce political 
disagreements, for example, between executive agencies and legislative bodies, 
which need to be acknowledged.410 
The discussion about internal or external evaluation411 has been underpinned 
by the fallible idea that external evaluators will be more independent, ignoring 
the fact that the contracting-out process is not exempt from political 
influence.412 As Gaarder and Briceño suggest: 
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The reality of their independence is determined mainly by who is funding 
them, and may be compromised if it is by the very managers in charge of 
the activities under evaluation. No undue influence needs to be exerted by 
the managers for the situation to be compromised, as consultants may be 
self-censoring to maintain their clients.413 
The last point of these authors is pertinent to discuss the level to which the 
institutional framework can shape the behaviour of stakeholders. In fact, rules 
about whether evaluation is performed in-house or contracted out can be 
driven by the logic of creating more favourable conditions for independence, but 
it can also produce incentives for providing a more or less independent 
judgement according to the interests of stakeholders. There is a difference, as 
Weaver observes, between independence de jure and de facto. Even if the 
institutional framework establishes the creation of an independent evaluation 
unit, its independence can be compromised through the control of other 
variables, such as ‘budget, staffing, and reporting structures’.414 Here, evaluators 
have a key role because they rely on the preservation of their credibility.415 
However, it should not be forgotten that they might be interested in maintaining 
a good relationship with commissioners to assure future contracts, as 
‘evaluation is a business.’416 This echoes Picciotto’s reflection about evaluators 
acting more as consultants, as they ‘favor a strictly advisory supporting role that 
does not challenge the implicit values of their employers or the process that 
underlie organizational performance.’417 
Regarding credibility, Copestake understands this as … 
… one party being able to offer a sufficient combination of evidence and 
explanation to convince another party that a proposition is reasonable in 
the sense of being sufficiently plausible to act upon – not rational in a 
logical sense, perhaps, but neither irrational.418 
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Stakeholders relate both independence and credibility to the legitimacy of this 
activity and the recognition of the trustworthiness of the findings. This can help 
improving not only policymaking but also its political sustainability.419 
Preserving these values gives stakeholders elements to cooperate according to 
their role. The linkage between evaluation and democratic values like 
transparency, inclusion, and accountability is considered a tool for including the 
views of the stakeholders involved in policy.420 The democratisation of 
evaluation421 has gained notoriety within governance, as ‘Evaluation is now 
being judged not only on its outputs (reports findings, conclusions and 
recommendations), but also on its process in terms of actors’ 
representativeness, inclusion and participation.’422 The identification of the 
interests of stakeholders has become a central element and, as a result, 
negotiation is crucial for determining the level of power exercised by each 
stakeholder.423 
According to House and Howe, the involvement of different stakeholders 
comprises inclusion, dialogue, and deliberation (elements linked to 
negotiation).424 This approach is more based on the establishment of informal 
rules of interaction than on strict norms defined by the institutional framework. 
An example of this is the role that this perspective gives evaluators as 
facilitators or mediators in the negotiation of interests.425 Associating 
evaluation with democracy resonates with its role as a risk-reduction 
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mechanism and as a tool for including different views in policymaking. As there 
is competition for resources and the behaviour of stakeholders is unpredictable, 
the formalisation of evaluation processes can help reducing uncertainty. In 
governance, as Picciotto suggests: 
Evaluation was conceived as a way to help identify and where necessary fill 
the democratic deficit embedded in public policies and programmes: 
limited transparency; weak accountability, limited participation by 
disadvantaged groups, disregard of social equity, etc.426 
The contribution of evaluation to democracy as a mechanism that favours 
transparency and accountability is subject to the use given to findings and the 
acknowledgement of the circumstances in which it takes place.427 In line with 
this, Stame suggests that in the context of the NPM reforms and governance, 
evaluation can provide evidence about the relationship between the changes 
that took place in policy and the variables that led to those changes.428 
The democratisation of evaluation relies on the openness of the process to the 
different positions of stakeholders in terms of power and resources. On the one 
hand, the institutional framework can establish formal mechanisms for their 
participation. On the other hand, through informal agreements stakeholders can 
establish conditions for reaching a common purpose, taking advantage of the 
discretionary spaces found in the institutional framework. In any case, the key 
element is questioning to what extent stakeholders are able to participate. It is 
not the same degree of involvement to participate as an evaluator than as a 
member of a focus group. The level of participation allowed can be related to the 
level of power that stakeholders are willing to grant others and the mechanisms 
that the institutional framework has established for this purpose, i.e. barriers of 
access. 
Outputs 
The use given to the products of evaluation, i.e. reports, surveys, or studies, 
depends on the different arrangements that take place among stakeholders, as 
‘evaluation cannot be regarded as neutral; it holds power and seeks to fulfil its 
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own interests.’429 This thesis addresses two major issues: utilisation and 
dissemination. Considering asymmetries of power and resources, stakeholders 
can use evaluation outputs in different ways. The actor that controls the process 
is in a privileged position to promote, disseminate, or even dismiss the results of 
an evaluation according to his criteria and interests.430 This advantage can be 
observed in the use of evaluation findings to support a pre-established political 
position. According to a study developed in Great Britain: 
The use of evidence tended to support a certain way of thinking about the 
world; a thought style which is produced through the unequal distribution 
of power and then plays a part in its reproduction.431 
The legitimisation function of evaluation is used to validate a particular pre-
conceived position. In some cases, since its inception the use that will be made 
of the findings has already been determined and it is linked to the user’s 
preferences.432 Neuman et al. emphasise the relevance of making a commitment 
to evaluation to promote utilisation,433 seen as its ultimate goal. This 
commitment434 is a central element of the participatory or democratic approach 
discussed before.435 Different reactions from stakeholders to evaluation outputs 
can be observed, ranging from welcoming a report to an adverse reaction to the 
findings or even completely burying them. The negative reaction to evaluation 
can be explained by the anxiety generated by this activity,436 while a positive 
one is linked to the identification of a particular benefit from the use of outputs. 
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As Weiss identifies, evaluation can be used as a means for legitimisation or even 
as ‘an excuse for inaction.’437 The political capital built around policies can 
influence the different levels of impact that evaluation will have and the 
leverage given to evaluation findings depends greatly on the ability of 
evaluators to communicate its relevance for decision-makers.438 Therefore, the 
findings of the evaluation of a high-profile policy would tend to get more 
attention than those from more modest programmes.439 
The second element regarding outputs is dissemination, which can also 
represent a political decision. This refers to ‘the appropriateness of the means 
used to facilitate access to the evaluation’.440 Stakeholders can facilitate or 
hinder the access to the audiences of evaluation, even presently, when 
technology can considerably simplify this process.441 Commissioners or 
sponsors have an important role in dissemination because they usually have 
more influence at this stage. This does not necessarily refer to the deliberate 
manipulation of findings, but to the intentional suppression of reports that 
might be unfavourable for stakeholders’ interests: 
If the findings are considered to be politically sensitive, they may not be 
publicly released or they may be ignored […] a further possibility is that the 
department which commissioned the evaluation will restructure and the 
evaluation findings no longer have relevance.442 
Weiss argues: ‘If the findings are negative, officials may not completely bury the 
report (although sometimes they try), but they can at least release it with their 
own interpretations.’443 Thinking of evaluation as a tool for risk-reduction, 
negative findings can be seen as a potential threat to their interests. Therefore: 
What will be the incentive for stakeholders to disclose even that information is 
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considered potentially harmful? The LSE GV134 Group observed that evaluators 
in the UK constantly receive petitions for changing the wording of findings.444 
Even if rephrasing findings cannot be seen as an open attempt at manipulation, 
it does represent a source of pressure. Seeing it as a commercial rapport, it is 
the client asking for modifications; the client who is paying for the services and 
a potential source for future business. Consequently, there might be incentives 
for evaluators to be complacent. 
The nuances of how politics affects the dissemination of evaluation outputs 
concern the level of control and the power of stakeholders. The inclusion of new 
participants in the process of evaluation is expected to make it more 
democratic. Chelimsky highlights the advocacy role of evaluators and the 
relevance of preserving their integrity: 
Although the policy use of findings will surely be reduced in such situations 
if opponents are powerful enough, still – once evaluations with important 
findings have been published, no matter how reluctantly – it is evaluators’ 
duty to bring their knowledge forward.445 
It is certain that a struggle of interests might take place at this stage. However, 
evaluators are not the only persons responsible for protecting findings from 
political interference. The establishment of institutional safeguards for this 
purpose and the promotion of evaluation culture could foster appropriate 
dissemination. 
Outcomes 
Outcomes, as the long-term effects of evaluation on the policymaking process, 
can be very difficult to observe because they entail making some assumptions 
that cannot always be supported empirically. The first one is that all evaluations 
are robust/high quality and that they produce relevant and pertinent findings. 
In reality, the establishment of criteria to measure the quality of evaluation can 
be subjective and inconclusive.446 The second refers to how policymakers use 
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findings to support their tasks. The difficulties in isolating the net effect of 
evaluation impede measuring accurately its contribution.447 As Rauschmayer et 
al. observe, establishing a causal link between inputs and outputs can lead to the 
misinterpretation of the contributions of evaluation: 
If we look at the consequences only, we fail to assess the degree to which a 
specific intervention is responsible for the changed situation. If we instead 
examine the direct outputs, i.e. the laws, rules, programmes, activities and 
budget allocations produced by the governance process, we are still unable 
to determine whether the outputs have had the intended effects.448 
Boardman agrees by underlining the need for an integrated approach that looks 
at both the process and the outcomes of public policy.449 This resonates with the 
discussion about the scope and purpose of evaluation: Who will determine the 
areas that will be prioritised for evaluation? To what extent is this prioritisation 
driven by political reasons? This will vary according to each stakeholder’s 
interests. For politicians, for example, evidence about the outcomes of a policy 
will be more useful than that of the process. The focus on outcomes can 
represent an important element in the context of governance. In line with this, 
Rotberg argues that performance measurements allow distinguishing those 
elements in the government’s machine that are working from those that are 
not.450 This gives de facto more relevance to certain aspects of a policy than to 
others. Performance information, as an input for evaluation, can provide a 
clearer identification of criteria for measuring the performance of governments 
and can make it easier for evaluators to understand the logic of a programme. 
The focus on the value generated by public policy seems to be a consequence of 
the new approaches in which beneficiaries/clients of public services are at the 
centre of the process.451 
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The key element here is not to what extent evaluation influences policymaking, 
but the extent to which it has been able to permeate the logic of policymakers. 
Evaluation needs to find more effective ways into the political dynamics and to 
transcend its managerial role to become an element for the political debate. As 
Richardson states: 
[B]arriers to full and effective use of social science in public policymaking 
are related to a separation of knowledge production from its consumption 
and utilization, and by a lack of mechanisms to allow for the political nature 
of knowledge transfer and decision-making processes.452 
The construction of arguments based on evidence from evaluation can generate 
more credibility due to the ‘rational’ and ‘objective’ values underpinning it.453 
Recognising the political context can give evaluation more leverage as ‘public 
policy must be analyzed as a political outcome and as a force that inﬂuences 
political actors, organizes political understandings, and structures political 
relations.’454 
This relates back to the development of evaluation capacities.455 Commitment to 
evaluation can be seen in how governments devote resources and efforts to 
build evaluation systems. This means prioritising different values, i.e. 
independence, credibility, and utility.456 These can fall into conflict with the 
agenda of the stakeholder conducting the evaluation system; yet, the 
development of evaluation capacities will provide stakeholders with more 
mechanisms to engage in evaluation under more favourable conditions. 
Fostering these capacities can depend on political will because it requires 
considering ‘the effect of informal practices, symbolic actions, evaluative beliefs, 
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values and attitudes.’457 The outcomes of evaluation can also be perceived in its 
relationship to accountability.458 
Evaluation can generate information about the effectiveness of public policy, 
while it can also identify new public problems and determine their 
magnitude.459 It might also strengthen budgetary processes and provide 
evidence about the appropriate allocation and use of public funds.460 Moreover, 
evaluation is especially useful in the construction of arguments for the 
justification and legitimacy of public action.461 
A potential problem that evaluation and accountability share is what Bovens 
calls the problem of many eyes and many hands. This refers to the fact that 
‘public institutions are accountable to a plethora of different forums’,462 all of 
which ‘apply a different set of criteria.’463 Public agencies systematically face a 
wide range of requests, which implies administrative efforts that can affect the 
development of the primary activities of the organisation. Although this 
problem was developed within the framework of accountability, it can also 
apply to evaluation. Public agencies receive continual requests for evaluating 
different features of their programmes and it can become a very time-
consuming activity. In the long-term, this can turn evaluation into a meaningless 
activity, the only purpose of which is to fulfil a legal obligation. This also finds 
echo in Flinders’ ideas about the integrity/efficiency dilemma of 
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accountability.464 The problem of many hands has a similar effect: 
Policies pass through many hands before they are actually put into effect 
[…] decrees and decisions are often made in committees and cross a 
number of desks before they (often at different stages and at different 
levels) are implemented.465 
The participation of many actors during implementation impedes identifying 
those who are accountable for that policy. In evaluation, when findings show 
poor performance, it is also difficult to determine what exactly went wrong 
during the process. Evaluation and accountability can be complementary 
activities, but it is important to consider the possible limits of evaluation and the 
need for developing effective institutional arrangements that can maximise this 
relationship. Here, Hood’s reflections upon accountability and blame-avoidance 
‘as opposite sides of the same coin’ make sense.466 Evaluation can be both used 
for accountability purposes, e.g. by generating evidence about the 
accomplishment of goals as well as for blame-avoidance, e.g. by discretionarily 
disseminating only positive findings. This duality will depend on the political 
intention underpinning evaluation. 
The theoretical review presented here guided by the thematic framework has 
elucidated the discussions considered most relevant for understanding the 
relationship between evaluation and politics. Taking this into consideration, it is 
useful to make some important remarks: 
1. The recognition of the political nature of evaluation and the way in 
which different stakeholders can influence this process. 
2. Evaluation is no longer a purely governmental task; it now implies the 
participation of new actors with divergent and sometimes conflicting 
interests. 
3. The institutional framework for evaluation can restrain the political 
influence of stakeholders. There are important elements of the process 
of evaluation that can be regulated through the establishment of formal 
rules, e.g. commissioning, but this does not completely eliminate spaces 
for stakeholders to act discretionarily. 
The acknowledgement of the political nature of evaluation favours being aware 
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of the potential negative effects associated, e.g. manipulation of findings, and 
fostering those political elements that can be beneficial, e.g. wider dissemination 
of findings. The next section refers back to the governance model in order to 
relate the discussions presented here. 
2.3.3 The Hidden Politics of Evaluation in the Context of Governance 
Governance has represented a substantial change in the way policymaking 
occurs. One of the most evident modifications has been the establishment of 
networks of stakeholders from different spheres that engage in the dynamics of 
cooperation and negotiation of interests.467 Here the role of evaluation has been 
transformed beyond its capacity of generating evidence about policy. Its 
instrumental dimension has moved towards a new one, more related to the 
legitimisation of public action derived from social transformations and the rise 
of political demands.468 This can be explained by the acknowledgement of the 
new needs of stakeholders. In a democratic context, government can no longer 
establish unilateral relationships; it is now compelled to negotiate and to 
develop cooperation networks in order to advance its agenda. 
The multiplicity of interests involved in public policy demands the adoption of 
tools to reduce uncertainty/risk that can provide stakeholders with more 
elements to act. It becomes indispensable to identify ‘who key policy players 
are, their historical roles in framing policy debates, their current policy 
objectives, and the consequences of these policy players’ influence on 
evaluation practice.’469 
This perspective highlights the significance of evaluation as a trigger for public 
debate. Rather than discussion based on values and individual partisan 
opinions, evaluation provides inputs for building more robust arguments, which 
are not exempted from these values and beliefs but are the result of a credible 
and independent process. This underlines the relevance of the legitimacy of 
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evaluation.470 This explains why some evaluation approaches have become 
more appreciated by governments. For instance, RCTs and participatory 
approaches are now recurrent models for the evaluation of public policy.471 This 
is not casual. RCTs are perceived as robust tools for identifying the effects of a 
public intervention,472 while participatory approaches are seen as a more 
democratic and transparent means to involve stakeholders.473 
The institutional framework gains importance as rules and procedures are 
required to enhance the role of evaluation in governance. This means setting out 
minimal conditions for its application.474 A more proactive response from 
stakeholders is needed and responsibilities for conducting evaluations are now 
spread among them. Negotiating interests must be now acknowledged as a 
routine practice in evaluation, although the conduction of this process should 
not rely only on evaluators. While it is true that their role as advocates is 
important,475 empowering other stakeholders is also relevant and the 
consequences of this must be studied in more detail.476 Evaluation can also 
represent a driver for change477 that is required in the context of the 
transformation of the state. The discussion about depoliticisation promotes 
reflecting about how transferring policy issues to other political arenas should 
be evaluated and, more importantly, how these evaluations should be linked to 
accountability. 
From an overall perspective, the role of evaluation in governance appears still to 
be at a stage of definition. This incremental transformation will generate 
different issues of discussion that will need to be developed in the light of the 
                                                        
470 Chelimsky, E. 1987. "What Have We Learned about the Politics of Program Evaluation?" 
Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 9(3):199-213. 
471 Pearce, W., and S. Raman. 2014. "The new randomised controlled trials (RCT) movement in 
public policy: challenges of epistemic governance." Policy Sciences 47(4):387-402. 
472 Gertler, P. J., S. Martínez, P. Premand, L. B. Rawlings, and C. M. J. Vermeesch. 2011. "La 
evaluación de impacto en la práctica." Washington, D.C., US: Banco Internacional de 
Reconstrucción y Fomento/Banco Mundial. 
473 House, E. R. 2006. "Democracy and Evaluation." Evaluation 12(1):119-27. 
474 Picciotto, R. 2015. "Democratic evaluation for the 21st century." Ibid.21(2):150-66. 
475 Mohan, R. 2014. "Evaluator Advocacy: It Is All in a Day’s Work." American Journal of 
Evaluation 35(3):1-7. 
476 Gildemyn, M. Ibid."Understanding the Influence of Independent Civil Society Monitoring and 
Evaluation at the District Level: A Case Study of Ghana." (4):507-24. 
477 Molas-Gallart, J. 2012. "Research Governance and the Role of Evaluation: A Comparative 
Study." Ibid.33:583-98. 
114 
 
political context in which evaluation takes place. The aim of this chapter has 
been to provide the theoretical and conceptual foundations for this thesis. It has 
engaged with the question of what this thesis is really about. The next chapter 
focuses on how the thematic framework developed in this chapter will be 
utilised during this research. 
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Chapter 3. Methodology 
This chapter concerns the way in which the hidden politics of evaluation has 
been studied. The reliability of research depends on the methodology used for 
the collection, systematisation and analysis of the data that led to the 
formulation of conclusions about an object of study. Methods are ‘techniques 
recognised by most social scientists as being appropriate for the creation, 
collection, coding, organisation and analysis of data.’478 In the social sciences, 
‘the scientific study of human behaviour’479 is carried out through the use of 
specific instruments that can provide the best possible means for grasping the 
complexity of social reality. The conceptualisation of social problems is built 
around the different perspectives adopted for this purpose. In this field, there is 
no absolute nor undebatable truth; only different interpretations about an 
object of study. The comprehension of social reality varies also in relation to the 
scope adopted and the methods selected. The epistemological debate about how 
knowledge is constructed requires looking at multiple ideological positions 
about the interpretation of reality.480 Such discussions would exceed the scope 
of this research. However, the strength of a research of this nature is based on 
the robustness of the method applied and on its capacity to simplify the reality 
of the object of study. Consequently, the knowledge generated about the hidden 
politics of evaluation needs to be supported by robust instruments to explain 
how the different elements analysed have been interpreted. 
The conditions in which evaluation occurs require a careful study of the 
contextual factors affecting this process. The scope or methodological 
approaches selected affect the interpretation of how politics and evaluation 
relate. This chapter sets out the methodology used in this research and the 
rationale behind the selection of the approach and the analytical instruments. It 
is divided into three parts. The first section presents an overview of the 
                                                        
478 Perri 6, and C. Bellamy. 2012. Principles of Methodology: Research Design in Social Science. Los 
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479 Punch, K. F. 2014. Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches: 
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2011. "Social Research: Issues, Methods and Research." California, US: Open University Press. 
116 
 
characteristics of qualitative research (the approach selected) and the features 
of the case study (the analytical instrument). This section explains the rationale 
for these choices and the motivations for the selection of the case studies (UK 
and Mexico). The second part describes the process undertaken for the 
development of this thesis. Finally, the limitations of the analysis and the 
methodological challenges faced during the process are addressed. 
3.1 The Qualitative Research Approach and the Case Study 
Method 
Different perspectives and several methods exist for the study of the social 
sciences. According to Babbie, social research has three purposes: exploration, 
description, and explanation, which guide and define methodological decisions 
such as the scope and time framework.481 Discussions have mostly revolved 
around which are the most suitable methods for social research. This debate has 
generated an important body of knowledge about the advantages and 
disadvantages of different methods in various contexts and under multiple 
conditions. Therefore, as Creswell states, quantitative and qualitative 
approaches should not be seen as dichotomies, but as a continuum.482 This 
means looking at methods as a wide range of tools with multiple strengths and 
limitations. Despite no consensus having been reached about the superiority of 
a particular method for analysing social problems,483 the core element of this 
decision relates to the nature of the data to be analysed.484 
In recent decades, for example, researchers have attempted to address more 
complex objects of study through the use of mixed methods.485 Combining 
                                                        
481 Babbie, E. 2004. The Practice of Social Research. London, UK: Thomson/Wadsworth. 
482 Creswell, J. W. 1994. Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. California, US.: 
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methods can help overcoming the possible weaknesses found in each method 
individually.486 However, as Bryman states: ‘Research methods are ineluctably 
rooted in epistemological and ontological commitments.’487 Methodological 
consistency represents therefore a key element.488 Both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches serve different purposes according to the nature of the 
object of study and the expectations of the research.489 The selection of the 
methodological approach transcends the mere collection and analysis of data; it 
entails reflecting on the nature of the object and the expected outcomes. Also, it 
involves acknowledging the characteristics of the research question and 
weighing what the different approaches offer for addressing it. 
In political science, addressing research questions that include variables 
difficult to quantify, e.g. power or cooperation, is a frequent situation. As 
Burnham et al. observe: 
Unlike the situation in natural science, where it is often argued, there are 
standardized and accepted measures, social scientists are more aware that 
there is a range of techniques that they can choose from and a particular 
problem does not necessarily suggest a particular method […] there is no 
correct method, even for a particular type of research.490 
An important concern within this field is the need for expanding the range of 
methods in the aim of promoting more diversity in research.491 In this context, 
qualitative methods have been widely utilised for understanding more carefully 
the diversity of phenomena that occur in the social sciences. 492 The qualitative 
approach claims to have a better capacity … 
                                                                                                                                                             
study in order to address a single research question.’ Jupp, V. 2006. The SAGE Dictionary of 
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2014. "The Role of Government in Voluntary Environmental Programmes: A Fuzzy Set 
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… to constitute compelling arguments about how things work in particular 
contexts […] the qualitative habit of intimately connecting context with 
explanation means that qualitative research is capable of producing very 
well-founded cross-contextual generalities, rather than aspiring to more 
flimsy de-contextual versions.493 
This approach facilitates the interpretation of multifactorial phenomena.494 The 
use of qualitative research in certain policy fields, i.e. social policy, has been 
prominent because it is ‘underpinned by the persistent requirement […] to 
understand complex behaviours, needs, systems and cultures.’495 As a result, it 
provides an analytical framework for reaching more specific levels of 
comprehension about the interactions that take place among individuals and 
that might affect the outcomes of a process, e.g. public policy. In terms of 
comparative politics, for example, Mahoney suggests that qualitative research 
‘offers […] various tools for framing research questions and formulating testable 
hypotheses.’496 Specifically in policymaking, Pierson states that in contrast to 
quantitative methods the use of a qualitative approach is desirable because it 
provides a broader perspective of its functioning by ‘looking at the long haul.’497 
Ritz agrees by stating that qualitative research ‘allows a more in-depth and 
inner perspective of the object of interest than quantitative research.’498 This 
shows the potential of the qualitative approach for the study of political issues 
derived from its capacity for a more detailed analysis, which can capture the 
relationships that take place in a particular context. 
The identification of the potential uses of the qualitative approach for the core 
argument of this thesis is based precisely on the complexity associated with 
politics. The scope of analysis needs to allow not only the study of the 
relationships established as a consequence of evaluation, but also how these are 
affected by rules and institutions. Although methodological choices can always 
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be debatable, the strength of research relies on recognising its suitability for the 
particular object of study and the context in which it occurs. The next section 
discusses the main characteristics of the qualitative approach that make explicit 
its pertinence for studying the hidden politics of evaluation. 
3.1.1 General Characteristics of the Qualitative Approach 
The qualitative approach can be defined as ‘research that investigates aspects of 
social life which are not amenable to quantitative measures.’499 According to 
Lawrence, this approach has the capacity to analyse the complex social reality, 
as it “refines ‘working ideas’ during the data collection and analysis process [to] 
form coherent theoretical definitions as you struggle to ‘make sense’ or organize 
the data and the preliminary ideas.”500 The logic that underpins the research of 
this nature is built from different theories and methods.501 According to 
Bryman, qualitative research presents three core characteristics: 
1. an inductive view of the relationship between theory and research […] 
2. an epistemological position described as interpretivist […] the stress in 
on the understanding of the social world through an examination of the 
interpretation of that world by its participants; and, 
3. an ontological position described as constructionist, which implies that 
social properties are outcomes of the interactions between individuals, 
rather than phenomena ‘out there’ and separate from those involved in 
its construction.502 
Punch agrees by underlining that qualitative research denotes that … 
research […] is a human construction, framed and presented within a 
particular set of discourses (and sometimes ideologies), and 
conducted in a social context with certain sorts of social 
arrangements, involving especially funding, cognitive authority and 
power.503 
Due to its characteristics, the qualitative approach does not fit into an inflexible 
research design. Therefore, the robustness of the methodology demands being 
explicit about the different stages of the process and the activities undertaken 
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for obtaining the findings. 504 Qualitative research, therefore … 
… covers a wide range of approaches, but by definition, none of these 
approaches relies on numerical measurements […] such work has tended 
to focus on one or a small number of cases, to use intensive interviews or 
depth analysis of historical materials, to be discursive in method, and to be 
concerned with a rounded or comprehensive account of some event or 
unit.505 
It aims to make inferences from the analysis of data obtained through multiple 
instruments, e.g. case studies, interviews, etc. However, these are subject to the 
particular conditions of the object of study and cannot be translated into a 
different context. It imposes creating mechanisms and guidelines appropriate 
for the reality to study.506 The way in which qualitative research is conducted 
cannot be conceived as a sequential completion of stages.507 Instead, it occurs 
according to the different activities planned, developed across time, and is 
subject to the conditions existing in the context of the research. The general 
conceptualisation of qualitative research suggests that it is a continuous process 
that involves the consecution of activities—in occasions overlapped—with 
which outputs eventually lead to the identification of findings that shape the 
course of the research. The key element here is the capacity to interpret the 
reality through the evidence obtained. 
The way in which data is produced is also relevant. For example, using 
quantitative methods for this purpose represents only one alternative for causal 
interpretation. Nonetheless, as Denzin states: 
Causality as a type of narrative is only one form of interpretation […] 
autoethnographic, action-based and other forms of narrative 
representation are equally powerful methods and strategies of analysis and 
interpretation.508 
In this particular research, the analysis of the hidden politics of evaluation does 
not aim to identify causes but to understand how this phenomenon manifests 
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and relates to the institutional framework. This distinction matters because the 
focus would be on the nexus between politics and evaluation and its 
implications. Knowing why politics affects evaluation is a sterile effort if the 
consequences of this are not studied. There is an important range of tools for 
collecting, systematising, and analysing qualitative data.509 The suitability of 
these tools for the research depends on several reasons. For example, the nature 
of the object of study, the access to it, and the temporality are just some 
variables to consider in the selection of a qualitative method. The selection of a 
particular method or a combination will be based on the criteria of the 
researcher and the prioritisation of those characteristics that are considered 
essential for the research. 
The nature of the qualitative approach and its capacity to grasp the interaction 
between individuals is strongly related to the study of the hidden politics of 
evaluation in the sense that this research aims is to understand the outcomes 
and implications of this phenomenon and how it responds to the rules and 
institutions developed for evaluation. 
3.1.2 The Case Study Method 
Different scholars in the social sciences literature have attempted to define ‘the 
case study’.510 Simons, for example, conceptualises this as … 
… an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity 
and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, programme or 
system in a ‘real life’ context […] The primary purpose is to generate in-
depth understanding of a specific topic (as in a thesis), programme, policy 
institution or system to generate knowledge and/or inform policy 
development, professional practice and civil or community action.511 
The case study has a predominant role in the development of new knowledge in 
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the social sciences because of the characteristics of this method. According to 
Yin: 
The case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and 
meaningful characteristics of real-life events –such as individual life cycles, 
small group behaviour, organizational and managerial processes, 
neighbourhood change, school performance, international relations, and 
the maturation of industries.512 
In a sense, this tool facilitates abstracting a particular phenomenon from the 
complex context in which it occurs and offers the capacity to reach more specific 
levels of analysis: 
Most case studies feature descriptions that are complex, holistic, and 
involving a myriad of not highly isolated variables; data that are likely to be 
gathered at least partly by personalistic observation; and a writing style 
that is informal, perhaps narrative, possibly with verbatim quotation, 
illustration, and even allusion and metaphor […] themes and hypotheses 
may be important, but they remain subordinate to the understanding of the 
case.513 
It provides detailed knowledge about a particular object. Consequently, it is 
useful for looking at its different dimensions and for studying in detail what 
occurs in a specific context, by ‘getting a rich picture and gaining analytical 
insights from it.’514 These characteristics show the capacity of this method to 
disaggregate different variables and to observe an object from different angles, 
in contrast to other methods (Table 3.1).  
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Table 3. 1 A Comparison of the Case Study with Other Forms of Inquiry 
 Case Study Experiment Survey 
Investigates… 
one case 
or a 
small 
number 
of cases 
a relatively large 
number of cases 
a relatively 
large number 
of cases 
 
Data collected 
and analysed 
about… 
a large number of 
features of each case 
a small number of 
features of each case 
a large number of 
features of each case 
 
Study of… 
naturally occurring 
cases where the aim is 
not to control the 
variables 
cases where the aim is to 
control the important 
variables 
naturally occurring 
cases selected to 
maximise the sample’s 
representativeness of a 
wider population 
Quantification 
of data… 
is not a priority is a priority is a priority 
Using… 
many methods and 
sources of data 
one method one method 
Aiming to… 
look at relationships 
and processes 
look at causation look for generalisation 
Source: Thomas, G., 2011. How to do your case study: A guide for students. SAGE. Pp. 10-11. 
The case study is considered an important methodological tool for the analysis 
of complex topics.515 Within the political sciences, Gerring recognises that this 
method is useful when ‘insight into causal mechanisms is more important than 
insight into causal effects.’516 This resonates with the core theme of this thesis, 
as knowing which are the elements of evaluation that are affected by politics, in 
the context of a particular institutional design, requires a more detailed study 
than explaining why politics affects evaluation. In the case of evaluation 
research, the use of the case study is pertinent due to its political nature. The 
inclusion of multiple perspectives and the interpretation of the values involved 
can be captured through this instrument.517 According to Yin, evaluation 
research can benefit from this method for two main reasons: 
First, the ability directly to incorporate an investigation of the context 
satisfies an evaluation’s need to monitor and assess both the intervention 
and the implementation process. Second, the case study is not limited to 
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either quantitative or qualitative data, but can incorporate both varieties of 
evidence […] the case study method can serve evaluation needs directly by 
being able to assess outcomes and to test hypotheses.518 
In line with this, Keen and Packwood observe that case studies in health policy 
are useful when looking at the success or failure of a particular intervention 
when there are contextual factors to consider.519 This agrees with Yin’s 
argument about its capacity to test hypotheses.520 Therefore, this method offers 
analytical lenses for comprehending a phenomenon occurring in a particular 
context.521 As a result, some of its strengths relate to its capacity to capture the 
experiences of the actors involved and its focus on causal relationships between 
variables.522 In line with the idea of the institutional framework, it can also ‘be 
useful in capturing the emergent and immanent properties of life in 
organizations.’523 
Despite the advantages recognised in this method, it is also important to 
acknowledge its limitations. Perhaps the main criticism of this method refers to 
the impossibility of generalisation of the conclusions because of validity 
reasons,524 as ‘in most circumstances the individual cases are not sufficiently 
representative.’525 Nonetheless, as Flyvbjerg recognises, ‘a purely descriptive, 
phenomenological case study without any attempt to generalize can certainly be 
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of value.’526 
Amaratunga and Baldry add that this method ‘suffers from a lack of rigour and 
an excess of bias.’527 This can be explained by the fact that the findings produced 
through a case study are mostly contextual. But it might be precisely this feature 
that permits valuing different explanations for a phenomenon.528 As Gerring 
states, political science case studies are useful ‘when propositional depth is 
prized over breadth and boundedness, [and] when (internal) case comparability 
is given precedence over (external) case representativeness.’529 These 
characteristics might help overcoming some of the weakness identified in the 
method. 
This general overview of the qualitative approach and the case study aid to 
make explicit the methodology applied in this research. The qualitative 
approach and the case study are the methods on which this research relies. 
Documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews were the instruments 
used for the collection and analysis of data. Considering the characteristics of 
the method exposed here, the next section explains the rationale behind this 
methodological selection. 
3.1.3 Rationale for the Selection of the Methodology 
The study of the political nature of evaluation and its implications requires 
looking at particular contexts in which this phenomenon occurs to identify the 
different areas of the process that are more vulnerable to this influence. The 
purpose of the selected methodological approach is to provide the analytical 
tools required for grasping those variables useful for uncovering the hidden 
politics of evaluation. As discussed, the qualitative approach offers a suitable 
methodological framework for analysing the relationships that are established 
during evaluation and the constraints that the institutional framework imposes 
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to these interactions. Considering that the hidden politics of evaluation do not 
manifest in the same way in every context, the case study method helps 
recognising those contextual factors that might explain variances in the 
behaviour of stakeholders in this process. The selection of this methodology can 
be explained by the following reasons: 
1. Most of the elements analysed in this research are not quantifiable, e.g. interaction 
between stakeholders. Consequently, these cannot be measured through a 
quantitative analysis. Documentary analysis and interviews are more appropriate 
analytical tools to capture the complexity of the relationships that are established 
during evaluation. 
2. The qualitative approach is helpful for understanding the hidden politics of 
evaluation, as it is an intangible component that interacts with different elements 
such as power, asymmetric information, and economic incentives. Moreover, the 
case study allows looking at variables identified by actors involved in the process 
and contrasting different perspectives that can be triangulated.530 
3. A case study comparison helps observing how a set of variables behave in two 
different contexts. This approach enables the researcher ‘to test general 
hypotheses about politics’531 by identifying similarities and differences between 
cases that can sustain the findings obtained.532 The institutional architecture, as 
the object of study, allows looking at the way in which these rules and procedures 
affect the elements of the thematic framework proposed. 
4. A case study is directed to contribute to the theory by analysing a particular 
situation in depth. More than testing a theory (which will require a different 
methodological treatment), this thesis aims to understand how different relations 
are built within evaluation stakeholders and the implications for the process. 
5. The thematic framework developed for the understanding of the hidden politics of 
evaluation is strongly related to the conditions of the institutional framework in 
which evaluation takes place.533 By focusing on the evaluation of health policy in 
both countries and how rules and procedures affect this process, it is possible to 
‘highlight cross-national differences, and their causes and consequences, in an 
effective fashion.’534 
6. The differences in the institutional framework for evaluation found in the case 
studies provide new elements for analysing how politics and evaluation interact. 
These reasons highlight two main characteristics of this research. The first one 
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is the intangibility of the object of study (the hidden politics of evaluation) and 
the need for its interpretation. The other refers to the existence of a common 
explanatory variable (the institutional framework) that requires developing 
instruments for the comparability of cases. The analysis of the institutional 
framework is guided by the elements of the thematic framework proposed to 
identify the set of rules, procedures, and actors involved in evaluation and to 
facilitate the comparison between countries. This methodological approach 
provides the analytical tools for conducting the research, which process is 
explained in the next section. 
3.2 Research Methodology 
The description of the process undertaken for the collection, systematisation, 
and analysis of the data is crucial for identifying how the conclusions were 
obtained and how this information can be interpreted. The entire research 
process implied reflecting continuously on the main and secondary research 
questions that guide this thesis and how these can be operationalised. The 
process through which the elements of discussion were obtained is just as 
relevant as the findings.535 The hidden politics of evaluation represents an 
interesting opportunity for the development of research models that can be 
adapted to its complexity and that can give new insights about how the 
institutional framework affects evaluation and vice versa. This section explains 
how this research was conducted and the methodological grounds on which it is 
based. The research design and process are described in detail, as well as the 
rationale for the selection of the case studies. 
3.2.1 Research Design 
The research design was developed around the understanding of the 
relationship between politics and evaluation. In line with this, the core question 
was disaggregated into more specific elements to establish a clearer idea about 
the process of knowledge construction (see Chapter 1, Section 1.1). These 
                                                        
535 An analytical research ‘seeks to explain why things are as they are, or how they came to be as 
they are, by a process of analysis and explanation.’ In line with this conceptualization, this 
research aims to explain how politics and evaluation interact by looking at a set of variables 
related to the assessment process in which politics manifest. Brewer, R. 2007. Your PhD Thesis. 
How to plan, draft, revise and edit your thesis. Abergele, UK: Studymates Limited. P. 17. 
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questions concern different elements of evaluation, of which analysis can reveal 
its connection to politics. For example: Does the evaluation policy produce 
relevant and convenient information that can be used for policymaking? This 
allows exposing the association of key elements of evaluation with the hidden 
politics of evaluation, and later, those with the empirical findings, e.g. How are 
evaluation findings used in Mexico? 
The flexible structure of the qualitative approach favours the incremental 
building of ideas and the development of different hypotheses during the course 
of the research. This process is driven by the identification and analysis of data 
to expose how the hidden politics of evaluation manifests. The richness of the 
research relies on the process of obtaining the perceptions and experiences of 
the stakeholders of evaluation, considering the complexity and intangibility of 
this object of study. This is consistent with the idea that the different rules 
established for evaluation will produce a different dynamic between 
stakeholders. 
The methodology applied makes explicit the connection between the variables 
associated with the hidden politics of evaluation and the particular 
characteristics of the context in which evaluation occurs in the UK and Mexico. 
For instance, the set of rules for the performance of evaluations can provide 
important notions about the level of influence that evaluands can have in a 
study and how this affects its outcomes. The utilisation of evaluation outputs 
can also reveal the extent to which evaluation has permeated the organisational 
culture and if it has transcended its managerial role to become a political 
instrument. The thematic framework developed about the hidden politics of 
evaluation is also linked to the research design. The institutional framework, as 
a core element of discussion in this thesis, is relevant for acknowledging how 
rules determine the way in which decisions are made and how stakeholders 
behave under these conditions. The elements of this framework (purpose, 
resources, process, outputs, and outcomes) demand a detailed understanding of 
the perceptions and experiences of the stakeholders involved in evaluation 
(Table 3.2). 
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Table 3.2 Research Design 
Research Questions 
Data Sources and 
Methods 
Justification 
Chapter of the 
thesis in which 
the question is 
addressed 
1. Are there efficient 
institutional 
frameworks that assure 
an effective assessment 
of public policy? 
Documentary 
analysis 
The identification of rules and procedures established for the performance of 
evaluation/audit in both countries can provide a clearer understanding of how 
the behaviour of stakeholders is shaped and to what extent it is possible for 
them to pursue their interests. 
Chapters 4 and 5 
2. Are the evaluation 
policies reliable? Are 
there robust 
instruments to assess 
the effectiveness of 
public policy? 
Documentary 
analysis 
Evaluators / 
Programme 
operators 
interviews 
The identification of the reliability of evaluation policy has to do with the 
robustness of the methods selected which can be known by the documentary 
evidence produced in both countries; however, it also incorporates an 
perception component that can only be seen through the experiences and 
empirical knowledge of programme operators who are actively engaged in the 
implementation of evaluation policies. 
Chapters 4 and 5 
3. Does the evaluation 
policy, in both 
countries, produce in a 
systematic way relevant 
and convenient 
information that can be 
used for the policy-
making process? 
Documentary 
analysis 
Programme 
operators/ 
Evaluators/ 
Politicians 
interviews 
The outputs of evaluation can be used for different purposes; the way in which 
evaluation becomes an input for the construction of political arguments is a 
phenomenon that can only be perceived from the experience of the stakeholders 
involved. Nonetheless, through documentary analysis it is possible to observe 
how policymakers use the information derived from evaluation/audit. 
Chapter 6 
4. When the outputs of 
evaluation are used, is 
there any effect on the 
improvement of policy-
making? 
Programme 
operators/ 
Evaluators 
interviews 
It is a highly complex task to isolate the effect of evaluation in the policymaking 
process as it is influenced by multiple factors. In order to obtain a general idea of 
the consequences that the performance of evaluation and audits have had in the 
broader context of governance it is important to know with more detail how 
stakeholders conceptualize this contribution in their own areas of influence. 
Chapter 6 
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Table 3.2 Continued 
Research Questions 
Data Sources and 
Methods 
Justification 
Chapter of the 
thesis in which 
the question is 
addressed 
5. Which is the role of 
policy evaluation in 
order to consider it 
useful for the policy-
making process? 
Documentary 
analysis 
Practitioners/ 
Academicians 
interviews 
One of the key elements of the hidden politics of evaluation is the driver that 
promotes the use of evaluation/audit in the public sector. The rationale and 
motivation behind an evaluation policy determines in great measure the way in 
which this process will be conducted and its possible outputs. The documentary 
analysis at this stage will provide the ‘official view’ on the use of evaluation as a 
management tool, this needs to be contrasted with the views of stakeholders of 
evaluation who have a more informal knowledge of the drivers that guide the 
assessment of public policy.  
Chapter 7 
6. In terms of ‘good 
policy’ and ‘good 
politics’, which of these 
issues predominate in 
the evaluation agenda of 
both countries? 
Politicians/  
Practitioners 
interviews 
The intangibility of the hidden politics of evaluation implies a subjective 
understanding according to the different views of stakeholders involved, 
therefore, the performance of in-depth interviews will allow obtaining data 
about the way in which these actors conceive and understand the political 
nature of evaluation. 
 
Chapter 7 
Source: Based on Mason, J., 2002. Qualitative Researching. SAGE. 
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3.2.2 Research Process 
Although qualitative research cannot be seen as a linear process, it is possible to 
identify some key stages (not necessarily sequential) whose main purpose is the 
obtaining of empirical evidence for the development of new knowledge about 
the political nature of evaluation. A series of activities were performed in order 
to collect, systematise, and analyse data, as is described below: 
1. The first stage of the process was a careful review of the literature in evaluation 
studies to identify those key elements of the hidden politics of evaluation 
considered crucial for the study of this phenomenon. 
2. The literature review was the basis for the construction of a theoretical 
framework for the thesis based on three pillars: governance, public policy, and 
evaluation studies. 
3. Based on the theoretical review, a thematic framework was developed for the 
understanding of the hidden politics of evaluation (see Chapter 2). This 
analytical tool aimed to play as a structured guidance for the comprehension of 
the political nature of evaluation. 
4. An exploratory analysis of different evaluation and audit policies led to the 
selection of the cases to be analysed. In order to have a basis for comparison, it 
was decided that the universe of study would be composed of four case studies 
in two different countries (UK and Mexico).   
5. To narrow the scope of the research a policy area was selected with an 
important development of evaluation and audit processes in both countries: 
health policy. The rationale behind this is that both in the UK and Mexico it is 
possible to identify a series of evaluation results susceptible to analysis relevant 
for reflecting upon its use. Although the way in which the government operates 
in both countries differs, it was considered pertinent to select two cases per 
country that belonged to the health sector and that have been systematically 
evaluated. In both countries it was considered the existence of an internal 
evaluation process and an external audit body (the NAO in the UK and the 
Supreme Audit Office (SAO) in Mexico). The selection of the cases was based on 
the criterion of assessment. This means that the nature and characteristics of 
each one of the cases was not the main focus of the research; the central issue to 
discuss was how politics influences evaluation/audit processes. Consequently, 
the cases only represent a vehicle for understanding this nexus. 
6. After selecting the case studies, primary data was obtained through the 
performance of semi-structured interviews with stakeholders of evaluation in 
both countries. This led to the identification of possible participants who were 
open to collaborating with the research. After a preliminary exploration of the 
evaluation policies of both countries, potential interviewees were identified. 
This incorporated people from different sectors that are or had been directly 
involved in the evaluation/audit processes of the selected case studies, i.e. 
evaluators, operators. 
7. A preliminary list of potential interviewees was defined and this stage was 
followed by a first attempt at contact (by e-mail, letter, or telephone) in which 
the purpose of the research and the relevance of their participation was briefly 
explained to them. With those participants who accepted taking part in the 
study a meeting for the interview was arranged. About 40 semi-structured 
interviews with different stakeholders of evaluation/audit were performed in 
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both countries. 95% of them were face-to-face interviews, with a minor number 
of informal chats performed over the telephone. Depending on the consent of 
the interviewee, some interviews were recorded. However, in all cases 
participants were informed that the data treatment would be made under the 
Chatham House Rule.536 
8. Interviews were carried out during an approximate 2-month period in each 
country. Most of them took place at the interviewee’s workplace and with an 
average length of 40 minutes. The interviews were semi-structured, based on 
the core issues identified in the thematic framework for the understanding of 
the hidden politics of evaluation. 
9. Interviews were transcribed and a series of quotes related to the core issues of 
the hidden politics of evaluation were identified. Due to the nature of the 
research, the use of data analysis software, e.g. Nvivo, Atlas.ti, etc., was avoided 
to have a more accurate interpretation of the ideas discussed during the 
interviews. As politics represents the main variable for the analysis, an 
important part of it was observing the behaviour of interviewees which cannot 
be perceived by the software. To preserve the anonymity of participants, each 
interviewee was assigned a code-number (e.g. UK-12/MX-9) that allows only its 
identification according to the country of origin.537 
10. Finally, the documentary analysis and the data collected from the interviews 
served as a basis for the development of a series of conclusions and 
recommendations about the hidden politics of evaluation. 
This description offers a structured idea of the general activities that led to the 
formulation of conclusions of the research. The interaction with the 
interviewees, the analysis of the data, and the identification of new areas of 
study in relation to the hidden politics of evaluation represent an important 
asset for the generation of new knowledge that constitutes an intangible 
element of the research process. 
3.2.3 Rationale for the Selection of the Case Studies 
The research analyses the evaluation policies of the UK and Mexico by focusing 
on health policy. In particular, the objects of study were the Cancer Strategy and 
the CQC (UK case) and SICALIDAD and Health Caravans Programmes (Mexican 
case). The analysis of the evaluation and audit outputs incorporated the 2011–
14 period. However, for the purposes of the research some references to prior 
evaluations were made. The comparative perspective adopted by this research 
recognises that the socio-economic and political differences between countries 
have influenced the institutional architecture for the development of evaluation. 
                                                        
536 This rule states that ‘when a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, 
participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation 
of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.’ The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs. 2011. "Chatham House Rule." London, UK. 
537 Appendix C presents a detailed list of interviewees. 
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Although these differences are not the focus of this research, it is important to 
make some remarks about this: 
 The political systems operating in these countries (the UK a constitutional 
monarchy and Mexico a presidential regime) impact on the configuration of the 
Executive and the Legislative and how these powers are executed.538 
 The level of maturity of these democracies also affects the establishment of 
control and accountability mechanisms and its effectiveness for the overview of 
public policy.539 
 The political culture in both countries is an element that might underpin the 
definition of rules for the interaction within the public sector. In the British civil 
service, for example, values like: ‘Integrity, honesty, impartiality, probity in the 
use of public money and putting the public interest above their own are still 
widely promoted and supported.’540 Ergo, it is comprehensible that these actors 
have discretion at their disposal for performing their tasks. In contrast, in the 
Mexican case the adoption of control and accountability reforms, for instance, 
has derived from the excessive development of formal rules and procedures, 
derived from ‘a profound mistrust in public officials’.541 
 In terms of the reform of the public sector, it is interesting to compare the UK 
case, as a paradigmatic example of the implementation of NPM reforms to 
Mexico as a country in which efforts in this matter are relatively recent. 
Considering this, the way in which institutions shape decision-making is 
relevant for understanding the potential differences that arise between case 
studies.542 The implementation of health programmes and the operation of 
healthcare organisations share some common grounds that contribute to the 
comparability of the cases. In the first place, the cases analysed are operated by 
a central department and demand the participation of different actors outside 
this sphere. In addition, in both countries health policy is considered a priority 
issue in the political agenda, which gives this policy area more relevance in its 
study.543 In both contexts it is possible to identify formal processes of evaluation 
                                                        
538 See: "Political Constitution of the United Mexican States.", Benwell, R., and O. Gay. 2011. "The 
Separation of Powers." London, UK. 
539 This can be seen in the Global Democracy Ranking that assesses dimensions associated to the 
level of democracy in a country, i.e. political rights, civil liberties. During 2014, in this index the 
UK ranked 13th and Mexico 58th. Global Democracy Ranking. 2014. "The Democracy Ranking of 
the Quality of Democracy." 
540 Horton, S. 2006. "The Public Service Ethos in the British Civil Service: An Historical 
Institutional Analysis." Public Policy and Administration 21(1):32-48. P. 44. 
541 Arellano, D. 2007. "Una cuestión de confianza. Retos e instrumentos para una reforma del 
Estado en América Latina." Nueva Sociedad (210):95-109.P. 103. 
542 Weaver, K. R., and B. A. Rockman. 1993. Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the 
United States and Abroad. Washington, D.C., US: The Brookings Institution. 
543 For example, in Mexico during the 2001-2006 Presidential term one of the core elements of 
the governmental priorities was the universal health coverage, particularly through the 
implementation of the Seguro Popular programme, which was widely promoted by the 
Executive. In the UK, health policy has also been a top priority within the governmental sphere, 
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promoted by central government and by an external audit body. There are an 
important number of evaluation/audit reports that show how these processes 
are conducted and how outputs are used by stakeholders. The case of the CQC 
requires making an additional remark. The inclusion of an organisation (as 
opposed to a policy/programme) responds to the specific value of this body as 
an object of study and its potential for providing important evidence about the 
hidden politics of evaluation. Its creation as a merger of previous healthcare 
regulators shows how the driver for efficiency in the public sector has fostered 
the adoption of important changes in the bureaucratic structure. Moreover, the 
way in which the CQC has operated and its political salience are interesting 
elements to analyse in terms of politics. 
Finally, as the institutional framework is one of the key elements of analysis, the 
identification of formal and informal rules for evaluation in both countries is 
useful for the comparison. In more specific terms, the selection of the case 
studies responded to the following reasons: 
● Mexico constitutes one of the Latin American countries that have recently adopted 
performance-management measures to improve efficiency and effectiveness in the 
public sector. Consequently, it seems relevant to contrast it to the UK case which is 
among the first countries that adopted NPM measures. The rationale behind this 
selection is the observing of the influence of the institutional framework in terms of 
the maturity of the evaluation policy in relation to its political nature. 
● The institutional framework for evaluation in these countries is substantially 
different. While in Mexico this process is highly centralised and conducted by three 
federal government agencies, in the UK evaluation is a process conducted in a more 
discretionary way and characterised by a strong audit body. It is interesting to 
analyse how these different institutional frameworks promote or inhibit political 
influence in evaluation. 
● The comparison of these two cases allows identifying those contextual variables 
that might favour the negative influence of politics and that might limit the use of 
evaluation results in policymaking. 
In addition to the rationale for the selection of the methodological approach, it is 
also necessary to discuss some of the challenges faced during the research 
process, addressed in the following section. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Conservatives Manifesto 2010, for instance, incorporates different statements about the 
need for increasing health spending and for more patient-centred policies. See: Gobierno 
Federal. 2012. "Sexto Informe de Gobierno.", The Conservative Party. "The Conservative 
Manifesto 2015." 
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3.3 Limitations and Methodological Challenges 
A sensitive topic like politics inevitably generates different reactions among 
people because of what it represents in terms of the exchange of power and 
resources. Moreover, scrutiny activities like evaluation and auditing have 
constantly found some ‘natural’ resistance due to the potential consequences 
that can be produced for individuals. A research that combines these elements is 
more likely to face some challenges that are important to consider, particularly 
for the conduction of the fieldwork. 
3.3.1 Limitations of the Methodological Approach 
As discussed, the case study is useful for the profound understanding of a 
particular phenomenon for which variables cannot be quantified. The study of 
the politics of evaluation fits into this description because of the intangible 
variables that can only be observed through the perception and experiences of 
participants. A first limitation to recognise regards the incapacity of 
generalisation associated with this method (see Section 3.1.2). There is an active 
theoretical discussion about this issue. For example, Gomm et al. distinguish 
between ‘generalisation across and within cases.’544 According to them, this 
matters in terms of the way in which researchers can claim the generalisation of 
their findings. Flyvbjerg adds ‘that knowledge cannot be formally generalized 
does not mean that it cannot enter into the collective process of knowledge 
accumulation in a given field or in a society’.545 The generalisation of findings, 
specially in this research, appears to be more useful for the identification of new 
areas of knowledge to explore.546 In the particular case of the hidden politics of 
evaluation, for which there is little empirical evidence, findings can provide 
some guidance about those elements of the institutional framework that might 
                                                        
544 Gomm, R., M. Hammersley, and P. Foster (Eds.). 2000. Case Study Method: Key Issues, Key 
Texts. London, UK: SAGE. P. 98. 
545 Flyvbjerg, B. 2006. "Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research." Qualitative Inquiry 
12(2):219-45. P. 227. 
546 The literature about policy transfer can be considered a suitable framework for 
understanding how findings derived from case studies can be translated to other contexts for 
the development of public policy. For further reference see: Dolowitz, D. P., and D. Marsh. 1996. 
"Who Learns What from Whom: a Review of the Policy Transfer Literature." Political Studies 
44(2):343-57, —. 2000. "Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary 
Policy-Making." Governance 13(1):5-23, Evans, M., and J. Davies. 1999. "Understanding Policy 
Transfer: A Multi-Level, Multi-Disciplinary Perspective." Public Administration 77(2):361-85. 
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influence this phenomenon, regardless of the contextual factors that affect the 
process of evaluation. 
The inferences made from the data collected and analysed apply only to the 
specific cases selected in both countries. This means that different findings 
could have been obtained through the study of cases in other countries or even 
different cases within the same context. This can also be influenced by the use of 
a different method, e.g. quantitative/mixed, for the collection and treatment of 
data. The conclusions reached in this thesis are strongly influenced by the 
perceptions and experiences of the stakeholders interviewed. Having a different 
set of interviewees probably would have resulted in different conclusions. 
However, the evidence obtained from the participants offers a broad 
understanding of how evaluation operates in both countries, the specific 
elements of the institutional framework that allow or hinder political influence, 
and, more importantly, how stakeholders from different spheres behave within 
this set of rules.  
A second limitation is related to the scope of the research. In terms of evaluation 
and auditing, there is a vast range of policies, programmes, and organisations 
that have been assessed through different methods. Nonetheless, considering 
primarily the availability of resources to perform the fieldwork (time, access, 
funding, etc.) it was necessary to narrow the scope of analysis to two cases per 
country. 
The development of the research implies developing strategies for coping with 
the limitations exposed in the pursuit of more robust findings. Regarding the 
limitation for generalisation of the case study, the incorporation of documentary 
analysis allows identifying structural elements of the evaluation policy in both 
countries, exceeding the boundaries of the case studies, and generating more 
data about the general state of evaluation. The identification of the institutional 
framework for evaluation/auditing, i.e. rules, procedures, and institutions, in 
both countries produced information about the hidden politics of evaluation 
applicable to programmes and organisations from other policy areas in these 
countries. In relation to the scope of the research, the selection of the case 
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studies was the result of a detailed process for identyfing those cases in the 
health sector with a wide range of evaluation outputs that could provide enough 
evidence for the analysis. The identification of interviewees also aimed to 
engage people from different sectors and backgrounds in obtaining different 
perspectives that could reflect the relationship between politics and evaluation 
beyond the particular reality of the cases analysed. 
3.3.2 Challenges Faced During Fieldwork 
In addition to the limitations associated with the methodological approach, the 
data-collection stage was challenging for a number of reasons. The most evident 
was that discussing about politics tended to create tension and reluctance in 
individuals when they feared that their responses might have a negative 
consequence for them, i.e. job loss. This is an element that is important to keep 
in mind because, as Desmond recognises, political sensitivity might affect the 
characteristics of the evidence provided by interviewees.547 
Overcoming this challenge entailed a gradual process of relationship-building 
and the establishment of trust to make interviewees feel more confident for the 
discussion.548 Based on this, it was a core element of the interaction with 
interviewees to continually transmit to them that their participation was highly 
valued and that their views and perceptions were respected. This resonated 
with the ethics underpinning the development of this research, especially in 
terms of how data was collected and the interaction with participants.549 The 
sensitiveness of politics required being always particularly aware of the 
position of participants in disclosing information. Ethically, the key element was 
the transparency of the process and making explicit the purposes and 
expectations of their contribution. In line with the ethical principles identified 
by Burnham et al., the development of the research and, particularly, the 
interaction with interviewees were driven by the idea of minimising any 
                                                        
547 Desmond, M. 2004. "Methodological challenges posed in studying an elite in the field." Area 
36(3):262-69. 
548 Abma, T. A. 2006. "The Practice and Politics of Responsive Evaluation." American Journal of 
Evaluation 27(1):31-43. 
549 Miller, T., M. Birch, M. Mauthner, and J. Jessop (Eds.). 2012. Ethics in Qualitative Research. 
London, UK: SAGE. 
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potential harm derived from their participation, and respecting their privacy 
and confidentiality.550 The core issue, as Seale states, ‘is how the rights of 
participants (and researchers) are to be balanced against the potential benefits 
to society.’551 
Another source of conflict was the identification and selection of possible 
interviewees. A clear limitation was that participation depended entirely on the 
will of each actor approached; some of them explicitly or implicitly (by not 
responding at all) declined the invitation for different reasons. Consequently, 
the research was based on the data collected only from those people who 
agreed to participate. This was a challenging situation. However, the networks 
established with some of the interviewees allowed the access to new potential 
participants to compensate for those who had declined the invitation. In some 
cases, it was also necessary to adjust to the limited time available for 
performing the interview because of the participant’s busy agenda, a common 
issue with elite interviewees.552 In terms of the documentary analysis, in both 
countries this was done, considering the information that was public and 
available. Some new documents were not considered because of the time 
framework of the research.553 Table 3.3 refers to the deepened discussion about 
the challenges faced during the research process and the strategies applied to 
overcome these situations. 
 
                                                        
550 Burnham, P., K. Gilland Lutz, W. Grant, and Z. Layton-Henry. 2008. Research Methods in 
Politics. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
551 Seale, C. 2012. Researching Society and Culture. London, UK: SAGE. P. 73. 
552 Aberbach, J., and B. Rockman. 2002. "Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews." Political 
Science & Politics 35(4):673-76. 
553 For example a study about the CQC in progress. 
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Table 3.3 Main Challenges Faced During the Research Process 
Challenge Description Strategy 
Disperse 
information 
During the documentary revision, the 
collection of the different 
evaluation/audit reports for each one 
of the case studies was complicated 
because this information is not 
concentrated into a single source. 
Main sources of information 
were identified to make the 
collection and classification of 
data easier according to each 
case study. This allowed 
prioritizing those documents 
that were more relevant for 
the research. 
Identification of 
potential 
interviewees 
It was a difficult process, some of these 
actors who participated into the 
assessment of the programmes 
analysed have left their previous 
positions and they have new positions 
at present. Consequently, it was 
important to access to the people that 
were directly involved, as the focus of 
this research was the evaluation/audit 
processes of those programmes. 
Some of the interviewees 
provided important 
information for contacting 
former officials or other 
people that could be relevant 
to interview.  
Assymetries in 
the 
interviewing 
process 
In the UK case, the process for inviting 
potential stakeholders to participate in 
the research was more time-
consuming, some interviewees 
responded later than expected and this 
provoked delays in the process. In the 
case of the Mexican participants it was 
a more expedite process to establish 
contact; however, in the case of 
government officials, the end of the 
presidential term clashed with the 
scheduled interview sessions. 
In some cases, it was 
necessary to modify the initial 
fieldwork programme. 
Particularly in the case of the 
UK, the supervisory team 
provided support for 
establishing contact with key 
potential interiewees. 
Acces to high-
level 
interviewees 
In both countries, interviews 
performed to high-level stakeholders 
(e.g. politicians, government officials) 
were difficult to obtain and subject to 
the time-constrains imposed by their 
agenda. 
The interviewing process was 
adapted, as possible, to these 
constraints to make 
interviewees aware of the 
relevance of their 
participation for this project. 
Resistance to 
discuss ‘the 
politics of 
evaluation’ 
In the Mexican case, some of the 
interviewees showed some resistance 
to opennly discuss the hidden politics 
of evaluation, they seemed careful not 
to disclose information that might be 
considered risky for them. In other 
cases, some participants seemed to be 
very interested in providing the 
‘institutional’ view about the topic.554 
Some interviewees in the UK were at 
first reluctant to participate as it was 
perceived that as politics was the core 
issue to discuss, their views might be 
used for non-academic purposes. 
Most of these resistance issues 
where overcome by 
establishing a relationship 
based on trust and confidence 
with interviewees, for 
example, by giving them more 
information about the nature 
of the research, the key issues 
to discuss and the treatment 
that will be given to the data 
they provide. 
                                                        
554 See the concept of social desirability effect explained by Bryman. Bryman, A. 2012. Social 
Research Methods. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. ibid. 
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3.3.3 Other Considerations 
The limitations derived from the methodological approach and the challenges 
faced during fieldwork are elements to contemplate when looking at the 
findings and conclusions presented in this thesis. Some other considerations are 
presented below: 
 The qualitative approach is considered more susceptible to subjectivity. 
Therefore, it is not possible to completely abstract the professional bias of the 
researcher. Making explicit the research process undertaken reduces the 
potential negative influence of such a bias. 
 Undertaking fieldwork in two different contexts might imply some asymmetry 
in the collection of data. Nevertheless it was a priority to carry out a very 
similar research process in both countries. 
 Recommendations formulated for each case study are made on the basis of the 
evidence collected and the analysis undertaken. Its generalisation, as discussed 
in this chapter, is not the purpose of the research. Instead, the identification of 
potential new areas of knowledge for the evaluation studies field aligns best 
with this method. 
The explanation of the process of this research is useful for having a broader 
understanding of how the data was collected, systematised, and interpreted. 
This chapter has also made explicit the limitations of the research and the 
methodological challenges that might have affected the outputs of this thesis. 
This information offers elements for identifying the scope of this research and 
the conditions underpinning it. The methodological framework detailed here 
serves as a basis for the description of the case studies selected. 
The next two chapters present a careful description of the institutional 
framework that operates in the UK and in Mexico for evaluation and auditing. 
The case studies for the analysis of the hidden politics of evaluation are also 
addressed in terms of its functioning and of the evaluation processes that have 
been undertaken. These chapters aim to identify the set of rules existent in both 
countries that shape and constrain the interaction of the stakeholders of 
evaluation. 
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Chapter 4. Case 1: Policy Evaluation in the United 
Kingdom 
The theoretical grounds of this thesis (see Chapter 2) yield important elements 
for the comprehension of the political nature of evaluation. However, empirical 
evidence about this topic is still at a developing stage. There is an important gap 
in the knowledge in relation to how the political nature of evaluation manifests. 
This chapter describes how evaluation and auditing operate in the UK, to grasp 
how its relation to politics manifests in practice. The core argument presented 
here is that evaluation and auditing in the UK are systems that operate 
simultaneously but separately. The rules directed to this purpose give 
stakeholders an important amount of discretion to act affecting the overall 
effect of evaluation in governance. Consequently, the contribution of these 
instruments to policymaking is unclear and demands more careful examination 
of these processes. This description is mostly based on primary documents that 
allow identifying the rules and procedures for evaluation and auditing. The 
empirical evidence obtained through interviews is discussed later in the 
analytical chapter. 
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first section sets out the rules and 
procedures that guide the performance of evaluation and auditing in the UK. 
The second section focuses on the first case study selected in the UK: the Cancer 
Strategy. This government initiative is taken as an element of analysis for the 
hidden politics of evaluation considering that it has been systematically 
evaluated and audited and it represents a central policy theme in the public 
agenda. The third section is dedicated to the second case study: the CQC. The 
analysis of this healthcare regulator is relevant, as it has been the result of a 
drive in the government for more efficiency. It also provides important 
knowledge about the outcomes of evaluation in relation to organisational 
performance. The core finding of this chapter is that policy evaluation in the UK 
is developed within an institutional framework that provides government 
departments with an important level of discretion in the decisions about what, 
when and how to evaluate. It is also characterised by a strong audit system led 
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by the National Audit Office (NAO) in which political strength is supported by 
the Select Committees of the House of Commons. These elements of the UK 
institutional framework contrast with the Mexican case where these activities 
are framed in a more rigid system of rules and procedures (see Chapter 5 
below). 
4.1 Audit and Evaluation in the UK 
The UK has a long tradition in terms of monitoring and evaluation. Across time, 
different approaches have been implemented to develop accurate systems for 
evaluating policy. As Talbot observes: 
The UK has been successful in developing a fairly comprehensive 
performance and evaluation measurement, monitoring, and management 
system which, over time, has become increasingly “outcome” focussed, 
although at various levels it still includes large elements of output, process 
and even input monitoring.555 
The reform of the public sector gave evaluation a more prominent role, 
particularly with the rise of the evidence-based policymaking approach.556 At 
the beginning of the New Labour Government in 1997, this model became a 
recurrent element of the political discourse.557 As Wells highlights, this fostered 
important changes in the public sector. On the one hand, evaluation gained 
significance as a systematic practice within central government and local 
agencies. On the other hand, evidence became a more frequent input for 
governmental tasks, along with VFM studies and outcome assessments.558 The 
adoption of this model in the New Labour government can be seen as a point of 
departure for understanding the current institutional framework for evaluation 
and auditing in the UK.559 The instruments generated for policy analysis aimed 
to obtain information about the effectiveness of programmes and 
                                                        
555 Talbot, C. 2010a. "Performance in Government. The Evolving System of Performance and 
Evaluation Measurement, Monitoring, and Management in the United Kingdom." Washington 
D.C., US: The World Bank. P. ix. 
556 European Commission. 2015. "Evidence-based Policymaking." 
557 See Cabinet Office. 1999a. "Modernising Government." London, UK. 
558 Wells, P. 2007. "New Labour and evidence-based policymaking: 1997-2007." People, Place & 
Policy Online 1(1):22-29. 
559 See: Solesbury, W. 2001. "Evidence Based Policy: Whence it Came and Where it’s Going." 
ESRC Centre for Evidence Based Policy and Practice. 
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organisations.560 
The growth of the audit field also influenced how policy is appraised and how 
data feeds back into policymaking. The ‘audit explosion’ described by Power 
made evident that a new dynamic between audited bodies and auditors was 
taking place,561 similar to the relationship between evaluators and evaluands. 
The shift towards a more rational public management and the use of tools like 
monitoring and evaluation created new conditions in the political arena.562 The 
hidden politics of evaluation matter because of the analysis of those 
relationships and their consequences. The political nature of evaluation 
concerns the way in which the stakeholders involved (practitioners, politicians, 
evaluators, etc.) make use of their resources to pursue their interests. As the 
bond between evaluation and politics can produce both positive and negative 
outcomes, it is important to bear in mind how these elements interact. 
From an overall perspective, it is possible to identify in the UK two major 
systems: internal evaluation (performance monitoring and evaluation studies) 
and an external audit system (Table 4.1). These systems are underpinned by 
different values, pursue different purposes, and are based on different 
processes. The values behind evaluation and auditing will inevitably affect the 
formal and informal arrangements produced. This generates a series of 
reciprocal reactions in which these processes are affected by the stakeholders’ 
values, while those values are also shaped by the conditions in which these 
                                                        
560 The DfID is a clear example of a central department in which evaluation is a systematic and 
internalised practice. See: Department for International Development. 2014. "Evaluations 
completed: April 2014 to March 2015." London, UK. 
561 Power, M. 1997. The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
562 In addition to the ‘audit explosion’ identified by Power, the rise in the use of evaluation 
mechanisms in the public sector has been also studied by various scholars in the field. For 
example, Pollitt considers that in Europe the furore caused by policy evaluation ‘is taking place 
not because executive politicians have suddenly changed their natures, but because their 
environments have shifted. In particular, the choices they face are more tightly resource 
constrained and they can no longer call on the same reserves of legitimacy and authority which 
were available to them two or three decades ago.’ Pollitt, C. 1998. "Evaluation in Europe: Boom 
or Bubble?" Evaluation 4(2):214-24. P. 223.  
The way in which both audit and evaluation have gained spaces in the public sector is 
underpinned not only by a managerial logic seeking more efficiency, but also by a political 
rationale that cannot be ignored. See: Datta, L. E. 2001. "Coming attractions." The American 
Journal of Evaluation 22(3):403-08, Mark, M. M. Ibid."Evaluation’s future: furor, futile, or 
fertile?":457-79. , Pollitt, C. 1998. "Evaluation in Europe: Boom or Bubble?" Evaluation 4(2):214-
24. 
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activities occur. The main element that this research aims to analyse is the way 
in which institutions affect the hidden politics of evaluation. Looking at how this 
variable engages in different contexts will detect those conditions that favour or 
limit the establishment of power relationships and the implications for the 
objectivity, independence, and utility of evaluation processes. 
Table 4.1 Evaluation and Audit Processes in the UK 
Internal Evaluation External Auditing 
• Performance monitoring activities 
through the use of indicators and 
the follow-up of organisational 
goals, overviewed by HM Treasury 
• No integrated evaluation policy, 
only guidelines for its development 
(the Green Book and the Magenta 
Book) 
• Evaluation studies carried out by 
government departments through 
internal units or external 
consultants 
• Audit system led by the NAO  
• The NAO scrutinises public 
spending on behalf of Parliament  
• It performs Financial Audits and 
VFM studies, followed-up by the 
Public Accounts Committee (PAC) 
 
 
The institutional architecture for evaluation in the UK will reveal the formal 
procedures that constrain its performance, particularly those areas of the 
process with political interests at stake, i.e. influencing the selection of methods, 
as well as the use given to evaluation findings for the legitimisation of public 
action. 
4.1.1 The Institutional Framework for Policy Evaluation in the UK 
The relationships that emerge from assessment processes are constrained by 
the limits and boundaries set by formal and informal rules. The institutional 
framework does not refer only to the legislation and organisations involved in 
evaluation and auditing, but also to the set of values (explicit or not) 
underpinning these activities (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3). The UK has a long 
tradition of initiatives for the assessment of ‘what works.’563 As stated, it is 
possible to identify two major processes for evaluation in the UK: internal 
evaluation (studies developed within departments or commissioned to external 
                                                        
563 Talbot, C. 2010a. "Performance in Government. The Evolving System of Performance and 
Evaluation Measurement, Monitoring, and Management in the United Kingdom." Washington 
D.C., US: The World Bank. 
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parties), and the external auditing performed by the NAO on behalf of 
Parliament. These activities are described in more detail in subsequent sections. 
However, it is worth providing an overview of the system operating in the UK. 
At the national level, evaluation research is carried out by government 
departments through internal units or external consultants. The Department of 
Health (DoH), for example, systematically produces evidence to support 
decision-making.564 In terms of performance monitoring, central government 
departments continually report a set of indicators (input and impact) about the 
activities carried out for addressing governmental priorities.565 The audit 
system is conducted by the NAO, an organisation that assesses central 
government departments in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and 
represents the pillar on which the accountability system is based. 
Evaluation in this country is entrenched in the public sector and ‘literally 
hundreds of evaluations are carried out.’566 To illustrate, the DoH recently 
commissioned a study about its relationship with stakeholders and their 
perceptions of an external organisation.567 This suggests that evaluation within 
central government involves stakeholders from different sectors to increase the 
robustness and legitimacy of evaluation.568 The most distinctive feature of the 
UK case is that there are no explicit obligations for central government 
departments to evaluate their programmes. Instead, there are guidelines that 
departments might or might not follow.569 According to the NAO, ‘Departments 
vary in the extent to which they follow central and department-specific 
                                                        
564 See: Advisory Committee on the Safety of Blood, Tissues and Organs. 2014. "Transplantation 
of Organs from Deceased Donors with Cancer or a History of Cancer." Department of Health. 
565 See for example: Department of Health. 2010. "Business Plan." London, UK. 
566 Schiavo-Campo, S. 2005. "Building Country Capacity for Monitoring and Evaluation in the 
Public Sector: Selected Lessons of International Experience." edited by The World Bank. 
Washington, D.C., US. P. 12. 
567 Department of Health. 2013a. "Department of Health 2013 Stakeholder Research." London, 
UK. 
568 See also: Department for Culture, Media and Sport. 2013. "An Independent Review of E-
Lending in Public Libraries in England." London, UK, Department for International 
Development. 2010. "Joint Irish Aid and DFID’s country programme evaluation Tanzania 
2004/05 to 2009/10." London, UK. 
569 The guidelines for central government departments comprise multiple approaches and 
methods for evaluating public policy. See: HM Treasury. 2011c. "The Magenta Book. Guidance 
for evaluation." edited by HM Treasury. London, UK. 
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requirements on cost-effectiveness evaluation.’570 Although guidelines for 
evaluation exist, these are not necessarily followed. Government departments 
have space for discretionary decision-making in evaluation, for example, in 
terms of the approaches applied and the stakeholders involved. This can be 
observed in the health sector. Organisations like the National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence (NICE) and Public Health England (PHE) are 
systematically involved in evaluation by issuing guidelines, piloting initiatives, 
or developing frameworks.571 
According to Henkel, the promotion of evaluation as a mechanism for 
strengthening policymaking in the UK is related to three major purposes: ‘To 
control public expenditure, to change the culture of the public sector and to shift 
the boundaries and definition of public and private spheres of activity.’572 Clarke 
agrees by stating: 
Establishing, assessing, and improving the performance of public services 
has become an increasing obsession of governments and institutions of 
evaluation have been adapted and invented to embody this obsession […] 
Britain has been a leading force in developing this approach that 
simultaneously builds on and transforms well-established approaches to 
audit and inspection.573 
This blooming of evaluation can be associated with the rise of the NPM. The 
pressures faced by the government to make more with less exposed the need for 
more efficient and effective policies. During the New Labour government 
(1997–2007), for example, the modernisation of the public sector was a central 
element of the political discourse.574 This can be observed in the Modernising 
Government White Paper (1999): 
Our aim is to reallocate money to key priorities; to change policies so that 
                                                        
570 National Audit Office. 2013a. "Evaluation in government." edited by National Audit Office. 
London, UK. P. 13.  
571 PHE, for instance, has developed standard evaluation frameworks for weight management, 
physical activity and dietary interventions. See: Public Health England. 2013. "Standard 
Evaluation Frameworks." London, UK. 
572Henkel, M. 1991. Government, Evaluation and Change. London, UK: Jessica Kingsley 
Publishers. P. 9. 
573 Clarke, J. 2005. "Performing for the Public: Doubt, Desire, and the Evaluation of Public 
Services." in The Values of Bureaucracy, edited by P. Du Gay. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
P. 212. 
574 See also: Finlayson, A. 1998. "Tony Blair and the jargon of modernisation." Soundings Autumn 
(10). 
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money is well spent; to ensure that departments work better together to 
improve services; to weed out unnecessary or wasteful spending.575 
Modernising government means [...] raising all standards until they match 
the best within and outside the public service, and continue improving. It 
means transforming government, so that it is organised around what the 
public wants and needs, rather than around the needs or convenience of 
institutions.576 
The adoption of NPM reforms pushed into the government’s modernisation 
agenda the need to measure the effectiveness of public policy by ‘creating a 
culture in which public bodies are continually reflecting on the services they 
provide and how they may be improved.’577 This became a general concern for 
the government, as there was an increasing necessity to be more parsimonious 
in the expenditure of public funds, along with a stronger social demand for 
transparency and accountability. The Open Data White Paper, for example, 
highlighted the relevance of a more transparent policymaking process: ‘We are 
proactively releasing much of the underlying, objective data used by the public 
sector to arrive at policy recommendations and in supporting policy 
decisions.’578 The promotion of evaluation and audit mechanisms has been an 
important element both within the Executive and the Legislative. 
Instruments for performance monitoring and evaluation grew both in the local 
and national spheres.579 What can be labelled as ‘evaluation policy’ in the UK is 
the co-existence of a performance monitoring system (implemented by HM 
Treasury), the use of evaluation research by government departments, and an 
audit system driven by the NAO. This is translated into the implementation of 
parallel processes that generate multiple outputs. As Dorey explains: 
The increased recourse to evaluation both reflects and reinforces a belief 
                                                        
575 Chancellor of the Exchequer. 1998. "Modern Public Services for Britain: Investing in 
Reform. Comprehensive Spending Review: New Public Spending Plans 1999-2002." 
576 Prime Minister and the Minister for the Cabinet Office. 1999. "Modernising Government." 
577 McAnulla, S. 2006. British Politics: A Critical Introduction. London, UK: Continuum. P. 151. 
578 HM Government. 2012. "Open Data White Paper. Unleashing the potential.", edited by 
Cabinet Office. London, UK. P. 31. 
579 Bjørnholt, B., and F. Larsen. 2014. "The politics of performance measurement: ‘Evaluation use 
as mediator for politics’." Evaluation 20(4):400-11, Haveri, A. 2008. "Evaluation of Change in 
Local Governance: The Rhetorical Wall and the Politics of Images." Ibid.14(2):141-55, Martin, S., 
J. Downe, C. Grace, and S. Nutley. 2010. "Validity, Utilization and Evidence-Based Policy: The 
Development and Impact of Performance Improvement Regimes in Local Public Services." 
Ibid.16(1):31-42. 
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among many policy makers that it is possible – and necessary, for reasons 
of efficiency and effectiveness – to develop a more rational and scientific 
approach to developing policies, based both on measuring statistical data 
and conducting experiments via ‘pilot schemes’580 and consequently 
determining ‘what works.’581 
The UK institutional framework is relevant in terms of how it affects the 
political relationships that are established as a consequence of evaluation. The 
description of each one of these activities elucidates those elements that are 
crucial for the analysis of the hidden politics of evaluation. 
4.1.2 Internal Evaluation 
As discussed, internal evaluation comprises two main processes: performance 
monitoring and policy evaluation. Performance monitoring is a much more 
institutionalised practice, promoted—through a range of instruments—by 
different parties in the government.582 It has comprised a vast range of tools 
that has evolved over time, but that have remained consistently at the core of 
central government.583 
The main reason for the predominance of this approach is the construction of a 
linkage between performance and the allocation of public funds.584 This reveals 
an explicit focus on the promotion of efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery 
of public services.585 During the New Labour government, measuring 
                                                        
580 Recently it has been debated in the UK the pertinence of carrying out policy pilots in contrast 
to other evaluation mechanisms like randomised –controlled trials (RCT). This comes from the 
idea that a pilot can effectively provide information about the feasibility of implementing a 
policy, but are not able to provide evidence about the potential harms of benefits that a policy 
can have because contextual elements change. Goldacre, B. 2013. "Building evidence into 
education." London, UK. 
581 Dorey, P. 2014. Policy Making in Britain: An Introduction. London, UK: SAGE. P. 280. 
582 A chronology of performance management systems in the UK developed by Bourn (2007) is 
shown in Appendix D. 
583 For a detailed description of the evolution of the performance monitoring system in the UK 
see Talbot, C. 2010a. "Performance in Government. The Evolving System of Performance and 
Evaluation Measurement, Monitoring, and Management in the United Kingdom." Washington 
D.C., US: The World Bank. 
584 Regarding this issue, the work of Curristine ‘provides an overview of the development and 
use of performance measures and evaluations in the budget process across OECD countries.’ 
This study highlights, for example, the case of the Research Assessment Exercise in the UK, 
where performance information was linked to budgeting processes. This instrument was 
substituted by the Research Excellence Framework in 2014. See: Curristine, T. 2005. 
"Performance Information in the Budget Process: Results of the OECD 2005 Questionnaire." 
OECD Journal on Budgeting 5(2):87-131. P. 87. 
585 The distortions produced by the development of performance systems have been discussed 
by Clarke, J. 2008. "Performance Paradoxes: The Politics of Evaluation in Public Services." Pp. 
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performance was a central issue and HM Treasury implemented the use of 
Public Service Agreements (hereafter, PSA).586 These were essentially ‘contracts’ 
between HM Treasury and departments based on the accomplishment of 
performance targets and “if not met the Treasury will ‘claw back’ funds they 
would otherwise release to departments.”587 In the 1998 Comprehensive 
Spending Review, the Prime Minister (PM) emphasised the role of these 
instruments in the government’s modernisation agenda: 
It reflects detailed public service agreements between departments and the 
Treasury about how these overall totals will be spent, with clear objectives 
and output and efficiency targets that departments have agreed to meet.588 
The establishment of PSA reveals an explicit bond between public spending and 
efficiency. PSAs were founded on a set of principles to promote a more detailed 
review of public expenditure and incorporated ‘high-level objectives and targets 
which commit the department to achieving a specific level of success.’589 Also, as 
James highlights, PSAs were ‘a tool for negotiating changes with individual 
departments, […] to improve the co-ordination of priority setting where policy 
or delivery issues cut across departmental boundaries.’590 Matthews describes 
the characteristics of this system: 
 Link between expenditure and performance was made explicit; 
resources were allocated in accordance with the Government's broad 
aims, translated into departmental objectives, against which PSA 
targets were set 
 Shift from annual budgeting to three-year Department Expenditure 
Limits 
 Longer-term planning 
 Targets were intended to be SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, 
relevant, and timed) 
                                                                                                                                                             
120-34 in Public Services Inspection in the UK. Research Highlight in Social Work, edited by H. 
Davis and S. Martin. London, UK: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.  
586 PSAs can be considered a substitute mechanism of the Output and Performance Analysis 
(OPA) established during the Conservative Government during the 1990s. For further reference 
see: Matthews, F. 2013. Complexity, Fragmentation, and Uncertainty. Government Capacity in an 
Evolving State. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Talbot, C. 2010a. "Performance in 
Government. The Evolving System of Performance and Evaluation Measurement, Monitoring, 
and Management in the United Kingdom." Washington D.C., US: The World Bank. 
587 McAnulla, S. 2006. British Politics: A Critical Introduction. London, UK: Continuum. P. 152. 
588 Chancellor of the Exchequer. 1998. "Modern Public Services for Britain: Investing in 
Reform. Comprehensive Spending Review: New Public Spending Plans 1999-2002."  
589 Johnson, C., and C. Talbot. 2007. "The UK Parliament and performance: challenging or 
challenged?" International Review of Administrative Sciences 73(1):113-31. P. 116. 
590 James, O. 2004. "The UK Core Executive's Use of Public Service Agreements as a Tool of 
Governance." Public Administration 82(2):397-419. P. 400. 
152 
 
 Encouragement of cross-departmental work 
 Greater degree of autonomy for front-line service providers 
 Publicity of performance information.591 
PSAs also aimed to incentivise departments to achieve their organisational goals 
during a specific period of time and to give them more flexibility in the 
administration of their budget … 
… to improve the coordination of priority setting where policy or delivery 
issues cut across departmental boundaries […] it was designed to bring all 
of central government under a system-wide performance regime to reduce 
fragmentation.592 
 
However, the effectiveness of the PSAs was not exempted from criticism. The 
Institute for Government explains that after the first New Labour term … 
… Blair was frustrated with the lack of progress made during his first term 
and wanted to use his second term to push through radical public service 
reform […] the PSA agenda became significantly more ambitious, but more 
focused.593 
The second New Labour term brought important changes to this scheme. The 
number of targets was reduced from 600 (in 1998) to 160 (in 2000)594 and 
other modifications were made (mostly related to the specification of 
indicators).595 In the British public sector, the PSA system … 
… dominated the government’s approach to monitoring public sector 
performance for 12 years and played a key role in evaluating the progress 
of public sector reform, but it was criticised for being over-centralist and 
bureaucratic despite being refined and simplified over the years while 
some targets proved counter-productive.596 
The identification of goals and the construction of indicators promoted by the 
PSA system fit better under the label of monitoring rather than under evaluation 
(see Chapter 2, Section 2.1.3). The main function of instruments of this nature is 
having a better control over the tasks given to each department and the goals 
                                                        
591 Matthews, F. 2013. Complexity, Fragmentation, and Uncertainty. Government Capacity in an 
Evolving State. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Pp. 84-86. 
592 James, O. 2004. "The UK Core Executive's Use of Public Service Agreements as a Tool of 
Governance." Public Administration 82(2):397-419. P. 400. 
593 Panchamia, N., and P. Thomas. 2014. "Public Service Agreements and the Prime Minister’s 
Delivery Unit." Institute for Government. P. 3-4. 
594 Gay, O. 2005. "Public Service Agreements." Parliament and Constitution Centre. P. 2. 
595 Department of Health. 2006a. "Autumn Performance Report." London, UK. 
596 Burton, M. 2013. "The Politics of Public Sector Reform." Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
P. 228. 
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achieved. The benefits produced by this system were recognised even beyond 
the government’s sphere. The Select Committee of Public Administration, for 
example, acknowledged that PSAs allowed … 
… targeting shifts attention from the classic Treasury concerns of inputs 
(money and personnel) to outputs and outcomes.597 
Efficiency and the public sector reform were still priority topics in the agenda of 
the Coalition Government (2010–15), as it can be observed in the statement 
made by the PM, David Cameron, during the Confederation of British 
Industry’s Conference: 
We had to cut the cost of government, we had to get the deficit down and 
we’ve got to live within our means. Now, we’ve made good progress but 
there’s a huge amount left to do […] we’ve managed to find £14.5 billion of 
efficiencies within government – that’s just about doing things better.598 
Despite the commitment to these values, the PSA system was abolished and a 
new performance-measurement system was implemented by the Coalition 
Government: the Business Plans. These “placed considerable emphasis on 
‘milestones’ against which to determine departments’ success in delivering 
commitments, with reporting structures leading directly to Downing Street.”599 
These documents set out … 
… coalition priorities, key policy and implementation actions for the 
remainder of this Parliament; expenditure for each remaining year of this 
Spending Review period, and other departmental data, including an 
organogram, input and impact indicators.600 
 
Business Plans enable monitoring the level of accomplishment made by 
departments and include key information about the connection between the 
Coalition priorities and departmental activities: 
Vision and priorities to 2014-15; 
Structural reform plan, including actions and deadlines for implementing 
reforms over the next two years; and 
                                                        
597 Public Administration Select Committee. 2003. "On Target? Government By Measurement." 
London, UK. P. 9. 
598 Cabinet Office. 2014a. "CBI Annual Conference 2014: Prime Minister's address.". 
599 Painter, C. 2012. "The UK Coalition government: Constructing public service reform 
narratives." Public Policy and Administration 20(1):3-20. P. 9. 
600 British Prime Minister's Office. 2010. "Business Plans: track progress in implementing our 
policies." London, UK. 
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Contribution to transparency, including the key indicators against which it 
will publish data to show the cost and impact of public services and 
departmental activities.601 
The establishment of indicators has an important political implication to 
highlight. Quantifiable measurements are an asset for justifying policy decisions 
because the conceptualisation of these instruments is underpinned by values 
like objectivity and political neutrality. As The World Bank recognises, ‘With 
indicators, monitoring and evaluation is more compelling because it is objective, 
not based on personal judgments or pure description.’602 
An interesting example of this can be found in the health sector. The Coalition 
Government established six priorities for the DoH. One of these priorities was 
‘to enable better health and wellbeing for all.’ There are actions and indicators 
associated with this priority that are systematically monitored by the 
Department and informed to HM Treasury (Box 4.1).603 This disaggregation of 
political priorities into concrete actions and quantifiable indicators is intended 
to generate more elements to control performance and to report progress. 
Box 4.1 Example of the Monitoring of Coalition Priorities in the Health Sector 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Department of Health, 2010. Business Plan.  
Business plans are also a core element of the planning process. The 
development of the DoH’s Corporate Plan is closely linked to the targets and 
indicators of their Business Plan. Following the example presented in Box 4.1, 
the Corporate Plan disaggregates the governmental priorities and establishes 
specific actions to implement during a period of time. For the priority ‘to enable 
better health and wellbeing for all’, this document recognises the need for 
                                                        
601 HM Treasury. 2010. "Spending Review 2010." edited by HM Treasury. London, UK. P. 9. 
602 Mosse, R., and L. E. Sontheimer. 1996. "Performance Monitoring Indicators Handbook." 
Washington, D.C., US: The World Bank. P. 4. 
603 Regarding this issue, in 2014 The Institute for Government analysed how departments 
measure performance and the use of Business Plans. See: Freeguard, G., P. Bouchal, R. Munro, C. 
Nimmo, and J. McCrae. 2014. "Whitehall Monitor 2014. A data-driven analysis of the size, shape 
and performance of Whitehall." London, UK: Institute for Government.  
Coalition Priority 
To enable better health and wellbeing for all. 
Action 
Reduce preventable early death. 
Indicator 
Mortality rate from causes considered preventable 
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‘preventing people from dying prematurely by improving mortality rates for the 
big killer diseases, to be the best in Europe through improving prevention, 
diagnosis and treatment and reducing health inequalities.’604 This shows that 
the use of performance information is embedded in the daily operation of 
departments and is an input for reporting progress.605 
This focus on performance monitoring has led to the development of other 
instruments of control. For instance, the 2013/14 NHS’s Outcome Framework606 
‘contains a number of indicators selected to provide a balanced coverage of NHS 
activity.’607 This allows the NHS to adapt the planning and monitoring of its 
activities to those priority-policy themes in the agenda. The NHS’s framework, 
for instance, incorporated new indicators for cancer to improve the monitoring 
of the services provided, e.g. five-year survival from all cancers. This suggests 
that planning processes are flexible to adapt to political changes in the 
priorities. 
In addition, departments issue a Quarterly Data Summary (QDS) that provides 
an update on how the budget is spent. It is mostly a transparency action that 
gives taxpayers a synthetic view of their financial performance: ‘To make more 
of the management information currently held by government available to 
members of the public on a regular basis.’608 Unlike other tools like evaluation 
and auditing, performance monitoring lacks the judgement component about 
policy. Nonetheless, monitoring data can represent an input for evaluation and 
auditing in terms of the interpretation that is made from this evidence. 
Policy evaluation has had a more fragmented development in the UK. Even 
though efforts in this area have been made, especially in health and education 
                                                        
604 Department of Health. 2014a. "DH Corporate Plan 2014- 2015." edited by Department of 
Health. London, UK. P. 11. 
605 See for example: —. 2014b. "Mid-year report 2014-15." London, UK. 
606 The purpose of this framework is to ‘provide a national overview of how well the NHS is 
performing; be the main way, along with the NHS Mandate, in which NHS England is held to 
account for improvements in health outcomes; improve quality throughout the NHS by 
encouraging a change in culture and behaviour focused on health outcomes not process.’ —. 
2013b. "Health and social care outcomes frameworks." London, UK. 
607 National Health Service. 2012. "The NHS Outcomes Framework 2013/14." edited by National 
Health Service. London, UK. P. 4. 
608 Department of Health. 2012a. "DH business plan quarterly data summary: January 2012." 
London, UK. 
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sectors, the rise of evaluation has been a more recent process.609 According to 
Pollitt, in the UK … 
… attempts have certainly been made to install evaluation at the core of 
central government […] yet, despite initial enthusiasms, the institutional 
homes built for policy evaluators have, one by one, been demolished by the 
huff and the puff of political forces and intellectual fashions.610 
With the arrival of the New Labour government, the interest for evidence-based 
policymaking rose as a strategy to give more rationality to policy decisions.611 
The enthusiasm for this model was even considered by some scholars as 
‘somewhat of a mantra for governments.’612 Under the administration of the PM, 
Tony Blair, the Modernising Government White Paper claimed for a ‘better use of 
evidence and research in policymaking and better focus on policies that will 
deliver long-term goals.’613 Its use in the public sector ‘was intended to signify 
the entry of a government with a modernising mandate, committed to replacing 
ideologically-driven politics with rational decision making.’614 This gave 
evaluation a more salient role, as ‘having to specify precise outcomes products 
and milestones early on helps policy makers to build evaluation into the policy 
making process from the outset.’615 However, evaluation exceeds the framework 
of the evidence-based policymaking model because the use of its outputs is not 
constrained to support decision-making. These might also contribute to broader 
aspects such as transparency and learning.616 
                                                        
609 Talbot, C. 2010a. "Performance in Government. The Evolving System of Performance and 
Evaluation Measurement, Monitoring, and Management in the United Kingdom." Washington 
D.C., US: The World Bank. 
610 Pollitt, C. 1993. "Occasional Excursions: A Brief History of Policy Evaluation in the UK." 
Parliamentary Affairs 46(3):353-62. P. 354. 
611 For further reference see: Bogenschneider, K., and T. J. Corbett. 2010. Evidence-Based 
Policymaking: Insights from Policy-Minded Researchers and Research-Minded Policymakers. New 
York, US: Routledge, Guenther, J., E. Williams, and A. Arnott. 2010. "The politics of evaluation: 
evidence-based policy or policy-based evidence?" in NARU Public Seminar Series. Darwin, 
Australia, McDavid, J. C., and I. Huse. 2012. "Legislator Uses of Public Performance Reports." 
American Journal of Evaluation 33(1):7-25, Shaw, I., J. C. Greene, and M. M. Mark. 2006. 
Handbook of Evaluation: Policies, Programs and Practices. London, UK: SAGE. 
612 Vaessen, J., and F. L. Leeuw. 2010. Mind the gap: Perspectives on Policy Evaluation and the 
Social Sciences. New Jersey, US: Transaction Publishers. P. 136. 
613 Cabinet Office. 1999a. "Modernising Government." London, UK. 
614 Sutcliffe, S., and J. Court. 2005. "Evidence-Based Policymaking: What is it? How does it work? 
What relevance for developing countries?", edited by Overseas Development Institute. P. 1. 
615 Cabinet Office. 1999c. "Professional Policy Making for the Twenty First Century." P. 18. 
616 Segone, M. (Ed.). 2008. Bridging the gap. The role of monitoring and evaluation in evidence-
based policy making: UNICEF. 
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The promotion given to evaluation by the New Labour government represented, 
at least discursively, a linkage between evidence and accountability and a high-
priority issue in the government’s agenda.617 During this period, it is possible to 
find recurrent allusions to evidence and evaluation, both in terms of its 
potential benefit for policymaking, as in terms of the need to develop more 
capacities in this area: 
-Every new initiative needs a built-in capacity to learn from monitoring and 
evaluation.618 
-A more rigorous approach to appraisal and evaluation is needed so that 
information requirements are sufficient to enable Government to appraise 
policy options, monitor progress and evaluate results.619 
This focus on evidence made the connection between social-science research 
and policy more explicit. According to Wells, this fostered the development of 
large-scale evaluations to social policies.620 The Sure Start initiative,621 for 
example, was profusely evaluated using multiple methodologies and generated 
important evidence about the effectiveness of the programme.622 The design 
and implementation of evaluation tools in different policy areas became also 
more frequent.623 This interest on evidence can be seen as a way for 
policymakers to set themselves apart from the politics of the public sector by 
relying on objective and so-called ‘neutral information.’624 Nonetheless, as will 
                                                        
617 Monaghan, M. 2011. Evidence versus Politics: Exploiting Research in UK Drug Policy Making? 
Bristol, UK: Bristol Policy.. 
618 Mulgan, G., and A. Lee. 2001. "Better Policy Delivery and Design: A Discussion Paper." edited 
by Performance and Innovation Unit. London, UK.P. 18. 
619 Cabinet Office. 2000. "Wiring it up: Whitehall's Management of Cross Cutting Politices and 
Services." London, UK. P. 38. 
620 Wells, P. 2007. "New Labour and evidence-based policymaking: 1997-2007." People, Place & 
Policy Online 1(1):22-29. 
621 These programmes ‘were aimed at families with children up to the age of 4 living in 
disadvantaged areas […] the aim was to bring together early education, childcare, health 
services and family support to promote the physical, intellectual and social development of 
babies and children.’ Source: Department for Education. 2011. "National evaluation of Sure Start 
local programmes: an economic perspective." London, UK. 
622 See: Birbeck University of London. 2012. "National Evaluation of Sure Start." London, UK. 
623 Sutcliffe and Court review some of the specific tools used by the UK government to obtain 
evidence, including The Green Book and The Magenta Book described later in this chapter. 
Sutcliffe, S., and J. Court. 2005. "Evidence-Based Policymaking: What is it? How does it work? 
What relevance for developing countries?", edited by Overseas Development Institute. 
624 This argument can be related to the idea of depoliticisation discussed in Chapter 2. From this 
perspective, evaluation and audit can be seen as mechanisms to shift the political values 
associated to public policy through the identification of evidence obtained through so-called 
objective and unbiased methods. As it will be discussed in Chapter 6, the political values 
embedded in evaluation inevitably manifest during different stages of the process. Therefore, 
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be discussed later, this is not exempt from political influence. The flourishing of 
evaluation during the New Labour’s government promoted a new dynamic 
between the public sector and the market of knowledge, which, according to 
Sullivan, did not have an important impact on policymaking at the time: 
Despite the considerable investment in policy evaluation, ‘evidence-based 
policymaking’ did not come to define the policy process but rather 
generated a disconnection between ‘evidence’ and ‘argument’ that 
diminished the role of the evaluator in the policy process.625 
As stated, the evidence-based approach was a core element of the political 
discourse, but in practice, the linkage between social-science research and 
public policy was not so perceivable. Parsons observes: 
The speech turned out, therefore, to be less of a new chapter in the history 
of public policy, so much as 'deja vu all over again'[…] If 'evidence' is to 
really to have more of an influence on policy-making then this involves 
tackling the thorny Lasswellian question of 'who gets what, when and how'. 
Whose evidence gets what influence, when and how?626 
Consequently, the impact of the evidence-based approach promoted by New 
Labour is debatable. On the one hand, its adoption contributed to the 
development of evaluation capacities in central government.627 On the other 
hand, its effect on policymaking is unclear and it requires assessment in terms 
of its utility for supporting and legitimising this process. According to Sutcliffe 
and Court, the UK ‘needs to be increased communication and interaction 
between the research and policy worlds in order to strengthen the integration 
of policy and evidence.’628 This makes evident the complexity of evaluation, not 
only in terms of establishing guidelines for its performance, but also to generate 
incentives to promote its utilisation. 
                                                                                                                                                             
depoliticisation can be seen as a process in which politics are removed from a highly technical 
area like methodology, to provide an example, and are moved to other areas like the definition 
of the scope or the dissemination of results. See: Flinders, M., and J. Buller. 2006. 
"Depoliticisation: Principles, Tactics and Tools." British Politics 1(3):293-318. 
625 Sullivan, H. 2011. "'Truth' junkies: using evaluation in UK public policy." Policy & Politics 
39(4):499-512.P. 510. 
626 Parsons, W. 2002. "From Muddling Through to Muddling Up - Evidence Based Policy Making 
and the Modernisation of British Government." Public Policy and Administration 17(3):43-60. P. 
57. 
627 Davies, P. 2012. "The State of Evidence-Based Policy Evaluation and its Role in Policy 
Formation." National Institute Economic Review 219(1):R41-R52. 
628 Sutcliffe, S., and J. Court. 2005. "Evidence-Based Policymaking: What is it? How does it work? 
What relevance for developing countries?", edited by Overseas Development Institute. P. 14. 
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In the Coalition Government (2010–15) there was no integrated evaluation 
policy or regulation that enforced evaluation; instead, certain guidelines were 
made available to departments.629 According to an evaluator (UK-14): 
In theory, any discretionary spending that the Treasury enable a 
department to engage in is required to do some kind of evaluation, but 
there are no sort of binding conditions on precisely how that evaluation is 
undertaken. 
Although there are guidelines for the performance of evaluation, each 
department has its own internal procedures for this activity—except for the 
public bidding of evaluation contracts.630 Despite evaluation not being 
mandatory, departments have systematically used social science research in 
different ways.631 According to Morris, evaluation in the UK has been mostly 
used for the following purposes: 
 Testing of new policy ideas – pilots and demonstrations (limited to specific 
areas/time periods) 
 Identifying whether existing interventions need to be reformed or abandoned 
 Improvement of implementation and management of interventions 
 Development of new interventions – action research 
 Pragmatic – politicians want evidence that their programmes/interventions 
work as a political defence.632   
The use of pilots was recurrent within the Coalition Government for the 
identification of the economic impact of a new policy.633 These aim to reduce the 
possible negative effects produced by executing a policy that might not work. It 
‘will be a prelude to the policy being implemented more widely or nationally, 
                                                        
629 The Government Social Research Service (GSR) has issued guidance for evaluation about 
multiple topics (methodology, ethics, and policy analysis). See: Government Social Research 
Service. "Professional Guidance." London, UK. 
630 Public organisations must follow the procedures and directions established in the Managing 
Public Money book issued by HM Treasury. This document ‘sets out the main principles for 
dealing with resources in UK public sector organisations.’ This includes the guidelines for public 
organisations to follow when they need to hire the services of external consultants. HM 
Treasury. 2013. "Managing Public Money." edited by HM Treasury. London, UK. P. 8. 
631 For example, the Behavioural Insights Toolkit study performed by the Social Research and 
Evaluation division in the Department for Transport and the Climate Change and Transport 
Choices study commissioned by the Department of Transport to TNS BMRB, an external 
consultant. 
632 Morris, S. 2005. "Evaluating Public Policy in the UK: History, Politics & Practice." P. 7. 
633 During the last years, an important number of evaluation studies for testing new policies 
have been performed by different departments. For example, last year, the Ministry of Justice 
commissioned to a group of researchers from The University of Kent the evaluation of the 
mandatory polygraph pilot. The DoH also commissioned a study to the NatCen Social Research 
and the University of York for the Drug System Change Pilots Evaluation. 
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once its effectiveness has been evaluated and any problems have been 
addressed.’634 It can also be seen as a way to minimise the potential political 
costs of failure. Other types of recurrent evaluation in this country are those 
focused on implementation, useful for detecting those potential areas of 
improvement.635 
Another relevant issue during the Coalition Government (2010–15) was the 
uneven evaluation capabilities among departments. This can be explained by the 
lack of a structured evaluation policy that standardises its performance. For 
example, there is no integrated information about the number, nature, and cost 
of evaluations.636 There are also important variances in the number of studies 
undertaken and most departments only make evaluation reports public without 
providing any further information.637 Despite this, some departments present a 
more developed evaluation strategy. The Department for International 
Development (DfID), for instance, has an explicit annual evaluation policy that 
sets out the ethical principles for research and evaluation. It also delivers 
annually a report about the evaluations undertaken (approaches, methods, and 
resources). 
Guidelines for evaluation in central government are concentrated in two 
instruments issued by HM Treasury. The first one is The Green Book, published 
during the New Labour government and revised by the Coalition Government.638 
This document established that ‘all new policies, programmes and projects, 
whether revenue, capital or regulatory, should be subject to comprehensive but 
proportionate assessment, wherever it is practicable, so as best to promote the 
                                                        
634 Dorey, P. 2014. Policy Making in Britain: An Introduction. London, UK: SAGE. P. 279. 
635 Examples of this kind of evaluation are the Evaluation of the SEND pathfinder programme 
(Process and Implementation Research Report) and the evaluation of the ‘Travelling to School 
Initiative’ Programme, both commissioned by the Department of Education.  
636 One of the criticisms made by the NAO in its report Evaluation in government published was 
precisely the lack of guidance for departments ‘on how to implement the principle of 
proportionality in what and how to evaluate’. National Audit Office. 2013a. "Evaluation in 
government." edited by National Audit Office. London, UK. P. 13. Appendix F summarises the key 
findings of this study. 
637 For example during 2014, the Department for Work and Pensions performed more than 20 
studies, while the Department for Transport less than five. 
638 The current edition of The Green Book was issued in 2003, with some minor changes done in 
2011. According to the HM Treasury’s website, The Green Book is going through a process of 
revision.  
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public interest.’639 Some of the most relevant topics addressed in this handbook 
are: 
 Appraisal and evaluation as part of the policy cycle understood within central 
government as ROAMEF—an acronym for: rationale, objectives, appraisal, 
monitoring, evaluation, and feedback (Figure 4.1). 
 It distinguishes between these two concepts by describing appraisal as an 
activity prior to the implementation of a policy, and evaluation as an ex-post 
judgement. 
 It provides methodological tools for assessing the pertinence of the 
government’s intervention. 
 Appraisal focuses on the performance of cost-benefit analyses; The Green Book 
provides a solid body of methodological tools for this purpose. 
 Evaluation is seen as a mechanism to compare the results obtained by a policy, 
programme, or project in relation to what it was expected to achieve. 
Figure 4.1 Rationale, Objectives, Appraisal, Evaluation and Feedback (ROAMEF) 
Cycle 
 
Source: HM Treasury, 2011. The Green Book. P. 3 
The Green Book distinguishes between appraisal and evaluation and this has 
derived into two different processes (Figures 4.2 and 4.3). 
 
                                                        
639 HM Treasury. 2011a. "The Green Book. Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government." 
London, UK. 
162 
 
Figure 4.2 The Green Book Process for the Appraisal of Policies, Programmes and 
Projects 
Source: Based on HM Treasury, 2011. The Green Book. 
Figure 4.3 The Green Book Process for the Evaluation of Policies, Programmes and 
Projects 
 Source: Based on HM Treasury, 2011. The Green Book. 
 
The second instrument is The Magenta Book, considered, ‘The recommended 
central government guidance on evaluation that sets out best practice for 
departments to follow.’640 Focused on evaluation, this document addresses a 
series of issues that public officials might face when commissioning evaluation 
studies (Table 4.2).641  
                                                        
640 —. 2011c. "The Magenta Book. Guidance for evaluation." edited by HM Treasury. London, UK. 
P. 7. 
641 Henkel analyses in detail the use of consultants for the performance of evaluation studies. 
Henkel, M. 1991. Government, Evaluation and Change. London, UK: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.. 
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Table 4.2 Key Policy Evaluation Themes Addressed by The Magenta Book 
Theme General Overview 
Conceptualization 
of evaluation 
Evaluation is understood as ‘an objective process of understanding how a 
policy or other intervention was implemented, what effects it had for 
whom, how and why.’642 
Evaluations 
approaches 
The design of an evaluation depends on the kind of questions that it wants 
to answer; however, three types of evaluation can be identified: process 
evaluations, impact evaluations, and economic evaluations (cost-benefit 
analysis).  
Planning of 
evaluations 
It focuses on the importance of considering key elements for the 
performance of an evaluation such as the target audience, the approach, 
the resources required and appropriate timing. 
Process of 
evaluation 
The book describes a series of stages (at a more disaggregated level than 
those described by The Green Book) for the performance of an evaluation. 
Performance of 
impact evaluation 
The Magenta Book provides some guidance on impact evaluation, which is 
considered a useful tool for knowing the effect of a policy on a particular 
group of the population; it focuses on the performance of randomised 
controlled trials and piloting. 
Technical issues 
of policy 
evaluation 
The book addresses some technical issues regarding policy evaluation that 
public officers should be aware of such as data collection, reporting and 
dissemination of evaluation findings. 
Source: Based on HM Treasury, 2011. The Magenta Book. 
Both instruments aim to support the commissioning of evaluations under a 
scheme of ‘objective’ generation of evidence. This suggests that these processes 
are underpinned by an idea of rationality and depoliticisation of policymaking. 
The focus of these guidelines is the identification of the net effect of public 
policy (impact) which might explain why the idea of building counterfactuals 
seems so relevant. Nonetheless, this model does not appear to fit appropriately 
in all cases. As discussed in the case of the Cancer Strategy, the complexity of 
public policy exceeds this framework in the sense that it is not possible to 
accurately determine the impact of a policy. This means, for example, that 
providing access to health services (and measuring it) does not explain 
completely the improvement or decline in the quality of life of patients. 
This rationale is also observed in the What Works? initiative.643 These centres 
                                                        
642 HM Treasury. 2011c. "The Magenta Book. Guidance for evaluation." edited by HM Treasury. 
London, UK.  
643 These centres have been developed to foster the production and use of evidence in social 
policy. Taking NICE as a point of reference, the government decided to explore ‘the creation of 
independent expert bodies in other areas of public services.’ A member of the civil service ‘will 
be appointed as National Advisor to engage with ministers and other stakeholder groups and 
promote high standards across the What Works network, they will sit within the Cabinet Office 
and report to the Minister for Government Policy and the Chief Secretary to the Treasury.’ 
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‘will provide robust and high quality synthesis of the research evidence on the 
effectiveness of interventions in each field.’644 Their technical strength is 
producing evidence as an aid for policymakers and politicians to decide and act 
under more controlled and certain conditions. At the policy level, health and 
education have been the areas in which the use of evaluation has been more 
intensive.645 In the health sector, after the publication of the health research 
strategy, the DoH created the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) ‘to 
provide the framework through which we can position, manage and maintain 
the research, research staff and infrastructure of the NHS in England as a virtual 
national research facility.’646 In the context of the NIHR, the Health Technology 
Assessment Programme (HTA) of the NHS illustrates the relevance given to 
evaluation in this sector. This programme funds ‘independent research about 
the effectiveness, costs and broader impact of healthcare treatments and tests 
for those who plan, provide or receive care in the NHS.’647 This salience of 
evaluation in health policy can be explained because ‘there is a clear focus on 
providing evidence of efficacy or effectiveness: which technologies or other 
interventions are able to bring about desired outcomes for different patient 
groups.’648 For this reason, it is understandable that NICE was one of the first 
bases of the What Works Network, now expanded to other areas such as crime 
reduction and local economic growth.649 None of these initiatives can 
completely abstract the political element from policymaking. As Dorey suggests, 
the What Works Network will eventually face the complexity of the reality of the 
public sector in terms of the people who will prioritise the evidence to be used 
to hold political values that cannot be ignored.650 In synthesis, internal 
evaluation in central government emphasises the linkage between public 
                                                                                                                                                             
Cabinet Office. 2013b. "What Works: evidence centres for social policy." London, UK. P. 4. 
644 Ibid. P. 2. 
645 The creation of the EEF makes evident the primary role given to evaluation in the education 
sector.  
646 Department of Health. 2006b. "Best Research for Best Health." London, UK.P. 9. 
647 See: National Institute for Health Research. 2015. "Health Technology Assessment (HTA) 
Programme." London, UK. 
648 Nutley, S., H. Davies, and I. Walter. 2002. "Evidence Based Policy and Practice: Cross Sector 
Lessons From the UK." in Social Policy Research and Evaluation Conference. Wellington, New 
Zealand. P. 3. 
649 NICE was established as a Non Departmental Public Body (NDPB) by the Health and Social 
Care Act 2012, its aim is ‘developing guidance and quality standards in social care.’ National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence. 2014. "Who we are." London, UK. 
650 Dorey, P. 2014. Policy Making in Britain: An Introduction. London, UK: SAGE. 
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spending and performance and the use of indicators is an activity already 
embedded in the logic of departments.651 Evaluation, in contrast, has received 
more attention during recent years, but it has not been internalised at the same 
level as performance monitoring. 
A recent NAO study is consistent with the argument made here about the 
fragmentation of the evaluation policy. This report ‘focuses on impact and cost-
effectiveness evaluation relating to government spending, taxation and 
regulatory interventions, across the main 17 departments and some of their 
bodies.’652 The analysis addressed four major issues: 
1. Coverage 
2. Quality 
3. Use of evaluation evidence 
4. Production, resources, and barriers. 
The general conclusion exposes a heterogeneous panorama of evaluation in 
central government with gaps in terms of the quality of the studies, variety in 
the processes for commissioning and conducting evaluation, and very little 
information about the general spending devoted to the assessment of public 
policy and its cost-effectiveness. The Institute for Government also recognised 
the need for a more political approach to this activity: “One of the challenges is 
to move beyond the more ‘technocratic’ end of the policy spectrum into more 
‘political’ or ideological areas.”653 In their report, Making Policy Better, this 
organisation highlights: 
While government often commissions evaluations, our evidence shows that 
most politicians and civil servants are extremely sceptical about whether 
Whitehall takes note of their results: lessons often do not feed back into 
policy design or problem formulation […] although evaluations are often 
commissioned they are often ignored. 
Evaluations are usually commissioned and managed by the same 
department that carried out the policy […] the department has the 
incentive and opportunity to tone down evaluation findings that are 
critical, but which could lead to significant learning, since evaluators often 
depend on repeat business, they have the incentive to acquiesce in self-
                                                        
651 See for example: HM Treasury. 2013. "Spending Round 2013." London, UK. 
652 National Audit Office. 2013a. "Evaluation in government." edited by National Audit Office. 
London, UK. P. 6. 
653 Rutter, J. 2012. "Evidence and Evaluation in Policy Making. A problem of supply or demand?", 
edited by Institute for Government. P. 29. 
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censorship.654 
This last finding can be easily observed in practice. In the health sector, for 
example, there are some consultancy firms who are recurrent providers of 
evaluation studies for different public bodies. Ipsos Mori,655 for instance, during 
the last year produced diverse studies for the DoH, the NHS, and PHE,656 and this 
also occurs in other sectors, e.g. Coffey International Development for the 
DfID.657 As departments require evidence to support the existence, continuity, or 
elimination of their programmes, there are incentives for commissioners and 
evaluators to establish informal arrangements for the pursuit of individual 
interests, e.g. obtaining contracts, or producing more favourable evidence. 
Moreover, the lack of information about the overall situation of policy evaluation 
in central government hinders the understanding of the extent to which this 
activity has penetrated into the public sector logic and the degree to which it has 
been able to enter into the political system. The studies undertaken by both the 
NAO and the Institute for Government provide some insight about the 
politicisation of this activity that will be reviewed later in Chapter 6. The next 
section addresses the external audit system in the UK. 
4.1.3 External Auditing 
Auditing in the UK is an activity embedded in the public sector at different 
levels. Although other audit institutions exist in the UK, this section focuses on 
the national level; specifically on the work of the NAO (external evaluation).658 
                                                        
654 Rutter, J., and M. Hallsworth. 2011. "Making Policy Better. Improving Whitehall's core 
business." London, UK: Institute for Government. P. 32. 
655 Ipsos Mori is one of the most well-known consultancy firms in the UK in the field of social 
and political research. See: Ipsos Mori. 2015. "About us." London, UK. 
656 Some examples are the Cognitive testing of integrated care questions commissioned by the 
Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC) and the Department of Health; the Public 
Health England 2014 public awareness and opinion survey commissioned by PHE; and the Friends 
and Family Test Qualitative Research on behalf of NHS England.  
657 For example, the study commissioned about small and medium-sized enterprises in 
Afghanistan. See: Coffey International Development. 2014. "Scoping the Need for Improved 
Access to Funding, Advisory Support and Business Skills Development for SMEs in Afghanistan." 
London, UK. 
658 Until the 31st March 2015 the Audit Commission was in charge of scrutinizing local services 
in England, currently a new set of procedures is taking place in which the functions of this body 
are now distributed among the Public Sector Audit Appointments Limited, the NAO, the 
Financial Reporting Council and the Cabinet Office. See: Department for Communities and Local 
Government. 2015b. "Local audit framework replacing the Audit Commission." London, UK. 
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This body is in charge of inspecting public spending on behalf of the 
Parliament659 through two major activities: 
Audit financial statements of all central government departments, agencies 
and other public bodies and report the results to Parliament, and 
Value for money studies660 to look at how government projects, 
programmes and initiatives have been implemented; they contain 
recommendations on how services can be improved.661 
Box 4.2 An Overview of the NAO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on National Audit Office. Annual Report and Accounts 2013 -14. 
The NAO is regulated by two major Acts of Parliament: the National Audit Act 
1983 and the Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000 (Table 4.3).662 
  
                                                        
659 As a parliamentary body, the NAO is outside the government’s sphere. This is a common 
feature of audit bodies linked to the Legislative, for example, the Government Accounting Office 
that reports directly to the U.S. Congress or the Supreme Audit Office in Mexico linked to the 
Chamber of Deputies. 
660 A value for money study ‘focuses on a specific area of government expenditure, and seeks to 
reach a judgement on whether value for money has been achieved, we define good value for 
money as the optimal use of resources to achieve the intended outcomes.’ See: National Audit 
Office. "What is a Value for Money Study?". London, UK. 
661 —. 2013k. "An Introduction to the National Audit Office." London, UK. 
662 Appendix E presents a synthesis of the history and development of the NAO prior to its 
consolidation in 1983. 
The NAO in its present form was established in 1983 as a corporate entity with a 
statutory Board; however, the UK has a long tradition in the auditing field and this 
body has evolved along time. There are records dated back to 1314 that mention a 
public official charged with auditing government expenditure. The Budget 
Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011 set the basis for the governance of the NAO: 
It requires that the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&GA) and 
Chairman are to be appointed by Her Majesty the Queen, upon an 
address to Parliament by the Prime Minister. 
The Public Accounts Commission is formally responsible for the 
appointment of the non-executive members of the NAO Board and the 
external auditor of the NAO.  
Its budget is approved by the Public Accounts Commission, who also evaluates its 
performance and it can suggest the commissioning of VFM studies. For the 2013-2014 
period, the NAO has 822 permanent members of staff and a £63 million budget for its 
operation.  
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Table 4.3 Legislation Underpinning the Work of the NAO 
Act of 
Parliament 
Key issues 
National Audit 
Act 1983 
 It establishes the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts 
Commission as the bodies in charge of controlling public 
expenditure on behalf of Parliament 
 It names the C&GA the head of the NAO and it gives him 
‘complete discretion in the discharge of his functions’ (Part I, 
section 3). 
 The C&GA ‘may carry out examinations into the economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness with which any department, 
authority or other body […] has used its resources in discharging 
its functions’ (Part II, section 6). 
 The NAO reports to the Public Accounts Commission.663 
Government 
Resources and 
Accounts Act 
2000 
 It is an Act ‘make provision about government’s resources and 
accounts…’ 
 It establishes that government departments shall prepare 
accounts for every financial year. 
 Departments must heed the directions given by the Treasury for 
the preparation of accounts. 
 These accounts must be sent to the Comptroller and General 
Auditor. 
 The C&GA must examine the accounts received and verify: 
the accounts present a true and fair view, 
that money provided by Parliament has been 
expended for the purposes intended by Parliament, 
that resources authorised by Parliament to be used 
have been used for the purposes in relation to 
which the use was authorised, and that the 
department’s financial transactions are in 
accordance with any relevant authority (c. 6). 
 The C&GA must issue a report of the examination of the accounts. 
There are five key areas in the NAO’s work: financial audit, VFM studies, insight 
and investigations, support to Parliament, and international audit.664 Its tasks 
are more related to accountability than to evaluation because the core of its 
activities is verifying the appropriate use of public funds, and through feed into 
an accountability process (Figure 4.4). 
                                                        
663 The National Audit Act 1983 and the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011 
establish the duties of the Public Accounts Commission, some of the most relevant are: ‘to 
examine the National Audit Office Estimate and lay it before the House, to consider reports from 
the appointed auditor of the National Audit Office, to appoint non-executive members of the 
National Audit Office Board, and to report from time to time.’ See: The Public Accounts 
Commission. 2012. "Role." London, UK. 
664 National Audit Office. 2013k. "An Introduction to the National Audit Office." London, UK. 
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Figure 4.4 The Accountability Process 
 
Source: National Audit Office, 2011. An Introduction to the National Audit Office. P. 7. 
In terms of evaluation, the work of the NAO is relevant for the performance of 
VFM studies that generate recommendations for the improvement of public 
services (Figure 4.5). During 2013/14, for instance, the NAO delivered 66 VFM 
reports covering an important range of policy areas.665 These studies identified 
if government departments were delivering services effectively and provided a 
series of recommendations to improve VFM.666 As the NAO does not have 
faculties for questioning the value or merit of policy, these studies aim ‘to form a 
clear judgement on whether value for money has been secured.’667 Through the 
analysis of the outputs of policy, VFM’s studies … 
… consist of detailed examinations of specific spending programmes within 
the relevant department in order to weigh up how efficiently, effectively 
and economically the government has used public money to achieve its 
aims.668 
This has produced two major consequences: 
A much greater focus on outcome achievement and the application of a 
much wider and sophisticated range of diagnostic and analytical 
techniques underpinning assessments of value for money, and 
consequently a need to rely on a much more multidisciplinary skill set.669 
                                                        
665 —. 2014a. "National Audit Office. Annual Report and Accounts 2013 -14." edited by National 
Audit Office. London, UK. 
666 See for example: —. 2012. "The management of adult diabetes services in the NHS." London, 
UK. 
667 —. 2013n. "National Audit Office. Annual Report and Accounts 2012-13." edited by National 
Audit Office. London, UK. P. 1. 
668 Bacon, R., and C. Hope. 2013. Conundrum. Why every government gets things wrong -and what 
we can do about it. Great Britain: Biteback Publishing Ltd. P. xvi. 
669 Bourn, J. 2007. Public Sector Auditing: Is it value for money? Chichester, UK: John Wiley & 
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Auditing is related to values like objectivity and independence. However, as 
Gray and Jenkins recognise, ‘In the world of VFM audit […] studies are 
conducted in an arena of greater uncertainty and political sensitivity.’670 This 
reflects the complexity of separating activities like auditing and evaluation. The 
major difference that arises is the nature of the analytical instruments and the 
scope selected. 
Figure 4.5 The VFM Study Cycle 
 
Source: National Audit Office. Annual Report and Accounts 2012-13. P.15. 
VFM studies do not question the government’s decisions on policy, but they do 
bring attention to multiple policy issues in the political agenda by providing 
evidence to Parliament about how money has been spent and the improvement 
of public services. The VFM programme is developed through an internal 
process in which NAO senior management decides its content, but that also 
needs to be reactive to the agenda of the PAC, as an NAO official explains (UK-3): 
We have a good understanding about the on-going issues, the main issues 
that we want to focus across the year, so we would put forward a range of 
proposals […] and then senior management would decide which proposals 
they would like to take forward […] We may have to prioritise work so if an 
issue comes up that we need to look at quickly, a piece of work that we 
were due to do may get pushed back, so that we can fit in and be more 
reactive, so it’s quite a sort of fluid process … 
This reveals that although there are rules and processes in place for developing 
                                                                                                                                                             
Sons, Ltd. P. 58. 
670 Gray, A. , and B. Jenkins. 1993. "Separate Developments: Budgeting, Auditing, and Evaluation 
in the United Kingdom." in Budgeting, Auditing, and Evaluation. Functions and Integration in 
Seven Governments edited by A. Gray, B. Jenkins, and B. Segsworth. London, UK: Transaction 
Publishers. 
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the VFM programme, this is subject to the discretion of the actors involved in 
the definition of the priority issues in the agenda.671 
The differences between evaluation and auditing form a point that requires 
more attention. Considering the work of the NAO as evaluation is debatable for 
two reasons. First, because appraising the effectiveness of the government in 
delivering public services does not necessarily imply the identification of a 
policy’s value. Secondly, because although they do not judge the rationale 
behind a programme, they do assess a set of features of policy that lead to 
recommendations, which can eventually be transformed into decisions. 
Consequently, the boundaries between judging the implementation of a policy 
and judging the policy itself are somewhat blurred. Information about the 
efficiency of a particular programme or the economy of a strategy can represent 
an important asset for decision-making, such as budget allocation or the 
prioritisation of policy issues. Also, it can represent an opportunity for the 
opposition to evidence the failures of government.672 An external view on the 
effectiveness of their policies can generate evidence for government 
legitimisation.673 These differences can therefore be observed in the rationale of 
these activities (control vs improvement/learning), the methods applied 
(financial tools vs social research methods), and the focus of analysis 
(deviations vs results/impacts). 
In synthesis, in the UK it is possible to identify two main strands for the 
evaluation and audit of public policy. On the one hand is performance 
monitoring (focusing on the link between public spending and results) in 
addition to evaluation studies about different dimensions of policy. HM 
                                                        
671 This occurred in the CQC inquiry, ‘the CQC was an example of where the PAC asked us to do 
some work because at the time there had been a BBC Panorama Programme on something 
called Winterbourne View and also one of the big providers, Southern Cross, was having some 
difficulties’ (UK-3). 
672 Greener, I., and B. Greve (Eds.). 2014. Evidence and Evaluation in Social Policy. London, UK: 
Wiley Blackwell. 
673 One of the major attributes associated to the NAO is its independence, ‘the constitutional 
framework of the NAO is intended to provide the degree of independence necessary to allow 
public sector audit to effectively contribute to the accountability of government.’ This becomes 
of great relevance when comparing the role of the NAO with its Mexican homologue in the 
analytical chapter of this thesis. White, F. 1999. Audit, Accountability and Government. Oxford, 
UK: Clarendon Press. P. 95.  
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Treasury can be identified as the leading organisation that controls the 
performance monitoring system. However, as there is no formal evaluation 
policy within central government, the development of this activity depends on 
the rules of each organisation. 
On the other hand, the NAO concentrates on scrutinising the government’s 
capability to deliver effectively public services, but this body does not formally 
question the pertinence of the decisions made to address those problems.674 
Beyond the utility of valuing the effectiveness of public services, the most 
important contribution of the NAO relies on the legitimacy and trust of its 
work.675 
As the major purpose of this research is to identify the relationship between 
politics and evaluation, it seems important to make the following remarks about 
the UK case: 
1. Performance monitoring is an institutionalised practice that produces a bond 
between public spending and performance. Central government departments 
have internalised the monitoring of their activities through the measurement of 
a set of indicators (e.g. the number of overseas visitors to the UK.)676 
2. The lack of an integrated evaluation policy makes difficult the identification of 
formal guidelines about the independence of evaluations. The DfID, for 
example, has developed its own mechanisms for preserving the independence 
of their studies, but there is no common procedure for ensuring the 
independence of all evaluation studies.677 
3. In relation to the studies commissioned to external evaluators, the criteria for 
commissioning the study, as well as the interaction between the evaluator and 
the department are interesting elements of study for identifying the political 
struggles that might take place. The process for the allocation of public 
contracts is underpinned by the logics of transparency. However, the explicit 
criteria established for assessing a bidder’s proposal can be subject to the 
discretion of the people in charge of the decision.678 
                                                        
674 For further reference about the role of PAC see: Dunleavy, P., C. Gilson, S. Bastow, and J. 
Tinkler. 2009. "The National Audit Office, the Public Accounts Committee and the risk landscape 
in UK public policy." London, UK: The Risk and Regulation Advisory Council. 
675 Talbot, C., and J. Wiggan. 2010. "The public value of the National Audit Office." International 
Journal of Public Sector Management 23(1):54-70. 
676 Impact indicator. Department for Culture, Media and Sport. July 2013. 
677 The work of the DFIF is supported by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI), 
which ‘is the independent body responsible for scrutiny of UK aid. ICAI focuses on maximising 
the impact and effectiveness of the UK aid budget for intended beneficiaries and the delivery of 
value for money for the UK taxpayer.’ See: Independent Commission for Aid Impact. 2015. 
"ICAI." London, UK. 
678 The set of criteria for evaluating a tenderer’s proposal are clearly stated; however, it 
demands the interpretation of the commissioner which implies a degree of discretion. See for 
example: Contracts Finder. 2015. "The Provission of A & E Qualitative Research." London, UK. 
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4. Due to the fact that evaluation capabilities are uneven within central 
government, it is relevant to analyse whether there are areas in which the 
political commitment to evaluation is stronger; the reasons behind this 
situation. The DfID, for example, is outstanding from the rest of the government 
departments because of its explicit commitment to evaluation.679 The 
asymmetry in the level of maturity in terms of evaluation can be explained by 
multiple factors. e.g. the participation of non-governmental stakeholders.680 
5. The relationship between the NAO and central government departments can 
interfere with independence and objectivity,681 but at the same time it can 
represent a mechanism to reduce political confrontation.682 
This section has shown that in the UK case, internal and external processes of 
evaluation operate simultaneously, but in a disconnected way. This matters for 
the study of the hidden politics of evaluation because it suggests that there are 
spaces of discretion that stakeholders can take advantage of and that can 
produce asymmetry of power and resources between them. The following 
sections describe the two case studies analysed in the UK. The first one is the 
Cancer Strategy implemented by the DoH, while the second case analyses the 
CQC, a body that regulates the provision of health and adult social-care services. 
The aim has been to examine the two evaluation streams and to expose the 
hidden politics of evaluation.  
                                                        
679 This department has an explicit evaluation policy, it systematically publishes evaluation 
reports and it has been recognized by international organisations like the OECD and The World 
Bank for its efforts in the area of monitoring and evaluation. See: York, N. 2013. "Developing an 
Evaluation Strategy-experience in DFID." 
680 An example of this situation is the evaluation of the programme for Strengthening South 
Africa’s Revitalised Response to HIV and Health, it involved the participation of the National 
Department of Health (South Africa), Mott MacDonald Ltd and the DFID, among others. See: 
Griffiths, S., S. Ahmar, J. Seager, L. Simbayi, and N. Mbelle. 2014. "Mid-Term Evaluation of the 
SARRAH programme." Department for International Development. 
681 Dunleavy et al. state that 'departments’ amendments often serve to ‘blunt’ NAO’s criticism, 
creating blander and sometimes euphemistic language.” Dunleavy, P., C. Gilson, S. Bastow, and J. 
Tinkler. 2009. "The National Audit Office, the Public Accounts Committee and the risk landscape 
in UK public policy." London, UK: The Risk and Regulation Advisory Council. P. 4. 
682 For example, as it is shown in Figure 4.5, one if the stages of the VFM cycle is clearance, which 
can represent a threaten to the independence of the study or compromise the NAO to modify 
their original remarks on a policy, this will be discussed with more detail in subsequent sections 
of this chapter. 
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4.2 Case A: The Cancer Strategy 
Understanding the relationship between evaluation and politics cannot be 
limited to the rules established by the formal institutional framework. Instead it 
is necessary to reach a deeper level of analysis through the description of how 
evaluation is performed in practical terms. This section is dedicated to the case 
of the Cancer Strategy, a policy implemented by central government to tackle a 
disease that will affect ‘1 in 2 people in the UK in their lifetime’.683 As a 
response, in 2011 the Coalition Government published Improving Outcomes: A 
Strategy for Cancer (IOSC), a policy document that guides governmental action 
in this matter: 
 It sets out the actions we will take to tackle the preventable causes of 
cancer, by providing better information to people about risk factors 
and how individuals and communities might work to minimise them, as 
well as the steps we will continue to take to improve the experience of 
cancer patients and support the increasing number of cancer survivors. 
 Describes the ways in which choice for patients in their cancer care will 
be extended and implemented throughout the health and social-care 
systems, informing both the decisions taken by NHS organisations now 
and the methods through which the mandate for the NHS 
Commissioning Board may be discharged; and 
 Identifies the gaps in information on health outcomes which are crucial 
to ensuring patients are empowered – in consultation and with the 
support of their clinicians – to exercise real choice over the care they 
receive, including through the extension of national clinical audit and 
through the strengthened patient voice delivered by Health Watch.684 
The Cancer Strategy represents a useful example of a policy area in which there 
has been a systematic production of knowledge, both generated by 
governmental bodies such as the National Cancer Intelligence Network (NCIN) 
and NICE, as well as by an active community of NGOs actively engaged in the 
provision of evidence about a disease for which ‘incidence rates in Great Britain 
have increased by more than a third since the mid-1970s.’685 
This case study describes the evaluation and auditing processes of the Cancer 
Strategy to set the basis for the analysis of the political relationships that are 
built as a consequence. The core argument presented here is that a policy issue 
                                                        
683 Cancer Research UK. 2015e. "What is cancer?". London, UK. 
684 Department of Health. 2011b. "Improving Outcomes: A Strategy for Cancer." London, UK. P. 3. 
685 Cancer Research UK. 2013. "Cancer Statistics Key Facts." London, UK. 
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that heavily relies on scientific evidence and knowledge is less susceptible to the 
politicisation of evaluation. However, in the case of the cancer policy the 
sensitiveness of this issue inevitably entails an important amount of public 
attention that guarantees its permanent position in the political agenda. Cancer 
is a recurrent subject on the parliamentary agenda and there is a careful follow-
up of the progress in this matter. For example, as the PAC’s Chair recently 
stated: 
It is good news that survival rates for cancer patients are improving with 
69% of cancer patients now surviving 1 year after diagnosis and 49% 
surviving 5 years after diagnosis. Yet, I am deeply disappointed that cancer 
survival rates in England remain poor compared with the best European 
countries, with rates in England still 10% lower than the European average 
according to the latest data. This is a shocking disparity.686 
 
Importantly the relevance of cancer as a disease that affects the British 
population is reflected both in the design and implementation of different policy 
initiatives, as well as in the level of scrutiny applied to this policy. This section 
provides an overview of the Cancer Strategy, about the tools that have been 
applied for its monitoring and evaluation and the audit process implemented. 
4.2.1 General Overview of the Cancer Strategy 
According to Cancer Research UK, ‘Cancer is a major cause of mortality and 
morbidity in the UK […] more than one in four (29%) deaths were caused by 
cancer in the UK in 2011.’687 This has inevitably forced the government to take 
action in the development of policies that can improve the conditions of the 
population suffering this disease. Different actions have been directed to make 
and measure the progress made by policy in health outcomes. This has been 
adopted as a political priority: ‘We will measure our success on the health 
results that really matter – such as improving cancer and stroke survival rates 
or reducing hospital infections.’688 Specifically, there has been an increasing 
concern about a better allocation of resources and in the improvement in the 
                                                        
686 Committee of Public Accounts. 2015a. "Chair's statement on improving cancer services and 
outcomes in England." 
687 Cancer Research UK. 2014a. "Cancer Statistics Report: Cancer Mortality in the UK in 2012." P. 
1. 
688 HM Government. 2010. "The Coalition: Our programme for government." London, UK. P. 25. 
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quality of the services delivered to patients.689 
The Cancer Strategy was the most representative instrument of the Coalition 
Government (2010–15) to tackle this disease. It is a policy instrument, the 
implementation of which involves the DoH and other organisations such as the 
NHS and PHE (Figure 4.6). The design, operation, and evaluation of the Cancer 
Strategy implies a complex system of stakeholders that need to reach 
agreements about the feasibility of the strategy and for the achievement of 
organisational goals. As a DoH official (UK-8) explains: 
Our strategy is supported by an impact assessment that had to be 
signed off by analysts and then […] by a Government Minister, saying 
that all things in the strategy [that] would cost money were evidence-
based, were cost-effective and were affordable … 
This finds echo in the discussion about coordination in governance (see Chapter 
2, Section 2.1.1). The interaction of multiple actors in policymaking can lead to 
the rise of conflicts that can affect implementation and evaluation or, as Bovens 
defined, a problem of many hands. The achievement of targets in the tackling of 
cancer depends not only on the development of key strategies by the DoH, but 
also on the effective provision of services to patients by the NHS and the 
development of evidence about the disease by PHE, among other elements. This 
case makes evident the need for establishing mechanisms to cooperate in the 
pursuit of a goal, e.g. the reduction of mortality rates. 
                                                        
689 See for example: Department of Health. 2015b. "Safer care for patients." London, UK. 
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Figure 4.6 Department of Health (Agencies and Public Bodies) 
 
 Source: gov.uk 
The DoH’s performance, in both cases analysed in the UK, relies on the capacity 
of other bodies to comply effectively with its tasks. In the case of the Cancer 
Strategy, for instance, the collection of data about cancer services (by the NHS) 
is a requirement for the development of research in this field, e.g. by NICE. 
Consequently, the existence of multiple decision points, the asymmetry of 
resources between these bodies, and the political will to cooperate are only 
some of the elements that need to be considered when looking at the 
performance of the DoH. This complexity cannot be ignored in evaluation—even 
less in its accountability functions—because it increases the difficulty of 
assigning responsibilities for the success of a policy. This provides a clear 
example of the transition from government to governance. The DoH must 
operate within a structure in which different networks are established and 
when hierarchical relationships become obsolete. 
Since the year 2000, the governmental response to cancer has transited through 
different reforms that eventually led to what is known as the Cancer Strategy.690 
                                                        
690 Under different names and models, the central government has implemented different 
measures for tackling the cancer problem in the UK. The NHS Cancer Plan: A plan for investment, 
a plan for reform published in 2000 can be considered one of the foundations of the Cancer 
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This has been mostly produced by the different political shifts in central 
government and by the pressures generated by the evolution of this disease 
among the British population. The arrival of the Coalition Government meant 
the revision of the strategy that … 
… set out how the Coalition Government’s commitments to enable patients 
to rate hospitals and doctors according to their quality of care, and putting 
patients in charge of making decisions about their care, will be achieved for 
cancer.691 
In 2011, this revision led to the publication of the document, Improving 
Outcomes: A Strategy for Cancer, which established a series of actions and 
strategies that made explicit the government policy in this area (Box 4.3). 
Box 4.3 The Cancer Strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on Department of Health, 2011. Improving Outcomes: A Strategy for Cancer.  
The Cancer Strategy covers a vast range of activities guided by the principles 
established in the strategy. This increases the complexity of grasping not only 
                                                                                                                                                             
Reform Strategy published in 2007 and that guided the publication of Improving Outcomes: A 
Strategy for Cancer in 2011. 
691 Richards, M. 2010. "Review of the Cancer Reform Strategy." edited by Department of Health. 
London, UK. 
The current Cancer Strategy derives from the Cancer Reform Strategy (CRS) from 
2007 which established a series of actions directed to improve cancer outcomes 
and to ensure the delivery of services. The CRS incorporated actions directed to 
cancer prevention, earlier diagnosis, reducing cancer inequality, among others. 
The Improving Outcomes: A Strategy for Cancer document presents the 
reformulation of the strategy by establishing three principles to guide the 
reforms undertaken in the health sector (p.2): 
1. To put the patient or service user at the heart of the public 
services –transforming the relationship between citizen 
and service through the principle of no decision about me 
without me; 
2. To orientate the NHS, public health and social care 
services towards delivering the improvements in 
outcomes which matter – rather than measuring 
processes which do not; and 
3. To empower local organisations and professionals to 
deliver the freedoms to innovate and to drive 
improvements in services which deliver care of the 
highest quality for all patients and service users. 
This strategy pursues three objectives: 1) to generate more useful and relevant 
information for ‘patients, commissioners, providers, clinicians, researchers’ 
(p.18) to make more informed decisions, 2) to improve cancer outcomes that 
can be monitored by specific indicators; and 3) to reduce cancer inequalities 
among the different groups of population in the country.  
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how the strategy is implemented, but also how these activities can be evaluated 
and their contribution to its ‘success’ or ‘failure’. Moreover, the different 
organisations involved in the execution of the strategy and the conceptualisation 
of its functioning increases the difficulty of pointing out the responsibility of the 
actors involved. 
The systematic use of evidence in this case is associated with the recognition of 
those areas in which there can be improvement in efficiency and effectiveness. 
The director of an NGO (UK-11) highlights the relevance of the strategy by 
stating that this ‘is looking at key aspects that the health service can have a very 
big impact on’. This concerns the discussion about seeking for more efficiency as 
one of the drivers of the transformation of the state. Those policy areas in which 
more effects can be perceived can become a priority in terms of the proportion 
of the population that is being served. In this case, the focus on outcomes has 
aimed to improve effectiveness. To illustrate, earlier diagnosis was evaluated in 
terms of its impact on cost and benefits for the NHS: 
Earlier diagnosis is generally cost effective, but not cost-saving. If people 
are diagnosed earlier, either through screening programmes or through 
their general practice, the main benefit is a substantial improvement in 
health outcomes. There is not a cost reduction, rather an increase in NHS 
costs (large increase in testing costs generally offset by a modest reduction 
in treatment costs).692 
The Cancer Strategy implied also the reallocation of public funds to achieve the 
goals established in the IOSC. The implementation of this strategy represented 
additional funding of more than £750 million in a four-year period.693 This 
reflects the magnitude of cancer in the UK, not only in the health policy but also 
in terms of its economic impact. As the NHS recognises, ‘Annual NHS costs for 
cancer services are £5 billion, but the cost to society as a whole – including costs 
for loss of productivity – is £18.3 billion.’694 Even though most of the actions are 
consistent with the efforts made by governments in the past e.g. earlier 
diagnosis, changes in lifestyle, etc., the Coalition Government emphasised the 
need to focus on outcomes that can be assessed: 
                                                        
692 Department of Health. 2011f. "The likely impact of earlier diagnosis of cancer on costs and 
benefits to the NHS." London,UK. P. 22. 
693 National Health Service. 2014. "Improving outcomes: a strategy for cancer." London, UK. 
694 Department of Health. 2013c. "Helping more people survive cancer." London, UK. 
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Governments of the past have placed too much faith in the ability of a top-
down hierarchy to deliver improved results for patients, through the 
micro-management of services from Whitehall resulting in the 
disempowerment of frontline staff and the disenfranchisement of patients. 
Too little faith has been placed in the power of local communities and 
frontline clinicians – and patients and service users themselves – to drive 
the improvements that we need to see.695 
As a result, the evaluation of the strategy, described in the next section, is 
strongly linked to the values of efficiency, efficacy, and effectiveness of the 
outcomes set out in the IOSC. 
4.2.2 The Evaluation of the Cancer Strategy 
Despite the fact that there is no formal central evaluation policy, the Cancer 
Strategy has been systematically evaluated since 2011. It has been subject to 
different internal and external mechanisms of scrutiny and the production and 
use of research to inform policy decisions is a common practice. The DoH 
evaluates annually the progress of the outcomes established in the IOSC, 
focusing on ‘the cost-effectiveness of interventions’ (UK-8). In addition, it has 
carried out multiple evaluation studies, (both internal and commissioned to 
external parties) in different areas related to cancer.696 In December 2012, for 
example, the DoH published a study that described the best practice … 
… in relation to piloting of service delivery to older people with cancer to 
improve outcomes; to deliver high quality services to increasing number of 
older cancer patients and to ensure quality of access to treatment and 
information, based on need, not age.697 
This suggests that evidence is considered an important input for internal 
decision-making. Prior to the publication of the IOSC document, the DoH carried 
out an impact assessment to identify the best policy option for improving the 
outcomes of the Cancer Strategy. Before making the final decision, other policy 
options were considered, in line with the guidance of The Green Book. This 
                                                        
695 —. 2011b. "Improving Outcomes: A Strategy for Cancer." London, UK.. P. 3. 
696 An example of these studies concerns the quality of life of cancer patients. See: Department of 
Health, and NHS England. 2012. "Quality of Life of Cancer Survivors in England. Report on a pilot 
survey using Patient Reported Outcome Measures (PROMS)." edited by Department of Health. 
London, UK.  
697 McMillan Cancer Support, Department of Health, and Cancer Research UK. 2012. "Cancer 
Services Coming of Age: Learning from the Improving Cancer Treatment Assessment and 
Support for Older People Project." London, UK. P. 2.  
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instrument offers policymakers a framework for reflecting on the need for 
government intervention, the objectives, and the intended effects of a particular 
policy, in addition to cost-benefit analysis of a potential policy.698 
This impact assessment set out three policy options that could have been 
implemented to achieve better results, along with a cost-benefit analysis for 
each option. This evidence supported the reform of the Cancer Strategy by 
showing that the option chosen was the one that will produce more benefits in 
the long term. This point is important because it suggests that policy decisions 
are made in terms of the benefits that will be produced. The core element of this 
reflects on who defines what benefit is and how is this operationalised. So far, 
the progress of the strategy has been reported in four reports. Due to structural 
changes in the health sector, the two most recent were published by the DoH 
jointly with PHE699 and NHS England.700 Each one has focused on the areas 
established as priorities in the IOSC, such as early diagnosis and data-collection. 
Data emphases the implementation of the IOSC and the achievements made 
during the year. Overall, the four reports follow the same structure 
concentrating on key aspects of the IOSC that are evaluated in relation to 
previous years. This is the most evident formal mechanism of internal 
evaluation that can be identified in this case (Table 4.4). 
                                                        
698 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. 2014. "Impact assessment template for 
government policies." London, UK. 
699 The creation of PHE was driven by the reforms to the NHS derived from the Health and Social 
Care Act 2012. This set of reforms gave PHE different responsibilities regarding the promotion 
of public health, among which outstands ‘reporting on improvements in the public’s health so 
everyone can understand the challenge and the next steps.’ Its inclusion as one of the actors in 
charge of updating the public about the progress in the Cancer Strategy represents a new model 
of co-responsibility that will be analysed with more detail in Chapter 6. Public Health England. 
2014a. "About us." London, UK.  
700 The involvement of the NHS is an important issue to highlight. Especially in the Cancer 
Strategy case, the assessment heavily relies on data produced and managed by the NHS, for 
example the collection of data about treatment, e.g. radiotherapy, depends on the effective 
provision of data from the NHS. As it will be discussed in Chapter 6, data-management can 
represent a major resource for political control in the performance of evaluations or audits. 
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Table 4.4 Progress Reports on the Cancer Strategy 
Year Report Main Findings 
2011 Improving 
Outcomes: 
A Strategy for 
Cancer  
First Annual Report 
This report recognised different challenges to address in relation to cancer, but some important achievements were 
made after the first year of implementation: 
there have been further improvements in data and analyses that we have to support clinicians, commissioners and 
providers to improve services and patients to make informed choices; we are continuing to extend the age range 
for bowel and breast cancer screening; we have successfully run a range of campaigns to improve the public’s 
awareness of cancer symptoms; the NHS has continued to improve care pathways in order to reduce inpatient bed 
days- reducing costs and improving the quality of care for patients (pp. 3-4). 
2012 Improving 
Outcomes: A 
Strategy for Cancer  
Second Annual 
Report 
At this point there was still no data available to measure the progress in the ambition of saving 5,000 lives per year 
by 2014-2015; it also provided information about some other areas of action in which achievements can be more 
easily identified: 
there have been improvements in survival rates; the age range for the breast and bowel screening program, 
campaigns are running to encourage people to go to their doctor if relevant symptoms persist (in order to get the 
cancer diagnosed when it is more treatable) and patient’s access to radiotherapy continues to rise (p.7). 
2013 Improving 
Outcomes: 
A Strategy for 
Cancer 
Third Annual Report 
This report is consistent with the achievements identified in previous years; yet there was still no information about 
the ambition of saving 5,000 lives per year by 2014-2015, it reported that ‘cancer survival estimates and mortality 
rates continue to improve’, the most relevant achievements were: 
significant developments in cancer screening –particularly on the first phase of introducing Bowel Scope Screening 
(BSS); activity to promote earlier diagnosis of symptomatic cancers, through the Be Clear on Cancer campaigns and 
the associated work with primary and secondary care; progress in ensuring better access for all to the best possible 
treatment, for example through improved access to Intensity Modulated Radiotherapy (IMRT); significant 
developments in the collection and reporting of new datasets and the analysis of information, to drive 
improvements and to inform patients (p. 6). 
2014 Improving 
Outcomes: 
A Strategy for 
Cancer 
Fourth Annual 
Report 
For the first time the DoH was able to provide new evidence about the government’s ambition to save an additional 
5,000 lives a year by 2014/15: 
Using the latest survival estimates and assuming incidence is constant, we estimate that on average between 6,500 
and 17,000 more patients per year diagnosed from 2011-2015 will survive cancer for five years compared to those 
diagnosed from 2006-2010 […] we also would not claim that all the improvement is down to actions set out in the 
IOSC, but we believe that actions set out in that Strategy have had a significant impact on cancer survival in this 
country (p. 8). 
Source: Based on Department of Health, 2011-2014. Improving Outcomes: A Strategy for Cancer. Annual Reports. 
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The progress observed in different areas of the IOSC is plausible due to the time 
in which the strategy has been implemented. This includes improvements in the 
Cancer Patient Survey, developments in the collection and reporting of data, 
access to radiotherapy treatment, among others.701 The late diagnosis and its 
effect on the efficiency of the governmental action are still debatable issues. 
According to The Guardian and Cancer Research UK: 
Almost half of people who get cancer are diagnosed late, which makes 
treatment less likely to succeed and reduces their chances of survival […] 
Urgent improvements to how soon cancer is diagnosed would save the NHS 
tens of millions of pounds a year through reduced chemotherapy, radiotherapy 
and surgery, as well as enhancing many cancer sufferers' chances of survival, 
CRUK estimates.702 
The systematic evaluation of the Cancer Strategy has been mostly constrained to 
the identification of progress in a group of variables and its behaviour in relation 
to efficiency, efficacy, and effectiveness, and yet, multiple variables associated 
with cancer cannot be addressed in deepness in the DoH reports. For example, 
the relationship between smoking and cancer is an issue that has been debated 
both within and outside the governmental sphere, but the level of specificity 
about this topic exceeds the scope of the DoH reports. 703 This will be discussed 
in more detail in the analytical chapter. 
In terms of external scrutiny, in 2010 the NAO produced a report704 on the 
Cancer Strategy that aimed to examine … 
… how effectively three of the Strategy’s actions to drive delivery have been 
utilised to improve services for cancer patients: 1) improving the quality of 
information, 2) strengthening commissioning, and 3) making better use of 
resources.705 
                                                        
701 Department of Health, Public Health England, and NHS England. 2014. "Improving Outcomes: 
A Strategy for Cancer. Fourth Annual Report." London, UK. 
702 Campbell, D. 2014a. "Almost half of cancer patients diagnosed too late." in The Guardian. 
London, UK.  
703 For example, the discussion about cigarettes packaging has become a central issue because of 
its relation to cancer in the UK. See: Department of Health. 2015a. "Government backs 
standarised packaging of tobacco." Cancer Research UK. 2015d. "Standard cigarette packs 'could 
save 2000 lives a year'." London, UK. 
704 It is important to state that the report delivered by the NAO was based on the Cancer 
Strategy Reform published in 2007. The current operating strategy is the one reformed in 2011. 
Appendix G presents a general description of the 2007 CRS. 
705 National Audit Office. 2010. "Delivering the Cancer Reform Strategy." London, UK. P. 5. 
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The findings derived from this study focused on the DoH’s capacity to allocate its 
resources efficiently.706 Mostly, it identified those areas in which it is possible to 
reduce costs and to achieve better outcomes. The report emphasised the opacity 
in costs of the services delivered by commissioners, which has led to 
imprecisions in the appraisal of the cost-effectiveness of the strategy, and it 
manifests a fragmentation in the cancer service delivery.707 Nonetheless, as an 
NAO member recognises (UK-4) this was ‘quite a positive report recognising the 
progress’: 
The Department has made progress in improving key aspects of cancer 
services through strong direction and high profile leadership underpinned by 
increased resources. While there have been measurable improvements in 
efficiency by treating more people as day cases, and reductions in length of 
stay, there is substantial scope to make further improvements by tackling 
variations and raising performance to the standard of the best.708 
One element to highlight was the role of the then Cancer Director, Professor 
Mike Richards, and how he championed the use of evidence: ‘He ran cancer in 
the UK and he ran it regardless who was in government […] he believed in data 
and […] in being analytical’ (UK-11). Not only the strength of evidence has been 
a key factor in the implementation and evaluation of the Cancer Strategy. The 
leverage given to this policy by key stakeholders has also promoted underlined 
the relevance of guiding decision-making on robust data. 
More recently, the NAO reviewed the progress in improving cancer services and 
outcomes in England. The report (January 2015) examines the implementation 
of the recommendations made by the PAC in 2011. Some of the key findings of 
this study are summarised below: 
 Outcomes for cancer patients, including estimated survival rates, 
continue to improve. 
 However, there remains considerable scope to improve outcomes for 
cancer patients further. 
 Significant variations and inequalities in outcomes and access to 
services persist. 
 People in England are less likely to develop cancer than in other high-
income countries in Europe but, according to the most recent data, 
cancer outcomes in England have generally been worse. 
                                                        
706 Appendix H synthesises the most relevant findings derived from the NAO study. 
707 National Audit Office. 2010. "Delivering the Cancer Reform Strategy." London, UK. 
708 Ibid. P. 9. 
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 Better information is becoming available to strengthen the evidence 
base for cancer services […] however, important gaps in cancer data 
remain. 
 There is a risk that the significant progress that has been made in 
improving cancer services and information will stall as a result of 
recent changes and pressure on resources.709 
 
This overview of the evaluation and audit of the Cancer Strategy shows that this 
has not been an integrated process. Instead, different assessment tools have 
been applied to obtain evidence and to verify its effectiveness. The nature of the 
cancer policy promotes a strong emphasis on the use of scientific evidence that 
feeds continuously into the decision-making process. Not only bodies such as the 
DoH, the NHS, PHE, and the NAO have been involved in the generation of 
evidence about this disease; different NGOs systematically produce research in 
the cancer field and are very active in the discussion of the government’s 
effectiveness in this area.710 This scenario reveals a highly complex policy area in 
which evaluation can play a predominant role in the legitimisation of the 
interests pursued by stakeholders. Different issues associated with cancer affect 
not only the perception of the effectiveness of the government’s response, but 
also reveal different levels of notoriety to each one of these issues, which are 
strongly related to politics. An example of this is the Cancer Drugs Fund711 which 
has received an important amount of attention due to potential cuts.712 This 
displays the complexity of cancer as a policy issue in which multiple factors are 
interrelated and susceptible to politics. The analysis of the hidden politics of 
evaluation of this case is presented in Chapter 6, taking as a basis the description 
presented here. 
  
                                                        
709 —. 2015b. "Progress in improving cancer services and outcomes in England." London, UK. Pp. 
7-8. 
710 To provide an example, in the report made by the NAO specialists from different institutions 
such as the University of Oxford, Imperial College, King’s College London, among others 
participated. For the inquiry made by the PAC organisations such as the Cancer Campaigning 
Group, Cancer Research UK and Ovarian Cancer Action provided written evidence. 
711 The Cancer Drugs Fund (CDF) ‘is money the Government has set aside to pay for cancer 
drugs that haven’t been approved by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE) and aren’t available within the NHS in England […] The fund is worth £340 million per 
year.’ Cancer Research UK. 2015b. "Cancer Drugs Fund." London, UK. 
712 See: McKie, R. 2015. "David Cameron’s flagship Cancer Drugs Fund ‘is a waste of NHS cash’ " 
in The Guardian. London, UK.  
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4.3 Case B: The Care-Quality Commission 
The Care-Quality Commission (CQC) is an executive non-departmental public 
body713 in charge of regulating the provision of health and social-care services 
in England, also responsible for monitoring the Mental Health Act. Its role in the 
institutional landscape is to guarantee the completion of a series of standards in 
the services offered to the public. 
In contrast to Cancer Strategy, the CQC case regards the evaluation of a public 
organisation; not a specific policy (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3). The relevance 
of this is that it provides a different perspective of how evaluation works in the 
public sector. In the case of the evaluation and auditing of the CQC, subjective 
judgements are more frequent and the effectiveness of the organisation is 
valued on the basis of different criteria. The CQC has been, since its inception, 
surrounded by controversial questionings about its performance and evaluation 
has played an active role in its evolution. This body presents an interesting case 
study for two main reasons. The first one is that it is the result of the merger of 
previous regulatory bodies, which has inexorably impacted its consolidation as 
a regulator and has affected its organisational learning during its almost five 
years of operation. As a CQC official (UK-1) highlights, these changes produce 
situations when…  
… Organisations aren’t able to become mature, they are not able to 
grow and develop their systems and processes, to develop the skills 
of the people that work in them and to get some consistency. 
Consequently, the CQC has faced the organisational challenges associated with 
the establishment of a new body, e.g. the fact that ‘it didn’t have the budget that 
the three bodies would have had’ (UK-2). This is an important element to 
highlight because it affected the performance of the CQC and, consequently, the 
evaluation of this organisation. 
The second reason regards the strong criticisms of its performance (especially 
during the first years) and the excessive attention given by the media to the 
                                                        
713 A non-departmental public body is ‘a body which has a role in the processes of national 
government, but is not a government department or part of one, and which accordingly operates 
to a greater or lesser extent at arm’s length from ministers.’ Cabinet Office. 2013a. "Public 
bodies reform." London, UK. 
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CQC’s shortcomings that have increased the rigour of the scrutiny of this 
organisation. As a former CQC official recalls (UK-6): ‘There would be a report 
every single day about something CQC hadn’t done right.’ The overview of this 
case allows looking at an organisation that has been through different processes 
of adjustment in the pursuit of the most effective way to operate. This change of 
perspective will generate different findings to make the discussion about the 
hidden politics of evaluation in the UK more complete and robust. As in the 
previous case, this section is dedicated to the description of the CQC and its 
evaluation process. 
4.3.1 General Overview of the Care-Quality Commission 
The CQC began operations in 2009 after being established by the Health and 
Social Care Act 2008 (Box 4.4). This new regulator714 was the organisation 
resulting from the merger of three previous regulatory bodies: the Healthcare 
Commission, the Commission for Social Care Inspection, and the Mental Health 
Act Commission.715 The main objective of the CQC is ‘to protect and promote the 
health, safety and welfare of people who use health and social care services.’716 
The CQC carries out multiple activities ‘to make sure that hospitals, care homes, 
dental and general practices and other care services […] provide people with 
safe, effective and high-quality care, and we encourage them to make 
improvements.’717 These activities are mostly directed to guarantee the users of 
health and social-care services that the services received meet the minimum 
standards set by the government. 
 
                                                        
714 According to Gray and Jenkins, in the UK ‘there have been concomitant developments too in 
performance audit and regulation with an increasing amalgamation of regulators […] 2009 saw 
the merger of the Healthcare Commission, the Commission for Social Care Inspection, and 
Mental Health Inspectorate into the Care Quality Commission –a mega regulator!’ Gray, A., and 
B. Jenkins. 2011. "Policy and Evaluation: Many Powers, Many Truths." in Evaluation. Seeking 
Truth or Power?, edited by P. Eliadis, J. E. Furubo, and S. Jacob. New Jersey, US: Transaction 
Publishers. P. 43. 
715 Under the light of the concept of post-bureaucratic organisations, this merger can be seen as 
a clear modification of the organisational boundaries. Elston, T. 2012. "Developments in UK 
executive agencies: Re-examining the ‘disaggregation–reaggregation’ thesis." Public Policy and 
Administration 28(1):66-89. 
716 "Health and Social Care Act." 
717 Care Quality Commission. 2013k. "Working for CQC." London, UK.  
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Box 4.4 Overview of the Care Quality Commission 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on Care Quality Commission. Annual report and accounts 2012/13.  
In terms of governance, the CQC has a Board that is ‘the senior decision-making 
structure […] it provides strategic leadership to CQC and takes collective 
responsibility for the long- term success of the organisation.’718 This is 
composed by a non-executive Chair and up to fourteen members (executive and 
non-executive). As an arm’s-length body of the DoH, the Permanent Secretary is 
accountable to Parliament for the performance of the CQC.719 In practical terms, 
the DoH ‘agrees CQC annual business plans and monitors CQC’s financial and 
operational performance and risks at general and strategic level through regular 
performance meetings.’720 For its operation, the CQC has a Chief Executive and 
three inspectorates that oversee the regulation of health and social-care 
services (Figure 4.7). 
 
                                                        
718 —. 2013c. "CQC Corporate Governance Framework." London, UK. P. 9. 
719 The DoH and the CQC have signed a framework agreement which purpose is to define ‘how 
the Department and the CQC will work in partnership to serve patients, people who use 
services, their carers, the public and the taxpayer, and how both CQC and the Department 
discharge their accountability responsibilities effectively.’—. 2013d. "Framework Agreement 
between the Department of Health and Care Quality Commission." London, UK. P. 3. 
720 Ibid. P. 10. 
The CQC regulates different health sectors in England including: NHS Trusts, 
independent healthcare, independent ambulance, dentists, adult social care and GP 
services. Its main regulatory activities are: 
 Setting standards of quality and safety 
 Registration of health and care services 
 Monitoring, inspecting and regulating care services to make sure that they 
continue to meet the standards 
 Protecting the rights of vulnerable people, including those whose rights are 
restricted under the Mental Health Act 
 Challenging all providers, with the worst performers getting the most attention 
 Making fair and authoritative judgments, supported by the best information and 
evidence 
 Taking appropriate action if care services are failing to meet the standards. 
 Carrying out in-depth investigations to look at care across the system 
 Reporting on the quality of care services, publishing clear and comprehensive 
information, including performance ratings to help people choose care 
 
According to its latest report, the CQC has 2,148 staff members (955 frontline 
inspectors) with a funding for 2012/13 of £68.1m Grant in-aid from the DoH and 
£92.7m annual fees from care providers. 
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Figure 4.7. Organisational Structure of the CQC 
 
Source: data.gov.uk 
The regulatory activities of the CQC can be classified into two main processes: 
the registration of health and social-care providers, and the inspection of 
different organisations, i.e. hospitals, clinics, and dentists, to verify that the 
services provided meet the national standards.721 The findings derived from 
these inspections are made public through the CQC’s website.722 A synthesis of 
the latest report of the CQC’s performance can be found in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5 Key Facts of the CQC’s Performance 2012/2013  
Registered Providers 30,261 
Inspections carried out 35,371 
Whistleblowing contacts 
received 
8,634 
Warning notices to providers 910 
Visits by Mental Health Act 
Commissioners 
1,090 
Source: Source: Based on Care Quality Commission. Annual report and accounts 2012/13.  
This overview of the operation and governance of the CQC allows understanding 
more clearly its role as a regulator. Two major characteristics of this body are 
                                                        
721 The CQC carries out two kinds of inspections: 1) Comprehensive, ‘To make sure services are 
providing care that's safe, caring, effective, responsive to people's needs and well-led’; and 2) 
Focused, ‘To look at something we're concerned about, which might have been raised during a 
comprehensive inspection or through our monitoring work [and] If there is a change in a care 
provider's circumstances …’ —. 2015c. "What we do on an inspection." London, UK. 
722 The CQC publishes an annual report that contains information about the inspections 
performed during the year. In addition, it also publishes thematic reports such as The State of 
Health Care and Adult Social Care in England (October 2014). 
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worth highlighting: the institutional framework that aims to protect its 
independence for establishing judgements about the performance of health and 
social-care providers and the relationship between the DoH and the CQC. 
Regarding the latter, a CQC official stated (UK-1): ‘We are independent from 
government and although we use taxpayers’ money to discharge our function, 
our independence, in my view, is independence of judgement.’ These two issues 
will become of great significance when looking at the hidden politics of 
evaluation in a subsequent chapter of this thesis. 
4.3.2. The Evaluation of the Care-Quality Commission 
The CQC is subject to the evaluation processes of its performance. This process 
is chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the DoH and undertaken by a panel of 
departmental officials and external reviewers. Its objective is ‘to provide robust 
assurance to the public, the Department and Parliament that CQC is improving 
its performance and that action will be taken to build and sustain its capability 
in the future.’723 This review took into consideration the main findings made by 
the NAO and the PAC (addressed later in this section) and it comprised the 
period between October 2011 and February 2012 (Table 4.6).  
                                                        
723 Department of Health. 2012c. "Performance and Capability Review. Care Quality 
Commission." London, UK. P.2. 
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Table 4.6 Main Findings of the CQC’s Performance Capability Review 
 
Source: Based on Department of Health, 2012. Performance and Capability Review. Care Quality 
Commission. Pp. 5-6. 
This instrument applied by the DoH to measure the performance of the CQC 
provides an example of the kind of internal evaluation that takes place. As the 
DoH is accountable for the CQC’s performance, this review (in addition to the 
CQC’s annual reports) constitutes evidence to be presented during external 
inquiries. The recommendations derived from these inquiries affect both 
organisations, as a member of the Health Committee staff states: ‘If we say the 
CQC needs to rethink its purpose […] that still has implications for the DoH and 
how things are regulated.’ The CQC has also performed evaluations for 
strengthening its internal procedures. For example, it recently commissioned 
studies about their current regulatory model and their programme of evaluation 
to The University of Manchester and The King’s Fund. 
The CQC has also been subject to an intensive external scrutiny that has evinced 
a series of shortcomings in its performance and has raised an important number 
1 CQC has now set the essential platform which tougher regulatory action can 
be taken when needed, if and where standards fall below acceptable levels. 
2 The CQC has faced operational and strategic difficulties […] delays to 
provider registration, shortcomings in compliance activity and, at times, a 
negative public profile have seriously challenged public confidence in its 
role. 
3 There is clear evidence to show that CQC has demonstrated a new focus on 
its core purpose, the operational base is stronger and improving. 
4 CQC must become more strategic and set out more clearly what success look 
like. 
5 There is a blurring of the boundary between the Board and the executive 
team, with the Board only recently moving to take on a stronger role to 
constructively challenge the executive team. 
6 The underlying regulatory model is new and so far there is limited practical 
evidence of its effectiveness. 
7 The majority view from the numerous stakeholders engaged in the Review 
was that they want lessons to be learnt from performance shortcomings of 
the early years […] recent improvements are acknowledged and there is 
much work to do to ensure CQC is a sustainably improving organisation 
delivering a respected regulatory system that protects patients and service 
users. 
8 For the Department, the way it challenges and supports CQC also needs to be 
more strategic 
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of criticisms about its capacity to fit its purpose.724 Here, it is important to 
highlight the role of the Health Committee as one of the bodies that recognised 
the need to make health regulators accountable: 
The Chair observed, when he first took on the role in 2010, that there 
was a gap in the accountability in the way sub regulators in the 
health world work […] because they are non-departmental public 
bodies […] so you have that situation where they are technically 
accountable to Parliament but there was no formal mechanism for 
Parliament to hold them to account …(UK-2). 
The identification of a gap in the accountability process for healthcare 
regulators is an important issue to consider because of the leverage and 
notoriety that the parliamentary scrutiny has had in the case of the CQC. As it is 
discussed in Chapter 6, the involvement of the Health Committee and the PAC 
has given important focus to the discussion of the CQC’s performance and the 
need to reflect on the decisions taken by its governance body. The reviews made 
by the Health Committee, the PAC, and the NAO have produced a series of 
findings and recommendations consistent among the different scrutiny bodies 
(Figure 4.8).725 
                                                        
724 See for example: Press Associated. 2013. "Care Quality Commission 'not fit for purpose' says 
BMA." in The Guardian. London, UK. 
725 For a more detailed description of the content of these reports, Appendix I summarises the 
main findings of each document. 
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Figure 4.8 Main Criticisms Made to the CQC’s Performance (External Auditing) 
 
Source: Based on Health Committee, 2012. Accountability Hearing with the Care Quality 
Commission; Public Accounts Committee, 2012. The Care Quality Commission: Regulating the 
quality and safety of health and adult social care; and National Audit Office, 2011. The Care 
Quality Commission: Regulating the quality and safety of health and adult social care. 
The scrutiny made of the CQC has revealed a series of failings and shortcomings 
in the performance of this regulator.726 Different events related to neglected 
treatment to patients in hospitals and social-care homes727 have put the CQC in 
the spotlight and have brought plenty of attention from the media.728 A 
                                                        
726 Campbell, D. 2012. "Care Quality Commission problems-timeline." in The Guardian. London, 
UK. 
727 The Winterbourne View and University Hospitals Morecambe Bay cases are relevant 
examples of episodes in which the approach undertaken by the CQC was highly questioned, both 
by Parliament, e. g. Health Committee, as well as by the press. For further reference see: BBC 
News. 2013. "Morecambe Bay trust failings prompts watchdog criticism." Lancashire, UK. BBC. 
2011. "Undercover Care: The Abuse Exposed." London, UK. 
728 See Hitchcock, G. 2011. "Care Quality Commission faces uphill struggle, says watchdog." in 
The Guardian. London, UK. 
•Distortion of priorities (registering providers 
over inspecting them) 
•Long-standing vacancies for CQC inspectors 
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paradigmatic case was of Winterbourne View, in which a series of abuses to 
patients at a private hospital were revealed by the BBC Panorama programme 
in 2011.729 The CQC received information about these abuses from a whistle-
blower and stated … 
… that the information provided was limited and different in scope to the 
issues raised in the programme, but recognised that, if it had contacted the 
whistleblower immediately, it would have been alerted to the seriousness 
of the situation […] instead the Commission passed the information 
received from the whistleblower to South Gloucestershire County Council, 
in November 2010, but did not follow up to check what action had been 
taken.730 
Moreover, in the past, frictions between members of the CQC Board have also 
contributed to the politicisation of this body. The case of Kay Sheldon, a member 
of the Board, gained notoriety. In November 2011 she approached the Mid-
Staffordshire Public Inquiry ‘with serious concerns about the leadership, culture 
and regulatory approach of CQC.’731 This led to a public dispute between 
Sheldon and the former Chair of the CQC that eventually led to the resignation of 
the latter in September 2012.732 
All these issues were addressed in the external scrutiny made to the CQC. This 
produced the recognition of the problems that the organisation had faced since 
its beginning. In the words of the former Chief Executive of the CQC: 
As the NAO report makes clear, we faced a difficult task. We had to bring 
together the work of three organisations and bring in a new model of 
regulating health and adult social care. Not everything has gone smoothly, 
but we have learned, reviewed what we do and made changes – often with 
support of others involved in health and social care.733 
An important remark is that these recommendations had an effect on the way 
the CQC is organised and operates at present. The publication of the document 
Raising Standards, Putting People First was an explicit attempt of the CQC to take 
                                                        
729 Curtis, P., and H. Mulholland. Ibid."Panorama care home abuse investigation prompts 
government review ". 
730 National Audit Office. 2011a. "The Care Quality Commission: Regulating the quality and 
safety of health and adult social care." London, UK. Pp. 41-42. 
731 Health Committee. 2014a. "2013 Accountability Hearing with the Care Quality Commission." 
London, UK. 
732 See: BBC News. 2012. "Dame Jo Williams: Care regulator chair to resign." London, UK. 
733 Care Quality Commission. 2011a. "Care Quality Commission response to the National Audit 
Office Report." 
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into consideration the criticisms received and to establish a new strategy for the 
organisation. For example, one of the main criticisms was its poor performance 
in inspections. As a response, the CQC developed a new strategy that took into 
consideration these recommendations and promoted the adoption of a new 
scheme: 
We are planning to appoint a Chief Inspector of Hospitals, and a Chief 
Inspector of Social Care and Support, and considering appointing a chief 
inspector for primary and integrated care.734 
These changes involved also the development of a public consultation 
that … 
… sets out the principles underlying how CQC will inspect all services and 
some more detailed proposals for how we will inspect NHS trusts and 
foundation trusts and independent acute hospitals […] It also includes 
some joint proposals between CQC and the Department of Health on 
changes to regulations that underpin our work.735 
Another relevant issue derived from this scrutiny were the changes made in 
relation to whistle-blowers. The CQC’s strategy recognised: “We will take full 
account of information from care staff, including ‘whistleblowers’.”736 The 
observations made by the Health Committee also highlighted the need to revise 
the registration process undertaken by the CQC. This has translated in the 
development of a new registration process, a priority issue for the CQC, in the 
aim to become more efficient.737 
More recently, the Health Committee has carried out a new hearing with the 
CQC to review the progress that the organisation has made over the last year. 
The focus of the inquiry was the VFM of the CQC and identifying whether this 
body was fit for purpose. Recalling the findings made in the past by the Health 
Committee, but also by other external reports, e.g. The Francis Report,738 the 
                                                        
734 —. 2013i. "Raising standards, putting people first. Our strategy for 2013-2016.". London, UK. 
P. 2. 
735 —. 2013g. "A new start. Consultation on the changes to the way the CQC regulates, inspects 
and monitors care." London, UK. P. 2. 
736 —. 2013i. "Raising standards, putting people first. Our strategy for 2013-2016.". London, UK. 
P. 12. 
737 —. 2014a. "Business Plan 2014/15 to 2015/16." London, UK. 
738 This report, published in 2013, ‘examined the causes of the failings in care at Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust between 2005-2009 [it] makes 290 recommendations, 
including: openness, transparency and candour throughout the healthcare system (including a 
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core question was about the changes that the CQC has undertaken in recent 
times. In this sense, the current Chair of the CQC recognised that a number of 
important changes have taken place in the CQC, both in its governance and in 
the methodology to register and inspect social services. In particular, during the 
hearing with the Health Committee he stated: 
We have changed the entire top team in the CQC. We have changed the 
organisation and we have changed our governance structure. On looking 
outwards, we have now an intelligence-driven, risk-driven inspection 
regime, which has made a huge difference, assessing the risk of acute 
hospitals and GP practices from information from data.739 
Another important issue refers to the incapability of the CQC to recruit 
inspectors. This has been a recurrent finding in the audit processes of the 
CQC740 and, according to the evidence discussed in the hearing, is still an 
unsolved issue. Regarding this, the Chair of the CQC exposed: 
I do believe we are capable of finding them. We have tried a number of 
different approaches to recruitment. We have tried recruiting through a 
mass recruitment exercise and now we are undertaking much more 
bespoke recruitment exercises, recruiting locally, but also looking flexibly 
at different models of recruitment […] But we have set a very high bar for 
inspectors. One of the criticisms we have had historically is about the 
quality of staff.741 
Finally, the CQC also made explicit the relevance given to data. The development 
of an intelligent monitoring tool is an example of the new approach undertaken 
in relation to inspections. ‘Our view was that there was a collection of […] data 
that could be used to flag if there was a risk that the service might not meet 
safety and quality standards.’742 This overview of the evaluation and audit 
processes of the CQC offers an interesting object of analysis of the hidden 
politics of evaluation because of the nature and characteristics of this 
                                                                                                                                                             
statutory duty of candour), fundamental standards for healthcare providers improved support 
for compassionate caring and committed care and stronger healthcare leadership.’ The Health 
Foundation. 2014. "About the Francis Inquiry." 
739 Health Committee. 2014d. "2014 Accountability hearing with the Care Quality Commission." 
London, UK: House of Commons. P. 1. 
740 See: —. 2011a. "Accountability hearing with the Care Quality Commission." London, UK: 
House of Commons, —. 2013a. "2013 Annual accountability hearing with the Care Quality 
Commission." London, UK: House of Commons. 
741 —. 2014d. "2014 Accountability hearing with the Care Quality Commission." London, UK: 
House of Commons. P. 6. 
742 Ibid. P. 12.  
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organisation.743 The core argument derived from this description is that the 
evaluation of the performance of the CQC has been more debatable because it 
has been based on subjective judgements. This matters for the research 
question of this thesis because it provides the opportunity to analyse and reflect 
upon how judgements are made in a context in which multiple interests are at 
stake and when the interpretation of success can rely on different criteria.  
The next chapter describes the institutional framework for evaluation in Mexico 
and the case studies in this country. 
 
  
                                                        
743 In July 2015, the NAO published a new report about the CQC’s progress ‘in putting its 
transformation strategy in place, and its capacity to implement its new approach.’ The report 
mostly focuses on appraising the new regulatory model. National Audit Office. 2015a. "Capacity 
and capability to regulate the quality and safety of health and adult social care." London , UK. 
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Chapter 5. Case 2: Policy Evaluation in Mexico 
The description made of the evaluation and audit systems in the UK (see 
Chapter 4) was useful for the identification of those elements of the institutional 
framework underpinning these activities. This chapter describes evaluation 
governance in Mexico to contextualise the analysis of the hidden politics of 
evaluation in the proceeding chapter. 
This overview comprises the identification of the most relevant legal 
instruments for evaluation and audit at the national level. It also incorporates 
the description of the selected case studies: the Health-Quality System 
Programme (SICALIDAD) and the Health Caravans Programme. 
5.1 Audit and Evaluation in Mexico 
The development of evaluation and auditing in Mexico is regulated by different 
legal instruments that establish obligations for ministries to evaluate their 
policies. At the national level, is it possible to identify two major processes for 
evaluating and auditing public policy. The first one is an internal process 
implemented by the Federal Government. The second process is an external 
audit carried out by the Supreme Audit Office (SAO), a technical body of the 
Chamber of Deputies.744 Policy evaluation in the Mexican case has been a 
relatively recent process, although sporadic efforts in this matter have been 
documented since the late seventies.745 However, the promulgation of the 
General Social Development Law in 2004 fostered the institutionalisation of 
evaluation in this country. In the audit field, the establishment of the SAO as it 
currently operates occurred in the early 2000s after the promulgation of the 
Superior Audit Federal Law. 
The following section describes in more detail the design and functioning of 
evaluation and auditing systems in Mexico. This overview identifies rules and 
procedures established for this purpose and the main stakeholders involved. 
                                                        
744 Supreme Audit Office. 2014a. "About us." 
745 Castro, M. F., G. Lopez-Acevedo, G. Beker Busjeet, and X. Fernandez-Ordonez. 2009. "Mexico's 
M&E System: Scaling Up from the Sectoral to the National Level." Washington, D.C., US: The 
World Bank. 
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The Mexican case illustrates how politics affects evaluation when this activity 
takes place in an under-resourced, fragmented, and strongly centralised context, 
and how this interferes with its ultimate purpose: improving policymaking and 
accountability.746 
5.1.1 The Institutional Framework for Policy Evaluation in Mexico 
As stated, there are two major processes for the evaluation of public policy in 
Mexico: internal evaluation and external auditing. Internal evaluation is a 
process undertaken by the Federal Government through three coordination 
agencies in charge of planning, supervising, and funding evaluation. 
International organisations such as the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank have played an important role in the promotion of 
evaluation in Mexico, both by funding evaluation747 as well as evaluators in 
certain cases.748 
At least discursively, evaluation promoted by the Federal Government is 
external, as it is commissioned to evaluators outside the governmental sphere. 
In practice, this is questionable because the majority of the frameworks used for 
the evaluation of programmes are pre-established, approved, and funded by the 
Federal Government. Consequently, the level of influence of government 
impacts on the extent to which evaluation can be considered an external 
process. The institutionalisation of evaluation has been an incremental process. 
It has transited from the development of performance indicators to the 
establishment of specific criteria for valuing different aspects of public 
                                                        
746 According to Mackay, a monitoring and evaluation system should serve governments for two 
major purposes: to support the policymaking process, particularly in the budget area, and in the 
national planning; and, to incentive transparency and to support accountability. Mackay, K. 
2007. "How to build M & E systems to support better government." Pp. ix, 157 p. Washington, 
D.C., US: The World Bank. 
747 For example, they have funded evaluations and been enthusiastic sponsors of the adoption of 
the Results-based Management Model (RbM). The Mexican Federal Government had a loan from 
the World Bank for US$17.24 million for a project to foster this model in Mexico. Source: World 
Bank. Projects and Operations. MX Results-based Management and Budgeting. The World Bank. 
2008. "MX Results-based Management and Budgeting." 
748 An example is the evaluation made by the IADB to the Mexican Rural Policy in 2007. See: 
Lozano, E., N. Gutiérrez, R. Díaz, and A. González. 2007. "Adquisición de bienes privados 
con recursos públicos. Revisión de Política Agropecuaria y Rural en México.": Banco 
Interamericano de Desarrollo. 
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programmes.749 This has been a fragmented process observable, for example, in 
the health sector, in which ‘evaluation areas have existed and disappeared 
according to the government in office’ (MX-3). This might suggest that the 
institutionalisation of evaluation has been a process linked to the political 
priorities of key stakeholders, i.e. the party in office, and their intentions to 
incorporate this activity into the logic of the public sector. Evaluation became a 
formal government’s policy when ‘obligations to evaluate the results of social 
programmes were established.’750 This is an interesting point because the 
implementation of formal rules in this area limited the discretion of 
policymakers in relation to what, when, and how to evaluate. 
The external audit process is performed by the SAO, an autonomous body of the 
Chamber of Deputies that assesses ‘the accomplishment of the objectives and 
goals established in the federal programmes […] in order to verify their 
performance and the proper use of federal public resources, according to the 
legal framework.’751 This body makes the Federal Government accountable 
through the performance of annual audits to the public expenditure executed. 
This is the means through which the Legislative ‘reviews the way and terms in 
which budget is executed’ (MX-12). The external nature of the SAO and its 
connection to the Legislative can be perceived, theoretically, as a mechanism to 
give this body more leverage. However, as discussed later, in practice the SAO 
has limited power. 
Both processes (internal evaluation and external audit) are constrained by a set 
of legal instruments that determine the obligations that ministries have in these 
affairs (Table 5.1). 
 
                                                        
749 Feinstein, O., and G. Hernández. 2008. "El Papel de la evaluación en México." Banco Mundial. 
750 Pérez-Jácome Friscione, D. 2012. "Presupuesto basado en resultados: Origen y aplicación en 
México." edited by Ministry of Finance. Mexico City. P. 3. 
751 "Federal Accountability Law." Art. 15, Fraction IV. 
202 
 
Table 5.1 Legal Framework for the Evaluation of Federal Programmes in Mexico 
Level Legal Instrument Policy Evaluation Highlights 
Macro 
Level 
Political Constitution of 
the United Mexican States 
 
 Policy evaluation is conceived as part of the Democratic Planning System 
 The Constitution gives the Executive the faculty to establish the guidelines for the 
design, implementation and evaluation of the national goals 
 It also gives evaluation faculties to the Congress, through its technical body the SAO, 
to ‘legislate for the SAO, as well as for the performance, control and evaluation 
procedures to be applied to the Powers of the Union and the federal agencies’ (Art. 
73, fraction XXIV).  
Meso 
Level 
Federal Law of Budget and 
Fiscal Liability 
 
 It mandates the obligation of evaluating systematically the federal expenditure. 
 It establishes the creation of the Performance Evaluation System (PES) 
 It acknowledges the linkage between evaluation and the budget process (Results-
based Management model) 
 This Law defines the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Public Function and 
National Council for the Evaluation of the Social Development Policy as the agencies 
in charge of conducting the evaluation policy 
General Law of Social 
Development 
 CONEVAL is the agency in charge of coordinating the evaluation of social policy 
Federal Accountability 
Law 
 This Law regulates the activity of the SAO 
 It establishes the legal premises for the control of public resources and for the 
performance of audits 
Micro 
Level 
General Guidelines for the 
Evaluation of the Federal 
Programmes of the FPA 
 This document defines the general rules for the performance of evaluations to 
federal programmes 
 It incorporates information about the administrative procedure to follow, and the 
nature of the evaluation approaches to be used 
Mechanism for the follow-
up aspects susceptible to 
improvement 
 It establishes the procedure for the use of recommendations derived from 
evaluation studies 
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As it is possible to observe, the legal framework is highly complex. Obligations 
are dispersed throughout multiple regulatory instruments and demand the 
participation of various ministries at different stages of the process. Despite the 
establishment of these formal guidelines, the legal framework presents some 
grey areas that have produced ambiguity about how responsibilities are 
allocated in terms of evaluation. In specifics, the evaluation promoted by the 
Federal Government is ruled by the following instruments: 
 Political Constitution of the United Mexican States 
 Federal Law of Budget and Fiscal Liability 
 General Law of Social Development 
 General Guidelines for the Evaluation of the Federal Programmes (hereafter, 
Guidelines for Evaluation) 
 Mechanism for the follow-up aspects susceptible to improvement (hereafter, 
Mechanism) 
In addition, the work of the SAO is regulated by the Constitution and the Federal 
Accountability Law.752 
The evaluation of public programmes is based on the application of instruments 
that focus on values like efficiency, efficacy, and economy. These instruments 
are directed to obtain ‘objective’ evidence about the accomplishment of 
programmes. For example, the Specific Performance Evaluation (SPE) implies 
the analysis of indicators like coverage and population served to capture the 
level of accomplishment obtained. Evaluation has been mostly constrained at 
the programmatic level rather than the discussion of broader policy issues, 
which might generate political reactions.753 According to a study made by 
GESOC, a Mexican public policy think tank, the limited scope of the evaluation 
policy represents one of its most notorious weaknesses: 
There are no institutional and normative grounds for performing an 
integrated systemic evaluation, both vertical and horizontally, bringing 
together the macro (policies), meso (programmes and organisations) and 
                                                        
752 In addition to the legal framework described here, both internal and external mechanisms of 
evaluation may refer to other legal instruments in the development of their activities (e.g. SAO’s 
internal regulations). 
753 For instance, in the Annual Evaluation Programme (AEP) 2015, the vast majority of the 
content concerns the evaluation of programmes, with the exception of the evaluation of the 
National Crusade against Hunger which is considered a strategic evaluation that exceeds the 
time framework of the AEP 2015. 
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micro (officials performance) levels.754 
In this scenario, evaluation seems to be a mechanism that avoids affecting 
political interests at a broader level. As a result, this has restricted its effect on 
policymaking and accountability and it has translated it into an activity that 
public officials perceive as an additional administrative load that they are 
obliged to fulfil. According to a Ministry of Health official (MX-6) evaluation 
‘generates a managerial effort and this affects more those [ministries] less 
organised.’ This resonates with the asymmetry of capabilities among actors 
within government and with the different conceptualisations about the utility of 
evaluation. The work of the SAO is more related to the control of public funds 
and accountability. This body audits public expenditure (after it has been spent) 
on an annual basis. 
In both cases, the effect of these activities in policymaking and in the political 
debate demands a more careful description. In contrast to the UK (see Chapter 
4), the Mexican institutional framework for evaluation and auditing is 
characterised by multiple rules and procedures that aim to guide the behaviour 
of the stakeholders involved in this process. These rules and institutions are 
described more carefully in the next sections. 
5.1.2 Internal Evaluation 
Internal evaluation is implemented by the Federal Government through three 
agencies: the National Council for the Evaluation of the Social Development 
Policy (CONEVAL), the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Public Function. 
All these agencies have obligations established in the legal framework related to 
the planning and coordination of evaluation at the national level. 
The Ministry of Finance is responsible for implementing and supervising the 
Performance Evaluation System (PES).755 It also coordinates the evaluation of 
                                                        
754 Arreola, A. (Ed.). 2008. ¿Gobernar por resultados? Implicaciones de la política de evaluación del 
desempeño del gobierno mexicano. Mexico City: GESOC, A.C. P. 241. 
755 The PES is ‘group of methodological elements that allows making an objective assessment of 
the Programmes’ performance, guided by the principles of verification of the level of 
accomplishment of objectives and goals, based on strategic and management indicators that 
show the social impact of programmes and projects.’ "Federal Law of Budget and Fiscal 
Liability."  
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non-social federal programmes, e.g. the communications and transport sectors. 
Evaluation from this ministry’s perspective is used … 
… to determine the pertinence and accomplishment of objectives, the 
efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of these, providing 
credible and useful information about the obtained results to improve the 
decision-making process.756 
In this context, the PES is an instrument that integrates information about 
public programmes and its relationship with national priorities considering 
performance indicators, evaluation outputs, and follow-up actions that can 
provide a more comprehensive overview of the accomplishments made by the 
government.757 The Ministry of Public Function is also involved in the 
monitoring of this system. However, its tasks are more linked to auditing and 
control. The aim of its evaluation unit is … 
… to design and develop instruments and methodologies for an 
integral evaluation of the public sector performance […] that 
comprises the issuing and publication of guidelines, general criteria, 
systematic and permanent coordination mechanisms that allow 
establishing a public evaluation culture.758 
Even though in 2012, after the change of government occurred, new President 
Enrique Peña Nieto issued a decree that eliminates the Ministry of Public 
Function, and its functions and responsibilities were presumably transferred to 
the Secretariat of the Interior. Until this day its situation is unclear within the 
Federal Public Administration (FPA).759 Apparently, it continues operating as in 
previous years, e.g. according to the current Annual Evaluation Programme 
(AEP), the Ministry of Public Function is in charge of coordinating the 
evaluation of 37 federal programmes, including some implemented by the 
Ministry of Finance. 
The third agency involved in the execution of the Mexican evaluation policy is 
CONEVAL. This is ‘a public decentralized organisation of the Federal Public 
Administration with legal personality and own equity, with technical and 
                                                        
756 Ministry of Finance. 2011. "Results-based Budget. Evaluation.". 
757 —. "Cédula: Conceptos Básicos del Presupuesto Basado en Resultados. Sistema de Evaluación 
del Desempeño (PbR-SED)." 
758 Ministry of Public Function. 2014. "Government Performance Evaluation Unit." Mexico City.  
759 "Decree that amends, supplements or repeals certain provisions of the Organic Law of the 
Federal Public Administration." 
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managerial autonomy […], it is within the sector coordinated by the Ministry of 
Social Development’.760 Its role is evaluating social policy at the national level 
and measuring systematically poverty indicators in the country. Its 
establishment was the result of an arrangement between political parties that 
led to the publication of the General Social Development Law in 2004.761 
The institutional design establishes these three actors as the organisations 
responsible for conducting the evaluation policy. In empirical terms, this set of 
arrangements has produced conflicts between these agencies and has affected 
the relationship with the evaluated bodies. According to a Ministry of Public 
Function official (MX-2), this design ‘is totally inefficient because you have three 
structures in three different institutions with three different approaches’. 
Moreover, the legal framework does not set formal boundaries for the 
separation of the competencies of each agency. The legal framework, for 
example, limits CONEVAL’s scope to social policy. However, this concept is not 
clearly defined in the law and it has generated ambiguity among coordination 
agencies.762 In addition, as a CONEVAL official recognises (MX-9) this has also 
produced duplicities. ‘We have performed very similar functions, with very 
similar objectives and I think it is a consequence of the fact that it has not 
defined very clearly the scope of each agency.’ 
Furthermore, the internal evaluation process raises important concerns about 
issues like independence, impartiality, and credibility, addressed in more detail 
in Chapter 6. Yet, at this point it is important to acknowledge that the process 
implies the interaction of these three agencies with the evaluated object (an 
                                                        
760 CONEVAL is a decentralized body that can be compared to quangos in the UK. "Decree that 
regulates the National Council for the Evaluation of the Social Development Policy." CONEVAL is 
a decentralized body that can be compared to quangos in the UK. 
761 Hernández Licona, G. 2010. "Construyendo un Sistema de Evaluación y Medición: Un Reto de 
Política Pública con Elementos Técnicos." 
762 Due to the gaps found in the legal framework, the AEP 2011 presents definitions for ‘federal 
actions of social development’ and ‘federal programme of social development’ with the purpose 
of making clearer the influence of CONEVAL and its scope in the evaluation policy. In addition, in 
2011 CONEVAL issued an Inventory of Federal Social Actions and Programmes which aim was to 
integrate the information about this kind of programmes implemented by the Federal 
Government. This inventory has registered 273 social programmes or actions. In practical 
terms, these three agencies have distributed the universe of federal programmes based on the 
classification used for budget purposes and for public expenditure control to carry out 
evaluation activities. 
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operative unit of the programme) and with an evaluation unit within each 
public agency whose main functions include ‘hiring, operating and supervising 
evaluation.’763 Internal evaluation relies strongly on the capabilities (technical 
and political) of different stakeholders within the Federal Government. 
Evaluation planning is fundamentally concentrated in the coordination agencies, 
while the implementation and the use of evaluation outputs are under the scope 
of the evaluated agencies. 
The lack of boundaries in the evaluation policy has generated two major 
problems. First, it has created power struggles that can be observed in the 
discretionary decisions made during the process—negotiation for the 
evaluation space. For example, the selection of the programmes to evaluate 
during the fiscal year appears to be more a negotiation between these parties 
than a decision based on explicit and transparent criteria. There is no explicit 
criterion for including or dismissing programmes, neither to decide which will 
be the coordination agency in charge. According to a member of the Ministry of 
Finance (MX-19): ‘Anyone eliminates or adds those that he likes.’ For instance, 
the AEP2015 establishes the performance of a cost-effectiveness evaluation 
coordinated by the Ministry of Finance for the Social Milk Supply Programme 
(LICONSA, its acronym in Spanish), while it also sets the revision of the 
programme’s indicator matrix and a design evaluation coordinated by 
CONEVAL. This exposes the lack of clear criteria for the selection of 
programmes to evaluate. LICONSA is considered a social programme; under the 
scope of CONEVAL, although the Ministry of Finance is also involved in its 
evaluation. 
This selection is left as a discretionary decision of these three agencies and it 
can leave room for using evaluation as a political tool to evince the weaknesses 
or the strengths of a programme. To illustrate this, the Human Development 
Programme Oportunidades has been considered in every AEP since 2007. This 
was the most iconic programme of President Calderón’s Government (2006–12) 
                                                        
763 The Guidelines for Evaluation establish that public agencies within the FPA, ‘without 
modifying their organisational structure, must designate an area […] that will be responsible for 
supervising the quality and the normative enforcement of evaluations, as well as for the 
coordination with CONEVAL …’ Guidelines for evaluation (n. 29). 
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and there was a clear interest in promoting its achievement. The international 
recognition obtained by the programme was also an important factor for its 
legitimisation.764 International organisations play an important role in this—
‘They [programmes] bring in the World Bank to perform their evaluation […] 
that means that they do not believe in the evaluation that takes place here’ (MX-
2). This reveals that the value given to the credibility and legitimacy of 
evaluation differs in relation to the organisation performing the study. From 
this perspective, the involvement of an international organisation may provide 
more leverage to the findings of a study. 
The second consequence of this discretion is that there are incentives for 
evaluating policy areas in which more evaluation capabilities have been built, 
e.g. social policy (MX-9). Just to illustrate, the AEP2013 established the 
evaluation of 202 federal programmes during this fiscal year; only 24% are non-
social. In addition, social programmes are considered more politically 
profitable, hence it is important to promote and disseminate achievements in 
this area. Again, the cases of the Oportunidades and Seguro Popular programmes 
are paradigmatic, as they have an explicit evaluation agenda, in contrast to the 
rest of the federal programmes operating.765 The evaluation agenda of these 
programmes transcends the identification of goals as it also involves the 
development of more specific studies to observe their effect on vulnerable 
sectors of the population, i.e. indigenous people.766 The political legitimisation 
of policies based on evaluation evidence is a common practice, particularly in 
those contexts in which the programme to be legitimised represents an 
                                                        
764 See: The World Bank. 2014. "A Model from Mexico to the World." . 
765 See: Coordinación Nacional del Programa de Desarrollo Humano Oportunidades. 2007. 
"Agenda Integral de Evaluación del Programa Oportunidades 2007 - 2012 (Evaluation agenda 
for the Oportunidades Programme 2007-2012)." Mexico City: SEDESOL, Ministry of Health. 2005. 
"Sistema de Protección Social en Salud. Estrategia de Evaluación (Evaluation Strategy)." Mexico 
City. 
766 See: Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social (CIESAS). 2010. 
"Indigenous Communication Programme Evaluation." Mexico City. and Sosa-Rubí, S., A. Salinas-
Rodríguez, and O. Galárraga. 2011. "Impacto del Seguro Popular en el gasto catastrófico y de 
bolsillo en el México rural y urbano, 2005-2008 (Impact on the catastrophic expenditure of the 
Seguro Popular programme in the rural and urban Mexico, 2005-2008)." Mexico City: Instituto 
Nacional de Salud Pública. 
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important amount of public funds.767 
In spite of the ambiguity and complexity of the legal framework, it defines the 
general parameters of the administrative process to follow for the evaluation of 
federal programmes. The Budget Law, for instance, establishes some important 
issues worth mentioning: 
 Evaluation to federal programmes can be performed either by public 
agencies itself or by specialised external agents who meet the 
requirements of independence, impartiality, transparency and any others 
established in the legal framework 
 Evaluations will be public and must provide information about the 
general characteristics of the evaluation to perform—information about 
the external evaluator team, general data of the administrative unit 
within the public agency in charge of coordinating and monitoring the 
evaluation, the hiring scheme of the evaluation, databases, data-
collection instruments, e.g. questionnaires or interviews, methodology, 
and the main characteristics of the sample, executive summary 
containing the main results obtained, recommendations from the 
external evaluator, and the total cost of the evaluation with its source of 
funding 
 Evaluation can be performed at different levels (policies, programmes, 
and institutions) 
 It is mandatory to establish an AEP 
 Federal programmes must follow recommendations derived from 
evaluations.768 
In addition, the Social Development Law defines CONEVAL as the agency in 
charge of evaluating of social policy769 by ‘revising periodically the 
accomplishment of the social objective of the programmes, goals and actions of 
the social policy with the purpose of correcting, modifying, adding, reorienting 
or supressing them totally or partially’ (Art. 72).770 
                                                        
767 According to a study made by GESOC, Oportunidades and Seguro Popular were the 
programmes with the largest budget in the Federal Expenditure Budget (circa 3 billion GBP 
each). Source: GESOC, A.C. 2014. "Índice de Desempeño de Programas Públicos Federales 2014 
(Performance Index of Federal Programmes 2014)." Mexico City. 
768 "Federal Law of Budget and Fiscal Liability." Art. 110. 
769 The Social Development Law (2004) acknowledges CONEVAL as the agency in charge of the 
evaluation of social policy; however, as a former CONEVAL’s counsellor has identified, the 
Budget Law limited the scope of CONEVAL by giving joint evaluation faculties to the Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of Public Function, reducing its capacity of influence and its power. 
Acosta, F. 2010. "La evaluación de la política social en México: Avances recientes, tareas 
pendientes y dilemas persistentes." Papeles de Población 64:155-88. 
770 Social policy represents the most visible policy field in which evaluation has been 
undertaken, where more assessment instruments have been applied, and with more visible 
results. 
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 Higher education institutions—scientific or non-profit organisations—
can evaluate social policy, CONEVAL can perform evaluations by itself, 
but when an external organisation is needed for the evaluation CONEVAL 
must do a public bidding 
 Evaluation must be annual; it can be multiannual when it is considered 
necessary 
 Evaluation outputs must incorporate the results, management, and 
service indicators to assess the coverage, quality, and impact of 
programmes 
 Evaluation outputs must be published in the Official Federation Journal, 
as well as sent to the Social Development Commissions of the Chamber of 
Deputies and Senators 
 CONEVAL, based on the results of evaluations, can make 
recommendations to the Executive and make them public.771 
Box 5.1 General Overview of CONEVAL 
Source: Based on CONEVAL and Castro et al., 2009 . Mexico's M&E System: Scaling Up 
from the Sectoral to the National Level. The Wolrd Bank. 
As a consequence of the complexity of the legal framework,772 coordination 
agencies published in 2007 the Guidelines for Evaluation to standardise the 
evaluation process (Table 5.2). Before this institutionalisation process, as a 
former CONEVAL’s official explains (MX-24), information about the 
                                                        
771 "Social Development General Law." Mexico. Title Fifth, Chapter I. 
772 In addition to the legal framework described in this section, there is a set of instruments that 
aim to define the processes for the development of evaluation to federal programmes and to 
‘regulate’ the work of evaluators by establishing ex ante the expected outputs of the evaluation, 
the obligations of the parties involved. These instruments are commonly known as Terms of 
Reference (ToR) and are usually developed by the unit in charge of coordinating the evaluation. 
Through a Presidential Decree issued in 2005, CONEVAL was created as public decentralized 
organisation of the Federal Public Administration with two main purposes: 
1. To regulate and coordinate the evaluation of the social development policy. 
2. To establish the guidelines and criteria for the definition, identification and 
measuring of poverty. 
According to the WB, CONEVAL ‘is the lynchpin of the social sector M&E system in Mexico […] it 
coordinates cross-sectorial evaluation activities, sets out standards and methodologies for the 
evaluation of social Programmes, provides technical assistance to ministries and agencies and 
undertakes or manages some specific evaluations’.  
CONEVAL’s Secretary is named by the Federal Government; however, the governance of this 
body relies on a Directive Committee composed by the Secretary of the Ministry of Social 
Development, six academic researchers, a representative of the Ministry of Finance, a technical 
secretary and a prosecretary. The Executive Commission, composed by the Executive Secretary 
and six academic researchers, which are chosen through a public process, is the technical body 
that guides the operation of CONEVAL. It has an administrative structure of 65 public officers 
distributed into five administrative areas: Executive Secretariat, General Direction of 
Coordination, General Direction of Administration, General Direction of Evaluation and General 
Direction of Poverty Measurement. According to information of the Ministry of Finance, for the 
2015 fiscal year, CONEVAL has a budget of 440 million pesos (approximately £18 million) and it 
will coordinate the performance of 158 evaluations according to the AEP2015 (45 designs 
evaluations and 113 performance evaluations). 
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effectiveness of programmes was dispersed and fragmented and ‘CONEVAL 
needed to generate instruments for this purpose’. This underlines the leverage 
given to its role as the agency responsible for promoting the use of evaluation, 
but also for generating evaluation capabilities within the public sector. 
CONEVAL lacks the capacity for enforcing its recommendations because unlike 
its counterparts in the evaluation system (Ministries of Public Function and of 
Finance) it is not associated with a sanction component. Instead, as a CONEVAL 
official (MX-9) recognises, ‘We have legitimacy […] we are academics […] this 
backs us up’. CONEVAL’s governance, as discussed in Chapter 6, has influenced 
the way in which this body is perceived. Regardless of sitting within the public 
sector as a parastatal body, it has built an important reputation as an institution 
with ‘technical quality and academic independence’ (MX-14). 
In this context, the Guidelines for Evaluation provided a more structured 
approach to the administrative process of evaluation and its nature. Here, 
evaluation is defined as ‘the systematic and objective analysis of federal 
programmes whose purpose is to determine its pertinence and the 
accomplishment of its objectives, as well as its efficiency, efficacy, quality, 
results, impact and sustainability’ (Table 5.2).773 
                                                        
773 "General guidelines for the evaluation of the federal programmes of the Federal Public 
Administration." Mexico. 
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Table 5.2 General Content of the Guidelines for Evaluation 
Monitoring Evaluation Approaches Recommendations 
derived from 
evaluation 
Dissemination of 
evaluation results 
Federal Programmes 
Integral Monitoring and 
Evaluation System 
All federal 
programmes must 
develop an 
indicators matrix 
that will be 
incorporated into 
the Performance 
Evaluation System. 
 
The methodology 
used for this matrix 
will be the logical 
framework 
approach. 
The following evaluation 
approaches are addressed in 
the Guidelines for Evaluation: 
Design Evaluation 
(mandatory for those new 
programmes during the 
first year of operation). 
Consistency and Results 
Evaluation 
Indicators Evaluation 
Processes Evaluation 
Impact Evaluation 
Specific Evaluation 
Strategic Evaluation 
Complementary 
Evaluation (all those 
evaluation not considered 
in the AEP). 
Public agencies 
must heed 
recommendations 
derived from 
evaluations 
according to the 
model that will be 
established for that 
purpose by the 
Ministries of 
Finance, Public 
Function and 
CONEVAL. 
Public agencies must 
disseminate the 
results of the through 
their websites. 
They are also 
obligated to 
inform about the 
evaluator that was 
hired, the cost of 
the evaluation, 
among other 
aspects.  
The three parties involved in 
the federal evaluation policy 
(Ministry of Finance, Ministry 
of Public Function and 
CONEVAL) must integrate a 
system based on information 
derived from the monitoring 
and evaluation processes in 
order to provide public 
agencies with evidence about 
the use of public resources, 
the advancements and 
achievements made in their 
results. 
This system must 
contribute to the 
programme’s 
improvement, to the 
decision-making process 
and to the accountability 
process.  
 
Source: Guidelines for Evaluation, 2007.  
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The Guidelines for Evaluation consider two kinds of evaluations. The first type 
are those established by the AEP (mandatory) that specify the kind of evaluation 
to be performed, the coordination agency, and timescales. The second group are 
all those complementary/ad hoc evaluations performed by public agencies 
according to their specific needs of information. The main difference between 
them is basically the stakeholder that defines the guidelines for the evaluation. 
While for those mandatory evaluations coordination agencies define the scope 
and instruments to apply, the ad hoc evaluations are planned and designed 
within the evaluated agency (Figures 5.1 and 5.2).774 
Figure 5.1 Process Followed for an Evaluation Established in the AEP 
 
Source: Based on Guidelines for Evaluation. 
  
                                                        
774 This description is a simplification of these processes only for illustration purposes. In 
practice, these processes are much more complex and composed by many other sub processes 
that are not shown here. The hiring of external evaluators, for example, is carried out based on 
what is established by the Law of Acquisitions, Leases, and Services of the Public Sector, so this 
constitutes a process that involves a series of administrative activities additional to what it is 
shown here. 
Publication of 
the Annual 
Evaluation 
Programme 
Administrative 
process to hire 
the external 
evaluator 
The contract is 
commissioned 
and evaluation 
begins based on 
the TOR 
established 
Coordinator 
mediates the 
interaction 
between the 
external 
evaluator and 
the evaluated 
Programme 
The evaluation 
is completed 
and delivered to 
the coordinator 
and the 
evaluated 
agency, and it 
becomes public 
Evaluated 
programmes 
are obligated to 
follow-up 
recommendatio
ns according to 
the procedure 
established by 
the Mechanism 
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Figure 5.2 Process Followed for a Complementary (ad hoc) Evaluation  
 
Source: Based on Guidelines for Evaluation. 
 
The process defined by the legal framework for the evaluation of federal 
programmes is complemented by the Mechanism for the Follow-up of Aspects 
Susceptible to Improvement, the primary objectives of which are: 
To establish the procedure for the follow-up of recommendations by 
external evaluations to make an effective use of evaluation finds in 
the improvement of programmes and policies […] to define the 
persons responsible for establishing the work instruments to provide 
follow-up of the aspects susceptible to improvement, as well as for 
their execution; and to define the deadlines for the follow-up of the 
aspects susceptible to improvement documents775. 
This Mechanism outlines a procedure based on the analysis and classification of 
recommendations from evaluation reports. The evaluated programme analyses 
recommendations and classifies them according to the actors involved in their 
attention, e.g. operation units, other government agencies, or state or municipal 
governments, and according to its level of priority (high, medium, or low).776 
Through this procedure, ministries define the actions to implement, the 
responsibility of those actions, and deadlines for the accomplishment. This is 
the only formal instrument of the Federal Government to foster the use of 
evaluations in policymaking. However, it lacks enforcement capacity, and it has 
                                                        
775 "Mechanism for the Follow-up of Aspects Susceptible to Improvement." N. 1. 
776 This also implies the generation of a set of documents in which public entities define the 
actions that they are committed to perform, as well as reporting on an annual basis to CONEVAL 
and the Ministry of Public Function the accomplishment of the actions that they established. 
Public agencies 
decide to 
perform an 
evaluation to 
their 
programmes 
based on the 
needs 
identified and 
the availability 
of resources for 
this purpose 
The evaluation 
unit develops the 
TOR(CONEVAL 
and Ministries of 
Finance and of 
Public Function 
might express an 
opinion) and 
carries out the 
hiring process for 
the evaluator 
The evaluation 
is assigned to 
an external 
evaluator and it 
begins based on 
the TOR 
established 
The evaluation 
unit mediates 
the interaction 
between the 
external 
evaluator and 
the operation 
unit of the 
programme 
The evaluation 
is completed 
and delivered 
to evaluation 
unit and it 
becomes public 
Evaluated 
Programmes 
are obligated to 
follow-up 
recommendatio
ns according to 
the procedure 
established by 
the Mechanism 
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produced limited results because it is subject to the discretion of operators. As 
an official of the Ministry of Health (MX-4) recognises, they ‘need to be very 
careful in the selection of the issues that they will work on […] some cheat a 
little, but generally speaking they choose those things they can accomplish’. The 
effectiveness of the Mechanism relies on the operator’s decisions about which 
recommendations to follow. As the compliance of this process is overviewed by 
coordination agencies, operators have incentives ‘not to choose the hardest 
ones’ (MX-8). Some aspects require only rephrasing or rethinking how they 
report information about the programme. Consequently, they can be easily 
accomplished and reported (see Box 5.2). 
Box 5.2 Example of the Follow-up of Aspects Susceptible to Improvement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on Ministry of Health, 2013. Follow-up mechanism of recommendations. Work 
plan. Health Caravans Programme. 
This description of the institutional framework for evaluation leads to reflecting 
upon two main points. The first one is the centralisation of the evaluation policy 
and the control exercised by the Federal Government in the planning and 
execution of evaluations. The second concerns the level of coordination that the 
implementation of the evaluation policy demands. The coexistence of three 
agencies involved in the evaluation policy has inevitably led to confrontation in 
terms of asymmetries of power and resources, worsened by the imprecisions of 
After the delivery of an evaluation report, the evaluated programme, along with other 
actors considered relevant for this purpose, analyse and discuss the findings and 
recommendations made by the evaluator. As a consequence of this process, the evaluate 
issues the following documents: 
 An institutional statement on the findings made by the evaluator 
 A work plan to follow-up the aspects considered direct responsibility of 
the operative unit of the programme (known as specific aspects) 
 An institutional work plan to follow-up the aspects considered 
responsibility of different areas of the Ministry (known as institutional 
aspects) 
The evaluand must inform about the progress in the attention of the recommendations, as 
it can be observed in this example of the Health Caravans Programme: 
Aspect susceptible to improvement: “To improve the definition of the purpose in 
the Logical Framework Matrix”. 
Activities to perform: To modify the narrative summary of the matrix in the 
purpose component. 
Responsible Area: Adjunct General Direction of Health Caravans 
Due date: 31/08/2013 
Expected Results: Improvement of the purpose component. 
% Progress: 50 
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the institutional framework about their role. In line with this, a Ministry of 
Health official (MX5) adds: ‘They don’t reach agreements […] they want to state 
who owns the evaluation policy and who gets to say how is it done.’ These 
power disputes are derived from the fact that each stakeholder has an agenda to 
pursue. This is discussed carefully in the analytical chapter. The next section 
focuses on the process for the external auditing of public policy in Mexico. 
5.1.3 External Auditing 
The external auditing of federal programmes is undertaken by the SAO, a 
technical organisation linked to the Chamber of Deputies. According to the 
Accountability Law performance auditing is ‘the verification of the 
accomplishment of the objectives established in federal programmes through 
the estimation or calculation of the obtained results in qualitative or 
quantitative terms, or both.’777 The nature of this law and of the SAO itself is 
more related to control of the use of public resources rather than to evaluation. 
However, recently audit organisations have taken performance assessment as a 
new dimension of their work, leading to a debate about the differences between 
evaluation and auditing (see Chapter 1, Section 1.1). In this sense, the SAO has 
the authority for ‘evaluating the final accomplishment of the objectives and 
goals of federal programmes […] with the purpose of verifying its performance 
and, if it is the case, the use of public resources according to the legal 
framework, independently of the fact that other instances might have similar 
attributions’ (Art. 15 fraction IV). As an external body, the SAO verifies the 
appropriate use of public funds and oversees that public organisations comply 
with the tasks established by the law. This body was conceived as a ‘counterpart 
to the Executive’ (MX-12). 
                                                        
777 "Federal Accountability Law." Art. 2. 
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Box 5.3 General Overview of the SAO 
Source: Based on SAO. About us. 
Overall, the SAO’s audits aim to assess multiple features of public policy. These 
include the performance of financial audits, public work audits, and follow-up 
audits. Performance audit is the most similar instrument to what is done by the 
Executive in terms of evaluation; it focuses on the analysis of … 
… the accomplishment of the audited entity of the objectives and goals set 
in the evaluated programmes and projects; the use of the resources given 
for that purpose in terms of efficacy, efficiency and economy; and the 
accomplishment of the indicators published and approved in the Federal 
Expenditure Budget.778 
The process that follows the SAO for the performance of audits depends on the 
nature of the analysis. However, some general stages can be identified (Figure 
5.3). Its work is driven by the logic of verifying those programmes or policies 
considered relevant, according to the amount of federal resources that they 
represent, as well as its linkage to the governmental priorities established in the 
National Development Plan. These audits mostly highlight omissions in the 
observance of the law, but lack the enforcement capacity to make public officials 
amend these omissions. The most relevant part of the process is the way in 
which the SAO ensures the follow-up of their recommendations.779 This 
                                                        
778 Merino, M. 2009. "Informe sobre la evolución y el desempeño de la Auditoría Superior de la 
Federación." Mexico City. P. 21. 
779 Just like in the case of the Mechanism promoted by the Federal Government, the SAO also 
lacks instruments of enforcement for the attention of the recommendations derived from audits. 
The lack of legal capabilities of the SAO to enforce audited entities to take into consideration 
their recommendations is an issue of concern about the impact that the SAO has on the 
The SAO is the audit organisation in which the Chamber of Deputies deposits the faculty of verifying 
the Federal Public Account at the end of every fiscal year. Some of its most relevant faculties are: 
 To perform audits to public institutions funded by federal resources 
 To establish fines and sanctions 
 To publish its reports 
 To make public institutions accountable 
 To establish rules and procedures, methods and accountability systems to control 
public income and expenditure 
The Chamber of Deputies selects the head of the SAO, the Supreme Auditor remains in office for 8 
years, with the possibility to be elected for one extra period. The Supreme Audit Office Surveillance 
Commission of the Chamber of Deputies is the body in charge of supervising the work of the SAO. 
According to the Federal Budget Decree, for the 2015 fiscal year, the SAO has a budget of 
approximately £87 million. There are about 1,500 people working for the SAO, in addition to external 
consultants hired for different projects. The most recent report issued by the SAO for the Federal 
Public Account 2013 establishes that for this fiscal year the SAO carried out 877 financial audits, 525 
performance audits, 8 evaluations and 3 studies. 
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basically consists of informing audited entities about the remarks made by the 
SAO and the actions they are expected to implement. 
Figure 5.3 General Process Undertaken by the SAO for the Audit of the Federal 
Account 
Source: Based on Merino, M., 2009. Informe sobre la evolución y el desempeño de la 
Auditoría Superior de la Federación.  
As it occurs in the case of internal evaluation, the nature of the 
recommendations— especially those related to performance—concern 
programmatic issues that audited entities can easily implement, but that do not 
represent an important change in the rationale of the programme. The 
recommendations made by the SAO do not seem to generate significant political 
disturbance and their effect on the improvement of policymaking and 
accountability has been largely questioned. In the opinion of a Legislative 
researcher (MX-13), recommendations ‘are sometimes driven by a logic of 
meeting quotas’, which suggests that the relevance of the SAO’s work might be 
constrained to perform a bureaucratic task without reflecting on its value as a 
means for making the Executive accountable. 
This relates to the reactions about the work of the SAO produced by the recent 
General Report of the Public Account 2013. According to El Financiero, a national 
newspaper, a group of deputies (members of the opposition) strongly criticised 
the work of the SAO by considering it an expensive and bureaucratic 
organisation unable to make the government accountable and to sanction its 
poor performance.780 This reanimated the debate about the pertinence of the 
SAO’s institutional design. The audits performed by this organisation are based 
                                                                                                                                                             
improvement of policymaking and on accountability. As a study about the performance of the 
SAO suggests ‘it requires more legal capacity to impose direct administrative sanctions to those 
public offices who have failed in their responsibilities, also the SAO needs more capacity for 
verifying that the changes that have been suggested are being taken into account.’ ibid. P. 62. 
780 Chávez, V. 2015. "En 14 años, la ASF sólo ha castigado a siete personas (In 14 years, the SAO 
has only punished seven persons)." in El Financiero. Mexico City. 
Audit 
Planning/ 
Identification 
of audit entities 
Audit 
Development 
Report of 
Results 
Follow-up of 
recommendations  
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on two ideas: ex-post and yearly analysis. This has raised questions about the 
effectiveness of this model, as sometimes the intervention of the SAO is 
perceived as belated in relation to the dynamics of the public sector. An SAO 
auditor (MX-12) recognises that this design produces a limited impact of 
performance auditing because ‘the law only obliges the audited body to tell us 
the extent to which they follow our recommendations and that will be the end of 
our intervention.’ A deputy of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD, its 
acronym in Spanish) agrees: 
The report on the Public Account 2013 […] makes evident that it is requires 
an institutional redesign of this organisation, it is necessary to give them 
‘teeth’ to sanction with rigor those who make inappropriate use of public 
funds and for them to deliver audit reports in real time in order to be able 
to make the amendments opportunely.781 
In its latest report the SAO made 6,902 recommendations derived from auditing 
the Federal Public Account.782 The key issue to discuss is not the number of 
recommendations issued and followed up, but its nature and its effect on the 
policymaking process and on accountability. It seems that the external audit 
process (at least in the performance dimension) has not permeated the broader 
political discussion because it does not evidence important flaws. Instead it 
shows minor administrative omissions that can be easily fixed by the audited 
entities.783 
This has fostered the debate about the need of giving the SAO more faculties and 
capabilities to become an organisation that can effectively hold the government 
accountable. This is particularly so in the Mexican context in which corruption is 
considered a major problem. According to Mexican Transparency, 200 million 
acts of corruption and circa £1.4 million were used for bribing public officials at 
all three levels of government in Mexico.784 
                                                        
781 Alcántara, S., and H. Jiménez. 2015. "Tibia, actuación de la ASF ante irregularidades: Raya 
(Lukewarm, SAO performance before inconsistencies: Raya)." in El Universal. Mexico City. 
782 Supreme Auditor. 2015. "Delivery of the General Report of the Audit to the Federal Audit 
Account 2013." Mexico City. 
783 See: Pelaez, M. 2015. "Aureoles pide que la ASF tenga dientes para sancionar (Aureoles asks 
for "teeth" for the SAO to sanction)." Azteca Noticias.  
784 Transparencia Mexicana. 2011. "Índice Nacional de Corrupción y Buen Gobierno (National 
Corruption and Good Government Index) Executive Summary 2010.". Mexico City. 
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Based on the description of the institutional framework for evaluation and 
auditing, it is possible to make the following remarks about the Mexican case: 
 In both cases, the institutional framework is highly complex. Obligations in 
evaluation matters are dispersed in several legal instruments and multiple 
actors are involved in the implementation of the evaluation policy. In the audit 
field, the wide scope of policies and programmes subject to the work of the SAO 
makes it difficult to reach a more specific level of analysis. 
 Regarding internal evaluation, the Federal Government exercises strong 
political power over the instruments, methodologies, and use of evaluation 
outputs. A group of academics and consultants dominate the market of 
evaluation and there are no clear standards to assess its quality. 
 The scope of the analysis performed by the SAO is mostly constrained by the 
fulfilment of legal requirements and it does not appear to have an important 
effect in the improvement of programmes and policies. As an ex post analysis, 
the pertinence of its recommendations seems unsuitable for the dynamics of 
the public sector. 
 Neither the bodies in charge of internal evaluation nor of external auditing 
seem to have the institutional capacity to enforce the use of recommendations. 
Despite evaluation in Mexico being a relatively recent process, mostly 
constrained to the programmatic level, there is evidence that the politics has 
affected this activity, mostly derived from the control that the Federal 
Government holds and the lack of institutional strength of the SAO, which raises 
questions about independence and objectivity. For a clearer perspective of the 
implementation of the evaluation policy in Mexico, the next two sections 
describe two case studies that will provide empirical evidence about the hidden 
politics of evaluation. This overview illustrates how evaluation and audit 
processes for federal programmes are undertaken. The description of these 
cases has been made through the documentary revision of evaluation reports 
and government planning documents. Based on this description, it is possible to 
observe how the fragmentation of the evaluation policy and the relegation of 
relevant stakeholders have generated discretionary spaces available for political 
use. 
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5.2 Case C: The Health-Quality System Programme 
This section focuses on two federal programmes taken as case studies for 
obtaining empirical evidence about the interaction between politics and 
evaluation. Both selected programmes (the Health-Quality System and the 
Health Caravans Programme) are part of the health policy undertaken by the 
Mexican Federal Government and operated by the Ministry of Health. 
5.2.1 General Overview of the Health-Quality System Programme 
The Health-Quality System Programme (hereafter, SICALIDAD) emerged from 
an initiative established in the Sectorial Health Programme 2007–12 for 
‘providing health services to all the population and to improve its quality by 
addressing priority sanitary problems and factors that determine and affect 
health.’785 Its main objective is ‘to strengthen the attention quality in public 
institutions of the National Health System through fostering the execution of 
projects that contribute to the effective access to health services.’786 SICALIDAD 
is composed by a series of projects that address different dimensions of health 
quality (Table 5.3).787 
Table 5.3 Dimensions of the Health Quality System Programme 
Dimensions of 
Health Quality 
Description 
Perceived quality 
It considers the citizen’s expectations by implementing actions 
directed to improve the quality of health services perceived by 
citizens. This dimension also incorporates the perception of 
health professionals. 
Technical quality and 
patient safety 
It aims to improve technical quality and patient’s safety by 
continuous improvement, the reduction of adverse events and 
evidence-based medicine. 
Quality in the 
provision of health 
services/ 
Institutionalization 
of quality 
To conduct, with the leadership of the Ministry of Health, the 
changes in the quality of the provision of health services, 
including the accreditation system, quality guarantee and 
organizational improvement. 
Source: Based on Ministry of Health. SICALIDAD Specific Action Programme 2007-2012. 
                                                        
785 Ministry of Health. 2007a. "Sectorial Health Programme 2007-2012 ", edited by Ministry of 
Health. Mexico City. 
786 "Agreement that issues the operational rules of the Integral Quality Health System for the 
2014 fiscal year." 
787 The number of projects changed after the current government took office in 2012; however, 
in general terms the nature of these projects has focused on the improvement in the quality of 
the services provided. 
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The programme provides funding to public health institutions to promote the 
development of health-quality improvement projects. In order to obtain 
SICALIDAD’s support, these projects need to be consistent with the national 
strategies for the improvement of health quality, e.g. initiatives directed to make 
rational use of medicines and the implementation of the Total Quality 
Management Model. For its operation, SICALIDAD requires the interaction of 
multiple actors from different sectors and demands a high level of coordination 
which turns it into a highly complex programme (Figure 5.4). 788 
Figure 5.4 Overview of the Operation of SICALIDAD 
 
Source: Based on 2014 ORP SICALIDAD. 
Considering the activities undertaken by SICALIDAD, the programme has 
established a series of indicators to monitor the accomplishment of its results 
which are reported to coordination agencies (Table 5.4).  
                                                        
788The operation of SICALIDAD involves the participation of multiple actors from the federal and 
local governments and other non-governmental actors. Each project supported has its own 
process of operation; the process presented here aims only to provide a general overview of the 
operation of the programme. For a deeper understanding of this process it is advisable to refer 
to the Operational Rules of the programme. 
Health institutions 
present their projects 
SICALIDAD verifies that 
projects fulfill the 
requirements established 
and a Comitee decides 
whether they are accepted 
or not; the decision is 
notified to the participants 
Resources are 
transferred to the 
institutions which 
project was accepted 
and a colaboration 
agreement is signed 
Institutions use the 
resources for their 
project and inform the 
Ministry of Health 
about the execution 
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Table 5.4 Indicators of SICALIDAD 
Name Periodicity 
Percentage of medical units associated to a SICALIDAD 
project  
Annual 
Percentage of satisfied users with the quality of the 
health services of the National Health System 
Annual 
Percentage of states that associate at least one hospital 
to the clinical integrated record project 
Biannual 
Percentage of certified health units that serve the Social 
Protection System  
Annual 
Quality percentage of training projects that participate 
in funding calls  
Annual 
Source: Based on 2012/2013 SPE SICALIDAD. 
These indicators make explicit those elements of the programme considered as 
primordial to measure its objectives and goals. The next section presents an 
overview of the evaluation and audit processes that have been applied to 
SICALIDAD. This information contributes to the understanding of the logic of 
the evaluation policy applied to a specific programme. 
5.2.2 The Evaluation of the Health-Quality System Programme 
SICALIDAD is subject to the legal framework that enforces its systematic 
evaluation, as well as to inform periodically about how it has spent its 
resources. This programme has been evaluated based on the parameters 
established within the Federal Government (internal evaluation) (Table 5.5), 
but it was also audited by the SAO in 2011.  
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Table 5.5 Evaluations Performed on SICALIDAD 2007-2012  
Source: Based on data from the Ministry of Health. 
The evaluation of SICALIDAD has basically focused on the performance 
dimension and on its operation. It has represented the expenditure of 
approximately £551,000,790 and at least in the case of ad hoc evaluations, all 
                                                        
789 The amount presented here is an estimated in GBP of the cost reported in Mexican pesos by 
the Ministry of Health. 
790 This is an estimated cost based on the information published by the Ministry of Health, in the 
case of the Design Evaluation (2007) there was no information available. 
Year Evaluation 
Type 
Evaluator Budget789 General Description of the Study 
2007 Design 
Evaluation (prior 
operation) 
National 
Institute of 
Public Health 
 
Not 
Available 
It assesses the consistency on the 
design of the Programme through a 
standardized framework 
developed by CONEVAL. 
2008 
 
Specific 
Performance 
Evaluation 
Demography 
and Health 
Research, S.C. 
£3,900  It is an annual synthetic review of 
the performance of the programme 
in terms of a series of management 
and result indicators, as well as its 
budget performance. 
It aims to identify key information 
about the performance of the 
programme through the analysis of 
its indicators. It is based on a 
standardized framework 
developed by CONEVAL. 
2009-
2010 
Specific 
Performance 
Evaluation 
National 
Institute of 
Public Health 
£3,100 
2010-
2011 
Specific 
Performance 
Evaluation 
Dr. Antonio 
Carlos Martín 
del Campo 
Rodríguez 
(Independent 
consultant) 
£3,000  
2009 Complementary 
Evaluation 
(Technical, 
Financial and 
Processes 
Evaluation) 
Metropolitan 
Autonomous 
University 
£175,000  It was a technical-financial 
appraisal and a process evaluation. 
A comparative analysis of a sample 
projects both funded and non-
funded by the programme using a 
mixed approach. 
2010 Complementary 
Evaluation 
National 
Autonomous 
University of 
Mexico 
£190,000  It was an evaluation of a sample of 
projects in 95 hospitals and using a 
mixed approach based on 
questionnaires and interviews. 
2011 Complementary 
Evaluation 
Metropolitan 
Autonomous 
University 
£107,000  It was an analysis of the 
positioning of quality attention as a 
priority of the National Health 
System. It was made through 
documentary analysis and 
interviews. 
2012 Complementary 
Evaluation 
Metropolitan 
Autonomous 
University 
£69,000  It was a meta-evaluation of the 
programme, considering the 
evaluation reports delivered 
between 2008 and 2011. 
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contracts have been commissioned directly to the evaluative institution. Most of 
these evaluations have been desk-based studies that have generated a series of 
findings summarised below: 
 The programme is considered to have a good performance. However, it is 
a recurrent finding of the performance evaluation that there need to be 
developed more accurate indicators of the accomplishment of its 
objectives. 
 In terms of implementation, there are some areas of improvement, 
especially in terms of training. 
 There seems to be little evidence about the effect of the Programme in 
the population. 
 In broader terms, it is not clear where the Programme stands within the 
national health quality policy. 
 In terms of the ad hoc evaluations, the studies performed seem 
disconnected and do not appear to belong to a rational evaluation policy. 
Instead, it seems that there have been identified some key areas that 
have guided the performance of studies. Some of the studies seem 
repetitive and self-referential. 
According to a Ministry of Health official (MX-3) considering the dynamics of the 
public sector and the model promoted by the Federal Government, ‘It is difficult 
to perform evaluations in the way you’d like.’ This reflects that the current 
model of evaluation is not perceived as entirely appropriate. Other interviewees 
supported this idea by stating that the model ‘does not enable us to perform 
other kinds of evaluations’ (MX-5) and that standardised evaluations ‘are not a 
substitute for other kind of studies’ (MX-10). These reactions about the current 
evaluation model are addressed more carefully in Chapter 6. However, these 
statements are useful for highlighting the lack of flexibility of the evaluation 
policy. 
SICALIDAD was also audited by the SAO in 2011 as part of the revision made to 
the Federal Public Account. This audit comprised ‘the evaluation of the efficacy 
in the accomplishment of objectives and goals, the efficiency in the operation of 
the programme, the economy in the use of resources, the progress toward the 
Performance Evaluation System and the accountability.’791 The most relevant 
conclusions of this study can be summarised as follows: 
 The SAO considers that the programme lacks effective mechanisms and 
indicators to verify the accomplishment of its objective. 
                                                        
791 Supreme Audit Office. 2012. "Health Quality System Performance Audit." Mexico City. 
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 The SAO urges the Ministry of Health to establish mechanisms for the 
promotion of quality. 
 The programme made rational use of the resources given for its 
operation. 
 Most recommendations made by the SAO focused on the development of 
management instruments for improving operation. None of the 
recommendations were directed to core issues of the programme. 
The findings derived from the audit to SICALIDAD are consistent with the 
previous discussion about the limited scope of evaluation. Both internal and 
external mechanisms appear to make a superficial appraisal of the programme 
without addressing core issues of the health-quality policy that could affect 
political stakes. Most of the recommendations made by the SAO to SICALIDAD 
were operational issues that can be easily fixed, i.e. ‘to ensure the development 
of a supervision programme for the accredited institutions.’792 Considering the 
nature of recommendations it is understandable that the SAO reports 99% of 
compliance on its recommendations. However, the impact of both evaluation 
and auditing findings on decision-making is quite limited, as a former deputy 
recognises (MX-23) that these represent ‘no input for the Legislative.’ 
This overview of the case of SICALIDAD will be complemented with the 
description presented in the next section about the operation and evaluation of 
the Health Caravans Programme. This description will allow identifying those 
core elements of these programmes that have been central in the evaluation 
process. This resonates with the theoretical discussions about the control that is 
exercised through evaluation by limiting its scope and influencing the process. 
The description of the second case study from the Mexican context will expose 
in more detail how the Federal Government exercises this influence and the role 
of the external audit body in this scenario. 
  
                                                        
792 Ibid. 
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5.3 Case D: The Health Caravans Programme 
Within the Mexican health policy, the Health Caravans Programme is considered 
a particularly relevant policy instrument due to the objectives that are pursued 
through its implementation. The role of a programme the main purpose of 
which is providing health services to the population living in remote locations 
gains relevance in Mexico, where an important number of people lack effective 
access to health and social-care services.793 The description of this case will 
show some similar features to those observed in SICALIDAD. However, the 
nature of the programme has given it a more visible spot in the public agenda 
that influences the way in which evaluation operates in a more politicised 
context. 
5.3.1 General Overview of the Health Caravans Programme 
The main objective of the Health Caravans Programme is ‘to contribute to the 
improvement of the health conditions of the population without access to health 
services through offering first level attention services in medical mobile 
units.’794 The programme’s operation is based on a series of strategies to guide 
the activities towards the accomplishment of its objective (Figure 5.5). Some of 
its most relevant strategies are: 
1. To increase the health services coverage by planning each one of the 
routes of the caravans; supported by itinerant health squads and by 
mobile medical units. 
2. To establish the legal framework that regulates the operation of the 
programme in the states. 
3. To strengthen the response capacity of the Medical Mobile Units by using 
technology and innovative medical and communications equipment. 
4. To contribute to reducing maternal and child mortality through 
coordinated actions with medical attention and public health instances. 
5. To develop and to link strategies for medical and dental attention, 
prevention, promotion, attention, and disease control of the beneficiaries 
of the programme.795 
                                                        
793 According to CONEVAL, in 2012 the percentage of Mexican population that lack access to 
health services was 21.5. National Council for the Evaluation of the Social Development Policy. 
2014a. "Coneval analyses the access and effective use of health services in population affiliated 
to Seguro Popular at the national level 2012." Mexico City. 
794 "Agreement that issues the operational rules of the Health Caravans Programme for the 2011 
fiscal year." 
795 Ministry of Health. 2011a. "Health Caravans Programme. Specific Action Plan 2007-2012." 
Mexico, City. 
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Figure 5.5 Overview of the Operation of the Health Caravans Programme 
 
Source: Based on 2011 ORP Health Caravans.  
The services provided by the Medical Mobile Units (MMU) are established in a 
catalogue based on the classification of the group of population that they serve, 
e.g. infants and children, and the kind of attention they provide, e.g. 
emergencies. This catalogue establishes a more structured organisation for the 
activities developed by the programme. In addition, the programme has 
established a set of indicators to monitor its main activities, also reported to 
coordination agencies (Table 5.6). 
Table 5.6 Indicators of the Health Caravans Programme 
Name Periodicity 
Percentage of people served by the programme in 
relation to the total population living in isolated 
communities with high levels of marginalisation  
Annual 
Percentage of communities served in relation to 
disperse communities that are difficult to access 
Annual 
Percentage of promotion and prevention services 
carried out in relation to those planned  
Biannual 
Percentage of ambulatory medical services provided in 
relation to those planned 
Biannual 
Percentage of medical mobile units fully equipped and in 
operation that have complete and trained itinerant team 
Quarterly 
Percentage of health staff specifically trained for the 
programme  
Quarterly 
Source: Based on ORP Health Caravans 2012.  
As in the case of SICALIDAD, the use of indicators for monitoring the activities 
oversimplifies the potential effect of the programme. The complexity of the 
problem addressed by Health Caravans (the lack of access to health services) 
requires the use of more sophisticated approaches to evaluate its effects on the 
target population and to determine which changes need to be made for its 
improvement. This complexity is also perceivable in terms of the coordination 
Equipping of 
medical 
mobile units 
and staff's 
training 
Integration 
of the 
existent 
medical 
mobile 
units 
Hiring of 
human 
resources 
Selection 
and 
evaluation 
of 
managerial 
staff 
Accreditati
on of 
mobile 
units 
Actions in 
prevention 
and 
promotion 
of health 
Medical 
attention 
services 
229 
 
level that the programme demands. As an official of the Ministry of Health (MX-
2) states: ‘If the programme requires the intervention of other areas to achieve 
its full potential, you don’t get the results you want because of the coordination 
and participation difficulties.’ The different conceptualisations about how a 
programme is evaluated affect the necessary conditions for fostering the use of 
evaluation findings. The following section more deeply examines the evaluation 
process of the Health Caravans Programme which provides the context for the 
analysis of the hidden politics of evaluation in Chapter 6. As it is possible to 
observe in this case that there is a clear bias of evaluation towards efficiency 
and effectiveness, indicators are underpinned by this rationale and the 
instruments promoted by the Federal Government are directed to generate 
information about these values. 
5.3.2 The Evaluation of the Health Caravans Programme 
The Health Caravans Programme has also been evaluated systematically since 
2007 with different instruments that provide information about its performance 
(see Table 5.7 below). All evaluations have been performed under the scheme 
promoted by the Federal Government and the SAO has only audited the 
programme in the context of the revision of the Federal Public Account in 
certain states of the country. It is important to acknowledge the kind of 
evaluations performed to identify which areas of analysis have been prioritised. 
Most mandatory evaluations have focused on the performance of the 
programme using the standardised frameworks developed by CONEVAL, while 
ad hoc evaluations have analysed more specific issues derived from the 
mandatory studies, such as the coverage of the programme. 
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Table 5.7 Evaluations Performed on the Health Caravans Programme 2007-2012 
                                                        
796 The amount presented here is an estimated in GBP of the cost reported in Mexican pesos by the Ministry of Health. 
Year Evaluation Type Evaluator Budget796 General Description of the Study 
2007 Design Evaluation Demography and Health 
Research, S.C. 
Not 
Available 
It assesses the consistency on the design of the Programme through a 
standardized framework developed by CONEVAL. 
2007 
 
Complementary 
Evaluation 
Metropolitan 
Autonomous University 
£167,000  It was a diagnosis of the access to health services for the target population of 
the Programme. 
2008 Complementary 
Evaluation 
Beta-Korosi, S.C. (Private 
consultant) 
£90,000 It was a study about the coverage and operation of the Programme, as well as 
its articulation with other health programmes, involving both documentary 
analysis and fieldwork. 
2008 Specific 
Performance 
Evaluation 
Demography and Health 
Research, S.C. 
£3,800 It is an annual synthetic review of the performance of the programme in terms 
of a series of management and result indicators, as well as its budget 
performance. It aims to identify key information about the performance of the 
Programme through the analysis of its indicators. It is based on a standardized 
framework developed by CONEVAL. 
2009
-
2010 
Specific 
Performance 
Evaluation 
National Institute of 
Public Health 
£3,100  
2010
-
2011 
Specific 
Performance 
Evaluation 
Dr. Antonio Carlos Martín 
del Campo Rodríguez 
(Independent consultant) 
£3,000  
2009 Complementary 
Evaluation 
Meritorious Autonomous 
University of Puebla  
£171,000  It was a study focused on the results obtained by the Programme in issues like 
coverage and operation, involving both documentary analysis and fieldwork. 
2010 Complementary 
Evaluation 
National Autonomous 
University of Mexico 
£139,000  It was a cross-sectional study that compared people in the programme to other 
people in similar conditions that don’t have access to it. 
2011 Complementary 
Evaluation 
National Autonomous 
University of Mexico 
£255,000  It assessed the coverage of the Programme in locations with very low HDI, it 
also measured user’s satisfaction and improvement in the conditions of the 
target population.  
2012 Complementary 
Evaluation 
National Autonomous 
University of Mexico 
Not 
available 
It was a meta-evaluation that comprises the reports delivered during 2007-
2011. 
2011
-
2012 
Consistency and 
Results Evaluation 
Dr. Nelly Aguilera 
(Independent 
Consultant) 
£15,000  It is a desk-based study that aims to analyse if programmes have the necessary 
information for its operation, how it produces new information, and how this 
information is used for the improvement. Based on a standardized framework 
developed by CONEVAL. 
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Table 5.7  Continued 
 
 
Source: Based on data from the Ministry of Health.
Year Evaluation Type Evaluator Budget General Description of the Study 
2012-
2013 
Specific 
Performance 
Evaluation 
National Institute of Public 
Health 
£4,000 The Programme has reached its planned coverage; however, its 
coverage is based on weak definitions and quantifications of the 
population. The lack of a list of beneficiaries makes difficult the 
identification of the distribution of the attention given to the 
population. It is necessary to generate more evidence that allows 
identifying the real access to the services offered. 
2013 Complementary 
Evaluation  
Intercultural University of 
the State of Mexico 
£421,000 The study assesses the effects of the Programme in indigenous 
locations with high and very high levels of marginalization. 
232 
 
These evaluations (mostly desk-based studies) represent the expenditure of 
approximately £1,271,900.797 These have produced evidence about some areas 
of improvement for the programme, for instance: 
 The coverage of the programme needs to be increased 
 Its performance is adequate. However, there are some operational issues 
that can be improved 
 There is little evidence about the impact of the programme on the target 
population. 
The evaluation of Health Caravans follows the evaluation agenda established 
centrally by the Federal Government. Also the process for the follow-up of 
recommendations is promoted and conducted by this actor. Consistently with 
the case of SICALIDAD, there is a very narrow space for programme operators 
to identify, design, and implement evaluation instruments beyond those already 
established. As a governmental initiative, Health Caravans represents an 
example of a programme based on a highly complex operation that relies on the 
coordination of multiple participants; a complexity that is also transferred to 
the evaluation arena. Taking into consideration the nature and purpose of the 
programme, it appears that the evaluation process undertaken has generated 
little information about the overall effect of the programme in terms of the 
access to health services. Instead, the focus has been on operational elements of 
the programme, which, according to an operator (MX-11) ‘have not been useful 
for generating new information.’ From this perspective, the questionings about 
the model of evaluation show that the interests of stakeholders within the 
Federal Government are not necessarily aligned, and consequently this can 
generate disputes among them. 
This chapter has described the institutional framework for evaluation and audit 
at the national level in Mexico. From this description it is possible to make some 
relevant remarks for the analysis of the Mexican case. Regarding internal 
evaluation, the intricate legal framework generates complexity and ambiguity 
about the competences of coordination agencies. At the same time, the set of 
                                                        
797 This is an estimate based on information available on the Ministry of Health and CONEVAL’s 
websites and it includes the cost of the evaluations performed to the Health Caravans 
Programme for the 2007-2012 period with exemption of the Design Evaluation 2007 and the 
Complementary Evaluation performed in 2012 where there was no information available. 
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rules and institutions involved in evaluation give the Federal Government an 
important amount of power that places other stakeholders, e.g. operators, in a 
disadvantaged position for participating in the evaluation process. 
In relation to auditing, the role of the SAO as the organisation in charge of 
making the Federal Government accountable is weak due to its lack of 
institutional capacities to promote changes in public organisations and to 
sanction the inobservance of the law. Moreover, these two processes coexist but 
do not integrate into a more comprehensive evaluation system that could foster 
the impact of these activities in policymaking. 
This characterisation of the Mexican case becomes relevant in the light of the 
analysis of the hidden politics of evaluation for two main reasons. On the one 
hand, the uneven allocation of power will affect the dynamics that are created 
around evaluation. On the other hand, the influence that a particular 
stakeholder (in this case the Federal Government) can exercise over the process 
will impact the outputs and outcomes of evaluation according to the interests, 
values, and beliefs held by this actor. 
The most relevant feature is the complexity associated with the multiple actors 
involved, the control exercised by the Executive, and the lack of political power 
of the audit body. Consequently, in the Mexican case a fragmented evaluation 
policy is observable, a weak audit procedure and a lack of enforcement capacity 
of the recommendations derived from both instruments. In the specific cases of 
the SICALIDAD and Health Caravans Programmes, the rigidity of the evaluation 
instruments applied allows very little space for a more sophisticated and plural 
discussion about their effectiveness in relation to the problem that originated 
their design and implementation. 
The next chapter dissects the evaluation and audit processes of all four case 
studies described through the lenses of the analytical framework for the 
understanding of the hidden politics of evaluation (see Chapter 2). 
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Chapter 6. A Comparative Analysis 
Previous chapters have described the institutional framework in which 
evaluation and audit processes take place in the UK and Mexico (see Chapters 4 
and 5). The description about the rules and institutions that shape evaluation 
and audit in both countries and the results of semi-structured interviews with 
relevant stakeholders have generated empirical evidence about the hidden 
politics of evaluation. The collection and systematisation of this data would be a 
sterile effort if the researcher were not to go through an analytical process to 
support the hypothesis of this research. This chapter now explores the 
interaction between evaluation and politics and how it is affected by the 
institutional framework. Therefore, its purpose is to identify, compare, and 
contrast the most relevant findings of the documentary and empirical research 
through the use of the thematic framework proposed in Chapter 2. The 
institutional framework is the core variable of the analysis, both for the general 
findings as well as the specificities of each case study (Figure 6.1). 
Figure 6.1 General Outline of the Analysis 
 
The core argument of this chapter is that the institutional framework, i.e. rules, 
coordination mechanisms, power distribution, etc., does play an important role 
in the politicisation of evaluation. The multiple configurations of power and 
resources built around evaluation based on formal and informal arrangements 
impact how this activity interacts with politics. The nuances of this argument 
concern the level of control that can be exercised over the evaluation space and 
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the resources that stakeholders have at their disposal for this purpose. 
The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first analyses the findings 
of the UK case through the evidence derived from the case studies (Cancer 
Strategy and the CQC). The second section replicates this analysis for the 
Mexican case studies (Health-Quality System Programme and Health Caravans 
Programme). The last section compares and contrasts both countries to make 
explicit the linkage between the empirical evidence and the theoretical 
framework. 
6.1 Main Findings of the UK Case 
Different monitoring and evaluation mechanisms have been implemented in the 
UK. In the public sector, there are internalised practices that systematically 
produce information about policy through the application of various methods 
(see Chapter 4, Section 4.1). In terms of monitoring, for example, the UK 
possesses a system controlled by HM Treasury that collects data from 
government departments about the accomplishment of organisational goals 
(indicators). Policy evaluation is underpinned by a different logic. There is 
neither a formal central mechanism to enforce policy evaluation nor a 
standardised process for its performance. Instead departments have guidelines 
at their disposal for evaluating their policies. However, in practice every 
organisation has its own routines and procedures. 
The main strength identified in the UK’s institutional framework is not related 
to evaluation but to auditing, particularly to the work of the NAO. The 
accountability system relies on the role of this body and the follow-up inquiries 
carried out by Select Committees of the House of Commons. Neither the NAO 
nor the Select Committees have faculties to question the merits of public policy. 
They are statutorily prohibited from doing so; ergo, their work is basically 
limited to the analysis of operational issues. This is an important element to 
highlight as the NAO’s role (and therefore PAC’s) is producing and debating 
evidence about policy effectiveness, not questioning the government’s solution 
to a particular problem. The question that arises here is: To what extent is it is 
possible to respect the thin line that stands between what is merely procedural 
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and what is not? 
These three main elements of the UK’s institutional framework can be 
summarised as follows: 
 A performance-monitoring system operated by HM Treasury that generates 
inputs for the budgetary system. However, its actual utilisation has been largely 
questioned (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1.3) 
 A heterogeneous evaluation policy (subject to each department’s procedures) 
whose purpose is generating knowledge for the internal decision-making 
process 
 A strong audit system guided by the values of efficiency, efficacy, and economy 
This brief description of the functioning of the institutional framework for 
policy evaluation in the UK exposes the conditions that shape the behaviour of 
stakeholders and their interaction, e.g. between commissioners and evaluators. 
6.1.1 The Institutional Framework and the Hidden Politics of Evaluation in 
the UK 
The hidden politics of evaluation concerns the establishment of relationships 
between stakeholders and how they use their resources, i.e. information, power, 
money, etc., to defend their interests. The analysis of this phenomenon in the UK 
case is guided by the key political elements involved in evaluation and the 
characteristics identified in the institutional framework (Figure 6.2). 
Figure 6.2 Main Characteristics of the Institutional Framework for Evaluation in 
the UK 
 
 
Lack of 
formalization of 
the evaluation 
policy 
Engagement of 
external 
stakeholders in 
the generation 
and analysis of 
evidence 
Political 
leverage to 
audit work from 
Select 
Committees 
Focus on 
eficiency, 
efficacy and 
effectiveness 
values 
Strong audit 
body 
238 
 
The lack of formal mechanisms of enforcement for evaluation in the UK has 
turned this activity into an instrument for internal decision-making and 
organisational learning. The importance of a formal evaluation policy has been 
explained by Trochim, who underlines the need for explicit criteria to guide the 
development of this activity.798 This absence of formality has developed into an 
uneven construction of evaluation capabilities within central government. The 
DfID, for example, stands out because it has devoted important efforts to the 
establishment of an evaluation policy ‘to determine whether the desired effects 
are being realised.’799 This case is an outlier in the evaluation landscape, as no 
other department has developed an evaluation policy to this degree, not only in 
terms of the use given to evaluation findings but also because of the recognition 
of the ‘progress made and the challenges and opportunities encountered in 
embedding evaluation across the organisation.’800 
These institutional conditions have given policymakers plenty of freedom to use 
evaluation more as an aid for internal decision-making than for the 
legitimisation of public policy. This gives evaluation a modest role in the 
broader context of governance and an unclear effect on policymaking. The 
Institute for Government has recognised this by claiming that the government 
needs to play … 
… a greater role for the centre in overseeing the quality of policy making 
(rather than just skills and capabilities) through the creation of a senior 
Head of Policy Effectiveness, who will also ensure rigorous and 
independent evaluation of government policies, and commission lessons 
learned exercises for major failures of policy process.801 
Nonetheless, this lack of standardisation has an important advantage. Under 
these conditions, central departments are able to evaluate considering their 
particular needs, using the methods identified as most suitable and with the 
periodicity believed as appropriate. However, this produces fragmentation for 
                                                        
798 Trochim, W. M. K. 2009. "Evaluation policy and evaluation practice." New Directions for 
Evaluation 2009(123):13-32. 
799 Department for International Development. 2013. "International Development Evaluation 
Policy." London, UK. P. 3. 
800 UK Aid, and Department for International Development. 2014. "Rapid Review of Embedding 
Evaluation in UK Department for International Development." London, UK. P. i. 
801 Rutter, J., and M. Hallsworth. 2011. "Making Policy Better. Improving Whitehall's core 
business." London, UK: Institute for Government. P. 9. 
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the consolidation of an integral evaluation policy. Outputs are dispersed and do 
not provide a straightforward judgement about the effectiveness of public 
policy.802 
The UK case shows that there is an important production and use of evidence by 
different organisations within and outside the government sphere. To illustrate, 
between 2011 and 2014, the DoH published circa 60 research and analytical 
papers with robust evidence about a wide range of topics related to health 
care.803 Multiple actors were involved in the generation of evidence, i.e. PHE, 
NICE, and NGOs, and they also participated in the inquiries performed by Select 
Committees.804 
The level of influence of each stakeholder is an important variable to consider in 
terms of the hidden politics of evaluation. In the case of NGOs, for example, it is 
possible to observe asymmetries in the level of engagement among these 
organisations. This might be related to the resources at their disposal and their 
lobbying capacity.805 Cancer Research UK, for instance, is one of the most active 
NGOs in health policy. This organisation has provided evidence in numerous 
Select Committee inquiries 806 and it has also promoted Early Day Motions807 in 
Parliament for the discussion of diverse topics related to cancer, e.g. obtaining 
funding from the government.808 This evinces there being channels for 
stakeholders to intervene in the discussion of public issues and to have a more 
                                                        
802 See National Audit Office. 2013a. "Evaluation in government." edited by National Audit Office. 
London, UK. 
803 Some recent examples are the Cancer Survivors Survey: Quality of Life after Diagnosis and 
Treatment and the Study on the Impact of Digital Technology in Health and Social Care, both 
published in 2013. 
804 As the former National Clinical Director for Cancer and End of Life Care recognised ‘the 
guidance that NICE has produced, the peer review programme, all of those collectively have 
helped us to make progress on cancer.’ Committee of Public Accounts. 2011. "Delivering the 
Cancer Reform Strategy." London, UK. PAC Report. Ev. 1. 
805 There are multiple NGOs that are importantly engaged in the discussion of public affairs, for 
instance, Oxfam and Action Aid. 
806 For example: The Clinical Trials Inquiry made by the Science and Technology Committee 
(2013) of the House of Commons and the Tobacco Products Directive inquiry led by the Select 
Committee on the European Union of the House of Lords (2013).  
807 These are ‘are formal motions submitted for debate in the House of Commons.’ Parliament 
UK. "What are Early day motions? ." London, UK. 
808 See: —. 2013. "Early Day Motion 1124 Cancer Research UK." London, UK. 
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active participation in this process.809 
Despite this evidence-based approach, a gap is perceivable between the 
utilisation of the evidence produced and the context in which policy takes 
place.810 As the theory states, a key component of evaluation is issuing a 
judgement about an object, considering previously set criteria. In the absence of 
this element (judgement), evidence becomes part of the information at the 
disposal of stakeholders to strengthen the decision-making process, but it 
cannot be considered as ‘evaluation’ because it has not gone through an 
analytical process by which outcome can be used to determine the value of an 
object. 
The lack of a structured evaluation policy has generated, as the NAO recognises 
(see Chapter 4, Section 4.1.2) heterogeneity in the quality of evaluation and little 
knowledge about the general state of this activity in central government. In 
terms of the institutional framework and its relationship with politics, elements 
like centralisation, distribution of power, and levels of discretion are crucial in 
the discussion. In terms of centralisation, the role of HM Treasury is modest. It 
has developed the guidelines for this activity (The Green Book and The Magenta 
Book), but it does not oversee the application of these instruments. Although 
these guidelines do not establish formal obligations, they do make evident the 
logic behind the use of evaluation in government: 
The Treasury has, for many years, provided guidance to other public sector 
bodies on how proposals should be appraised, before significant funds are 
committed – and how past and present activities should be evaluated.811 
This reveals the connection between the use of evaluation tools and the 
improvement of decision-making for the allocation of resources. On the one 
                                                        
809 For example, in the recent study about dementia was conducted by the Senior Regulatory 
Officer, Integrated Development, Global Health, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and it also 
incorporated the views of different stakeholders, e.g. OECD and World Health Organization, for 
both the conduction and reviewing of the report. Long, R. 2015. "Finding a Path for the Cure for 
Dementia. An independent report into an integrated approach to dementia research.". London, 
UK: Department of Health. 
810 See: Nutley, S., H. Davies, and I. Walter. 2002. "Evidence Based Policy and Practice: Cross 
Sector Lessons From the UK." in Social Policy Research and Evaluation Conference. Wellington, 
New Zealand. 
811 HM Treasury. 2011a. "The Green Book. Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government." 
London, UK. P. v. 
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hand, there is an important concern in having more tools in reserve to make a 
more efficient use of public funds. On the other hand, it reflects the need for 
evidence about policy effectiveness. The allocation of resources is a political 
decision that requires technical support to convince others of the pertinence of 
spending more or less money in a policy area, particularly when there are 
disputes about who gets more funding and who will be affected by budget 
cuts.812 The second element is also political, as it regards the identification of the 
government’s effectiveness and, in consequence, the legitimisation of public 
action (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1). For example, the relevance given to impact 
evaluation can be explained because this tool ‘supports both accountability, by 
verifying whether what was promised was also delivered, and learning, by 
drawing from the experience in order to better design and manage future 
interventions.’813 The recognition of the effectiveness of a particular policy can 
be translated into political backing for a politician or a political party. It shows 
the symbiotic relationship between the rational and political dimensions of 
evaluation as ‘technical expertise and facilitation of knowledge access would be 
complemented by an impact feedback on political decisions.’814 
The most distinctive feature of the UK case, therefore, is the absence of formal 
rules and obligations in evaluation matters. This can be interpreted as a 
mechanism of evasion in terms of accountability. Without formal rules and 
expectations for evaluation, it is difficult to determine to what extent this 
activity is embedded in the public sector and, more importantly, what has been 
the effect of performing evaluations. Also it impedes determining with clarity 
how stakeholders will interact and what is expected from these relationships. 
Adopting a more formal model of evaluation would imply establishing 
responsibilities for the coordination of this activity, e.g. to HM Treasury. This 
was acknowledged by the Institute of Government: 
                                                        
812 For the Comprehensive Spending Review 2015-2016 presented by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, George Osborne MP, there were important cuts in different policy areas and 
substantial increases in some others like the NHS. See: 2013b. "Osborne's spending review – 
winners and losers at a glance " The Guardian. 
813 Scott, A. Ibid."Impact evaluation: which way forward? ." 
814 Steinich, M. 2000. "Monitoring and Evaluating Support to Decentralisation: Challenges and 
Dilemmas." European Centrre for Development Policy Management. P. 7. 
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The Treasury ought to play a key role in incentivising departments to 
commission and use good evaluations – but that it probably played that 
role less than it should, perhaps because Treasury spending teams spent 
more time mediating between competing departmental priorities than 
focusing on the cost effectiveness of what money was spent on.815 
This is also linked to its role in the development and refinement of evaluation 
guidelines. Neither The Magenta nor The Green Book have been recently 
updated. Current editions were published in 2003, with some additions in 2013 
and in 2011, respectively. This leads to reflecting upon: To what extent was 
policy evaluation a core element of the Coalition’s government agenda? At least in 
terms of the establishment or follow-up of formal guidelines, there were not 
substantial efforts during this period. Without a structured guidance for 
evaluation it is not possible to determine whether departments should be 
producing more or less evaluations; if more sophisticated studies should be 
prioritised in contrast to more policy-oriented outputs; or even if the model of 
commissioning evaluations is more pertinent than an in-house approach. This 
ambiguity leaves space for different interpretations about the role of evaluation 
in policymaking and also about the values that policymakers associate with 
evaluation as these ‘influence not only how they make their decisions but also 
the content of those decisions.’816 As a stage of the policy process, evaluation 
should represent a mechanism to identify the effects of an intervention and to 
contrast them with the expected results identified in the design. But as an 
instrument for accountability, evaluation demands a less instrumental 
perspective to discuss the effectiveness of a government and its capacity to 
respond to social demands in a context in which the meaning of effectiveness is 
built on the perceptions of different stakeholders. Consequently, the role of 
evaluation in the UK is unclear. Efforts in this matter are dispersed and 
fragmented and understanding its purpose as a governance tool is not a 
straightforward process. 
In terms of auditing, it is possible to identify two major purposes. The first one 
is to make central government accountable in relation to the VFM that 
                                                        
815 Rutter, J. 2012. "Evidence and Evaluation in Policy Making. A problem of supply or demand?", 
edited by Institute for Government. P. 21. 
816 Peters, B. G. 2001. The Politics of Bureaucracy. London, UK: Routledge. P. 43. 
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departments deliver through their policies. The second concerns the power to 
insert in the public agenda different policy issues relevant to the electorate or 
for groups of interest. This role of leverage played by audit bodies provides a 
more democratic context for questioning the effectiveness of government, 
particularly when civil society is involved.817 The institutional framework sets 
the legal obligation for the NAO to make central government accountable, both 
by scrutinising public accounts as well as through the performance of VFM 
studies. This comprises the support of the PAC to the NAO’s work, giving 
auditing a very important political leverage. 
The UK case offers an interesting example of a context in which the institutional 
framework serves as a mechanism to limit the power of the NAO in the aim of 
preserving independence and objectivity. The work of this body is underpinned 
by three main values: 
Accountability – everything done by those who work in the NAO must be 
able to stand the test of parliamentary scrutiny, public judgements on 
propriety, and professional codes of conduct 
Probity – there should be an absolute standard of honesty and integrity in 
handling NAO work and resources, and 
Objectivity and Impartiality – The C&AG’s independence is secured in 
statute. This underlines the need for us to be objective and impartial in all 
our work, including accurate, fair, and balanced reporting.818 
This is relevant at a discursive level. However, the way in which the legal 
framework sets a basis for the NAO’s operation provides safeguards for the 
independence and objectivity of its judgements. This is how the institutional 
framework can impact the way in which politics operate, when the rules and the 
distribution of power can shape the behaviour of a stakeholder. In the case of 
the NAO, its institutional architecture imposes a safe distance between the NAO 
and the Executive (through PAC’s intermediation). As a member of this 
Committee (UK-12) recognises: 
In our culture and in the standing orders of the House of Commons, the 
Committee of Public Accounts […] must be chaired by a member of the 
opposition, […] the Comptroller Auditor General when appointed is an 
                                                        
817 Malena, C., and M. McNeil. 2010. "Social Accountability in Africa: An Introduction." in 
Demanding Good Governance: Lessons from Social Accountability Initiatives in Africa, edited by C. 
Malena and M. McNeil. Washington, D.C., US: The World Bank. 
818 National Audit Office. "Quality and Independence." London, UK. 
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independent officer of the House of Commons and then the budget […] 
comes from Parliament, that’s again a very important safeguard, so we 
have a separate body called the Public Accounts Commission, […] the job of 
which is to listen to the NAO’s bid for a budget and then approve it, and 
then sign it off, we give the information to Treasury, they write the cheque 
but they write the cheque of the size that we say, they have no say over the 
budget of the NAO, again that provides an extra distance and extra 
institutional independence ... 
These institutional safeguards endow a more independent space for the NAO to 
scrutinise governmental bodies, while at the same time constrain it from 
exceeding its functions through the surveillance of the PAC. Although this 
Committee does not follow up all NAO reports to the same extent, it does 
systematically monitor its activity, giving more legitimacy to its work. This leads 
to another important element of analysis in relation to politics. The reports 
delivered by the NAO and followed up by the PAC might reflect those policy 
areas considered more relevant for MPs. For instance, during 2014 the NAO 
published 70 major reports, and nearly 47% were followed up by the PAC.819 
Derived from this, it comes to our attention that health, infrastructure, and 
education are high-priority issues on the Committee’s agenda.820 It is a political 
decision to select and prioritise the evaluation or auditing of a particular policy 
or programme. In the absence of a policy that dictates key elements of the 
process of evaluation, i.e. periodicity, scope, this decision becomes discretional. 
This is consistent with what Weaver and Brockman discuss about the trade-offs 
of different institutional arrangements.821 While the NAO sits distantly from the 
government, it is immersed at the same time in the political logic of the PAC. 
The UK case is also characterised by the existence of mechanisms for the 
participation of both governmental and non-governmental stakeholders in the 
audit process, i.e. VFM studies, or Select Committee inquires. In a sensitive area, 
such as public health, groups of interest and civil society need formal 
mechanisms to participate in policymaking, and yet this does not exempt it from 
                                                        
819 This is an estimate based on the number of reports published by the NAO during 2014 and 
the number of follow-up reports delivered by the PAC during the current Parliament. Sources: 
Committee of Public Accounts. 2015b. "List of Reports from the Committee during the current 
Parliament." London, UK: House of Commons, National Audit Office. "Major Outputs." London, 
UK. 
820 See: Committee of Public Accounts. 2014c. "Publications." London, UK. 
821 Weaver, K. R., and B. A. Rockman. 1993. Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the 
United States and Abroad. Washington, D.C., US: The Brookings Institution. 
245 
 
politics because it might involve a close—sometimes adversarial—relationship 
between the Executive and Parliament. As Gray and Jenkins observe: 
When faced by critical reports from bodies such as the NAO and the 
Audit Commission, the executive in the United Kingdom has 
attempted to narrow the parameters of what it is and should be 
accountable for […] at the centre accountability is often defined 
narrowly, i.e. in a managerial or technical fashion, with the function 
of audit restricted to serve this.822 
The variety of stakeholders involved in these processes generates more 
inclusive conditions as the incorporation of other views contributes—at least 
formally—to reducing the risk of capture and bias in the inquiry. To illustrate, 
the PAC’s inquiry about adult social care in England brought in the oral-session 
witnesses from different sectors whose perspectives were later included in the 
report. NGOs such as the Association of Directors of Adult Social Services, Carers 
UK, and Age UK participated along with DoH and the Department for 
Communities and Local Government Staff.823 This scheme provides at least the 
opportunity for external stakeholders to raise their concerns about a particular 
topic, and to have their views represented by the actor leading the process.824 In 
this case, for example, the Association of Directors of Adult Social Services 
stated that ‘Collaboration is needed across services beyond health and social 
care, within both central and local government’, while Carers UK added that 
‘Changes to housing benefit may mean that when people with disabilities have 
to move house, their caring relationships could suffer as a result.’825 Although it 
is not possible to determine the extent to which the participation of these actors 
effectively influences policymaking, the institutional framework allows two 
major issues: 
 It permits external stakeholders to share their views and to make the PAC 
aware of their concerns. 
                                                        
822 Gray, A. , and B. Jenkins. 1993. "Separate Developments: Budgeting, Auditing, and Evaluation 
in the United Kingdom." in Budgeting, Auditing, and Evaluation. Functions and Integration in 
Seven Governments edited by A. Gray, B. Jenkins, and B. Segsworth. London, UK: Transaction 
Publishers. P. 59. 
823 Committee of Public Accounts. 2014a. "Adult social care in England." London, UK: House of 
Commons. 
824 Mathison, S. 2000. "Deliberation, Evaluation, and Democracy." New Directions for Evaluation 
(85):85-89. 
825 Committee of Public Accounts. 2014a. "Adult social care in England." London, UK: House of 
Commons. P. 11. 
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 The incorporation of these views in the reports provides more leverage for 
stakeholders to pursue their interests. 
Select Committee inquiries are politically relevant because of the effect that 
these might have in the decision-making. For example, Benton and Russell recall 
the case of the Health Committee’s Smoking in Public Places inquiry that 
‘provided crucial political reinforcement for the mounting medical evidence, 
and clearly influenced other MPs’ views.’826 Nonetheless, the participation of 
stakeholders in this process is mostly limited to the provision of evidence which 
is based on formal guidelines established for this purpose.827 There are open 
calls for evidence, when any person interested can easily identify the inquiries 
taking place and submit evidence.828 However, this formality does not 
completely eliminate the spaces of discretion. As a Health Committee staff 
member (UK-2) recognises, this procedure is constrained by the resources 
available in terms of staff and time: 
I’d read the evidence and I take what I think are the important points 
and I put that into our briefings and there’s no, there’s no formal fact 
[…] I wouldn’t have the resource or the time to go away and double-
check all these claims. In no way I can do it; you have to take them at 
face value.  
This suggests that actors who control the inquiry process have the prerogative 
to include or dismiss a particular piece of evidence based on their own criteria. 
This is also affected by the barriers of access. Stakeholders with a more public 
profile and more resources would have more elements to participate and 
defend their interests.829 
                                                        
826 Benton, M., and M. Russell. 2013. "Assessing the Impact of Parliamentary Oversight 
Committees: The Select Committees in the British House of Commons." Parliamentary Affairs 
66(4):772-97. P. 787. 
827 In the case of civil servants, for instance, ‘ministers have emphasised that, when officials 
represent them before Select Committees, they should be as forthcoming and helpful as they can 
in providing information relevant to Committee inquiries.’ Cabinet Office. 2014b. "Giving 
Evidence to Select Committees. Guidance for Civil Servants." P. 3. For members of the public, 
there is also guidance for this process. See: Parliament UK. "Guidance on giving evidence to a 
Select Committee of the House of Commons ". London, UK: House of Commons. 
828 Currently, there are open calls for evidence for inquiries undertaken by the Northern Ireland 
Affairs Committee and the Science and Technology Committee. See: —. "Committee inquiries: 
Open calls for evidence." London, UK: House of Commons. 
829 This can be related to the issue of lobbying as a way of searching mechanisms to influence 
decision (e.g. to get an MP to vote in a certain way), the extent to which individuals or 
organisations can influence depends on multiple factors i.e. resources). According to the UK 
247 
 
This general overview of the hidden politics of evaluation in the UK serves as a 
point of departure for understanding how different relationships of power and 
interchange of resources take place in this context. The following two sections 
focus on the case studies (Cancer Strategy and the CQC) which are dissected 
with the aid of the thematic framework proposed (see Chapter 2). 
6.1.2 The Hidden Politics of Evaluation in the Cancer Strategy 
The description of the Cancer Strategy (see Chapter 4) has shown the 
complexity that characterises public policy when it involves the participation of 
multiple stakeholders, not only in its design and implementation but also in the 
way in which the meaning of success is built. The Cancer Strategy is a policy 
instrument directed to address different purposes. On the one hand, it aims to 
improve the outcomes related to this disease, i.e. improve survival rates or 
reduce emergency admissions; on the other hand, to increase the focus of the 
government’s intervention on the patient’s needs and the quality of the services 
offered. The definition of whether the Cancer Strategy has been successful or 
not depends on the actor evaluating it and the criteria used for this purpose. In 
general terms, the evaluation and auditing of the Cancer Strategy do not provide 
a clear statement about the results obtained by this policy. However, the 
information produced by these processes does give important insights about 
the hidden politics of evaluation. 
The first element to highlight is the evidence-based nature of this case. The 
proliferation of scientific evidence about cancer plays an important role 
supporting decision-making. Cancer is considered a technical subject, but 
simultaneously it represents a highly sensitive policy issue. Its scientific nature 
helps reducing the controversy around decisions taken, as the evidence on 
which it is based is considered legitimate. For example, the target of saving an 
extra 5,000 lives per year represents an important political statement, as 
claimed by the former Secretary of State for Health: 
                                                                                                                                                             
Public Affairs Council (UKPAC) lobbying ‘means, in a professional capacity, attempting to 
influence, or advising those who wish to influence, the UK Government, Parliament, the 
devolved legislatures or administrations, regional or local government or other public bodies on 
any matter within their competence.’ UK Public Affairs Council. 2012. "Lobbying Definition." 
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The coalition government's reforms of health and care services will 
drive improvements in what matters most to patient and their 
families – cancer outcomes, lives saved. That is what we will be 
measuring our success against.830 
The support given to the statement is based on the potential benefits identified 
by the scientific community of implementing a series of actions, i.e. early 
diagnosis. In addition to the political claim of considering cancer a top 
government priority, the scientific support given to these decisions contributes 
to their legitimacy.831 Moreover, the incidence of this disease among the 
population inevitably gives cancer a major spot in the public agenda, which 
cannot be ignored by politicians.832 To illustrate, the recent election promoted 
the debate about cancer and the government’s response.833 Different media, for 
example, reported the flaws of the Coalition Government in this area: 
More than a third of cancer patients are dying within a year of being 
diagnosed in parts of Britain in what campaigners have described as an 
‘inexcusable’ postcode lottery.834 
‘Hidden at Home – the social care needs of people with cancer’ reveals that 
one in 10 (11%) people with cancer in the UK, equivalent to at least 160 
000 people, say they are constantly or often left housebound due to a lack 
of support. At least 100 000 people (7%) are constantly or often unable to 
wash themselves, dress or go to the toilet […] Macmillan is urgently calling 
on the NHS and local authorities to recognise that people with cancer do 
have social care needs and they desperately need more support.835 
Nine in 10 people think that cancer screening is ‘almost always a good idea’ 
despite the fact that screening uptake is lower […] In the lead up to this 
year’s General Election Cancer Research UK is calling on candidates from 
all parties to back measures to improve early diagnosis of cancer […] the 
Government should ensure accurate information is provided on the risks 
and benefits of all cancer screening to help people make informed decisions 
alongside specific efforts to increase the low uptake of bowel screening.836 
                                                        
830 Watt, N. 2011. "New GP cancer tests will save 5,000 lives a year, says Lansley." in The 
Guardian. London, UK. 
831 For example, the rise in the funding for cancer in the UK represents a way to make a 
statement about the relevance given to this issue. See: Cancer Research UK. 2015a. "£14 million 
Government investment to help ‘personalise’ treatment." London, UK. 
832 Boseley, S. "Half of people in Britain born after 1960 will get cancer, study shows " in The 
Guardian. London, UK. 
833 The way in which cancer can be treated as a health policy issue has been studied by different 
scholars. For example: Faguet, G. B. 2008. The war on cancer: An anatomy of failure, a blueprint 
for the future. London, UK: Springer. 
834 Wheeler, C. "EXCLUSIVE: Scandal of postcode lottery costing cancer patients’ lives." in 
Express. London, UK. 
835 McMillan Cancer Support. "Lack of social care causing devastating consequences for 100000s 
of cancer patients." 
836 Cancer Research UK. "Ninety per cent approve of cancer screening but screening uptake is 
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This evinces that cancer is a highly political policy issue which also affects its 
evaluation and auditing.837 The Cancer Strategy is complex in terms of the 
different actors involved in its operation and the narrow scope of its 
assessment, mostly based on the values of efficiency, efficacy, and effectiveness. 
To obtain a fine-grained analysis of the hidden politics of evaluation in this case 
it will be used as the thematic framework developed in Chapter 2 (Figure 6.3). 
Figure 6.3. Overview of the Hidden Politics of Evaluation in the Cancer Strategy
 
In line with the literature, the purpose of the evaluation establishes the premises 
for the whole process and it can predetermine the results.838 In the Cancer 
Strategy, the internal evaluation process (performance report issued by the 
DoH, NHS, and PHE) clearly establishes the purpose and the criteria used for 
evaluating progress. The claim about saving 5,000 lives per year, for example, is 
a highlighted aspect in the report: 
For the first time, we have estimates of how many additional lives may 
have been saved against our ambition of saving an additional 5,000 lives a 
year by 2014/15, to halve the gap between the survival estimates in 
England and those in the best countries in Europe.839 
                                                                                                                                                             
lower." London, UK. 
837 See for example: Estrich, S. 2013. "The Politics of Cancer.", Pym, H. 2015. "Cancer, politics and 
public money - a difficult mix." 
838 Bogenschneider, K., and T. J. Corbett. 2010. Evidence-Based Policymaking: Insights from 
Policy-Minded Researchers and Research-Minded Policymakers. New York, US: Routledge, 
Palumbo, D. J. 1987. The Politics of Program Evaluation. California, US: SAGE. 
839 Department of Health, Public Health England, and NHS England. 2014. "Improving Outcomes: 
Cancer 
Strategy 
Purpose 
Focus on VFM and the identification of quantifiable variables  
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Outputs 
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Evidence-based but highly political policy issue 
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As the stakeholders in charge of verifying progress, the DoH, the NHS, and PHE 
have the prerogative to establish and set the scope of the analysis by focusing on 
those areas of the government’s response to cancer that they consider relevant 
or politically profitable, especially those quantifiable: 
A total of £9 million was allocated to Primary Care Trusts in 2010/11 to 
run local awareness and early diagnosis initiatives, targeting breast, bowel, 
and lung cancers.840 
Over three years, the Cancer Drugs Fund is making £200 million available 
annually to support improved access to cancer drugs.841 
Expenditure on cancer has increased from £3.19 billion in 2003/4 to £5.68 
billion in 2012/13.This represents an increase of £680 million compared to 
2011/12.842 
These examples make it evident that the control over the purpose and the scope 
prioritises the variables to evaluate. The definition of the scope is political 
because … 
… Different parties or entities may have quite different objectives for 
programs or policy changes, and may apply different weights to various 
types of outcomes […] this can lead to the scope of studies being defined to 
address only one perspective, perhaps intentionally.843 
Consequently, the identification of progress in the Cancer Strategy is narrowed 
to those topics selected by the stakeholder in charge. For instance, in the four 
progress reports published so far, the discussion of equality is only slightly 
addressed.844 Instead, this has been a key topic of discussion in the public 
domain.845 
                                                                                                                                                             
A Strategy for Cancer. Fourth Annual Report." London, UK. P. 8. 
840 Department of Health. 2011e. "Improving Outcomes: A Strategy for Cancer. First Annual 
Report." London, UK. P.32. 
841 —. 2012b. "Improving Outcomes: A Strategy for Cancer. Second Annual Report 2012." 
London, UK. P. 58. 
842 Department of Health, Public Health England, and NHS England. 2014. "Improving Outcomes: 
A Strategy for Cancer. Fourth Annual Report." London, UK. P. 14. 
843 Hedrick, T. E. 1988. "The Interaction of Politics and Evaluation." American Journal of 
Evaluation 9(3):5-14. P. 7. 
844 The references to equality in the Cancer Strategy’s reports are mostly limited to the work of 
the National Cancer Equality Initiative (NCEI) ‘to support, inform and champion efforts to 
improve cancer outcomes by reducing inequality and promoting equality.’ Department of 
Health. 2013d. "Improving Outcomes: A Strategy for Cancer. Third Annual Report." London, UK. 
P. 17. 
845 Some media in the UK have reported the existing inequalities in the country in the access to 
cancer treatment and the consequences of this ‘postcode lottery’. See: BBC News. 2014b. "NHS's 
cancer help 'postcode lottery' angers Pembrokeshire nurse." London, UK, Campbell, D. 2014b. 
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The purpose and scope of the NAO study on the Cancer Strategy was the result 
of an internal process focused on VFM. Its aim was ‘to reach a judgement on 
whether value for money has been achieved […] good value for money [is] the 
optimal use of resources to achieve the intended outcomes.’846 This emphasis 
constrained the analysis to the identification of costs and benefits of the 
activities performed under the Cancer Strategy, which refers specifically to 
looking at its … 
… performance in delivering cancer services; on improving information on 
activity, cost and outcomes of cancer services; and how the Department 
intends to deliver cost-effective cancer services in the new NHS.847 
As in an internal evaluation process, the NAO and the PAC control the definition 
of the purpose and scope. In the case of the NAO, this decision relies on the 
C&AG and senior management.848 They have a formal space of discretion to 
decide those policy areas that will be analysed by the NAO.849 The rationale 
behind these decisions is not very clear, but it can respond to multiple factors 
including the political relevance of a policy issue.850 The focus on VFM clearly 
prioritises values like efficiency, economy, and effectiveness. As a MP (UK-12) 
recognises: ‘If you want to save as many lives as possible, wouldn’t it be better if 
you had more accurate and timely information about what’s going on?’ This is a 
political decision because the predomination of these values over others like 
equality or justice sends the message that the ‘success’ of a policy is understood 
as its capacity to use effectively its resources to deliver services, rather than 
perhaps solving or alleviating the problem. Under the light of politics, this 
control over the purpose and scope responds to the interests of stakeholders 
                                                                                                                                                             
"Cancer patients dying early because of postcode lottery " in The Guardian. London, UK. 
846 National Audit Office. "What is a Value for Money Study?". London, UK. 
847 Committee of Public Accounts. 2011. "Delivering the Cancer Reform Strategy." London, UK. P. 
4. 
848 For further reference about the VFM process undertaken by the NAO see White, F. 1999. 
Audit, Accountability and Government. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press. 
849 According to the NAO, in the development of the VFM programme, ‘we take account of 
suggestions from the PAC, but the Comptroller and Auditor General alone decides on what the 
NAO will examine.’ National Audit Office. "Planning the value for money programme." London, 
UK. 
850 The privatisation of the Royal Mail, for example, was subject of an important political debate 
and attention from the media. See: BBC News. 2014a. "Business Secretary Vince Cable defends 
Royal Mail sale." London, UK, National Audit Office. 2014c. "The Privatisation of Royal Mail." 
London, UK: National Audit Office, Post & Parcel. 2014. "NAO says UK lost hundreds of millions 
through Royal Mail IPO." London, UK. 
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who, as Mohan and Sullivan recognise, ‘attempt to get evaluators to report to 
policymakers findings that will cast their programs in a favourable light.’851 
Therefore, since the establishment of its purpose, the stakeholder 
commissioning the evaluation defines what ‘success’ would look like. 
This also affects the implementation of a policy and how outcomes are 
perceived by beneficiaries. The constraints imposed through the purpose and 
scope of a study (to efficiency and efficacy in this case) exclude from the 
discussion variables considered relevant by others. For example, in relation to 
cancer treatment, the Chief Executive of a cancer charity (UK-11) considers that 
better results for patients could be achieved if alternative mechanisms of 
attention would be considered: ‘Personalised medicine should be able to avoid 
amounts of wastage, but the NHS is not designed for that sort of inefficiency.’ 
However, if evaluation and audit instruments do not incorporate other kinds of 
variables, it will not be possible to obtain evidence that might support 
alternative options. This leads to questioning the purpose of evaluation in 
relation to the expected results for the commissioner (NAO, in this case). It 
appears that both the evaluation performed by the DoH and the VFM study by 
the NAO are directed to measure the progress of the operating policy and 
identifying possible courses of action to improve efficiency, but these 
instruments do not inquire about policy alternatives for addressing cancer or 
the pertinence of the current policy—to redesign, continuation, or termination. 
The diversity of actions undertaken within the framework of the Cancer 
Strategy increases the difficulty of the assessment. The DoH provides an annual 
report on the implementation of the strategy and the behaviour of specific 
variables, e.g. mortality, incidence, and survival rates. This is also framed by the 
information that the DoH considers relevant and suitable for reporting progress, 
such as the best and worst performing Trusts from Cancer Patient Experience 
Survey and the analyses made by the NCIN.852 
                                                        
851Mohan, R., and K. Sullivan. 2006. "Managing the Politics of Evaluation to Achieve Impact." New 
Directions for Evaluation 2006(112):7-23. P. 9. 
852 Department of Health, Public Health England, and NHS England. 2014. "Improving Outcomes: 
A Strategy for Cancer. Fourth Annual Report." London, UK. 
253 
 
In synthesis, evaluation processes for the Cancer Strategy are mostly driven by 
two major purposes: the identification of VFM and the monitoring of key 
variables, e.g. mortality and incidence rates that can be associated to its 
operation. However, in both cases, the focus is on the values of efficiency, 
effectiveness, and economy.853 This emphasis on VFM leads to discussing about 
how the meaning of ‘success’ of policy is built. When speaking about a sensitive 
topic like cancer, it appears that the predomination of the VFM approach is 
unable to cover the different areas that should be assessed. Nonetheless, its 
sensitiveness favours its permanency in the scrutiny agenda. As DoH official 
(UK-8) observes: 
Cancer is a very emotional subject, […] every MP would have cancer 
patients in their constituency, there’d be a story, a heart-breaking story of a 
child or a person who’s died of cancer, or somebody in their families, and 
so cancer’s hold to high scrutiny by Parliament, so by the MP, so lots of 
parliamentary questions, lots of the parliamentary letters, lots of debates in 
the House, both houses, Commons and Lords, there’s a high level of 
scrutiny of cancer by Parliament itself. 
The political salience of cancer can also be observed in the attention given by 
the media and external stakeholders, whose perception and interests can be 
divergent as ‘stakeholders frequently disagree on the nature and approach to 
the problem.’854 For instance, the governmental response to cancer can be 
subject to different interpretations and opinions. In the context of this year’s 
election, possible courses of action to treat this disease have been a topic of 
discussion among politicians.855 As a very emotional subject, cancer generates 
public expectations about the way in which the government should respond.856 
The most relevant lesson from this case regarding the purpose of evaluation is 
that the political decisions about which elements are worth analysing constrain 
                                                        
853 The driver for these values within government can be observed in the premises established 
by The Green Book and The Magenta Book (see Section 4.1.2) in which impact assessment 
appears to be a predominant tool in the policymaking process.  
854 Fitzpatrick, J. L. 1989. "The Politics of Evaluation With Privatized Programs: Who Is the 
Audience?" Evaluation Review 13(6):563-78.. P. 564. 
855 See for example: BBC News. 2015. "Cancer care in England has lost momentum, say MPs." 
London, UK, Bostock, N. 2015. "Cancer care slipping under coalition government, MPs warn." 
London, UK. 
856 In the UK media for example it is possible to regularly find stories about people living with 
cancer and the difficulties of this process. See: AFP. 2015. "Oliver Sacks describes learning he 
has terminal cancer: 'My luck has run out' " in The Telegraph. London, UK. 
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it to those variables that are of interest to the stakeholder that controls this 
stage, i.e. the NAO, the DoH. According to Bjørnholt and Larsen, the 
establishment of goals allows politicians to make explicit their political 
priorities.857 However, when looking at the establishment of an evaluation’s 
purpose this could also be a mechanism for politicians to promote the alignment 
of political priorities, goals, and the outputs of an evaluation. This discussion 
finds echo in the relevance given to the institutionalisation of evaluation. In the 
absence of formal rules, the discretion of stakeholders guides the establishment 
of the purpose, taking into account the political salience of this issue in the 
public landscape. 
Resources, i.e. data, staff, or funding, play a very important role in evaluation. As 
Bamberger suggests, its control is strictly linked to the political nature of 
evaluation.858 In the case of cancer, there is a strong dependence on scientific 
evidence generated by all kinds of organisations.859 Perhaps one of the most 
important characteristics of this case is the diversity of stakeholders engaged in 
this policy area willing to pressurise the government into pursuing their 
interests, and that might use evidence for this purpose. As the Chief Executive of 
a cancer charity acknowledges (UK-11), ‘Cancer is a well-funded disease group 
compared to other disease groups, there’s a lot of evidence in the cancer 
registries and there‘s an interest to use that data to make strategies.’ Some other 
interviewees add: ‘On cancer there’s relatively quite strong information’ (UK-4) 
and ‘It’s easier to make evidential statements rather than subjective statements 
which are harder to argue against to evidence-based cases’ (UK-5).  
The objectivity associated with scientific evidence supports stakeholders’ views 
about cancer and represents a valuable resource. For example, arguments that 
promote regulation changes in relation to smoking have been strongly based on 
                                                        
857 Bjørnholt, B., and F. Larsen. 2014. "The politics of performance measurement: ‘Evaluation use 
as mediator for politics’." Evaluation 20(4):400-11. 
858 Bamberger, M. 1991. "The Politics of Policy Evaluation in Developing Countries." Evaluation 
and Program Planning 14(4):325-39. 
859 In the governmental sector for example: NICE, NCIN and the DoH; in the social sector it 
outstands the work of NGOs such as Cancer Research UK and MacMillan Cancer Support; in the 
academic sector there are research centres and universities that systematically develop 
research about cancer, for example, the School of Health and Related Research at The University 
of Sheffield and the UCL Cancer Institute. 
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evidence.860 However, the use and analysis of data can also be subject to politics, 
especially in its control and access, which are key elements for producing 
evidence and for the development of evaluations and audits.861 According to the 
theory, this is an important area of political susceptibility.862 Restraining or 
facilitating access can represent a way to influence the process. This leads to 
questioning the extent to which stakeholders involved in the production of 
cancer data are willing to share this information with others. 
According to a recent PAC inquiry, the reform of the cancer networks did not 
make data access more efficient, as ‘organisations, including cancer charities, 
have experienced delays in getting access to the data needed for research and 
analysis to support improvements in cancer services.’863 The actor that controls 
data864 can limit cooperation with the evaluation process.865 Beyond this, the 
political issue to discuss is that even though there are other stakeholders who 
develop research in this field, they rely on government data for this purpose. As 
the NAO’s report suggests, ‘A number of organisations that we interviewed also 
highlighted that the flow of cancer data around the health system had reduced 
since 2013.’866 Access to data as a resource for evaluation and auditing can 
become a political matter when its control depends on a sole actor who can 
intentionally or unintentionally block, delay, or deny access. 
                                                        
860 As Cancer Research UK states ‘smoking is by far the most important preventable cause of 
cancer in the world […] 64,500 cancers are caused by smoking each year in the UK.’ 
861 Denzin, N. K. 2009. "The elephant in the living room: or extending the conversation about the 
politics of evidence." Qualitative Research 9(2):139-60. 
862 Datta, L. E. 2011. "Politics and Evaluation: More Than Methodology." American Journal of 
Evaluation 32(2):273-94. 
863863 According to Sarah Woolnough, Executive Director of Policy and Information of Cancer 
Research UK, ‘there has been a loss of national and local leadership and infrastructure resource 
as a consequence of the changes. There used to be, for example, a national cancer action team 
that helped Sir Mike deliver the cancer strategy—that was disbanded […] the 28 cancer 
networks that existed have been reduced to 12 strategic clinical networks, and they are not 
cancer specific […] the strategic clinical networks cover a range of disease areas.’ Committee of 
Public Accounts. 2015c. "Oral evidence: Progress in improving cancer services and outcomes." 
London, UK: House of Commons. 
864 This has also been addressed by Bamberger et al. in relation to the relevance of the quality of 
data. For them, ‘project records and other documentary data often suffer from reporting biases 
or poor record-keeping standards…’ Bamberger, M., J. Rugh, and L. Mabry. 2012. Real-World 
Evaluation: Working Under Budget, Time, Data, and Political Constraints. California, US: SAGE. P. 
25. 
865 Weiss, C. H. 1973. "Where Politics and Evaluation Research Meet." American Journal of 
Evaluation 14(1):93-106. 
866 National Audit Office. 2015b. "Progress in improving cancer services and outcomes in 
England." London, UK. P. 21. 
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Specialists available to assess the Cancer Strategy are another resource 
connected to politics. Going back to the idea of a market of knowledge it is clear 
that the use of external evaluators/consultants can provide more legitimacy to 
the evaluation process.867 An official of the NAO (UK-3) recalls that some years 
ago ‘there was a sort of a government drive to make use of consultants whereas 
now it has gone the other way.’ This can be explained mostly because of the 
budget cuts that the public sector faces. According to The Guardian, for example, 
there are ‘70 projects, worth £8.9m over several years, that had been cancelled 
or cut short across four government departments since May last year.’868 
Despite this trend, the role of academics in the development of policy studies is 
still important, particularly in a highly technical area like cancer. This is 
recognised by a DoH official (UK-8): ‘You need academics to produce it with the 
quality standards of academics.’ In this case, the prestige of academics gives 
cancer research more external legitimacy.869 In the UK, there is an important 
range of evaluators, consultants, NGOs, and research centres developing high-
quality cancer research.870 
The hidden politics of evaluation are on the level of discretion in the 
commissioning of evaluations. Although this is based on a public bidding 
process with clear criteria for evaluating the proposals, an evaluator (UK-14) is 
sceptical about ‘whether there is an unconscious bias in the selection […] there 
might be sometimes when the commissioner already has in mind the right 
organisation to do the work but you have to put it out to tender anyway.’ 
Discretion in the commissioning of evaluation was also analysed by the LSE 
GV314 Group871 in terms of the extent to which the UK “government evaluation 
research tends to concentrate on ‘safe’ topics – that is, those less likely to 
                                                        
867 Bogenschneider, K., and T. J. Corbett. 2010. Evidence-Based Policymaking: Insights from 
Policy-Minded Researchers and Research-Minded Policymakers. New York, US: Routledge. 
868 O'Hara, M., and J. Shepherd. 2011. "Government cuts millions from research and evaluation 
budgets " in The Guardian. London, UK. 
869 According to Conley-Tyler, ‘the appearance of impartiality remains a real need among many 
evaluation audiences and remains a strong argument for the use of external evaluators.’ Conley-
Tyler, M. 2005. "A fundamental choice: Internal or external evaluation?" Evaluation Journal of 
Australasia 4(1 & 2):3-11. P. 8. 
870 For example, Cancer Research UK and McMillan Cancer Support. 
871 This group is ‘a final year undergraduate course in the Government Department at LSE.’ 
London School of Economics. 2014. "GV314 Empirical Research in Government." 
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produce results that will embarrass it.”872 According to this research: 
Government does appear in general to play it safe: 31 per cent of 
respondents agreed with the statement that ‘Government is often prepared 
to take risks in commissioning research that might produce results that 
highlight shortcomings in policies and programmes’, while 49 per cent 
disagreed and 20 per cent neither agreed nor disagreed (N = 185).873 
This concerns also the development of evaluation capabilities. Despite there 
being no explicit purpose related to this, the Cancer Strategy shows that the use 
of social research has bloomed in this area, perhaps as a consequence of its 
political relevance—‘It affects older people who vote and have time to write to 
their politicians’ (UK-11)—and its impact on the UK’s economy (£15.8bn.).874 
Funding availability can determine, for example, the scope of a study, the 
consultant to hire, or the methodology to apply. This is explained by a NAO 
officer (UK-3): ‘If we are doing a three-month study methodologies tend to be 
sort of simpler, interviews with stakeholders […] the Department, the various 
organisations, data analysis and probably not a lot else…’ The constraints 
imposed by the resources at disposal play an important role in key decisions 
about the evaluation: 
Since 2010–11 four departments have reduced evaluation resources; four 
have cancelled or curtailed 25 evaluations between May and December 
2010; eleven ongoing evaluations were cancelled before completion, 
reducing spending by more than £3 million; [and] a further 14 evaluations 
were cancelled. 875 
‘We would then need to consider the methodology you’d propose in terms 
[of] how much that would cost, because sometimes short studies are not 
necessarily cheap, sometimes a three-month study can be as expensive as a 
9-month study if the topic is big and would focus on a theme but that 
doesn’t mean it would be cheap…’ (UK-4). 
The allocation of funds for evaluation or auditing can become a mechanism of 
political control.876 As Chaplowe and Engo-Tjéga state, funding and sponsorship 
                                                        
872 The LSE GV314 Group. 2014. "Evaluation under contract: Government pressure and the 
production of policy research." Public Administration 92(1):224-39. P. 228. 
873 Ibid. P. 228. 
874 This is the annual cost of all cancers to the UK economy according to an Oxford University 
study. University of Oxford. 2012. "Cancer costs the UK economy £15.8bn a year." Oxford, UK. 
875 National Audit Office. 2013a. "Evaluation in government." edited by National Audit Office. 
London, UK..  
876 Azzam, T., and B. Levine. 2014. "Negotiating Truth, Beauty, and Justice: A Politically 
Responsive Approach." New Directions for Evaluation 2014(142):57-70. 
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imply multiple challenges for evaluators, including having to make decisions 
about the scope or methodology in relation to the funding available.877 It can 
also imply a compromising relationship with the funder.878 In the case of the 
Cancer Strategy the safeguard is given by the institutional framework that 
clearly norms the public bidding process and the way in which public contracts 
must be allocated.879 
The hidden politics of evaluation in relation to resources can be reduced to the 
establishment of constraints that might impact the outputs of an evaluation. 
Major restrictions in this case can be observed from the fact that the different 
actors involved, i.e. NAO and DoH, have limited resources to perform more 
sophisticated studies or to make a more systematic follow-up of evaluations. 
The continuity of the assessment is restrained not only by the political 
commitment of decision-makers, but also by the resources available and the 
need for prioritising evaluation areas. A member of the PAC (UK-12) realised 
that in terms of following up reports, ‘We are not as good at it, we’re not as 
systematic as we should be.’ Therefore, following up evaluations also depends 
on the political agenda which might be linked to the fear of negative findings. 
For example, the discussion about the Cancer Drugs Fund880 might have 
fostered the interest of the PAC in reviewing the government’s response to 
cancer.881 As discussed, the electoral climate has also brought more attention to 
this disease,882 which can be translated into the negotiation of more resources 
                                                        
877 Chaplowe, S. G., and R. B. Engo-Tjéga. 2007. "Civil Society Organizations and Evaluation: 
Lessons from Africa." Evaluation 13(2):257-74. 
878 Lipsky, D. B., R. L. Seeber, A. C. Avgar, and R. M. Scanza. 2007. "Managing the Politics of 
Evaluation: Lessons from the Evaluation of ADR Programs." Pp. 116-29 in Proceedings of the Fift-
Ninth Annual Meeting of the Labor and Employment Relations Association. 
879 "The Public Contracts Regulations 2015." 
880 The Cancer Drugs Fund ‘is money the Government has set aside to pay for cancer drugs that 
haven’t been approved by NICE and aren’t available within the NHS in England […] the aim of 
the fund is to make it easier for people to get as much treatment as possible.’ Source: Cancer 
Research UK. 2015b. "Cancer Drugs Fund." London, UK. 
881 Even though cancer has been a permanent subject of discussion in the public arena, after the 
NAO’s report in 2011, it was until last year when the strategy was revised again. 
882 For instance, different NGOs in the country have made public manifestos in relation to cancer 
for the general elections of this year. See: Breast Cancer Care. 2015. "The Breast Cancer 
Manifesto 2015. Breast Cancer Care’s ambitions for the next government." London, UK, Target 
Ovarian Cancer. 2014. "General Election 2015 Manifesto." London, UK.  
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for research about cancer.883 
Perhaps it is in the process of evaluation that the influence of politics becomes 
more evident. The institutional framework in the UK promotes the openness of 
assessment processes through the inclusion of external evidence providers. In 
the NAO study and in the PAC’s inquiry, different stakeholders were invited to 
give evidence.884 A member of the Health Committee staff (UK-2) explains this in 
more detail: 
Sometimes we might put terms of reference if there are specific issues we 
want them to comment on […] is announced through a press notice so that 
goes to the press and also to a lot other people on our list, it’s put on our 
website as well. 
Other interviewees agree in recognising that there are conditions for different 
actors to access evaluation processes and to openly put their views on the table 
about a specific policy issue: 
We have a good relationship with a lot of MPs as well because we do work 
with them, so I think we have good opportunity to put forward any 
concerns that we have… (UK-6) 
The Committee did feel it was very helpful to have outside interest giving 
the evidence before we have the official view… (UK-7) 
The formal processes established for the participation of stakeholders suggest 
that the institutional framework operating in the UK favours a more inclusive 
approach. Considering the value given by the literature to this issue,885 its 
political relevance demands acknowledging ‘who key policy players are, their 
historical roles in framing policy debates, their current policy objectives, and 
the consequences of these policy players’ influence on evaluation practice.’886 
The process allows participation, but this does not mean it is exempt from 
political influence. Cancer represents a policy area with high levels of 
                                                        
883 Balthasar, A. 2009. "Institutional Design and Utilization of Evaluation: A Contribution to a 
Theory of Evaluation Influence Based on Swiss Experience." Evaluation Review 33(3):226-56. 
884 The most recent PAC’s inquiry included a range of governmental (i.e. NICE, NHS England) and 
non-governmental witnesses (i.e. Cancer Research UK and McMillan Cancer Support). 
885 See for example the work of Green regarding this point. Greene, J. C. 1997. "Evaluation as 
Advocacy." American Journal of Evaluation 18(1):25-35, —. 2001. "Dialogue in Evaluation: A 
Relational Perspective." Evaluation 7(2):181-87. 
886 Rutkowski, D., and J. Sparks. 2014. "The new scalar politics of evaluation: An emerging 
governance role for evaluation." Ibid.20(4):492-508. P. 504. 
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engagement. There are channels to take part in evaluation and audit processes. 
Nonetheless, there may be asymmetries between stakeholders. Larger 
organisations, i.e. CRUK, will have more resources for influencing the policy 
process than smaller ones.887 Moreover, there are asymmetries of power and 
influence among different types of cancer groups. Regarding this, the Chief 
Executive of a cancer charity states (UK-11): ‘I think Cancer Research UK 
should be more of a NGO and not a competitive charity […] but it has all the 
benefits of the NGO, so they have very strong access into government.’ Through 
the lenses of the hidden politics of evaluation these asymmetries indicate that 
in addition to the initial allocation of resources of each stakeholder, there are 
political factors that favour or limit their participation such as the interest of 
politicians on a particular disease group.888 This can be considered a bilateral 
relationship; politicians give more attention to a disease group because it 
affects a wider proportion of their electorate, and vice versa.889 
Breast cancer, for instance, receives a great amount of attention from the 
government, and important efforts for the production of knowledge have been 
made in this particular disease group.890 MPs from different parties have 
advocated breast cancer, giving it more notoriety than other disease groups,891 
generating reactions from other groups: 
There is an understandable but very frustrating bias towards the big 
cancers, so if you’ve got breast cancer there are many more different 
strategies and options available for you than if you get ovarian cancer, 
                                                        
 887 In terms of funding, CRUK reported having £490 million to carry out their activities, in 
contrast to, for example, Ovarian Cancer Action that reported in 2013 an income of £2.3 million. 
Sources: Cancer Research UK. 2014b. "Every Moment Counts. Our Annual Review 2013/14.". 
London, UK: Cancer Research UK, Ovarian Cancer Action. 2013. "Annual Report and Audited 
Accounts for the Year Ending 31st March." London, UK: Ovarian Cancer Action. 
888 Conservative and labour MPs, especially women, have made public their support to wide-
known movements in favour of breast cancer victims, e. g. Pink October.. See: Mactaggart, F. MP. 
2014. "Slough MP ‘Wears it Pink’ for Breast Cancer Awareness.", McKinnell, C., MP,. "Catherine 
goes pink for breast cancer awareness." 
889 Statistics show that breast cancer is the most common type of cancer in the UK. Source: 
Breast Cancer Care. "Facts and statistics." 
890 For example, the NICE Guidance on Cancer Services focuses on breast cancer; the DoH has 
also developed guidance for ‘improving breast cancer clinical care’ and the NCIN has piloted 
studies in relation to this type of cancer. In contrast to other disease groups, breast cancer has 
been a core element of the government policy. See: National Cancer Intelligence Network. 2012. 
"Recurrent and Metastatic Breast Cancer Data Collection Project. Pilot Report.". 
891 See: Moody, J. 2015. "Breast screening unit is now back where it belongs in Uttoxeter." in 
Uttoxeter Adviser. 
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pancreatic cancer and I think that it’s understandably complex for the 
health strategy to keep pace with cancer discovery. … (UK-11) 
Access and capacity of influence are linked to the resources and power of 
organisations and individuals. It is natural to observe that certain organisations 
become recurrent evidence providers and it is left to the discretion of the people 
in charge of the inquiry to incorporate or dismiss that evidence. For example, 
comparing the witnesses that took part in the most recent NAO study with the 
PAC’s inquiry it is possible to identify that some evidence providers were 
dismissed in the latter and did not take part in the oral session.892 There is an 
internal area of discretion in the selection and prioritisation of evidence: 
Mostly we receive evidence from the people and the organisations we 
always expect to receive evidence from, and we know what position they 
are coming from and what they are arguing in favour … so we sort of know 
they are going to say that and so we can take that into account when we 
look at their views (UK-2). 
It’s a judgement call to sort of how far down different groups you go, you 
have to decide who you think is important to talk to, whether you cover an 
issue or whether they sort add value that you need to speak to them 
because who haven’t spoken to anybody who might have a view on that 
type of issue (UK-3). 
Another important issue regards the relationship between stakeholders, which 
relates back to the idea of democratisation of evaluation.893 According to 
Karlsson, this ‘could be seen as an attempt to break the dominance of the one-
sided commissioners’ and contents of the evaluation power in favour of the 
aims and contents of the evaluation.’894 The relationship between evaluated 
bodies and evaluators, for example, is an interesting element of analysis. In the 
case of the Cancer Strategy, this refers to the relationship between the DoH (as 
the implementation agency) and the NAO and PAC. In terms of the cooperation 
in the provision of information for the NAO’s studies, some interviewees 
explain: 
Most of the time it’s absolutely fine, I mean, under statutory law they’re 
obliged to provide us with anything that we request […] some 
                                                        
892 Among them Breast Cancer Campaign and the King’s Fund. 
893 Hanberger, A. 2006. "Evaluation of and for Democracy." Evaluation 12(1):17-37. 
894 Karlsson, O. 1996. "A Critical Dialogue in Evaluation: How Can the Interaction between 
Evaluation and Politics be Tackled?" Ibid.2(4):405-16. P. 405. 
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organisations are quicker than others at providing information, most of the 
time the relationship is fine, yet sometimes it can get particularly slow, so 
you might have to push it up the line so that somebody higher up in their 
organisation is informed that we are not getting the information that we 
require, but we do always get the information that we need (UK-3). 
The NAO gets support from the PAC because when the PAC get a lot of 
publicity, which they do, it means that the NAO can go in, and they can go 
into the departments and they can increase the pressure on the 
departments to give them the information they need (UK-7). 
A DoH official (UK-8) adds: 
When the NAO produces a report we help them creating terms of reference 
[…] ‘so they’re not barking up the wrong tree’, […] so we help them making 
as useful as possible, they produce the evidence largely and gather the 
evidence.  
This raises questions about the pertinence of keeping some distance between 
evaluators and evaluated bodies and how this affects independence and 
objectivity. According to Lonsdale’s experience at the NAO: 
There appear to have been increased informal discussions about study 
topics between the NAO and senior officials within audit bodies […] 
Increased efforts have also been made to be responsive to departmental 
views on the methods (their appropriateness, for example), the timing of 
work (from specific visits to the study as a whole) and the consultants used 
(to avoid conflicts of interest and ensure their credibility with those under 
examination).895 
The recognition of this ‘closeness’ gives important insight into the hidden 
politics of evaluation.896 In the Cancer Strategy, for example, the fact that the 
DoH participates in the definition of the Terms of Reference (ToR) that will 
guide the evaluation might interfere with the objectiveness and independence 
of the inquiry. It may not be a deliberate attempt to interfere in the NAO’s work; 
however, it can become a mechanism to influence the scope, purpose, and 
outputs of a study. This brings back House’s ideas about the appropriate 
distance that must be kept between stakeholders.897 On the one hand, a more 
                                                        
895 Lonsdale, J. 2008. "Balancing Independence and Responsiveness: A Practitioner Perspective 
on the Relationships Shaping Performance Audit." Ibid.14(2):227-48. P. 235. 
896 Lipsky, D. B., R. L. Seeber, A. C. Avgar, and R. M. Scanza. 2007. "Managing the Politics of 
Evaluation: Lessons from the Evaluation of ADR Programs." Pp. 116-29 in Proceedings of the Fift-
Ninth Annual Meeting of the Labor and Employment Relations Association. 
897 House, E. R. 2008. "Blowback: Consequences of Evaluation for Evaluation." American Journal 
of Evaluation 29(4):416-26. 
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operational perspective on the inquiry might provide guidance about specific 
and technical issues.898 On the other hand, too much closeness between actors 
can lead to a biased judgement.899 
The political implication to debate here is the degree of influence that 
government departments have in the outputs of a study. Specifically in the case 
of VFM studies (see Section 4.1.3), this can be perceived at the ‘clearance’ stage 
in which the NAO sends report drafts to government departments ‘to check that 
they’re happy with the factual accuracy’ (UK-3).900 A DoH official explains (UK-
8): ‘We see drafts, we have the right to comment on drafts, I don’t think we have 
the right to change.’ However, it seems interesting that during the interviews 
the idea of reports based on ‘agreed evidence’ was recurrent. This means that 
the data used for the studies is derived from a process in which both the auditor 
and the audited body work collaboratively to build the evidence. This can lead 
to political struggles in which the final outcome will be driven by the interests of 
the stakeholder who exercised its power more strongly. Regarding this Sharma 
observes that: 
‘Clearance’ is a convention whereby the facts and presentation of VFM 
reports are ‘agreed’ with Accounting Officers before publication (NAO, 
2003a). The formal process involves two key stages of clearance, between 
the audit team and the Principal Finance Officer and the main 
representatives of the Agency under audit.901 
It was denied by interviewees that the outputs of a study can be manipulated 
during ‘clearance’. Still, when speaking of a possible negotiation between the 
NAO and government departments, an interviewee (UK-3) explains: 
                                                        
898 The work of Owen et al. about the evaluation of the Early Excellence Initiative provides an 
interesting discussion about the interaction between stakeholders in the process of evaluation, 
including practitioners. Owen, J., T. Cook, and E. Jones. 2005. "Evaluating the Early Excellence 
Initiative: The Relationship between Evaluation, Performance Management and Practitioner 
Participation." Evaluation 11(3):331-49. 
899 See: House, E. R. 1997. "Evaluation in the Government Marketplace." American Journal of 
Evaluation 18(1):37-48. 
900 The clearance stage found in the NAO’s VFM process has been questioned by different 
scholars in the audit field. See: Gray, A. , and B. Jenkins. 1993. "Separate Developments: 
Budgeting, Auditing, and Evaluation in the United Kingdom." in Budgeting, Auditing, and 
Evaluation. Functions and Integration in Seven Governments edited by A. Gray, B. Jenkins, and B. 
Segsworth. London, UK: Transaction Publishers, Sharma, N. 2007. "Interactions and 
Interrogations: Negotiating and Performing Value for Money Reports." Financial Accountability 
& Management 23(3):289-311.  
.901 —. 2007. "Interactions and Interrogations: Negotiating and Performing Value for Money 
Reports." Financial Accountability & Management 23(3):289-311. P. 298. 
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I think negotiation is possibly not the right word […] in some ways it is the 
right the word, I mean they’d put forward arguments if they really don’t 
want a study to be done at a certain time, but as I said, it’s very rare, I mean, 
the most that would normally happen is that the study would get put back. 
At least informally, there are spaces of discretion in which political power can 
be exercised, particularly in those cases where actors hold an important amount 
of power, i.e. C&AG: 
At the end of the day it is the C&AG’s decision if he wants to do a study and 
even if there are objections, he might say this issue is too important we 
need to do a study now and he would drive that through …(UK-3). 
A final remark concerns the evolution of the relationship between the NAO and 
the PAC. As the NAO represents a technical body that feeds into the 
accountability processes undertaken by the PAC, it would appear that the 
interests of these two institutions might be aligned, but according to a PAC’s 
former clerk (UK-7): 
The relationship has changed in the last four years, in previous times the 
NAO would put forward a draft report to the PAC and they would always 
accept it, almost always accept it except for one or two words, now there’s 
often a process of discussion in the Committee about whether the wording 
of the report is right and this occasionally take a party political tension. 
This statement reveals political discrepancies between them showing that 
conciliating interests does not occur de facto. The strength of the PAC in the 
House of Commons inevitably can generate political disputes. As a member of 
this Committee (UK-12) explains: ‘Our committee works completely differently, 
instead of doing [like] most committees would do sort of 7, 8, to 10 reports a 
year, maybe we do 50, or 60.’ This amount of inquiries covering a wide range of 
policy areas would lead to the confrontation of different views, not only 
between the PAC and the government, but also with the NAO and other 
stakeholders. The discussions about the Cancer Drugs Fund and the 
performance of NICE in this area illustrate the kind of disagreements that can 
arise.902 In this case, for instance, CRUK believes … 
                                                        
902 NICE plays a key role in relation to the assessment of those drugs that should be funded by 
government and this year is taking place a very active debate in relation to the VFM of the CDF 
According to Professor Karl Claxton, of York University: ‘Last year the Cancer Drugs Fund spent 
£280m on medicines […] that money did some good but it would have done a lot more if it had 
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… that NICE should be reformed to ensure sufficient flexibility in the 
assessment of cancer drugs so that a separate Fund would no longer be 
considered necessary […] proposals to reform NICE (Value Based 
Assessment) were put forward but rejected by stakeholders in 2014 as 
they were unlikely to significantly change NICE’s approach to assessing 
new drugs, and may have disadvantaged some patient groups.903 
The government defended its position by stating that: 
The decisions on the cancer drugs fund were not just to look at what drugs 
may not be supported, but also to be mindful that there are newer and 
better drugs available to us as a result of the challenge that we gave the 
pharmaceutical industry to provide more personalised drugs for different 
clinical indications […] our objective is to be able to get the best drugs for 
the best value for money in the cancer drugs fund.904 
These debates are useful for identifying more clearly the role of politics in 
evaluation and auditing. Despite the evidence at disposal and the criteria used 
for the evaluation, discussions also emerge from the discrepancies between the 
values of stakeholders. While for the government a better allocation of funds is 
considered a priority, disease groups consider that this approach does not 
capture the weight of other important variables, i.e. justice, equity. Stakeholders 
give different weights to evidence for building their arguments, prioritising 
those elements that support their positions. The Cancer Drugs Fund is a very 
clear example of how politics can overtake evidence. Technically, there is little 
to argue against the fact that this fund is inefficient, and yet despite the 
evidence, the discussion becomes political in terms of which values and 
interests should predominate: efficiency or equity?905 It also puts the light on 
                                                                                                                                                             
been spent elsewhere in the National Health Service.’ McKie, R. 2015. "David Cameron’s flagship 
Cancer Drugs Fund ‘is a waste of NHS cash’ " in The Guardian. London, UK. 
While the government aims to cut back funding for this purpose; other stakeholders argue that 
this could represent a serious problem in terms of equality for lots of patients in the country.( 
“Mark Flannagan, chief executive of Beating Bowel Cancer, said two-thirds of patients with 
advanced bowel cancer ‘face the probability of an earlier death’ by being refused the treatments 
[…] ‘Doctors will be forced to tell their patients there are treatments that can prolong their lives 
but will no longer be available’, he said.” Cooper, C. 2015. "Cancer Drugs Fund: Life-extending 
drugs to be denied to NHS patients in England as fund overspends " in The Independent. London, 
UK. 
903Cancer Research UK. 2015f. "Written evidence from Cancer Research UK." London, UK. 
904 Statement made by Sean Duffy, National Clinical Director for Cancer, during the oral evidence 
session held by the PAC on the 21st January 2015. See: Committee of Public Accounts. 2015c. 
"Oral evidence: Progress in improving cancer services and outcomes." London, UK: House of 
Commons. 
905Appleby, J. 2014. "The Cancer Drugs Fund: inequitable and inefficient?". London, UK: The 
King's Fund  
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the agenda of other stakeholders, e.g. pharmaceuticals,906 which relates to one 
of the most relevant criticisms about the policymaking response to cancer. Most 
of the efforts have focused on treatment rather than on prevention: 
Researchers and their sponsors focused their efforts, and clinicians and 
their patients centered their hope more on the eradication of advances 
cancer than on its prevention or detection in surgically curable early 
stages.907 
This suggests that cancer, both as a government policy and as a business area, 
represents important interests for stakeholders such as pharmaceuticals and 
medical infrastructure enterprises.908 Despite the political confrontation about 
the government’s response to cancer, the point to highlight here is that this has 
neither affected the credibility of evaluation nor the evidence produced about 
cancer. There is a debate based on different perspectives about how this disease 
should be addressed, but this does not affect the legitimacy of evaluation. 
Outputs are another variable in which politics manifests through the use and 
dissemination of findings. The results from an evaluation process can have 
different uses, most of them already defined at the planning stage.909 The Cancer 
Strategy case shows that the work of the DoH in terms of evaluation is more 
related to knowledge generation than to setting a judgement about this 
policy.910 Outputs of this process appear to be used internally for decision-
making.911 
                                                        
906 See: Pharmaphorum. 2015. "Pharma 'shocked' as drugs cut from Cancer Drugs Fund."  
907 Faguet, G. B. 2008. The war on cancer: An anatomy of failure, a blueprint for the future. 
London, UK: Springer. P. 146. 
908 In addition, there has been research about the lack of profit of prevention efforts and the 
predominance of the interests of the health industry. See: Read, C. 1995. Preventing breast 
cancer: The politics of an epidemic. London, UK: Pandora. 
909 Bogenschneider, K., and T. J. Corbett. 2010. Evidence-Based Policymaking: Insights from 
Policy-Minded Researchers and Research-Minded Policymakers. New York, US: Routledge. 
910 As it was discussed before in this Chapter, the label of ‘strategy’ is a tool to integrate a series 
of activities and processes carried out by the government in the attention of the cancer problem, 
this considerably increases the complexity of evaluation because it is difficult to assess it as an 
integrated unit, instead, assessment processes have attempted to analyse and understand 
different initiatives related to this disease. 
911 For example, the implementation of standardised tobacco packaging was a decision taken 
based on different studies performed and commissioned by the DoH. Chantler, C. 2014. 
"Standardised packaging of tobacco." London, UK: King's College London, Department of Health, 
Public Health England, and NHS England. 2014. "Improving Outcomes: A Strategy for Cancer. 
Fourth Annual Report." London, UK. 
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External audit processes have a different use. These reports serve as a basis for 
inquiries in which those responsible for the operation of the strategy attend oral 
hearings at the House of Commons to debate the findings912 and where the 
government responds to PAC’s recommendations.913 Saunders clearly identifies 
the political nature of evaluation outputs: 
The organizational environment into which an evaluation output might be 
intervening and the design of the evaluation output itself […] interact to 
determine the extent to which an evaluation output or an evaluation 
process can create effects (i.e. change practices).914 
Considering this, the context in which the NAO operates provide more leverage 
to audits than to evaluation, i.e. follow-up by the PAC. Nonetheless, the use of 
the findings is left at the discretion of stakeholders. An interesting finding about 
the Cancer Strategy case concerns the response of the DoH at the potential 
publication of the NAO’s report: 
It was kind of [a] coincidence that as we’ve only started the fieldwork, 
shortly afterwards the Department decided to refresh the second strategy, 
so they published the strategy roughly about a month after our report, so 
lots of dialogue with commissioners in the field-work already fed into their 
new strategy (UK-4). 
The government was aware of the possible areas of improvement to be reported 
by the NAO and they anticipated the reform of the strategy by incorporating 
several of the observations made in the study. This reflects that the evaluation 
made by the DoH and the audits performed by the NAO serve different 
purposes. On the one hand, the lack of formal mechanisms to foster the use of 
evaluation outputs confines them mostly to support decision-making within the 
DoH.915 On the other hand, the close linkage between the NAO and the PAC 
                                                        
912 The former National Cancer Director, Sir Mike Richards, attended an oral hearing with the 
PAC at the House of Commons, Mr David Flory, Deputy Chief Executive and Director General 
Finance and Christine Connelly, Chief Information Officer, from the Department of Health also 
participated in the session. Source: Oral Evidence Taken before the Committee of Public 
Accounts on Tuesday 7 December 2010. 
913 HM Treasury. 2012a. "Treasury Minutes. Progress on implementing recommendations from 
28 Committee of Public Accounts reports (Session 2010-12) and 5 National Audit Office 
reports." London, UK. 
914 Saunders, M. 2012. "The use and usability of evaluation outputs: A social practice approach." 
Evaluation 18(4):421-36. P. 428. 
915 According to several interviewees, government departments are not obliged to follow 
recommendations, however, they are expected to respond to a Select Committee Report within 
eight weeks from the publication. In the case of the Cancer Strategy, the government through the 
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allows audit work to comply its accountability function in relation to how 
money is spent. 
In terms of dissemination, there is no formal mechanism to enforce government 
departments to make evaluation reports public. This affects the process at 
different levels. The first one regards transparency, about which areas are being 
evaluated; for what reasons and by whom.916 The second concerns the way in 
which evaluation findings are made public. According to the theory, ‘political 
entities may disseminate or use evaluation results selectively.’917 With no 
formal guidelines to enforce dissemination this becomes another area of 
discretion for stakeholders, especially commissioners. These pressures can be 
considered political because of the potential harm to the interests of 
stakeholders and the decisions they made for disseminating findings. A cancer 
researcher (UK-5) emphasises that there is no intentional lack of transparency, 
although he recognises that when it is a sensitive topic … 
… there are a lot of pressures to, I suppose, not make waves in a sense, but 
that’s usually a case of publishing the data quietly rather than putting it in a 
big press release, making a big splash of it. 
A policy think tank member (UK-18) adds that occasionally departments release 
evaluation reports on dates when they are not very likely to get attention, e.g. 
holidays.918 As evaluation serves legitimisation purposes, evidence can be used 
to argue in favour or against a policy. It ‘has become a tool for control and 
measuring to answer if the performances can show quality and efficiency and to 
legitimize the political decisions and priorities.’919 Despite cancer being an 
evidence-based policy, a DoH official (UK-8) recognises that: 
                                                                                                                                                             
Treasury Minutes reported in 2012 the progress on the implementation of recommendations 
made by the PAC. Committee of Public Accounts. 2013a. "Select Committees. Government 
Responses." London, UK. 
916 As the NAO observed: ‘It is difficult to establish the coverage of evaluation evidence, but it 
does not appear to be comprehensive.’ National Audit Office. 2013a. "Evaluation in 
government." edited by National Audit Office. London, UK. P. 7. 
917 Hedrick, T. E. 1988. "The Interaction of Politics and Evaluation." American Journal of 
Evaluation 9(3):5-14. P. 8. 
918 An interesting example of this was the release of the report Applying Behavioural Insights to 
Organ Donation: preliminary results from a randomised controlled trial, published by the DoH 
last year on Christmas Eve.  
919 Karlsson, O. 2003. "Evaluation Politics in Europe: Trends and Tendencies." Studies in 
Educational Policy and Educational Philosophy. P. 1. 
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The strategy is essentially political, it’s decided by government ministers, 
so the government of the day is the strategy, so when’s the election next 
May the government changes or may not change, that would be the lead 
before the strategy (UK-8). 
The elections have fostered the engagement of politicians—especially from the 
opposition—in the debate about the performance of the Coalition Government. 
In the context of the PAC’s report on cancer, a Labour MP expressed: 
This report makes devastating reading for David Cameron and is damning 
proof of his mismanagement of the NHS. Under the Tories, cancer care has 
gone backwards and patients are missing out on the treatment they 
need.920 
This statement reflects a clear political use of evaluation/audit outputs. The use 
of evidence considered legitimate to emphasise negative findings is an attempt 
to politically discredit the party in office and to make explicit political promises 
in this area.921 In line with this, a DoH official (UK-8) explains: 
We will find out when the political parties produce their manifestos they 
may well say something on cancer, then we’d have to start planning for 
that, as a department of state you plan for all eventualities, so if there’s 
something on the manifesto of the Labour Party or the Conservative Party 
or even the Democratic Party, we have to make sure that what they’re 
saying, if they get into power, how would we do that, all the preferences go 
prior general election. 
Healthcare is a constant topic in the manifestos of political parties. For the 
recent election, for instance, major parties made explicit their intended actions 
in this area. The Labour Party ‘will make sure the NHS is focused not on 
competition but on collaboration, so that the system is properly integrated to 
work in the interests of patients,922 while the Liberal Democrats will ‘invest in 
research and set ambitious goals to improve outcomes for the most serious life-
threatening diseases like cancer.’923 The use of evaluation outputs as political 
ammunition to discredit the work of the current government and to promote a 
partisan agenda is a common practice (especially during electoral times) and it 
                                                        
920 Labour Press. 2015. "Response to PAC report on deteriorating cancer services." 
921 For example: Brady, E. 2014. "Labour Pledges One-Week Cancer Diagnosis." London, UK: Sky 
News. 
922 Labour Party. 2014. "Patients before profits." 
923 Liberal Democrat Party. 2014. "Liberal Democrat Pre-Manifesto 2014." 
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also draws more attention to evaluation and audit reports.924 
The last variables to examine are the outcomes of evaluation. The long-term 
effects of assessment processes in policymaking are very difficult to observe and 
this has been one of the most relevant areas of concern in the evaluation studies 
field.925 It becomes really complex to establish causal relationships between 
changes in a particular policy and the findings of an evaluation, particularly in 
those areas that involve variables that cannot be quantified. As Selameab and 
Stuart state: ‘Social outcomes […] do not always lend themselves to expression 
in monetary terms.’926 
In the case of a multifactorial problem like cancer it is almost impossible to 
isolate the net contribution of evaluation to its improvement. Positive cancer 
outcomes can be explained by numerous reasons, i.e. changes in lifestyle, 
medical history, not only as the result of government’s intervention. As a 
researcher recognises (UK-5), ‘There’s no counterfactual, so if you succeed or if 
you fail was that because of the strategy or was that because of other facts 
beyond the strategy?’ The establishment of indicators of progress, as those 
established by the DoH, i.e. mortality, survival rates, does not provide a 
complete panorama of the situation. Proctor explains this more clearly: 
Survival rates are only one of several ways to measure progress against a 
disease. Survival rates will not tell you if chemotherapy or radiation is less 
unpleasant than it was once, or whether surgery leaves the typical cancer 
patient less disfigured that it once did […] or whether patients are less 
likely to die from a cancer caused by medical treatment.927 
Another element to consider is the level of integration of evaluation and audit 
mechanisms in policymaking. While in the past the utility of evaluation was 
strictly related to changes in policy, ‘More recently, investigators have 
                                                        
924 The recent NAO’s report on cancer and the subsequent PAC’s report generated circa 100 
articles during March 2015. Source: Google UK. 
925 See Hughes, M., and T. Traynor. 2000. "Reconciling Process and Outcome in Evaluating 
Community Initiatives." Evaluation 6(1):37-49, Lloyd, N., and L. Harrington. 2012. "The 
challenges to effective outcome evaluation of a national, multi-agency initiative: The experience 
of Sure Start." Ibid.18:93-109. 
926 Selameab, T., and S. S. Yeh. 2008. "Evaluating Intangible Outcomes: Using Multiattribute 
Utility Analysis to Compare the Benefits and Costs of Social Programs." American Journal of 
Evaluation 29(3):301-16. P. 302. 
927 Proctor, R. 1995. Cancer wars: How Politics Shapes What We Know And Don't Know About 
Cancer. New York, US.: BasicBooks. P. 252. 
271 
 
considered the possibility that evaluation research is used in ways other than in 
directly affecting policy.’928 From an instrumental perspective, the audit to the 
Cancer Strategy produced important improvements in the data-collection area 
(UK-4), also as a cancer researcher (UK-5) recognises: 
The data I provided for that audit on cancer [the NAO study] staging might 
have a huge political impact on the way cancer registration was performed, 
although I wouldn’t claim it directly to what ended up happening in the 
subsequent years. 
It would be rather simplistic to establish a direct link between the assessment of 
the Cancer Strategy and the changes that occurred after the publication of the 
reports, as these can have been driven by many other motives (including 
political momentum). Nonetheless, the way in which outputs are managed can 
provide some insights about the long-term effects of evaluation and audit. As 
discussed, the use of evaluation outputs derived from the DoH and other 
governmental bodies is mostly limited to internal consumption; ergo, little effect 
can be expected outside this sphere. Regarding the products derived from the 
NAO and the PAC, as it implies more public notoriety, they appear to have more 
effect in the public landscape, for example, by feeding into the discussions 
between politicians, government officials, media, NGOs, and academicians.929 
Finally, the effect that might be produced as a consequence of 
evaluation/auditing can lead to a dispute of power in terms of who is 
responsible for a particular change; in other words, who gets recognition. In the 
words of a member of the NAO (UK-3): 
The department may not always want to admit that it has made those 
changes because we’ve done the study, but it was a driver, it would just 
never be admitted, so you’re creating change almost just by sort of focusing 
attention on the area. 
The Cancer Strategy shows that although it is a policy issue that heavily relies 
on evidence, it is not exempt from political influence. The asymmetry of access 
of stakeholders to evaluation processes affects the way in which political power 
can be exercised. Those stakeholders with more resources can influence key 
                                                        
928 Boyer, J. F., and L. I. Langbein. 1991. "Factors Influencing the Use of Health Evaluation 
Research in Congress." Evaluation Review 15(5):507-32. P. 509. 
929 See: Campbell, D. 2015. "Government accused of breaking promises on NHS cancer treatment 
" in The Guardian. London, UK. 
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elements of the evaluation process like funding, methodology, or scope of an 
inquiry. In the broader context of governance, this case shows the linkage to 
accountability because the information created by evaluation and auditing 
serves as a basis for questioning the government’s accomplishments and to 
debate the possible amendments that could be made in this area. The next case 
focuses on the CQC, an organisation that has been since its inception 
surrounded by controversy and, consequently, involved in a more subjective 
assessment. 
6.1.3 The Hidden Politics of Evaluation in the Care-Quality Commission 
The case of the CQC represents an interesting object of analysis because of its 
evolution and notoriety in the public landscape. Understanding the rationale 
behind the decision of merging organisations into a super-regulator of health 
and mental care is one of the most important elements in the context of the 
politics of evaluation. The establishment of the CQC was driven by political 
purposes, related to pressures for more efficiency in this field. Nonetheless, this 
decision provoked important criticism: 
A lot of the changes in the public sector in England have really been driven 
by the 2008 recession where we looked to reduce spend on public service 
provision, and I think the pressure to merge regulators therefore, get better 
efficiencies, better economies of scale have been driven politically (UK-1). 
It was created not from any obvious policy logic but simply from a desire to 
save money […] as CQC came into existence it was the third new quality 
regulator for health, and the fourth for social care, in only nine years.930 
Its creation contained four big mistakes. (i) Its budget was inadequate for 
the purposes […] (ii) It was rushed and was a forced creation with no 
visible attempt to learn from evidence in business mergers about the 
problems that always result in the short term from such imposed changes 
(iii) The rhetoric around its creation was about developing a tough, no-
nonsense approach – so the people recruited to senior jobs displayed those 
characteristics – and we have just seen the consequences of that.931 
The controversy around the CQC’s inception has played a crucial role in the 
discussion about its effectiveness. Moreover, past events that involved the CQC, 
                                                        
930 Timmins, N. 2013. "Designed to fail: the Care Quality Commission is a warning to quango 
cullers." London, UK: Institute for Government. 
931 Greig, R. 2013. "CQC – 3 Big Reasons It Went Wrong; 3 Big Actions to Get It Right." London, 
UK: NDTi National Development Team for inclusion. 
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i.e. Morecambe Bay, Mid-Staffordshire, have also influenced the process of 
evaluation and auditing to this organisation. Consistently with the previous 
case, the analysis of the hidden politics of evaluation in the CQC will be guided 
by the thematic framework proposed in this research (Figure 6.4). 
Figure 6.4 Overview of the Hidden Politics of Evaluation in the CQC  
 
The establishment of the purpose of evaluation in this case has also been 
strongly driven by the values of efficiency, effectiveness, and economy. The DoH 
as the organisation in charge of supervising the work of the CQC has the task to 
evaluate its performance: 
To provide robust assurance to the public, the Department and Parliament 
that CQC is improving its performance and that action will be taken to build 
and sustain its capability for the future.932 
The DoH review was based on three major sources of information: performance 
data, interviews with the CQC and stakeholders, and documentary evidence. Its 
aim was identifying those challenges that the organisation faced in its operation, 
while the focus was on the accomplishment of quantifiable measures, i.e. 
capacity to registry providers and inspections undertaken. This instrument 
                                                        
932 Department of Health. 2012c. "Performance and Capability Review. Care Quality 
Commission." London, UK. P. 5. 
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allows looking at those areas of improvement in terms of the values 
underpinning it (efficiency, efficacy, effectiveness). As the theory suggests, the 
purpose reflects the role given to evaluation in the context of governance.933 
Considering that the creation of the CQC was driven by efficiency and efficacy 
values, it is logical to find these values behind evaluation. There is a need to 
produce evidence about the improvements made in efficiency that can 
legitimise the decision of its creation. 
These values narrow the evaluation scope mostly to operational variables, 
leaving aside important elements related to this area, such as patient dignity 
and quality of care which would imply evaluating variables such as accessibility, 
focus on patients, equity, and safety.934 However, the stakeholder that controls 
evaluation (the DoH, in this case) has the prerogative to define the purpose and 
the values associated to it, even when other stakeholders might have a different 
opinion about what must be the focus of evaluation, as a researcher of a social-
care charity (UK-6) suggests: 
For me the best way to assess is what patients are saying, what people are 
saying, are people getting the outcomes that they need? Are people able to 
live life in a way that gives them independence? 
The politics related to this stage concerns the establishment of rights and 
obligations in the institutional framework. For instance, the agreement between 
the DoH and the CQC states that the former’s obligations include: 
Monitoring the whole system’s performance to ensure it delivers what 
patients, people who use services and the wider public value most.935 
Even without a formal evaluation policy, the institutional framework distributes 
powers among stakeholders that allow controlling the purpose and scope of 
evaluation, including decisions about when to evaluate. For instance, since the 
CQC began operation, the DoH has only formally reviewed its performance once 
(in 2012) in the context of the strong criticism made to this regulator as a result 
                                                        
933 Berriet-Solliec, M., P. Labarthe, and C. Laurent. 2014. "Goals of evaluation and types of 
evidence." Evaluation 20(2):195-213. 
934 World Health Organisation. 2006. "Quality of care: A process for making strategic choices in 
health systems.". France. 
935 Care Quality Commission. 2013d. "Framework Agreement between the Department of Health 
and Care Quality Commission." London, UK. P. 8. 
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of whistle-blowing events. The lack of formal rules to define periodicity and 
time frameworks for evaluation gives the stakeholder in charge the capacity to 
decide this discretionally. 
In the case of NAO study and the follow-up inquiries of the Health Committee 
and the PAC, the purpose was also to obtain evidence about the CQC’s 
performance and its capacity to fit the purpose of its creation.936 Considering 
the shortcomings observed in the CQC’s performance (see Chapter 4, Section 
4.3.2), the Chair of the Health Committee recognised that it … 
… is an acknowledged fact—and you have both acknowledged it in public 
many times—that the CQC, until recently, has not been delivering the 
service that the public looked to it to deliver.937 
The focus of the inquiry was also driven by the capacity of the CQC to properly 
regulate and inspect health services. It becomes relevant to have a clearer 
perception of how these bodies define and prioritise the areas of assessment. 
The definition of the purpose and scope can be driven by multiple reasons, not 
all of them political. Financial and time constraints can lead to reducing the 
scope of an evaluation, while time frameworks can also affect its broadness.938 
In the case of the CQC, as a member of the Health Committee staff (UK-2) 
acknowledges, the purpose and scope of the assessment … 
… is driven by the members and how they evaluate the Care Quality 
Commission through the feedback that they get from members of the 
public, particularly of their constituencies, and from meetings that they 
have continually with different parties who are affected by the work of the 
CQC. 
This reveals that the participation of MPs in scrutiny activities is embedded in a 
political process that inevitably affects their task. Most of their work would be 
shaped by the interests of members of their constituencies or by interest groups 
around them.939 The inclusion of an issue in the PAC’s agenda depends on the 
                                                        
936 See: Health Committee. 2011a. "Accountability hearing with the Care Quality Commission." 
London, UK: House of Commons. 
937 —. 2014a. "2013 Accountability Hearing with the Care Quality Commission." London, UK. 
938 Mohan, R., and K. Sullivan. 2006. "Managing the Politics of Evaluation to Achieve Impact." 
New Directions for Evaluation 2006(112):7-23. 
939 For example, Andrew George MP, member of the Health Committee has expressed in relation 
to the work of the CQC in nursing homes of his constituency. See: Andrew G. MP. 2013. 
"Welcome for Cornwallis Care Quality report." 
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role of MPs. In addition, the institutional framework gives the PAC the 
prerogative to influence the work agenda of the NAO by proposing/suggesting 
potential studies. As a member of the PAC (UK-12) explains, ‘the fact that a 
member of the Committee is very interested might help push it’, so a policy 
issue that gets the attention of a MP is more likely to be considered in the NAO’s 
agenda. This interviewee recalled the case of a PFI hospital940 in the northern 
part of the country: 
The NAO did a report on that and I know it was partly because I was 
involved locally and I was a local member of Parliament, and they took a 
closer interest because I kept on going on and on about it (UK-12). 
A similar case was the Leytonstone Hospital, in which the CQC reported ‘poor 
standards of care and a culture of staff bullying.’941 This situation was 
highlighted by a Labour MP, giving more leverage to this report’s findings.942 As 
a technical body of the PAC, the NAO sets the basis for most of this Committee’s 
work. As a former clerk of this Committee describes (UK-7), the work of the PAC 
is driven by the inquiries of the NAO: 
The PAC is the public face of that process, and the criteria are these 
reasonably large amount of money that’s wasted, is it of strong political 
interest, and thirdly, does it help the NAO to do its job of ensuring that 
public money is being well-spent, whether the committee can add value 
with an oral evidence session … 
The NAO also influences the way a study is designed and here the political 
preferences and interests of the members of the Committee play an important 
part in this process. This can increase the pressure to scrutinise the 
performance of a public body, as it occurred in the CQC case. An NAO official 
(UK-4) recalls that ‘the CQC received a lot of media coverage before we started’, 
so the need to study in detail the performance of the CQC became more urgent. 
The public profile of the CQC also influenced how its assessment developed: 
‘There were high political expectations for the newly created body’ (UK-10). 
                                                        
940 A Private Finance Initiative (PFI) allows ‘enabled local authorities to enter into contracts 
with the private sector for the provision of new and/or improved capital assets (infrastructure 
for example) and related services.’ Source: Department for Communities and Local Government. 
2015a. "2010 to 2015 Government Policy: House Building." London, UK. 
941 O'Brien, Z. 2015. "Whipps Cross Hospital has been placed in special measures by the Care 
Quality Commission over bullying." in Guardian. 
942 Care Quality Commission. 2014c. "Whipps Cross University Hospital. Quality Report." 
London, UK. 
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Consequently, its evaluation and auditing were also shaped by these 
expectations. 
The Winterbourne View and Mid-Staffordshire events brought important 
attention to the work of the CQC, which could have been reflected in more 
external pressure for scrutiny bodies to intervene. The NAO reported on the 
CQC’s performance on December 2011943 as a consequence of a petition made 
by the PAC. This was ‘a quick reactive study’ (UK-3) followed by an 
accountability hearing led by the Health Committee in September 2011944 and a 
PAC’s inquiry in May 2012.945 In addition, the CQC faced important internal 
struggles as a result of the discrepancies between Board members that included 
questioning the credibility of the former Chief Executive.946 During its first years 
of operation, the CQC ‘wasn’t working; people were falling through the gaps and 
nobody would take responsibility … there was no consistent standard’ (UK-6). 
This was undeniably an opportunity for politicians to be proactive in addressing 
a problem that affects the general population and that had an important level of 
notoriety. In other words, to get advantage of this impetus for evaluating the 
CQC. 
Likewise, a former clerk of the PAC (UK-7) explained that political interest does 
play an important role in the definition of the issues discussed within this 
Committee: ‘It would have to be a wide-spread political interest’ and the case of 
the CQC clearly showed that the failings of this regulator needed to be 
scrutinised. The inquiry made by the Health Committee in 2011, acknowledged: 
                                                        
943 National Audit Office. 2011a. "The Care Quality Commission: Regulating the quality and 
safety of health and adult social care." London, UK. 
944 Health Committee. 2011c. "Annual accountability hearing with the Care Quality Commission." 
London, UK. 
945 Committee of Public Accounts. 2012. "The Care Quality Commission: Regulating the quality 
and safety of health and adult social care." London, UK. 
946 The former Chief Executive of the CQC, Cynthia Bower, was strongly criticised for her 
performance as Chief Executive of the West Midlands Strategic Health Authority (SHA) and for 
being involved in the Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust where ‘as many as 1,200 patients may have 
died due to poor care.’ Borland, S. 2012. "Care quango chief is forced to quit over a catalogue of 
failures (but she walks away with a £1.35m pension pot)." in The Daily Mail. London, UK. 
In addition, she was also accused ‘of conspiring in a cover-up over the organisation’s failures to 
protect the public.’ Sawer, P., and L. Donnelly. 2014. "NHS scandal chiefs launch 'reputation 
management' firm." in The Telegraph. London, UK. 
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The CQC had quite a big internal agenda in terms of bringing together the 
predecessor organisations, creating a common culture, working out exactly 
how the new body was going to work internally and, ultimately—and, of 
course much more importantly—relate to providers in the system. Mr 
Stephen Dorrell, Chair.947 
The expectations about the new regulator may have shaped the audit process. 
The NAO study, for example, ‘examines how the Commission has used its 
resources in carrying out its quality and safety assurance work.’948 As Greene 
acknowledges: 
Politics can be keenest when evaluation is intended to inform decisions 
about the continuation or elimination of a controversial policy949 
There was interest in valuing the decision of merging previous regulators into 
one organisation. Consequently, the focus on its effectiveness in the provision of 
services was a central variable under the eyes of the NAO. In terms of politics, it 
is interesting how the different reactions about the performance of the CQC 
converged into a common purpose that was judging whether the organisation 
was fit for purpose. In a sense, the controversy around the CQC generated some 
pressure on audit bodies to act and to question the officials responsible of the 
organisation. Even the government promoted the performance of independent 
inquiries about the state of healthcare in England.950 In the Select Committees 
inquiries, the focus of the analysis was also the capacity of the CQC to deliver. 
These made evident that the CQC was underperforming: 
The Committee concluded that the bias in the work of the CQC away from 
its core function of inspection and towards the essentially administrative 
task of registration represented a significant distortion of priorities. Health 
Committee.951 
                                                        
947 Health Committee. 2011c. "Annual accountability hearing with the Care Quality Commission." 
London, UK. Evidence 1.  
948 National Audit Office. 2011a. "The Care Quality Commission: Regulating the quality and 
safety of health and adult social care." London, UK. P. 5. 
949 Greene, J. C. 2003. "War and peace … and evaluation." Studies in Educational Policy and 
Educational Philosophy 2. P. 2. 
950 A well-known example was the Francis Report which aimed ‘to examine the operation of the 
commissioning, supervisory and regulatory organisations and other agencies, including the 
culture and systems of those organisations in relation to their monitoring role at Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation  
Trust between January 2005 and March 2009 and to examine why problems at the Trust were 
not identified sooner, and appropriate action taken.’ Robert Francis QC. 2013. "Report of the Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry." London, UK. P. 10.  
951 Health Committee. 2011c. "Annual accountability hearing with the Care Quality Commission." 
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The Commission […] has failed to fulfil this role effectively […] As a result; 
the public are unclear what the Commission’s role is and lack confidence 
that it is an effective regulator. PAC 952 
The assessment guided predominantly by values like efficiency and 
effectiveness showed that the tasks given to the CQC have not been properly 
accomplished. As an NHS official (UK-13) highlights, the focus was on making 
the CQC accountable for the money. As a newly created body, it was given a 
wider range of tasks under more restrictive conditions, i.e. less resources, new 
legislation. 
Although the CQC was set up under the Labour government in 2009, most of its 
operation occurred under the Coalition Government. This echoes the ideas 
about ‘the blame game’; the failure of the CQC can represent a scenario in which 
both political parties can be blamed—the Labour Party for the decision of 
merging three regulators (design), while the Coalition Government can be 
blamed for the shortcomings of the organisation (implementation). The 
establishment of the purpose of evaluation in the case of the CQC is controlled 
by key stakeholders (DoH, NAO, PAC). As a result and, according to the theory, 
the control exercised by these actors at this stage can have important influence 
on subsequent decisions about evaluation. Under the VFM scope, the work of 
the NAO and of Select Committees dismissed the discussion of other variables 
relevant in the health and social-care sector. For example, the quality of care, 
access to treatment, patient safety, among others helpful for analysing the role 
of a regulator, which represents a highly complex issue.953 
In terms of resources, the NAO generates and provides the evidence for the 
follow-up inquiries made by the PAC. Evidence-collection is a process subject to 
the discretion of the NAO or Select Committees. Even though there are some 
standardised guidelines for submitting evidence to a Select Committee inquiry, 
there are discretionary spaces for staff and MPs to choose the evidence that is 
considered more suitable for the purposes of the study. A former member of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
London, UK. P. 26. 
952 Committee of Public Accounts. 2012. "The Care Quality Commission: Regulating the quality 
and safety of health and adult social care." London, UK. 
953 Stern, J. 2010. "The Evaluation of Regulatory Agencies." London, UK: City University London. 
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CQC’s Board (UK-10) acknowledged that there was a constant interaction 
between them and advisory groups to identify areas of improvement. Although 
the institutional framework allows participation in the scrutiny of public bodies, 
this might be constrained by different variables. Knowledge about the 
procedures, networking and geographical location can limit the access to some 
actors that might provide relevant evidence about a policy. For example, for the 
NAO study most of the stakeholders consulted (circa 77%) were London-based 
organisations, i.e. Age UK and NHS Confederation, which had better conditions 
for accessing this process.954 
Access and participation are also related to the power and interests of 
stakeholders. For example, in the latest Health Committee’s inquiry, nearly 75% 
of the witnesses were large organisations from the governmental sphere (DoH, 
CQC, Foundation Trust Network) and from the social sector, i.e. General Medical 
Council and The Royal College of Radiologists.955 Some individuals also gave 
evidence regarding their personal experiences with the CQC’s work and their 
concerns had already arisen in other forums.956 This suggests that the 
institutional channels for accessing the process allow the participation of a 
range of stakeholders; most participants are organisations whose interests 
might be directly affected by work of the CQC. For example, the Relatives and 
Residents Association, a recurrent evidence provider to the Health Committee, 
expressed their concern about ‘the inadequacy of the CQC’s inspection 
methodology’957 which is directly related to their tasks (providing information 
to support the selection of a care home).958 If the criteria for evaluating a care 
home differ from the one used by the CQC it might generate controversy among 
                                                        
954 National Audit Office. 2011e. "The Care Quality Commission: Regulating the quality and 
safety of health and adult social care. Detailed Methodology.". London, UK: National Audit Office. 
955 Health Committee. 2014a. "2013 Accountability Hearing with the Care Quality Commission." 
London, UK. 
956 For example, Margaret and Janet Brooks gave evidence in relation to the case of their mother 
who received poor medical care in a NHS Trust Hospital. They have already made their concerns 
public to the Nursery and Midwifery Council (NMC) and to the Parliamentary Health Service 
Ombudsman. 
957 Health Committee. 2013b. "Written evidence from the Relatives & Residents Association ". 
London, UK. 
958 This association ‘is a national charity which exists for the benefit of older people in 
residential care, as well as their families and friends left behind at home.’ The Relatives & 
Residents Association. 2012. "Who we are." 
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organisations involved in this area. 
Data provided by the evaluated body is one of the most important inputs for an 
evaluation. As a DoH official states (UK-9), it is essential to respond to 
Parliament on behalf of the government about the CQC’s performance. The 
discretion to disclosure data is limited—not annulled—by the statutory power 
of the NAO. Moreover, it is important to note that the CQC is not the only 
governmental source of information; both the DoH and the NHS produced 
information for the inquiries. In terms of the flow of information, the CQC 
appears to be a cooperative body. For example, a former Board member (UK-
10) stated that the CQC staff was interviewed for the NAO study. This can have 
political implications too, even though finding some resistance to evaluation is 
not uncommon. Exhibiting the flaws of the organisation can generate political 
consequences.959 For instance, Kay Sheldon, one of CQC’s Board members, gave 
evidence to the Mid-Staffordshire Inquiry (Francis Report) about the CQC’s 
deficiencies: 
It was a very hard decision to give evidence. I'd tried to raise the issues 
internally and with the Department of Health. But all I got was either denial 
or a sense that I was the problem. I was asked not to attend any further 
board meetings. I declined that request - but the meetings were very 
difficult.960 
This generated different reactions within the CQC, which increased the 
controversy around this regulator, particularly because this member directly 
accused the DoH of dismissing her concerns: 
I was disturbed to hear Una O’Brien say that my concerns were “well 
known” to the Department and that I had contributed them to the 
Capability Review. This is not the case. I have stated several times to Una 
over the last two months (I have emails as evidence) that I have not had 
adequate opportunity to describe, discuss and evidence the serious 
concerns I have about the leadership, management and culture of CQC.961 
This shows the extent to which politics can interfere in the performance of an 
evaluation or an audit. The CQC case allows looking at the discrepancies 
                                                        
959 Geva-May, I., and W. Thorngate. 2003. "Reducing Anxiety and Resistance in Policy and 
Programme Evaluations. A Socio-Psychological Analysis." Evaluation 9(2):205-27. 
960 Dreaper, J. 2013. "CQC whistle-blower: 'I am tainted because I spoke up'." BBC News. 
961 Committee of Public Accounts. 2012. "The Care Quality Commission: Regulating the quality 
and safety of health and adult social care." London, UK. Evidence 37. 
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between stakeholders, the confrontation that arises from the process and the 
power that can be exercised in the pursuit of interests. 
Funding is another variable to discuss in relation to resources. Regarding this, 
during the last six months the CQC reported having spending £911,009.26 in 
research services.962 An interesting example is the study developed by the 
Manchester Business School and The King’s Fund about the regulatory model. 
According to evidence submitted to the Health Committee in 2012, the cost of 
the study would be £50,000.963 Between September 2013 and March 2014 the 
CQC paid £156,717.80 combined to both institutions under the concept of 
‘professional services’. However, as transparency information does not include 
the specific products that those services comprised it is not possible to know if 
these payments belong to the mentioned study. This matters because opacity 
about the costs of evaluation increases uncertainty in the market as both 
suppliers and demanders have incomplete data to make an informed decision. 
As it has been observed by House in the case of the United States, the dynamic 
that is created between commissioners and evaluators is different from any 
other market: 
Instead of an autonomous, impersonal market of many buyers and sellers, 
this particular sector of the evaluation market consists of a set of bilateral 
associations between the government and firms, based on specific, 
personal, interdependent interactions over a long period of time, what 
some might call an “imperfect” market from a neoclassical view.964 
 
These ‘imperfections’ are also relevant when discussing independence and the 
credibility of evaluation. In relation to human resources available for evaluation 
and auditing, the CQC case shows the existence of a very active community of 
NGOs involved in the debate about the effectiveness of the CQC, and that can be 
very critical. After the publication of one of CQC’s reports,965 for example, the 
                                                        
962 This is the total amount of the spending reported by the CQC under the label of ‘research 
services’ from September 2014 to February 2015. Source: Care Quality Commission. 2015b. 
"Spending transparency." London, UK. 
963 Health Committee. 2012. "2012 Accountability Hearing with the Care Quality Commission." 
London, UK. Evidence 49. 
964 House, E. R. 1997. "Evaluation in the Government Marketplace." American Journal of 
Evaluation 18(1):37-48. P. 39. 
965 Care Quality Commission. 2011b. "Dignity and Nutrition Inspection Programme. National 
Overview.". London, UK. 
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Chief Executive of The Patients Association stated: 
Yet another report to add to the plethora of other reports, all highlighting 
the same issues around poor care of elderly patients in hospital. How many 
reports do we have to look at and how many times the public need to hear 
about this before the right action does is taken. What will it take to bring 
about the change that is needed so that elderly people get treated in 
Hospitals with the respect and dignity they deserve.966 
This was seconded by the Age UK’s Chief Executive: 
Age UK renews its call to Government to take the responsible course by 
appropriately funding and guaranteeing fair access to high quality health 
and social care services […] this report967 shows the dire consequences of a 
social care system that has been under increasing financial pressure over 
the last eight years and in many areas is now financially stripped to the 
bone.968 
The space for NGOs to discuss public issues is linked to their level of 
independence and their distance to audit bodies, as a member of a social-care 
charity (UK-6) highlights: ‘We can say what we want. If you’re getting funding 
from government you can’t possibly criticise government.’ There is availability 
of information, financial resources, and experts to assess the CQC’s 
performance. In terms of the hidden politics of evaluation, the relevance of 
resources for evaluation and auditing is how these are allocated and how this 
impacts the level of power and control of stakeholders. 
The process of evaluation appears to be the most complex area to analyse, due to 
the multiplicity of factors that intervene. One of the most political issues 
associated with this element is the interaction between stakeholders. For 
example, the configuration of the PAC establishes the basis for making the 
government accountable and it is a major component of the institutional 
framework that determines how each stakeholder can participate. Without the 
obligations and prerogatives given to the NAO and the political support 
provided by the PAC, the establishment of an accountability system would not 
be possible or effective. The fact that the PAC’s Chairman is a member of the 
leading opposition limits the potential influence of the government in its 
                                                        
966 The Patients Association. 2011. "Patients Association reacts to results of CQC." London, UK. 
967 Care Quality Commission. 2012b. "The state of health care and adult social care in England ". 
London, UK. 
968 Age UK. 2012. "Response to CQC ‘State of Care’ Report." London, UK. 
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work,969 a logic that also underpins the appointment of the C&AG.970 
He’s appointed through a process that involves the Prime Minister of the 
day and the Chairman of the PAC of the day, who is always a member of the 
leading opposition party, so he’s appointed, so he can only be appointed by 
consensus of both sides, but then his independence is guaranteed by 
statute, the government can’t influence what he writes in these reports 
(UK-12). 
The relationship between the NAO and the PAC is also framed by the 
institutional framework. This gives this audit body independence ‘to pursue an 
audit agenda and report publicly without external influence, even from MPs.’971 
Despite the distance between both stakeholders formally established, it is not 
possible to ignore the fact that politics is a very important component of their 
work. The work of both bodies can generate important political reactions, as 
multiple interests can be affected by their inquiries. The institutional 
framework provides some warranties in relation to the Chair of the PAC. This 
aims to establish a counterpart to government for the discussion about the 
implementation of policy and how resources are spent. It represents an 
important characteristic of the UK case, considering that evaluation and audit 
outputs can represent a threat for some stakeholders.972 Therefore, it is 
important to acknowledge the politics of these activities in relation to the 
interests pursued by each stakeholder.973 
The openness to the involvement of external stakeholders is another variable to 
discuss. This is left to the discretion of the actor that controls the process. In this 
case, it appears that the studies about the CQC involved the integration of 
                                                        
969 For example, the last Chair of the PAC was Margaret Hodge, a member of the Labour Party. 
970 According to the Public Accounts Commission, ‘the C&AG’s independence is preserved even 
from the House by the fact that he or she has, by statute, complete discretion in the discharge of 
his functions.’ The Public Accounts Commission. 2008. "Corporate governance of the National 
Audit Office: response to John Tiner's Review." London, UK: House of Commons. 
971 Dunleavy, P., C. Gilson, S. Bastow, and J. Tinkler. 2009. "The National Audit Office, the Public 
Accounts Committee and the risk landscape in UK public policy." London, UK: The Risk and 
Regulation Advisory Council. P. 4. 
972 Datta, L. E. 2011. "Politics and Evaluation: More Than Methodology." American Journal of 
Evaluation 32(2):273-94, Hatry, H. P., J. S. Wholey, and K. E. Newcomer. 2010. "Evaluation 
Challenges, Issues and Trends." in Handbook of Practical Program Evaluation, edited by Harry P. 
Hatry, Joseph S. Wholey, and Kathryn E. Newcomer. US: Jossey-Bass. 
973 Lipsky, D. B., R. L. Seeber, A. C. Avgar, and R. M. Scanza. 2007. "Managing the Politics of 
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different views about its performance. This is encouraged by the institutional 
framework and has given the PAC an important place in the accountability 
process and more leverage to its recommendations. A CQC official states (UK-1): 
I think they’ve all over the past 3-4 years have really developed a 
reputation for holding the government to account for the ways it is 
delivering its policies that would include all the people that I need to 
account and I see that as a good thing. 
The PAC is an important element of the audit system in the UK, particularly 
because it gives political support to the work of the C&AG. Moreover, the 
political power of the Chair also contributes to the credibility and notoriety of 
the PAC’s inquiry and it has modified the traditional relationship with other 
actors, according to a former clerk of the PAC (UK-7): 
Until 2010 the work of the PAC was purely the dialogue between the 
committee and the department, so you’d have oral evidence session 
only with the officials from the department and there would not be 
politicians, there would be permanent officials, the permanent 
secretary and other staff, in the last four years under the chair of 
Margaret Hodge they have included evidence from many more 
outside sources. 
The inclusion of new actors in the discussion about the performance of public 
organisations shows the way in which the institutional framework can allow or 
restrict this access. A relevant point here is the leadership of the former Chair, 
Margaret Hodge MP, and how she gave the PAC important notoriety. On the one 
hand, the former Chair was criticised for being severe and harsh in her 
questionings—even to the point of being accused of bullying and abuse.974 As a 
Labour MP declared: ‘When she’s got her teeth into something, she won’t let go 
of the bone.’975 On the other hand, the political strength of the PAC also 
produced confrontation with other Select Committees, for example, in the case 
of the tax avoidance investigation976 about which … 
… Members of the Treasury Committee clearly regarded the tax 
avoidance investigation as an armed incursion into their territory, 
                                                        
974 Syal, R., and M. Sweney. 2015. "Margaret Hodge accused of 'abusive and bullying' attack on 
BBC Trust chair." in The Guardian. London, UK. 
975 Mason, R. Ibid."Brief, brutal and very public: there's more to Margaret Hodge’s grillings than 
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976 Committee of Public Accounts. 2013b. "Tax avoidance: The role of large accountancy firms ". 
London, UK: House of Commons. 
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and complain that they would have made a better job of it.977 
This underlines the role of the PAC in the UK’s landscape. The political support 
of the House of Commons not only makes explicit the distance between Select 
Committees and the government, but also legitimises the work of the NAO as the 
external body that scrutinises governmental accounts. This becomes crucial 
when addressing issues like independence and credibility.978 Currently, under a 
new Chair, new questions arise about the way in which PAC will hold the 
government accountable.979 
The coexistence of different bodies scrutinising the performance of the CQC has 
generated a greater pressure for this regulator to overcome its initial failures. 
As a CQC official states (UK-1): ‘The issue is being clear about how we are 
discharging those multiple accountabilities.’ The existence of a plethora of 
bodies that make this regulator accountable shows that the UK’s institutional 
framework is characterised by the interaction of multiple actors whose action 
might be guided by a different rationale. In the opinion of a former member of 
the Board (UK-10) there is an effective checks and balances system that also 
involves the participation of external stakeholders who can be affected by the 
work of this regulator. 
The CQC case shows that the rigorous scrutiny has been a constant, even though 
responding to it is ‘not comfortable[…] but actually it is necessary’ (UK-1). The 
relevance of the existence of these bodies is that ‘it is important that the public 
know that money is being used properly’ (UK-10). The openness to scrutiny and 
evaluation is an important variable that can facilitate or difficult the process. 
Regarding this, a Health Committee staff member (UK-2) states: 
                                                        
977 D'Arcy, M. 2015. "Cracks in the PAC?". London, UK: BBC News. 
978 Brown, A. B., and J. A. Klerman. 2012. "Independent Evaluation: Insights from Public 
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They are used to the process now and they can’t avoid it and if you are not 
helpful what it will do is to create impression on most members of the 
Committee that they are trying to avoid scrutiny and if you create the 
impression in front of the Committee then you are hiding things you are 
going to make them look harder and make them more sceptical about what 
they do find. 
In terms of politics, this resonates with the concept of evaluation culture (see 
Chapter 2). According to Højlund, organisations interested in increasing 
efficiency are more likely to have a culture of evaluation, because its 
legitimisation is based on outputs.980 In this scenario, criticisms to the CQC 
might influence how this organisation embraces evaluation as a part of its daily 
work. Moreover, the institutional framework enforces the CQC to heed the 
recommendations of audit bodies. Audits and evaluations are important 
political tools to promote change both internally and externally.981 For instance, 
the Health Committee inquiry fostered the development of a study ‘to show how 
evidence and research can be used by CQC to evaluate how well its current 
regulatory arrangements in health and social care work.’982 
Despite the interaction between evaluators and evaluated bodies being 
constrained by the institutional framework, this does not completely eliminate 
discretionary spaces. An example of this (also observed in the Cancer Strategy 
case) is the ‘clearance stage’ that occurs during a VFM study. Here, the audited 
body can comment on the NAO’s report and even though it was emphasised by 
interviewees that evaluated bodies cannot make changes to the content, one of 
them recognises: 
You get to a sort of nuances about possibly tone so sometimes you may 
argue over wording, so you’re still saying the same thing but how you say it 
can change, so those can be more difficult conversations, because it’s less 
about facts and more about tone. (UK-3). 
A former PAC’s clerk (UK-7) agrees, ‘There’s often a process of discussion in the 
Committee about whether the wording of the report is right and this 
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982 Walshe, K., and D. Phipps. 2013. "Developing a strategic framework to guide the Care Quality 
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occasionally takes a party political tension.’ These statements evince informal 
mechanisms that public bodies can use to influence reports. The degree to 
which this is possible is unclear, but there are documented cases in which a 
report has been delayed because of disagreements at this stage.983 While there 
is no explicit intention to manipulate the findings of a report, changes in the 
tone and wording can become mechanisms to make a criticism softer, to be less 
straightforward about a particular issue, and to generate less political reactions. 
To rephrase a statement by turning a ‘weakness’ into an ‘opportunity for 
improvement’ can involve making a judgement more subtle.984 This has been a 
recurrent issue in the discussions about the political nature of evaluation. 
Petitions for changing the wording of findings are constantly found in the 
interaction between evaluators and evaluands.985 
The inclusion of non-governmental actors in the assessment is also part of the 
process. As in the previous case, there are institutional mechanisms for the 
incorporation of different views, both in internal evaluation activities as well as 
in inquiries led by the NAO or Select Committees. Regarding this, a researcher of 
a social-care charity (UK-6) acknowledges: 
If we feel that there’s a theme that is coming across again and again that it 
affects majority of people, then we would influence the policy and we 
would influence the politicians. 
To exercise their influence, organisations use official information as well as data 
produced by them.986 Here, the role of evaluators becomes more relevant. They 
have the capacity to promote the inclusion of different views, yet this is 
constrained by the power of the actor who commissions the evaluation or even 
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986 The Patients Association, for example, has a Helpline for patients and their relatives in which 
they provide information about different aspects of the health system as well as advice about 
any concerns that patients might have in relation to healthcare. The data derived from this 
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by evaluators, as one of them (UK-14) describes: 
We would seek the views of the people we think it would be helpful to 
speak to, of course […] we would always have to check with the client, this 
is what we propose to do and this it who we think it would be useful to 
speak to, of course the client would have an idea because they have inside 
knowledge on what’s going on, the politics, they might have a view, 
however if they don’t want you to speak to somebody in a way that’s data, 
it says something. 
For example, according to the methodology of the study undertaken by the 
Manchester Business School and The King’s Fund, the CQC participated in the 
process at different moments, ‘including commenting on the selection of 
inspections to observe and on the design of interview and survey questions 
prior to finalisation.’987 This is again related to the proximity between the 
evaluated body and other stakeholders, because it raises concerns about 
independence and credibility. For example, some NGOs that have participated as 
witnesses in Select Committee inquiries have also been commissioned to 
research products, an issue that can create conflicts of interest.988 If an 
organisation plays a double role, both as witness and as provider of services for 
the audited body, this can have negative effects on the credibility of the 
evaluation. What the process of evaluation and auditing in the CQC case 
suggests is that when the evaluated body is embedded in a highly politicised 
context, this will also affect the interaction between stakeholders and, 
consequently, the outputs and outcomes of evaluation. 
The hidden politics of evaluation also concerns the outputs. The products 
derived from the evaluation and audit processes to the CQC make evident those 
areas that need improvement. The influence of politics can be observed here in 
the use and dissemination of findings. According to Stevens, evidence can be 
used to support an idea previously developed by a stakeholder.989 In the CQC 
case, the utilisation of findings can be more clearly seen in the promotion of 
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organisational changes. The way in which evaluation and audit outputs are 
integrated in the logics of organisations supports the argument made by 
Hansson about how these mechanisms are a consequence of the logic imposed 
by the NPM: 
The growing interaction of evaluation in the processes of organization and 
management is a forceful demonstration of how evaluation is becoming an 
integrated part of the organizational environment under the new public 
management system.990 
Indeed, this new dynamic has forced organisations to embrace mechanisms of 
control to generate evidence about its performance and to have elements that 
justify its existence. An important element derived from this is the need to be 
politically profitable. For the government in office this serves the purpose of 
proving the effectiveness of its policies, while for the opposition it generates the 
opportunity to make evident the need for a change. In both cases, positive and 
negative findings derived from evaluations or audits can be used by different 
stakeholders. One of the most evident examples in this case is the changes that 
took place within the organisation’s governance. The NAO’s report had already 
pointed out that the Board had not been able ‘to define success.’991 
Consequently, this made evident a lack of direction that became more notorious 
at the PAC’s hearing, for which one MP highlighted: 
One of its own board members has gone on record about the repeated 
failures of delivery, governance and effective leadership.992 
The deficiencies in the CQC’s governance were also publicly disseminated by the 
media.993 This might have produced the contextual factors necessary to promote 
use. As Green et al. discuss, context can represent an important factor that 
facilitates the use of knowledge;994 in this case, the evidence generated by 
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evaluation and audit processes. The CQC offers an interesting case study in 
terms of how politics can shape not only the evaluation and audit agenda but 
also the use of findings. It is not possible to determine exactly the linkage 
between the political notoriety of the CQC and how evaluation and auditing 
fostered changes in the organisation, but it is clear that the attention given to 
this regulator was driver for the transformation of the CQC. 
In organisational terms, for example, the intense scrutiny resulted later in the 
resignation of the former Chair and Chief Executive,995 and it led to the 
appointment of new Board members.996 An interesting point to highlight is the 
inclusion of Robert Francis QC, who led the Francis Report, and also the fact that 
Kay Sheldon, who denounced failings in the governance of the CQC, was the only 
member who remained in the Board after these changes took place.997 
Another important issue to discuss is the capacity of bodies like the NAO or 
Select Committees to enforce public bodies to heed recommendations. The 
evidence suggests that there is no formal obligation for public bodies to follow 
recommendations made by bodies such as the NAO or Select Committees. 
However, they are expected to respond to those recommendations and to argue 
in case of dismissal. The CQC acknowledges: 
The external scrutiny raised questions about our performance and role as 
the health and social care regulator. The Board acknowledges many of the 
criticisms that have been made about the effectiveness of the organisation 
during its first three years of its life […] over the next year we will reset the 
strategic direction of the organisation, measure CQC’s impact and 
effectiveness, and hold the Executive to account for delivery.998 
This leads to making two major points. The first one is that the institutional 
framework allows public bodies to either agree or not with recommendations. 
For example, in relation to the registration problems faced by the CQC 
highlighted by the PAC, ‘The Department does not agree with the Committee’s 
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conclusion that it has only recently begun to take action.’999 This is an important 
element to promote the public debate and to engage stakeholders in the 
process.1000 It suggests that there is room for discussion and not a unilateral 
imposition of judgement. The second is that the institutional framework also 
generates ambiguity about how recommendations will be implemented. The 
discretionary space given to public bodies can be observed in the following 
statement made by a CQC official (UK-1): 
One is: Do you accept the substance of it, they are not making a 
recommendation about how they think that recommendation should be 
taken forward. I think we have to take a view about not just the what we’ve 
been told to do, but how, so we might accept the ‘what’ but think in 
different ‘hows’ to deliver a recommendation […] I mean you accept the 
spirit of the recommendation—not the detail of it. 
The way in which recommendations are followed show how political power is 
exercised. For example, derived from the PAC’s finding: ‘There are 
inconsistencies in the judgements of individual inspectors and in the 
Commission’s approach to enforcement.’1001 The DoH and the CQC carried out 
important modifications to the regulatory model that included the performance 
of an evaluation study1002 and a public consultation with stakeholders.1003 This 
suggests that the focus of the CQC was on the development of a new regulatory 
model considering that this affects the interests of different stakeholders, i.e. 
providers, GPs, and the adoption of changes in this area had to be driven more 
carefully. For example, the increase of regulatory fees1004 and the public display 
of CQC ratings1005 are particularly sharp issues for which the reactions of key 
stakeholders can already be seen: 
                                                        
999 HM Treasury. 2012b. "Treasuy Minutes. Government responses on the Fifty Sixth, the 
Seventy First, the Seventy Sixth and the Seventy Eighth Reports from the Committee of Public 
Accounts: Session 2010-12.". London, UK. P. 16. 
1000 Adams, A. E., N. A. Nnawulezi, and L. Vandenberg. 2014. "“Expectations to Change” (E2C): A 
Participatory Method for Facilitating Stakeholder Engagement With Evaluation Findings." 
American Journal of Evaluation. 
1001 Committee of Public Accounts. 2012. "The Care Quality Commission: Regulating the quality 
and safety of health and adult social care." London, UK. P. 6. 
1002 Walshe, K., R. Addicott, A. Boyd, R. Robertson, and S. Ross. 2014. "Evaluating the Care Quality 
Commission’s acute hospital regulatory model: Final Report." 
1003 Care Quality Commission. 2013g. "A new start. Consultation on the changes to the way the 
CQC regulates, inspects and monitors care." London, UK. 
1004 Care Home. 2015. "CQC announce nine per cent increase in regulatory fees." London, UK. 
1005 Warrington Guardian. 2015. "CQC ratings to be displayed publically at health and care 
providers." 
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It is extremely disappointing that the views of 80% of the respondents to 
the consultation have been ignored and GP practices will be facing yet 
another increase in CQC fees.–Deputy Chairman, General Practitioners 
Committee.1006 
In terms of the implementation of recommendations, the relationship between 
the CQC and the DoH plays an important role. It is clear that the DoH sets the 
policy and the CQC implements it, so there is a strong bond between both 
organisations that might influence the way in which recommendations are 
instrumented. A DoH official (UK-9) explains that their role is ‘to share the 
objective’, and also ‘to make explicit that it is a separate body with independent 
judgement and against the perception of political interference’; however, this 
seems to produce a conflict of interest for the DoH to respond to Parliament on 
behalf of the CQC, while simultaneously it aims to promote the independence of 
this body. In the context of the fieldwork undertaken for this research, the 
intention of not being ‘too open’ was perceived in the discussion of this issue, in 
the sense that this might put interviewees in an awkward position. This reveals 
the political interests at stake involved in the duties of the CQC. Despite the 
incorporation of different mechanisms for the obtaining of evidence to support 
decision-making, the political factor remains inherent to all stages of 
policymaking, including evaluation. 
The other element to discuss is the dissemination of findings. The institutional 
framework for auditing, for instance, promotes the transparency the NAO’s 
work and of the Select Committee hearings. This ensures that documents 
derived from these processes are made public. In relation to politics, this 
represents an important opportunity for stakeholders to exercise their power. 
As Gaarder and Briceño observe: 
If the entity overseeing the public evaluation efforts is vulnerable to 
political changes, e.g. if its existence is politically determined, its budget 
allocation, or its staff, then the independence in mind and appearance 
principles may be compromised, as it may be or feel under pressure to 
report successes only.1007 
This case is useful for identifying how the institutional framework can limit the 
                                                        
1006 Millett, D. 2015. "CQC's 9% fee hike is a 'financial blow' to GP practices." London, UK. 
1007 Gaarder, M. M., and B. Briceño. 2010. "Institutionalisation of Government Evaluation: 
Balancing Trade-Offs." International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie). P. 6. 
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political influence in evaluation and audit processes. The independence 
conferred to the NAO, in addition to the support given to this body by 
Parliament, prevents that its work might be negatively influenced by other 
stakeholders. Moreover, the case of the CQC also illustrates the benefits of 
having an active community of external stakeholders interested in the 
discussion of the findings. The reports derived from Select Committees’ 
inquiries, for example, have been discussed by external stakeholders.1008 This 
helps reducing the discretion in the selective dissemination of findings, as there 
are more stakeholders involved in the follow-up of an evaluation. The extent to 
which stakeholders participate in this process can range from disseminating the 
results of a study to actively engage in a deeper discussion of the results.1009 
Finally, the outcomes of evaluation are difficult to determine because of the 
multiple factors that might have influenced the changes produced in the long 
term and that ‘cannot be easily divorced from procedural and normative 
measures.’1010 This leads to questioning: Where does the line stand between what 
can be considered the effects of evaluation and contextual factors such as political 
momentum and economic drivers? Furthermore, the case of the CQC is 
particularly interesting because of its evolution across time and the events that 
have affected its performance. First, the origin of the CQC as the merger of other 
regulators has evidently impacted the early stages of its operation. Unrealistic 
performance targets set for this regulator, as well as a poor organisational 
capacity, clearly undermined its capacity to successfully fulfil its task and to 
level up to ‘the expectations of the public.’1011 
The public attention brought to the CQC by events like Winterbourne View 
increased the pressure on this organisation and led to a more severe scrutiny. 
                                                        
1008 The Relatives & Residents Association. 2013. "Care Quality Commission not yet successfully 
defined its core purpose or earned public confidence ". London, UK. 
1009 For example, recently The King’s Fund disseminated the report published by the NAO about 
the improvement of cancer services and outcomes in England, while McMillan Cancer Support 
released a formal response to this report. See: Health Management and Policy Alert. 2015. 
"Progress In Improving Cancer Services And Outcomes In England." London, UK. McMillan 
Cancer Support. 2015. "Macmillan Cancer Support responds to NAO report on cancer services." 
London, UK. 
1010 Fukuyama, F. 2013. "What Is Governance?" Governance 26(3):347-68. P. 356. 
1011 Gary Fitzgerald, Chief Executive, Action on Elder Abuse. Committee of Public Accounts. 
2012. "The Care Quality Commission: Regulating the quality and safety of health and adult social 
care." London, UK. Evidence 4. 
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However, changes in the organisation and its policies cannot be automatically 
associated with these processes. Evaluating outcomes is challenging because 
there is no ‘logic model that helps program managers see the relationship 
among inputs, processes, and outputs and the key roles played by formative 
feedback and contextual variables in managing for results.’1012 In this particular 
case: 
I think the next difficulty then is what is caused by what we do and what is 
a correlation, improvements take place in complicated context 
organisations for lots of different reasons, so actually saying it’s all caused 
by what we do is probably too simplistic, so actually we need some quite 
rich and sophisticated research and evaluation tools to work out what it is 
that we do that is unique in driving improvements, is distinct from what it 
is others in the system do that will drive improvements (UK-1). 
The effect of the assessment in the broader context of policy cannot be isolated, 
and yet some nuances of its influence can be identified, as a member of the 
Health Committee staff explains: 
The accountability hearings worked pretty successful overall in identifying 
what the CQC was doing wrong and what they needed to do right and 
politically as well it provided, the act that this Committee was doing these 
reports, provided the momentum for the government to go away and 
change what the CQC was doing and to change the regulation, the 
regulatory work that they do, and ultimately is a good thing because they 
are a better organisation now than they were three years ago… (UK-2). 
The case of the CQC provides a good example of how evaluation can become a 
powerful tool to promote change in an organisation. The modifications in the 
CQC’s governance appear to have been directed to build more credibility within 
the public landscape. The appointment of a new Chief Executive in 2012 and a 
new Chair in 2013 generated momentum for its reorganisation and the 
establishment of new priorities just before the elections, which might bring new 
changes to the CQC, i.e. even a potential merging with the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority. On the eve of the elections, a CQC official (UK-1) 
reflects on the implications of these changes: 
At the minute we’re just coming to the end of the first year of a three-year 
reform journey and I think they should let us complete the three years of 
the reform journey before we start looking at additional things. 
                                                        
1012 Schalock, R. L., and G. S. Bonham. 2003. "Measuring outcomes and managing for results." 
Evaluation and Program Planning 26(3):229-35. P. 230. 
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Furthermore, the appointment of new Board members can be seen as an 
attempt to rebuild public trust. As stated, Robert Francis QC was recently 
appointed as a non-executive Board member. He is well known for being critical 
about the role of this body and also an advocate for patients’ rights.1013 The 
inclusion of such a figure can bring to the CQC more credibility and it sends out 
the message that the failings that occurred in the past will not be repeated. The 
CQC case makes evident that the appraisal of an organisation’s performance can 
be driven by multiple purposes. The most relevant is the need for legitimisation 
of the decision about merging the regulation of health and social care in a 
unique body. The initial difficulties faced within the CQC and the criticism about 
its response to highly publicised incidents did play a role in the way the 
organisation was assessed. Its relationship with the DoH and the way its 
credibility was affected also influenced the process. The CQC offers a case study 
in which assessment is underpinned by subjective elements affected by politics. 
In order to establish clear elements for comparison, the next sections are 
dedicated to the analysis of the Mexican case studies. 
  
                                                        
1013 Robert Francis QC was Chair of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry 
and he published a wide-spread report about the deficiencies found in this trust in patient care. 
He is also Honorary President of The Patients Association, an NGO that advocates for patients’ 
rights and that has a close relationship with the CQC as a provider of evidence. According to a 
member of this association (UK-6), ‘we have an arrangement with CQC where they’ve asked us 
to give them broad top-level findings from our helpline, I think we do it every week, so we send 
them information saying, you know, somebody was trying to do something and they weren’t 
able to get answer from the trust...’ The incorporation of Robert Francis to the CQC might affect 
this relationship in terms of independence. 
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6.2 Main Findings of the Mexican Case 
The characteristics of the institutional framework in which evaluation and audit 
take place in Mexico are also useful for analysing the role of politics in these 
activities. This section discusses the most relevant findings of the Mexican case 
through the thematic framework developed in Chapter 2. 
The description of the rules and procedures that guide evaluation in Mexico (see 
Chapter 5) represents a good point of departure for looking at how these rules 
affect its design and implementation. The Federal Government has fostered the 
development of evaluation capabilities for the institutionalisation of this activity 
at the national level. So far, these efforts have developed into the systematic 
evaluation of a wide range of policies and programmes. The audit process 
undertaken by the SAO represents an important advancement for the 
establishment of an accountability system and for the inclusion of an external 
view about the effectiveness of government and the use of public funds. 
Evaluation and audit tools are affected by the political context both in their 
processes and outcomes, as it is discussed in the next section. 
6.2.1 The Institutional Framework and the Hidden Politics of Evaluation in 
Mexico 
The first element that stands out in the Mexican case is its highly centralised 
evaluation policy. This comprises two major processes: internal evaluation and 
external audits made by the SAO on behalf of the Chamber of Deputies. The 
allocation of power promoted by the institutional framework affects the 
characteristics of the evaluation and audit systems implemented and the way in 
which participants interact (Figure 6.5). 
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Figure 6.5 Main Characteristics of the Institutional Framework for Evaluation in 
Mexico  
 
Unlike the UK case, in Mexico the Federal Government exercises strong control 
over the evaluation process. Most evaluations are based on standardised 
instruments (mostly developed by CONEVAL) that leave a very narrow space for 
evaluators to work outside these frameworks. In line with some of the 
secondary questions of this research, this element aids acknowledging the kind 
of evaluation instruments that have been developed in this country and which 
outputs can be expected from these.1014 Design evaluation, for instance, is based 
on a model that not only sets the questions that the programme must answer, 
but also the criteria for the evaluator to assess these responses.1015 This 
produces two major consequences: 
 It allows obtaining standardised information about programmes that can be 
more easily systematised and compared.1016 
 It simplifies the performance of evaluations through the use of models designed 
for this purpose. However, this limits evaluation to a reduced range of variables. 
This has been a central issue in the discussion about the effectiveness of the 
Mexican evaluation policy, as some interviewees recognise: 
                                                        
1014 This relates back to the question, Does the evaluation policy, in both countries produce 
relevant and convenient information that can be used for the policymaking process? The nature of 
the instruments promoted within an evaluation policy can provide insights about the kind of 
outputs that can be obtained. 
1015 National Council for the Evaluation of the Social Development Policy. 2015. "Terms of 
Reference Model for the Design Evaluation." Mexico City. 
1016 CONEVAL, for instance, developed an instrument in which it is possible to have a synthetic 
view of the performance of federal programmes. Source: —. 2014d. "Monitoring Record Card." 
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I can see as a serious problem of these formats that a poor evaluator can 
stick exclusively to fit the criteria […] but it is not an evaluation that 
generates added value (MX-1). 
There is a questioning about the CONEVAL’s evaluation model because they 
use secondary information and there are all desk-based studies that do not 
necessarily reflect all process, for instance, even though they claim to make 
processes evaluation, they are evaluating lots of issues regarding design, 
planning […] of course in the health sector you need to carefully select 
indicators to observe the direct impact on the population’s health (MX-5). 
This control over evaluation instruments can also be observed in the 
Consistency and Results Evaluation. This model focuses on the analysis of six 
themes: design, strategic planning, operation, coverage, beneficiaries’ 
perception, and results.1017 A programme that has been assessed with this 
instrument cannot provide any other information, i.e. equity or progressivity, 
outside this framework. This resonates with the idea that ‘judging programs 
against pre-determined targets may give the wrong signals: the targets may be 
irrelevant, overambitious or exceedingly modest.’1018 But at the same time, it 
makes evident that the actor who has control over the process has also the 
power to make those decisions according to his interests. Under this logic, an 
increase on the coverage could be seen as a positive finding, and yet, this would 
not provide enough elements to determine if a policy is working or not. 
Despite the rigidity of the evaluation process and the limited access to external 
stakeholders, evaluation is not exempted from political interference, 
particularly in the case of programmes that have reached an important level of 
notoriety in the public landscape. A Ministry of Health official (MX-4) identifies 
that ‘There are interests and nuances; at the end there are programmes that are 
protected.’ This suggests that the inflexibility of the evaluation policy can be an 
attempt of the Federal Government to maintain evaluation at a level that does 
not represent a menace to their interests. This is consistent with what Behrman 
and Skoufias state: 
Those who institute and advocate particular programs often are convinced, 
a priori, that they are likely to be successful in attaining their stated 
                                                        
1017 —. 2011b. "Terms of Reference Model for the Consistency and Results Evaluation." Mexico 
City. 
1018 Picciotto, R. 1999. "Towards an Economics of Evaluation." Evaluation 5(1):7-22. P. 16. 
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objectives, which is why they are strong advocates in the first place.1019 
The political influence in evaluation can be observed at different stages of the 
process as it will be discussed through the case studies. Overall, the most 
evident influence perceivable is the one exercised by the Federal Government in 
the control of evaluation instruments and the incentives for maintaining a small 
market of evaluators. 
The second element concerns the scope of the evaluation policy. This has been 
mostly constrained to the programmatic level and there is little debate and 
analysis of evaluation outputs. This was a problem detected almost since the 
inception of the evaluation policy. An NGO involved in public policy recognised 
this as one of the most evident weaknesses of the system: 
There are no institutional and normative bases for performing an 
integrated and systematic evaluation […] conciliating the macro (policies), 
meso (programmes and organisations) and micro (public officers’ 
performance) levels […] there is the risk to have incomplete information 
for decision-making, budget allocation and accountability.1020 
It appears that the evaluation policy operating has not been able to transcend its 
role as a managerial activity to become an active part of the discussion about 
government effectiveness and accountability. This will be explained in more 
detail in the following sections as it is a crucial aspect of the use of outputs. 
The third element worth discussing is the market of evaluators. Its development 
has been the result of the rise in the demand for evaluation after the 
institutionalisation of this activity.1021 At first, there was only ‘a very reduced 
pool of evaluators’ (MX-24) that began working for government ministries. This 
dynamic is atypical, because ‘The limited supply of evaluation services means 
that some putative advantages of contracting out (e.g. reducing bureaucratic 
control, cutting costs, and speeding operations) may not obtain.’1022 Moreover, it 
                                                        
1019 Behrman, J. R., and E. Skoufias. 2006. "Mitigating Myths about Policy Effectiveness: 
Evaluation of Mexico’s Antipoverty and Human Resource Investment Program." The ANNALS of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 606(1):244-75. P. 245. 
1020 González Arredondo, A. (Ed.). 2008. ¿Gobernar por resultados? Implicaciones de la política de 
evaluación del desempeño del gobierno mexicano. Mexico City: GESOC, A.C. P. 241. 
1021 Feinstein, O., and G. Hernández. 2008. "El Papel de la evaluación en México." Banco Mundial. 
1022 House, E. R. 1997. "Evaluation in the Government Marketplace." American Journal of 
Evaluation 18(1):37-48. P. 40. 
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generates negative incentives in terms of independence and credibility because 
it favours a codependent relationship between commissioners and evaluators. 
As an academic (MX-10) observes: 
My perception is that because the market is reduced the independence of 
both commissioners and evaluators is limited […] organisations do not 
have enough options to choose from […] and even though evaluators make 
their job right this does not guarantee that they will be hired again so that 
does not necessarily mean that they might be captured or compromised to 
say things that are not true, but they might be more subtle in the way they 
say them. 
Even though the institutional framework gives public organisations the 
prerogative to commission evaluations to external parties through public 
bidding, this does not eliminate the discretionary spaces in the process and its 
impact on the outputs of this activity. 
A fourth element of discussion regards the conflicts associated with the external 
nature of evaluation. The model implemented by the Federal Government 
produces important conflicts in terms of independence and credibility. On the 
one hand, the control of methodological aspects of evaluation limits the work of 
evaluators. On the other hand, the narrow market existence creates perverse 
incentives to perpetuate this situation. This makes the Mexican case an 
interesting object of study because the institutional framework favours the 
‘simulation’ of an external approach to evaluation. This means that despite 
evaluations being commissioned to external parties this does not necessarily 
mean that these studies are independent, because the government controls the 
key decisions of the process. Consequently, at a discursive level, the external 
nature of evaluation is seen as a safeguard for its independence, while in praxis, 
this independence is constrained by the rules and procedures imposed 
centrally. According to a Ministry of Health official (MX-5): ‘Somehow it is the 
government evaluating itself and there is an important credibility issue.’ 
The last element to discuss revolves around the audit system. The SAO’s work 
focuses on the identification of procedural deviations and financial reviews. 
Nonetheless, it has very little impact in terms of accountability and 
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policymaking.1023 One of the most recurrent criticisms of the SAO is precisely its 
lack of ‘teeth’ to enforce the follow-up of recommendations and to sanction: 
‘Without power for establishing direct sanctions, criminal complaints made by 
the SAO to the General Attorney of the Republic are diluted in time and do not 
proceed.’1024 Despite its relationship with the Legislative, the SAO does not 
appear to be appropriately supported by the Chamber of Deputies. As a member 
of the SAO (MX-12) states: ‘We believe performance auditing is a valid effort, 
but sometimes the cycle is not completed because it lacks enforcement 
mechanisms.’ 
In Mexico, evaluation and audit processes operate in a separate way. This 
diminishes the impact of these activities on the public sector. While 
coordination agencies promote evaluation within the Executive sphere, the SAO, 
in a separate way, provides ‘congressional budget oversight [and] performance 
audits to assess program progress in meeting objectives and goals and generate 
recommendations to improve government results.’1025 
This overview shows that the evaluation policy is still at an immature stage, 
regardless of the institutional efforts made in this area.1026 The main aim of the 
evaluation policy has been the development of technical capacities, but its effect 
on policymaking is still unclear. In addition, the lack of power of the SAO has 
limited its role in the accountability system and it is not perceived as an 
effective and complementary counterpart to how the Executive evaluates itself. 
This discussion will become clearer through the analysis of the case studies in 
the next two sections. 
                                                        
1023 Merino, M. 2009. "Informe sobre la evolución y el desempeño de la Auditoría Superior de la 
Federación." Mexico City. 
1024 Chávez, V. 2014. "Pleitos ponen en jaque al Ifai; ASF sin dientes (Lawsuits threatens IFAI; 
SAO toothless)." in El Financiero Mexico City. 
1025 Lopez-Acevedo, G., P. Krause, and K. Mackay (Eds.). 2012. Building Better Policies. The Nuts 
and Bolts of Monitoring and Evaluation Systems. Washington, D.C., US: The World Bank.. P. 176. 
1026 Cardozo, M. 2009. "La institucionalización de una cultura de la evaluación en la 
administración pública mexicana: Avances y desafíos pendientes." Convergencia. Revista de 
Ciencias Sociales 49:175-98. 
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6.2.2 The Hidden Politics of Evaluation in the Health Quality System 
Programme 
The case of SICALIDAD delivers important evidence about the hidden politics of 
evaluation. Considering the context in which evaluation and audit activities take 
place in Mexico, looking at the case of a specific programme sheds new light to 
the discussion about the political rationale underpinning these instruments. 
This section discusses the findings of this case through the thematic framework 
proposed in this research (Figure 6.6). 
Figure 6.6 Overview of the Hidden Politics of Evaluation in the Health Quality 
System Programme  
 
As discussed by the literature, the purpose of evaluation represents an 
important political decision because it requires conciliating the multiple 
interests that exist around evaluation.1027 In the Mexican case, there is an 
important bias towards efficiency and efficacy which makes explicit that the 
‘value’ of a programme is reduced to the relationship between funds spent and 
people benefited (inputs and outputs). SICALIDAD illustrates this; its most 
recent SPE provides information about its progress through indicators, i.e. 
coverage and budgetary performance.1028 What arises from here is that the 
value given to the programme is associated mostly with managerial variables. 
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This evinces a disconnection with the general objective of the programme, 
which is: 
To strengthen the quality of the attention in public institutions of the 
National Health System through the impulse of the execution and 
recognition of projects that help the effective access to health services.1029 
These variables do not necessarily provide convincing evidence about the effect 
of a programme, but they give stakeholders a more accessible way to evaluate 
based on quantifiable measures, i.e. the number of beneficiaries. This is 
consistent with what Hedrick called ‘the appropriateness of measures’ in 
relation to the intended or unintended bias that is generated in the definition of 
the scope.1030 The interesting point here is that in a context with limited space 
for debating evaluation, there will not be reactions to this situation even though 
it is a deliberate political decision of the Federal Government to prioritise the 
assessment of cost-effectiveness, instead of other elements like equity or 
transparency. 
In the case of SICALIDAD, a more pertinent focus of evaluation could be the 
ultimate benefits (beyond perception) received by patients in terms of quality. 
This has been acknowledged by external evaluators who consider it necessary 
‘to promote research to evaluate uniformly the impact of the actions of the 
programme.’1031 Nonetheless, this has not permeated the evaluation agenda. 
The purpose of evaluation can predetermine the results, as it implies the 
selection of certain kind of instrument that assesses only those variables 
selected by the predominant actor (coordination agencies) and that excludes 
the evaluated body from the process. In the opinion of a Ministry of Health 
official (MX-3): 
Evaluation should be based on joint decisions […] there are social 
programmes that should not be kept aside from evaluation, there is so 
much money there, so much effort, that you really need evidence of what is 
or not working. 
                                                        
1029 Ministry of Health. 2013a. "Agreement that issues the operational rules of the Integral 
Health Quality System Programme for the fiscal year 2014." Mexico City. 
1030 Hedrick, T. E. 1988. "The Interaction of Politics and Evaluation." American Journal of 
Evaluation 9(3):5-14. 
1031 Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana. 2012. "External Evaluation SICALIDAD." Mexico City: 
Ministry of Health. P. 98. 
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The marginalisation of key stakeholders reduces the level of confrontation, but 
it also impedes evaluation from becoming a more useful tool for improvement 
and accountability. Whose interests should predominate in the definition of what 
to evaluate and why? The political relevance of the purpose is also associated 
with the generation of evidence to justify the existence or the continuity of a 
programme, especially when termination is perceived as a threat.1032 Much 
earlier, Weiss observed that operators and managers ‘are concerned not just 
with today’s progress in achieving program goals, but with building long-term 
support for the programme.’1033 A Ministry of Public Function official (MX- 2) 
exemplifies this: 
When there was the transition in the Federal Government from the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party to the National Action Party, 12 years ago, 
Oportunidades1034 performed an evaluation with the World Bank […] as a 
way to say: ‘Look, our programme works’ and this is said by an 
international organisation, not just by us. 
This shows that stakeholders struggle for the predomination of their interests. 
Several people rely on the continuity of a programme, e.g. job security and 
electoral gaining. Consequently, they might have a political agenda to pursue, 
not always consistent among them. Evaluators might be interested in the 
continuity of a programme seen as an opportunity for business,1035 while 
funders, i.e. international organisations, might want evidence about the 
effectiveness of their investment.1036 Regarding this political agenda, an 
                                                        
1032 DeLeon, P. 1987. "Policy Termination as a Political Phenomenon." in The Politics of Program 
Evaluation, edited by Dennis J. Palumbo. California, US: SAGE, Geva-May, I. 2004. "Riding the 
Wave of Opportunity: Termination in Public Policy." Journal of Public Administration Research 
and Theory: J-PART 14(3):309-33. 
1033 Weiss, C. H. 1973. "Where Politics and Evaluation Research Meet." American Journal of 
Evaluation 14(1):93-106. P. 95. 
1034 The Human Development Programme Oportunidades is an obligated reference in the 
evaluation policy in Mexico. Under the previous name of Progresa, this programme has been 
systematically and profusely evaluated (using both quantitative and qualitative approaches) 
since 1999 and it has set the basis for the development of evaluation capabilities, particularly in 
the social development sector. 
1035 For example in recommending the termination of a programme, Eddy and Berry recognise 
“the potential conflict that exists between those seeking to serve their clients’ interests first and 
those who seek to serve the ‘public good’.” Eddy, R. M., and T. Berry. 2009. "The Evaluator’s Role 
in Recommending Program Closure." American Journal of Evaluation 30(3):363-76. P. 366. 
1036 The Mexican government has signed loan contracts with the IADB for the implementation of 
the Results-based budget model that include the development of monitoring and evaluation 
systems. Source: Inter-American Development Bank. 2008. "Results-based Budget Model 
Support Programme-Phase I." Washington, D.C., US. 
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evaluator (MX-22) recalled the case of the Piso Firme Programme:1037 
When the evaluation was performed they [the evaluators] found out that 
providing concrete floor with antibacterial properties reduced the 
presence of mites and this had an impact on the incidence of 
gastrointestinal diseases in children, this was done by Enrique Martínez to 
show that the programme worked, because he aimed to be President and 
he wanted to disseminate the results.1038 
The idea behind the political control of the purpose of evaluation is that it can 
shape the process according to the interests of stakeholders, for example, to 
expose the accomplishments or failures of government.1039 This relates back to 
the ideas about the role given to evaluation. The establishment of a purpose 
related to the identification of the effectiveness of SICALIDAD generates support 
for the programme as it makes evident its capacity to deliver. 
Another variable of the hidden politics of evaluation is the resources. For the 
performance of evaluations, SICALIDAD depends on the resources allocated by 
the Ministry of Health. This influences important decisions, such as the 
evaluators that can be hired or the instruments to be applied. As a Ministry of 
Health official (MX-3) recognises: 
What coordination agencies have done are evaluations based on 
documentary issues, there is no intentional search for evidence that can be 
obtained from studies of the beneficiary populations [for example] so there 
are a lot of obstacles to perform these exercises that you would like to do in 
evaluation not all programmes can be evaluated in the way you would like 
to, I mean, is an enormous amount of programmes and there is neither 
budget nor evaluators to perform those studies. 
SICALIDAD clearly exemplifies this situation. In 5 years (2007–12), eight 
different evaluations were performed; half of those were ad hoc studies mostly 
                                                        
1037 Piso Firme was a programme implemented by the state’s government of Coahuila (a state 
located in the northern part of Mexico). It basically consisted in providing a concrete’s floor with 
antibacterial properties to reduce the negative health effects on the population. 
1038 The interviewee refers to the impact evaluation leaded by Paul Gertler performed to the Piso 
Firme programme in Coahuila during 2004. Some of the most relevant findings of this study is 
that children under 5 years who live in households beneficiated by the programme present 18-
20% less incidence of diarrhoea episodes and 20% less prevalence of anaemia than children 
living in non-beneficiary households. Enrique Martínez was the governor of the State of 
Coahuila from 1999 to 2005, this politician tried to secure PRI’s nomination for the 2006 
presidential election, but he was unsuccessful. 
1039 For example, during the past government period, evaluations performed to programmes 
such as Oportunidades or Seguro Popular were highly promoted in the media. 
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done by the same evaluator.1040 This raises questions about how resources 
constrain the possibilities to perform more complex studies and to access a 
more competitive market of evaluators. With a very small pool of evaluators 
available, there are incentives to perpetuate this situation, particularly by those 
public institutions which are recurrent evaluators of federal programmes. The 
National Public Health Institute (INSP) has performed 50% of the SPEs to the 
programme and the design evaluation in 2007.1041 Regarding this issue, an 
evaluator (MX-15) recognises that ‘There are oligopolies, institutions where you 
know people are well-prepared, and it’s those people who receive the 
evaluations, almost de facto.’ As a result, a group of evaluators are constantly 
obtaining contracts from different ministries, establishing relationships that can 
become noxious for the independence of the process. 
The availability of data required for its evaluation is also an important resource. 
According to a recent report about SICALIDAD, some of the data required ‘was 
inconsistent’ regarding some indicators of the programme.1042 The literature 
recognises the control of data as an area of political influence.1043 The collection 
of data from different sources was challenging for the evaluation of SICALIDAD, 
because it implied the participation of multiple stakeholders, i.e. state 
governments, and sometimes operators were reluctant to disclose information: 
At an operative level that happened […] we asked for some particular data 
and they gave us some other thing […] we had a case in which we asked for 
information in different ways and even outside the planned timescale, and 
they refused giving it to us […] they were reluctant, they gave us a plain no 
(MX-15). 
This was also observed by SAO’s auditors, who rely on the information provided 
by the programme. According to the audit performed in 2011, the data of the 
programme ‘does not allow evaluating the accomplishment of the general 
                                                        
1040 For instance, the Metropolitan Autonomous University has evaluated SICALIDAD in three 
occasions since 2009. 
1041 Coordinators of the evaluations have changed but they all belong to this organisation. 
1042 National Public Health Institute. 2013f. "Specific Performance Evaluation. SICALIDAD 
Programme.". Mexico City. P. 21. 
1043 Bamberger, M., J. Rugh, and L. Mabry. 2012. Real-World Evaluation: Working Under Budget, 
Time, Data, and Political Constraints. California, US: SAGE, McLemore, J. R., and J. E. Neumann. 
1987. "The inherently political nature of program evaluators and evaluation research." 
Evaluation and Program Planning 10(1):83-93. 
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objective of SICALIDAD.’1044 This control over data can be translated into the 
selective provision of information (intended or not) to protect the interests of 
stakeholders. Omissions in the production of data systems are also an important 
issue, as SICALIDAD requires data from state-level health institutions that 
implement quality projects funded centrally. However, as evaluators identified: 
There is no integrated information system in terms of quality that allows 
the opportune, exact and sufficient identification of the conditions about 
the quality problem in health institutions in the country.1045 
Funding for the development of evaluation studies is also a resource with 
political implications. As Bamberger et al. recognise, constraints in terms of 
data, funding, and time can affect the characteristics of an evaluation. This might 
favour the performance of simpler and cheaper studies.1046 SICALIDAD has been 
mostly evaluated through the application of synthetic instruments based on 
operational information provided by the programme. This kind of evaluation is 
less expensive than those studies that require fieldwork.1047 In this case, the 
funding restriction has even affected those mandatory evaluations. For example, 
the Consistency and Results Evaluation was cancelled in 2012 because of 
budgetary restrictions (MX-4). 
From the perspective of the institutional framework it is interesting to observe 
that the obligation imposed to programmes to perform an annual evaluation 
might generate incentives to carry out simpler studies to comply regulation, 
regardless of its real contribution to the programme.1048 The non-compliance of 
this rule can be seen as a resistance to be evaluated and has negative political 
consequences for the programme.1049 
                                                        
1044 Supreme Audit Office. 2011. "Performance Audit. SICALIDAD.". Mexico, City. 
1045 Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana. 2012. "External Evaluation SICALIDAD." Mexico City: 
Ministry of Health. P. 16.  
1046 Bamberger, M., J. Rugh, and L. Mabry. 2012. Real-World Evaluation: Working Under Budget, 
Time, Data, and Political Constraints. California, US: SAGE. 
1047 The average cost of the specific performance evaluations to SICALIDAD is circa £3,500 
compared to the cost of the latest ad hoc evaluation to the programme which cost was around 
£66,000. Source: Estimation based on data of the Ministry of Health. 
1048 "Social Development General Law." Mexico. Art. 78. 
1049 This has been observed recently in the resistance to evaluation found in the education 
sector. See: Castillo, M. A. 2015. "Gestión y evaluación: De la resistencia al desarrollo próximo." 
in Segundo Congreso Latinoamericano de Medición y Evaluación Educacional. Mexico City. 
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Methodological issues are also susceptible to political influence.1050 As 
Chelimsky says, the political context underpinning evaluation demands giving 
more attention to the selection of methods, as this can be disputed by political 
adversaries,1051 ‘questioning the methodology is a major obstacle for evaluation 
to be beneficial’ (MX-2). The control over the methodology can represent a 
mechanism for influencing the process. As described, in ad hoc studies 
evaluation units define the TORs, although evaluators usually present a 
technical proposal. As an evaluator of SICALIDAD (MX-15) describes: ‘There is a 
dialogue with the commissioner to clarify some aspects mostly technical and in 
some cases methodological.’ TORs established by the commissioner constrain 
evaluators from exploring any other areas. Despite this, the general opinion is 
that evaluators are independent enough: 
I think that they work independently and according to their own criteria, I 
don’t believe that they are influenced [by someone], what affects the 
assessment is the idea that they have of the programme (MX-11). 
The process is not exempted from political influence either. Independence is a 
constant element of discussion in the Mexican case. Important efforts have been 
made to promote the performance of external evaluations to provide an 
objective judgement about a programme. The key element is to what extent this 
independence can be preserved in a context in which the institutional 
framework allows excessive influence of the Federal Government and leaves a 
very narrow space for evaluators to make their work. This creates a scenario in 
which independence seems to be a core element of the discourse, but is limited 
in practice due to the rigidness of the evaluation policy. An evaluator of 
SICALIDAD (MX-15) acknowledges that he perceived ‘only isolated cases of 
interference due to political disputes in state-level organisations […] that 
altered the dynamic of the evaluation.’ There do not seem to be explicit threats 
                                                        
1050 Oportunidades illustrates this situation. According to an evaluator (MX-22), in the process of 
defining an evaluation ‘there are a lot of political decisions, there is the need to evidence if a 
programme is doing right […] it’s not only the fact of performing evaluations, another issue is to 
evaluate the aspect that is under the sun, rather than the one than is in the shadow, [for 
example] there are very few evaluations of Oportunidades to assess the impact of the 
programme in urban localities.’ 
1051 Chelimsky, E. 1995. "The Political Environment of Evaluation and What it Means for the 
Development of the Field: Evaluation for a New Century: A Global Perspective." American 
Journal of Evaluation 16(3):215-25. 
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to independence, but subtle interferences occurred as a result of the 
centralisation of the process and the use of predetermined frameworks. As 
Karlsson suggests, ‘Evaluation has become a tool for control […] and to 
legitimise the political decisions and priorities.’1052 
The process concerns also commissioning evaluations. Regulation determines 
that ministries can contract external parties through three mechanisms: public 
bidding, restricted invitation, and direct adjudication.1053 There is an exemption 
to public bidding when a public university will provide the service. Deadlines 
and procedures for this purpose are, as a generalised opinion, highly complex, 
and this forces the commissioner to make decisions under suboptimal 
conditions.1054 An official explains: ‘It is complex for us [public bidding] because 
of time restriction; we are always pressured by deadlines’ (MX- 4). This might 
explain why circa 80% of the evaluations of SICALIDAD have been performed by 
public institutions. In addition and according to a former CONEVAL official (MX-
22), some of these institutions have monopolised evaluation, producing a rise in 
the costs. The theory recognises that contracts in evaluation need to transcend 
the technical aspect and incorporate an ethical component.1055 However, what 
seems more relevant to discuss are the informal rules that shape the 
relationship between commissioners and evaluators. If only the commissioning 
part is regulated there is a discretionary area in the interaction between parties. 
The process of evaluation in the case of SICALIDAD shows that despite the 
rigidity of the institutional framework, stakeholders constantly find spaces of 
discretion to pursue their interests. 
The use of outputs is a matter of political concern as well. In terms of utilisation, 
the mechanism for the follow-up of recommendations (see Chapter 5, Section 
5.1.2) is considered ‘a very light instrument’ (MX-8) as there is no enforcement 
                                                        
1052 Karlsson, O. 2003. "Evaluation Politics in Europe: Trends and Tendencies." Studies in 
Educational Policy and Educational Philosophy. P. 1. 
1053 "Act on Acquistion, Leasing and Public Sector Services."Art. 26. 
1054 One of the major concerns of public agencies is that if they do not exercise public funds 
within the established term, the Ministry of Finance might withdraw these funds and they would 
no longer be able to perform the evaluation. 
1055 Bechar, S., and I. Mero-Jaffe. 2014. "Who Is Afraid of Evaluation? Ethics in Evaluation 
Research as a Way to Cope With Excessive Evaluation Anxiety: Insights From a Case Study." 
American Journal of Evaluation 35(3):364-76. 
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in the use of evaluations and it has evolved into another administrative process 
that ministries must follow. This produces two major concerns. First, the 
programme’s operation and evaluation units are in charge of analysing 
recommendations and establishing a course of action for their implementation. 
This generates incentives for the selection of those considered more feasible 
and easy to accomplish.1056 As a Ministry of Health official (MX-8) states: 
The follow-up system is a way of accountability, but I think that it remains 
too short, it makes it too easy for them [operators] […] as far as I am 
concerned SICALIDAD accomplishes what it is established in the system, 
but still, they are not going to select the most difficult issues. 
If programme operators have the freedom to select recommendations there is 
no real incentive to address those that can be more challenging. On the contrary, 
it seems to promote the fulfilment of administrative requirements with poor 
effects on improvement, because the focus is on the process, not on the results. 
To illustrate this, in its most recent work programme for the follow-up of 
recommendations, SICALIDAD only planned the performance of a single action: 
‘To develop an indicator for the matrix 2015 that provides more specific 
measurements about quality in services.’1057 This reveals that the programme 
meets the requirements of coordination agencies, but this does not seem to have 
an important effect on the improvement of the programme or a substantial 
contribution to decision-making. The institutional framework gives 
coordination agencies the power to question or enforce programmes to heed 
recommendations, but with no real consequences in practice if they fail to 
comply. As one of CONEVAL’s counsellors (MX-14) recognises: 
The main challenge of this mechanism is transcending from generating quality and 
independent evaluations to achieving impact, I think we have figured out the first 
part, but the second one, that we haven’t accomplished it yet, […] the follow-up 
process is very positive but that is something that programmes do and you can see 
their response to very specific recommendations, is much less the utility that 
evaluations have, for example, for budgetary. 
A similar situation occurs in the case of the SAO performance audits. The report 
                                                        
1056 Also, it is a recurrent argument that they cannot follow a particular recommendation 
because is not of their competence; they need the intervention of other actors or simply require 
additional funding. 
1057 Ministry of Health. 2014b. "Sistema Integral de Calidad en Salud SICALIDAD. Work 
Programme." Mexico City.  
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issued in 2011 contained recommendations mostly related to the lack of 
indicators and mechanisms to assess its accomplishment. The audited entity is 
expected to deliver promptly the information requested, to cooperate with the 
auditing process, and to respond to the observations made by the SAO; yet they 
are only expected to establish actions of improvement or to provide arguments 
for not heeding recommendations.1058 Although utilisation is contemplated in 
the institutional framework, in practice it is a weak instrument that does not 
clearly promote the use of outputs, mostly because as an auditor (MX-12) states, 
the SAO “lacks ‘teeth’ to enforce public agencies to act in a certain way.” 
Utilisation as a core element of the theory developed around evaluation 
suggests that if institutions are not clearly being benefited from this activity, 
‘there is little justification for investing the resources necessary to conduct an 
evaluation.’1059 It is difficult to determine an accurate rate of return from 
evaluation and auditing by only considering instrumental benefits when 
political returns from these activities cannot be quantified but are also quite 
important. 
Regarding dissemination, regulation enforces the publication of all compulsory 
evaluations in the Official Federation Journal1060 and in the ministries’ 
websites.1061 This reduces the space of discretion for stakeholders to selectively 
disseminate outputs. However, this does not mean that their interests cannot be 
affected. A SICALIDAD operator explains that an evaluator disseminated the 
results of a study without the programme’s authorisation. The findings were not 
positive because, according to this interviewee, he ‘evaluated according to his 
models and not considering the context of the programme, so this harmed the 
programme considerably’ (MX-17). 
This reveals two important issues. On the one hand, getting out of the 
predetermined framework for evaluating the programme generates conflicts 
                                                        
1058 "Federal Accountability Law." Art. 32. 
1059 Neuman, A., N. Shahor, I. Shina, A. Sarid, and Z. Saar. 2013. "Evaluation utilization research—
Developing a theory and putting it to use." Evaluation and Program Planning 36(1):64-70. P. 64. 
1060 "Social Development General Law." Mexico. Art. 79. 
1061 "General guidelines for the evaluation of the federal programmes of the Federal Public 
Administration." Mexico. Title III, chapter VII. 
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between stakeholders, particularly if applying alternative models deriving in 
negative findings. On the other hand, the dissemination of negative aspects of 
the programme is considered a threat because it exposes operational 
deficiencies that can affect them individually, e.g. losing their job. Even though 
regulation enforces dissemination, this does not completely limit the potential 
influence of stakeholders to align outputs to their interests and ‘to present 
themselves in a positive light.’1062 For example, the award promoted by the 
Ministry of Public Function ‘to identify the programme’s commitment to heed 
evaluation recommendations’1063 was an interesting opportunity for SICALIDAD 
to promote its positive aspects. This prize reflected its ‘remarkable 
appropriation of the logic of evaluation results to generate internal 
improvement processes’1064 and it allowed the programme to disseminate those 
evaluation outputs that clearly justify its existence, particularly in a political 
moment of transition in which many programmes were at risk of 
termination.1065 This was a mechanism of dissemination that legitimated the 
programme through the intervention of the external reviewers that awarded 
the prize. 
Finally, in terms of outcomes, SICALIDAD provides some interesting lessons 
about the effect of evaluation in the improvement of the programme. Several 
interviewees were asked if they could recall a substantial change derived from 
the findings of an evaluation. Most of them agreed on saying that only minor 
adjustments have been made. Long-term effects of evaluation are not easy to 
define because of the complexity of isolating them from other variables that 
might have intervened. Evaluation can find resistance because, as Picciotto 
highlights: 
                                                        
1062 O'Brien, T., S. Payne, M. Nolan, and C. Ingleton. 2010. "Unpacking the Politics of Evaluation: A 
Dramaturgical Analysis." Evaluation 16(4):431-44. P. 432. 
1063 Cejudo, G. 2011. "De las recomendaciones a las acciones: El uso de la evaluación en la mejora 
del desempeño del gobierno." in De las recomendaciones a las acciones: La experiencia del Premio 
2011 Programas Federales Comprometidos con el Proceso de Evaluación, edited by G. Cejudo and 
C. Maldonado. Mexico City: CIDE-SFP. P. 8. 
1064 Maldonado, C. 2011. "El programa SICALIDAD: Ejemplo de gestión pública anclada en la 
evaluación para la mejora continua." in De las recomendaciones a las acciones: La experiencia del 
Premio 2011. Programas Federales Comprometidos con el Proceso de Evaluación, edited by G. 
Cejudo and C. Maldonado. Mexico City: CIDE-SFP. P. 67. 
1065 Presidential elections were held in July 2012 and the elected government took office in 
December of that year. 
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The impetus […] has often come from parliaments, supreme audit organizations, 
budget authorities or funding agencies. Internally, there are fears that budgetary 
allocations may be reduced as a result of evaluations; reluctance to share control 
over information flows; distrust about performance-based evaluations.1066 
The fact that evaluation is already an institutionalised practice that has become 
a part of the programme’s routine is an important progress, but other elements 
still need to be addressed. The first one is the quality of the studies, as currently 
its performance does not guarantee that studies are being properly 
conducted.1067 The other is the promotion of more effective mechanisms for the 
utilisation of findings. In the case of SICALIDAD, evaluation and auditing can 
represent core elements of its operation as the problem that is tackling the 
programme is complex and multifactorial. In Mexico, quality of health services 
‘is heterogeneous and its efficiency is reduced, causing the prevalence of 
dissatisfaction in users and providers.’1068 Consequently, the production and 
utilisation of evidence is crucial to identify the most critical areas to address. 
Despite the efforts made by the Federal Government, it appears that evaluation 
is not completely embedded into policymaking, even less in the political sphere. 
After the 2012 election, SICALIDAD suffered minor adjustments to its operation 
(transiting from ‘programme’ to ‘strategy’), but it has not reached an important 
level of notoriety in the political sphere. For example, President Peña Nieto 
recently declared: ‘Let’s have an area within the health sector specifically in 
charge of monitoring the quality of services provided by the institutions of the 
National Health System’.1069 This suggests that politicians are not entirely aware 
of the work carried out by ministries or of the existence of findings that show 
the progress made in this area. So political changes that might interfere with 
policy continuity of these changes are seen as an opportunity to start from 
                                                        
1066 Picciotto, R. 1999. "Towards an Economics of Evaluation." Evaluation 5(1):7-22. P. 14. 
1067 The quality issue in evaluation has fostered, for example, the discussion about the 
pertinence of the certification of evaluators. See: Davies, R., D. Randall, and R. E. West. 2015. 
"Using Open Badges to Certify Practicing Evaluators." American Journal of Evaluation 36(2):151-
63. 
1068 Alcántara, M. A. (Ed.). 2012. La calidad de la atención a la salud en México a través de sus 
instituciones: 12 años de experiencia. Mexico City: Ministry of Health. P. 12. 
1069 Rodríguez García, A. 2014. "Peña commands the creation of an area to overview quality of 
health services." in Revista Proceso. Mexico City. 
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scratch.1070 
SICALIDAD allows looking at the consequences derived from a very rigid and 
centralist evaluation policy, a weak external audit body and an embryonic 
market of evaluators. These variables have generated spaces of discretion that 
stakeholders use in the pursuit of their interests. Moreover, the lack of 
participation from external stakeholders (NGOs, charities, media) in questioning 
the results of audits and evaluations and the process itself leaves these activities 
in a position of having very little influence. The next section focuses on the case 
of the Health Caravans Programme, which also provides consistent findings 
about the hidden politics of evaluation in Mexico.  
                                                        
1070 See: Wilson, C. A. 2013. Public Policy: Continuity and Change. USA: Waveland Press. 
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6.2.3 The Hidden Politics of Evaluation in the Health Caravans Programme 
The case of the Health Caravans Programme is also analysed through the lenses 
of the thematic framework proposed in this research. The analysis aims to 
present additional evidence about how politics affects evaluation, considering 
the Mexican institutional framework. Due to its nature, Health Caravans has had 
more notoriety in the public sphere. Local media, for example, often spread the 
word about the arrival of a caravan to a particular location.1071 It is also a more 
salient programme in terms of budget (circa £30 million in 2012).1072 These 
particularities give this case a different perspective to the hidden politics of 
evaluation (Figure 6.7). 
Figure 6.7 Overview of the Hidden Politics of Evaluation in the Health Caravans 
Programme
 
In terms of the purpose, coordination agencies control the periodicity, 
methodology, and scope of evaluation. The literature recognises these as 
political decisions because this stage imposes ‘the challenge of reconciling a 
wide range of understandings of, and purposes for, program evaluation among 
these stakeholders.’1073 A power struggle arises between coordination agencies 
in relation to the definition of the programmes to evaluate and the kind of 
evaluation to apply. According to members of the Ministry of Finance, 
                                                        
1071 See: Estrada García, K. 2015. "Health Caravans come to Ascensión." in Diario.mx. Chihuahua, 
Mexico, Trejo, Á. 2015. "Health Caravans arrive to Epazoyucan." in Criterio. Hidalgo, Mexico. 
1072 Source: National Public Health Institute. 2013b. "Specific Performance Evaluation. Health 
Caravans Programme 2012-2013.". Mexico City. 
1073 Rutkowski, D., and J. Sparks. 2014. "The new scalar politics of evaluation: An emerging 
governance role for evaluation." Evaluation 20(4):492-508. P. 493. 
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coordination agencies receive a list of evaluation needs from programmes that 
are negotiated for the final definition of the AEP (MX-18-22). This exposes an 
area of discretion produced by the lack of explicit criteria for the selection of 
programmes and evaluation instruments. While programmes like Health 
Caravans have been systematically evaluated, others have just recently been 
incorporated into this process, e.g. programmes from the Ministry of Tourism. 
The defined purpose of evaluation is limited mostly to effectiveness and 
operational issues, leaving aside other features that might generate evidence of 
a different nature. For example, the purpose of Health Caravans’ most recent 
evaluation was: 
To describe and analyse the operation of Health Caravans in order to detect 
opportunity areas and strengths that allow the development of a continuous 
improvement model of its macro processes to achieve the goals and targets of the 
programme in a more efficient, effective and opportune way.1074 
In the opinion of an academic (UK-1), the narrowness of the purpose of 
evaluation to determine effectiveness shows: 
A bias to grant a priori the public value generated by the programme […] it looks 
only at the accomplishments of the programme but there is no previous 
questioning of the relevance, the public value and the mere existence of the 
programme. 
This gives space for discussing an important issue of the Mexican case. Here 
evaluation relies on the assumption that the policy is appropriate to address the 
problem. Constraining this activity to the discussion of the effectiveness of 
programmes can help explaining why evaluation has not penetrated the 
political discussion. For instance, the provision of health services in remote 
locations by Health Caravans seems a palliative to a much more complex 
problem: access. Therefore, the study of variables beyond the effectiveness of 
the programme and its operational issues is required for obtaining evidence 
about better ways for tackling the problem. According to Juárez-Ramírez et al., 
Mexico has a serious problem of inequality in the access to health services, 
especially among vulnerable groups of the population such as the elderly and 
                                                        
1074 Universidad Intercultural del Estado de México. 2013. "Health Caravans Evaluation 
Programme in High and Very Highly Marginalised Locations ". Mexico City. P. 1. 
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migrants.1075 Even though the focus of the evaluations to Health Caravans has 
been its effectiveness as an alternative for the provision of health services in 
remote locations, its lack of impact due to the magnitude of the problem has 
been acknowledged, as ‘it is insufficient considering the real health needs of the 
population that it serves.’1076 
This resonates with Clarke’s ideas about success. He states that evaluation 
contributes to the identification of ‘winners and losers.’1077 Consequently, the 
variables that transmit the accomplishment of targets are a good mechanism to 
demonstrate the ‘value’ of a programme. In the case of Health Caravans, 
evaluations have highlighted its accomplishments in terms of coverage and 
trained staff.1078 However, these indicators provide little information about its 
capacity to reduce inequalities. 
Resources represent another variable susceptible of political influence. The 
centralisation of financial resources for evaluation leaves ministries in a 
position of mere executors of decisions taken by others. Financial resources 
predetermine not only the number of evaluations to perform during a fiscal 
year, but also its nature, as some studies are more expensive than others.1079 
For example, the cost of the most recent ad hoc evaluation to Health Caravans 
was approximately £431,000 (nearly 1.2% of its 2014 budget1080). Considering 
operational costs it is not possible to allocate many more resources to 
evaluation; ergo, there are constraints beyond the control of the programme, as 
political will and commitment to evaluation are not the only elements required 
                                                        
1075 Juárez-Ramírez, C., M. Márquez-Serrano, N. Salgado de Snyder, B. E. Pelcastre-Villafuerte, M. 
G. Ruelas-González, and H. Reyes-Morales. 2014. "La desigualdad en salud de grupos vulnerables 
de México: Adultos mayores, indígenas y migrantes." Revista Panamericana de Salud Pública 
35:284-90. 
1076 National Public Health Institute. 2013b. "Specific Performance Evaluation. Health Caravans 
Programme 2012-2013.". Mexico City. P. 2. 
1077 Clarke, J. 2008. "Performance Paradoxes: The Politics of Evaluation in Public Services." Pp. 
120-34 in Public Services Inspection in the UK. Research Highlight in Social Work, edited by H. 
Davis and S. Martin. London, UK: Jessica Kingsley Publishers. 
1078 National Public Health Institute. 2013b. "Specific Performance Evaluation. Health Caravans 
Programme 2012-2013.". Mexico City. 
1079 As an example, the Health Caravans Programme carried out in 2011 a Specific Performance 
Evaluation which cost was 65, 384.23 Mexican pesos (approximately 3,500 GBP) and a 
complementary evaluation that cost 5, 490,000 Mexican pesos (circa 293,000 GBP), with these 
examples we can observe the range that exists in the cost of evaluations to public programmes. 
1080 Estimate based on information from the Ministries of Health and Finance. 
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for this activity to succeed. 
This also shows the unfeasibility of evaluation of all existent programmes, 
despite the proportion of their cost in the overall budget of the Federal 
Government1081 and the selection of instruments suitable to the needs of the 
programme. It is difficult to carry out more sophisticated and possibly more 
expensive studies. This might also imply sacrificing quality and prioritising the 
cost variable. As a Ministry of Health official (MX-5) recognises, ‘Often quality is 
sacrificed for cost […] when criteria [for evaluation] was not properly 
established.’ This issue has been recently discussed in the academic sector: 
The evaluation market is still incipient: lots of evaluators are relatively new 
in the evaluation field, there are not enough signals about the quality of 
evaluations, nor an instance that qualifies the solidness of an evaluator […] 
In addition the acquisition processes in the Federal Government are good 
for identifying good prices, but not necessarily good quality.1082 
In the case of Health Caravans, operators were very enthusiastic about 
performing more complex studies, but they are limited by the resources 
available. Most evaluations have been desk-based studies that have provided 
information for internal consumption (MX-11). The evaluations commissioned 
and funded by CONEVAL are standardised studies that do not entirely meet the 
programme’s needs. This generates a political dispute because ‘it involves 
power relations and decisions about rules and resources, particularly the 
allocation of funding.’1083 
Like SICALIDAD, the limited pool of evaluators has also been a weak link in the 
evaluation system. It is important to recall that evaluation bloomed in Mexico 
after the results-based Management model was institutionalised in 2007, 
generating an important increase in the demand for evaluation studies. As an 
academic explains (MX-1): ‘There wasn’t an installed capacity [of evaluators], 
                                                        
1081 According to information of the Synthetic Model of Performance developed by the Ministry 
of Finance, in 2012 were identified 1022 budgetary programmes operating in the Federal 
Government.  
1082 Cejudo, G. 2011. "De las recomendaciones a las acciones: El uso de la evaluación en la mejora 
del desempeño del gobierno." in De las recomendaciones a las acciones: La experiencia del Premio 
2011 Programas Federales Comprometidos con el Proceso de Evaluación, edited by G. Cejudo and 
C. Maldonado. Mexico City: CIDE-SFP..  
1083 O'Brien, T., S. Payne, M. Nolan, and C. Ingleton. 2010. "Unpacking the Politics of Evaluation: A 
Dramaturgical Analysis." Evaluation 16(4):431-44. P. 433. 
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instead it has been created since; universities have started to direct researchers 
toward evaluation; consultancies have been created.’  
The offer of evaluators is insufficient for the existent demand.1084 Consequently, 
a reduced group of evaluators is constantly hired due to the lack of options.1085 
Some of the evaluators of SICALIDAD have also evaluated Health Caravans, i.e. 
National Public Health Institute, and other programmes operated by the 
Ministry of Health.1086 This also occurs in the case of ad hoc evaluations, when 
the National Autonomous University of Mexico has performed 42% of the 
studies.1087 This reveals another problem in terms of the capacity to perform 
evaluation studies. A former CONEVAL official (MX-24) explains: 
At first we didn’t have enough knowledge about evaluators […], so we 
turned to universities and this process was not easy, they were used to 
write papers but not to write evaluation reports. 
The development of evaluation capabilities has been an incremental process but 
it has not favoured the expansion of the market. The limited group of evaluators 
that exists have gained experience and knowledge about the operation of the 
evaluation policy, which gives them a competitive advantage regarding those 
academicians that have the technical expertise to evaluate but who have not 
entered into this privileged group. According to Maldonado, both the legal 
complexity for commissioning evaluations and the prevalence of public 
institutions in the market of evaluation ‘induces a remarkable barrier of 
entrance to new, private and individual consultant services providers and puts a 
bunch of academic institutions in an oligopoly of the market of evaluation.’1088 
                                                        
1084 To illustrate the dimension of this situation, the AEP 2013 established the evaluation of 210 
federal programmes for this year. These programmes are operated by different agencies of the 
Federal Government and require the participation of multiple evaluators.  
1085 As an example, the SPE coordinated by CONEVAL in three different periods of time (2008-
2009, 2009-2010 and 2011-2012) shows that approximately 32% of the evaluators in charge of 
conducting the evaluation have been hired at least in two occasions out of three in which this 
evaluation has been performed. Due to the numerous evaluations that needed to be hired, it is 
not possible to identify specialists for every subject; instead, evaluators participate in the 
assessment of several programmes that are linked to their broadest expertise. 
1086 For instance, most evaluators of Health Caravans also have performed studies for the Seguro 
Popular programme, one of the most salient health initiatives of the Federal Government. 
1087 This also occurs with the Metropolitan Autonomous University in the case of SICALIDAD. 
1088Maldonado, C. 2012. "Más allá de las instituciones: La evaluación y la gestión por resultados 
en México. Una perspectiva de mercado." in XVII Congreso Internacional del CLAD sobre la 
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A Ministry of Health official (MX-4) justifies commissioning evaluations to 
recurrent institutions: ‘They have the infrastructure and knowledge to perform 
this kind of evaluation. They even take blood samples, which require a lot of 
resources.’ This resonates with the lack of evaluation capabilities in the country. 
As Rist et al. state, human capital is an element of evaluation capacity. ‘There 
needs to be good capacity in terms of the quantity and quality of M&E human 
resources, both within the organization (M&E staff) and outside the 
organization (external evaluators).’1089 
This situation produces a lack of market signals about quality, which according 
to a CONEVAL official (MX-9) ‘has been very heterogeneous.’ There are no 
mechanisms for commissioners to discriminate among evaluators and ‘a 
consultancy firm can disappear and reappear under a new name to make 
systematically poor evaluations and survive in the market because there are no 
means to eliminate them’ (UK-1). In line with this, an NGO reflects about the role 
of coordination agencies: 
They need to go further overviewing the compliance of the regulation. They 
must have a proactive role in the provision of data and evidence to 
commissioners about the quality and costs of evaluations, reducing 
information asymmetries.1090 
This is observable in ad hoc evaluations. SICALIDAD, Health Caravans, and 
Seguro Popular have consistently commissioned this kind of study. For the 
2009–12 period, the average cost of each one of these evaluations was circa 
£170,000 for a 3-month contract.1091 However, the scope, methodology, and 
complexity of the studies differ. For example, the 2012 evaluation to Health 
Caravans was an analysis of the evaluations performed during 2007–111092 
(meta evaluation). In contrast, the 2010 evaluation to Seguro Popular comprised 
the study of two groups of women who had been treated for breast cancer at 
                                                                                                                                                             
Reforma del Estado y de la Administración Pública. Cartagena, Colombia. P.8. 
1089 Rist, R. C., M. H. Boily, and F. Martin. 2011. Influencing Change. Building Evaluation Capacity 
to Strengthen Governance. Washington, D.C., US: The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development/The World Bank. P. 7. 
1090 GESOC, A.C. 2009. "Monitoreo de la Confiabilidad de las Evaluaciones a Programas Federales 
(2007-2008)." P. 8. 
1091 Estimation based on information of the Ministry of Health. 
1092 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. 2012. "External Evaluation. Health Caravans 
Programme.". Mexico City. 
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selected hospitals.1093 Consequently, there are no criteria to determine a range 
of costs derived from the characteristics of the study (complexity, length, etc.). 
The lack of options gives evaluators the prerogative to set the price or at least to 
be in a better position for negotiating. 
The process of evaluation has also political considerations. Discretionary spaces 
can be found in the selection of methodology, during the commission of 
evaluations and in the interaction among stakeholders. A clear example is the 
complexity of the commissioning process, as an interviewee (MX-24) suggests 
‘there are perverse incentives for public entities […] to avoid public bidding for 
simplifying the administrative work of finding people to carry out the studies.’ 
This keeps the market reduced and promotes a closer relationship between 
commissioners and evaluators in universities, particularly those publicly 
funded: 
There is a very serious reputation game with universities […] I think that 
the best evaluations are done within academic institutions, but there are 
also very poor evaluations that rely on the institution’s reputation (UK-1). 
This creates incentives for preserving the status quo.1094 Evaluation represents 
an important area of business for researchers while at the same time it also 
simplifies the work of commissioners. The SPE illustrates this as there are 
recurrent evaluators in different years and programmes of the Ministry of 
Health.1095 Some interviewees identified that evaluators who are familiar with 
the administrative process can take advantage of this situation through informal 
arrangements. As an evaluator (MX-22) points out: 
It can be a very flexible situation, if you want to perform an evaluation but 
you belong to a private university you go to a public institution, you pay the 
overhead, the contract is established under the name of a researcher from 
that university […] you perform the evaluation and get paid.1096 
                                                        
1093 National Public Health Institute. 2012. "Evaluation of the effects of the catastrophic expenses 
fund in breast cancer patients ". Mexico City. 
1094 These universities and centres receive public funds for their operation. In the case of public 
research centres, these belong to the Federal Public Parastatal Administration, so they are part 
of a scheme in which public programmes are evaluated by researchers that belong to public 
universities. 
1095 Source: Specific Performance Evaluations: Health Caravans, SICALIDAD and Seguro Popular 
2008-2012. 
1096 This situation has also led researchers at private institutions to consider that they are in 
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A Ministry of Health official (MX-6) explains that the familiarity of the 
evaluators with the nuances of the process can also impact on the quality of the 
studies. ‘In the commercial relationship that is established to perform an 
evaluation the evaluator becomes too confident knowing that once a project is 
authorized, the flow of resources is guaranteed.’ The closeness of the market 
generates space for informal agreements that can compromise independence, as 
House observes in the ‘socialization’ between evaluators and commissioners.1097 
This can represent a threat to independence… 
Evaluators need freedom to plan and implement the particular study 
design that will bring the best answer to the question asked, and they need 
freedom to determine their findings and report on what they’ve found.1098 
As both commissioners and evaluators have interests at stake, constant 
interaction can lead to the establishment of informal rules around the process of 
evaluation, e.g. in the provision of data. According to a Ministry of Health official 
(MX-8), ‘Programmes are given the opportunity to update documents’, which 
will be part of the evaluation. In the case of the SAO audits performed to Health 
Caravans in different states of the country, for example, it was reported that 
some operative documents were not provided to auditors until later in the 
process.1099 
Once a contract is assigned, the process of evaluation continues to a stage of 
monitoring and supervision. At this point, independence might be compromised 
due to the interference of stakeholders. In the Mexican case some evaluators 
recognised that they have perceived the influence of others, mostly evaluation 
units and programme operators. However, they sustained that this does not 
have the political intention of manipulating the outputs: 
I think that it is in a good sense, they [public agencies] know well their 
programmes and they alert about some misinterpretations […] giving us a 
                                                                                                                                                             
disadvantage to participate in evaluation processes for the Federal Government, as they have to 
deal with several administrative processes that might discourage public agencies to hire them. 
1097 House, E. R. 1997. "Evaluation in the Government Marketplace." American Journal of 
Evaluation 18(1):37-48. 
1098 Chelimsky, E. 2009. "Integrating Evaluation Units into the Political Environment of 
Government: The Role of Evaluation Policy." New Directions for Evaluation 123:51-66. P. 55. 
1099 Supreme Audit Office. 2013b. "Financial Audit. Federal resources transfer through the 
agreement between the Ministry of Health and the State of Zacatecas." Mexico City. P. 2. 
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dose of reality from their experience, but never with the aim of modifying 
the sense of the evaluation or the content of recommendations (MX-1). 
This finds echo in the discussion about the agendas of stakeholders. In Health 
Caravans, conflicts have arisen between operators and evaluators. An operator 
(MX-11) describes that they disagreed with an evaluator due to the approach 
taken: ‘They had a different vision, they […] only evaluated a particular moment 
in different locations, we considered that the study was not valuable to us.’ 
From this statement it is possible to observe that despite the inconformity of the 
programme, the findings of the evaluation were not changed. This reveals that 
not always in a relationship between operators and evaluators is the latter in a 
more disadvantaged position. The institutional framework in Mexico, for 
instance, withdraws the right of commissioning from operators and gives it to a 
third party (coordination agencies or evaluation units). Without this power, 
perhaps the relationship between evaluators and operators can become more 
equitable as evaluators do not perceive operators as a direct client. Nonetheless, 
it is an important issue for evaluators to be politically sensitive during the 
process of evaluation, mostly in the way they communicate findings, as an 
evaluator (MX-10) expresses: 
You want to make an excellent job, but this does not guarantee you per se 
that you will be hired again, this does not necessarily mean that evaluators 
might become co-opted or compromised to say things that are not true, but 
maybe to be careful in the way they say it. 
There might be incentives for evaluators to please commissioners as evaluation 
is a business opportunity. Evaluators cannot openly accept this situation, but 
preserving a good relationship with commissioners for future contracts seems a 
logical behaviour. Bechar and Mero-Jaffe observed this in the evaluation of an 
educational training programme, about which they described the difficulties 
that emerged with the programme’s head: 
He did not comment on positive evaluation findings, while he rejected 
negative findings and all recommendations, instead offering alternative 
interpretations or remarking that the issue was already taken care of.1100 
                                                        
1100 Bechar, S., and I. Mero-Jaffe. 2014. "Who Is Afraid of Evaluation? Ethics in Evaluation 
Research as a Way to Cope With Excessive Evaluation Anxiety: Insights From a Case Study." 
American Journal of Evaluation 35(3):364-76. P. 368. 
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A recurrent topic of discussion between operators and evaluators has been the 
definition of the potential population that Health Caravans must serve. An 
operator (MX-11) stated that the quantification of people who lack access to 
health services is not the responsibility of the programme: ‘It does not concern 
us to determine coverage in a particular location’, but this was an element 
highlighted in the last Consistency and Results Evaluation,1101 and also 
mentioned in an evaluation of 2011.1102 Regarding this the programme stated: 
The objective population of the programme is focalized and it corresponds 
to the population that inhabits locations that formed part of the routes […] 
they do not receive attention from other health units.1103 
This challenges the role of evaluators as advocates. Mohan clearly points out the 
complexity of coping with the interests vested in evaluation: 
Being responsive only to the evaluation sponsor or to a select few 
stakeholders could be perceived by others as a bias or taking sides. Such 
perceptions could adversely affect the credibility of the evaluation and 
could slowly over time erode the credibility of the evaluator and the 
evaluation organization. In the public policy environment, credibility 
comes, in part, from clearly demonstrating the independence of evaluators 
and evaluation organizations from sponsors and stakeholders.1104 
This matters because of the challenges that evaluators face to preserve 
independence and credibility and it leads to reflecting about the role of the 
other stakeholders, e.g. sponsors, operators.1105 The way in which the Mexican 
institutional framework distributes power generates a different dynamic with 
which coordination agencies and evaluators appear to be in a more favourable 
position than operators and evaluation units. 
The outputs of evaluation in the Health Caravans case are also an interesting 
                                                        
1101 Ministry of Health. 2011-2012. "Consistency and Results Evaluation. Health Caravans 
Programme.". Mexico City. 
1102 Martín del Campo Rodríguez, A. C. 2010-2011. "Specific Performance Evaluation. Health 
Caravans Programme.". Mexico City. 
1103 Ministry of Health. 2011b. "Specific Performance Evaluation 2010-2011. Health Caravans 
Programme. Institutional Statement.". Mexico City. 
1104 Mohan, R. 2014. "Evaluator Advocacy: It Is All in a Day’s Work." American Journal of 
Evaluation 35(3):1-7. P. 398. 
1105 See: Datta, L. E. 1999. "The ethics of evaluation neutrality and advocacy." New Directions for 
Evaluation 1999(82):77-88, Greene, J. C. 1997. "Evaluation as Advocacy." American Journal of 
Evaluation 18(1):25-35, House, E. R., and K. R. Howe. 1998. "The Issue of Advocacy in 
Evaluations." The American Journal of Evaluation 19(2):233-36. 
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area of analysis. As described, use is promoted through weak instruments that 
establish a process for the follow-up of recommendations with little impact in 
the overall policymaking process. The follow-up of recommendations made by 
Health Caravans has mostly been constrained to operational issues. For 
example: 
To select indicators reflecting changes in the beneficiaries’ health. 
To identify operation areas not currently overseen.1106 
 
Derived from this, the programme developed some technical tools to improve 
operation. In 2011, CONEVAL recognised it for ‘the development, 
systematisation, and operation of an information system for the control and 
identification of beneficiaries.’1107 Another key issue is the political use of 
findings linked to the notoriety of Health Caravans and the attention given by 
the media. For instance, it is common to observe local politicians promoting the 
achievements of the programme: 
The programme in 2014 undertook 101,688 health prevention and 
promotion actions through 25,600 consultations in 243 rural communities 
that lack access to permanent health services.1108 Ministry of Health and 
Social Well-being, State of Colima. 
As of today with Health Caravans we are going to offer medical services and 
epidemiological surveillance to those locations that lack or have limited 
access to traditional health services. 61 health caravans will go to the most 
remote sites of our state with prevention and promotion activities and 
ambulatory attention for circa 90, 000 people.1109 Manuel Velasco, Governor 
of the State of Chiapas. 
Health Caravans has provided 43,652 general consultations, including 
prenatal control, nutritional state of children under 5, hypertension, 
diabetes, cervical and breast cancer detection, among other services to 
benefit the most needed.1110 Coordinator of Health Caravans in the State of 
Veracruz. 
These statements highlight two relevant points. On the one hand, it is 
                                                        
1106 Ministry of Health. 2014a. "Follow-up mechanism of recommendations. Work plan. Health 
Caravans Programme.". 
1107 National Council for the Evaluation of the Social Development Policy. 2011a. "II Award 
"Good practices in the use of monitoring and evaluation outputs in policymaking" 2010-2011." 
1108 2015. "Health Caravans provides 25,600 health consultations." El Correo de Manzanillo  
1109 Government of the State of Chiapas. 2013. "We take health where it is needed: Manuel 
Velasco." Chiapas, Mexico. 
1110 2013a. "Health Caravans registers more than 40, 000 consultations in Veracruz." in La Crónica. 
Mexico City. 
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interesting that the focus given by politicians to those indicators of the 
programme are quantifiable, e.g. the number of consultations. This is more 
politically profitable because it transmits in a succinct way the idea of success, 
understood as people benefited and locations were served, and also it shows 
where the money has been spent. On the other hand, all this positive recognition 
comes from politicians from the same party in office in the Federal 
Government.1111 
At the national level, the political use of outputs has been observed in 
programmes politically relevant for the government and that have received 
more attention from the media.1112 After the Consistency and Results Evaluation 
2011–12 was published, a national newspaper published an article entitled 
CONEVAL Evidences Health Caravans’ Flaws, which focused again on the 
deficiencies related to the definition of the target population, the lack of a 
registry of beneficiaries and instruments to assess its impact on the population’s 
health. According to the programme’s operators (MX-11): 
There have been some negative opinions […] that state that the programme 
does not assess the health impact, but it does, only that this information 
was not requested by the evaluator. As a consequence of this press article, 
the interviewee added it affected us politically and in terms of budget […] 
an 80 million pesos reduction was made. 
This was observed in a reduction of the programme’s budget in 2011.1113 
However, this was prior to the publication of the report, so it suggests that other 
factors might have intervened. As the research of Bamberger suggests, data ‘is 
also used to help with future investment planning and budgetary 
allocations.’1114 For example, in the context of the budgetary process, CONEVAL 
provides annual information to deputies about social programmes based on 
evaluation outputs, as there is a need ‘to prioritize the access to health services 
                                                        
1111 Governors from the states of Chiapas, Veracruz and Oaxaca all belong to the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI). 
1112 There can be identified two federal programmes that have received plenty of attention of 
the media: Seguro Popular and Oportunidades. Both were considered iconic of the 2007-2012 
Federal Government Administration. Oportunidades, for example, in 2012 had a budget of 
66,132,502,318 Mexican pesos (approximately 3, 547, 000,000 GPB). 
1113 National Public Health Institute. 2013b. "Specific Performance Evaluation. Health Caravans 
Programme 2012-2013.". Mexico City. P. 8. 
1114 Bamberger, M. 1991. "The Politics of Policy Evaluation in Developing Countries." Evaluation 
and Program Planning 14(4):325-39. P. 334. 
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to vulnerable groups (people living in rural zones, indigenous, disabled people, 
women) and to emphasise actions that allow effective access to health 
services’1115, which is clearly linked to the focus of Health Caravans. 
Nonetheless, as a former deputy (MX-23) recognises, ‘Evaluations are rarely 
used […] I would even say that the reports of the SAO are more commonly used 
[…] the SAO is independent and more related to deputies.’ The director of an 
NGO (MX-16) also acknowledges that budget allocation relies more on political 
than on technical knowledge: 
There will always be a political component, the discussion and approval of 
budget takes place in the most political space existent which is Congress 
[…] but that should not be the only variable, it is necessary to have other 
variables, and in those extreme cases where there is systematic evidence 
that a programme has not improved, they should make a decision. 
The use of outputs in this case appears to be mostly limited to the public 
recognition of achievements for political or electoral purposes and minor use 
for the improvement of the programme and budgetary decisions. Regarding the 
information produced by the SAO about Health Caravans, it is important to 
acknowledge that this organisation has audited the programme as a 
consequence of the financial audit of funds transferred from the Federal 
Government to states for the operation of the programme. In this context, the 
identification of misuse of funds has been an element that has reached 
notoriety. In the case of the State of Morelos, for instance, the SAO detected 
‘non-compliance of the regulation, fundamentally in payments for personal 
services of the Health Caravans programme.’ Nonetheless, this seems to be an 
isolated incident.1116 
In terms of dissemination, like SICALIDAD Health Caravans is enforced to make 
public the evaluation reports and information about contracts, so there is no 
space for manipulation of findings. Nonetheless, according to a CONEVAL’s 
study, the Ministry of Health discloses selectively information about the 
evaluations of its programmes, as not in all cases is complete information 
                                                        
1115 National Council for the Evaluation of the Social Development Policy. 2014b. 
"Considerations for the 2015 Budget Process." Mexico City. 
1116 Supreme Audit Office. 2013a. "Financial Audit. Federal resources transfer through the 
agreement between the Ministry of Health and the State of Morelos." Mexico City. P. 5. 
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published.1117 Regarding the ad hoc evaluation performed in 2012 on Health 
Caravans, there is no information about the cost, the length of the contract, and 
the mechanism used for its allocation.1118 Moreover, in the index of 
dissemination developed by CONEVAL, the Ministry of Health is below the 
average (71.43) due to the cost of the evaluation and data of the evaluator, some 
of the variables in which the level of compliance is lower.1119 There does not 
seem to be any relevant consequence associated to the lack of compliance of the 
rules, except for the ‘symbolic sanction’ of making this information public. 
The dissemination of audit findings is diluted within the wide range of 
information disclosed through the Annual Accounts Report and individual 
reports related to the transfer of federal funds to states.1120 Outputs are rarely 
mentioned by the media or other stakeholders, except for those cases in which 
an important finding stands out, as in the case of the State of Coahuila, when the 
SAO found out that ‘only 36% of the funding allocated for the operation of 
Health Caravans was used’;1121 ergo, dissemination of outputs was minor. This 
resonates with the work of Lawrenz et al. about the implementation of 
dissemination techniques to promote use. For them: ‘If the evaluator intends for 
the report to be used, report dissemination should be tailored for each audience 
in terms of scope, sequence, timing, and presentation format.’1122 In the case of 
the audits to Health Caravans, information is buried into much data about other 
programmes and strategies operated with federal resources. As a result, it is 
difficult to access this information. 
Finally, in relation to the outcomes of evaluation, observing the net effects of 
                                                        
1117 The Guidelines for Evaluation that regulate this activity within the Federal Government state 
the information that public organisations need to make public in relation to the evaluations 
performed (See Chapter 5). 
1118 This also occurs in the case of the compulsory evaluation performed in 2011, where the 
evaluation unit in the Ministry of Health did not make public the data about the evaluation (e.g. 
cost), what is more, it was only published an executive summary of the evaluation with no data 
from the evaluator who performed the study. Ministry of Health. 2013b. "Health Caravans 
Evaluations." 
1119 National Council for the Evaluation of the Social Development Policy. 2012b. "Dissemination 
Index of External Evaluations to Social Development Federal Programmes." Pp. 9-10.  
1120 Supreme Audit Office. 2014b. "General Public Account Report 2013." Mexico City. 
1121 Pérez, L. 2015. "Coahuila spent only 36% of the Health Caravans funding." in El Siglo. 
Coahuila, Mexico. 
1122 Lawrenz, F., A. Gullickson, and S. Toal. 2007. "Dissemination. Handmaiden to Evaluation 
Use." American Journal of Evaluation 28(3):275-89. P. 287. 
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evaluation on policymaking, beyond some minor operational changes, is a 
complex task. Evaluation has not received enough attention outside government 
and there is no active debate about the utility of evaluation and the quality of 
the reports, except for some NGOs, i.e. GESOC, México Evalúa.1123 Long-term 
effects of evaluation and audit processes of Health Caravans cannot be clearly 
identified. Perhaps the most obvious effect has been the continuity of the 
programme after political changes took place in 2012. There were no 
substantial modifications to its operation and there was a 25% increase to its 
budget in the federal budget project of 2015 (in relation to 2014).1124 This 
suggests that the programme is still part of the current government’s agenda, 
regardless of its real contribution to the problem of inequality in the access to 
health services. 
This case presents consistent findings about the hidden politics of evaluation 
related to the control exercised by the Federal Government and the embryonic 
market of evaluation. The nature of the programme, in contrast to SICALIDAD, 
suggests a more active political use of evaluation findings, but still at a modest 
level. This section has presented the core findings of the research in relation to 
the hidden politics of evaluation. The main argument that arises from it is that 
the differences found in the institutional framework for evaluation allow 
explaining different manifestations of politics in this process. Even though the 
rules established in both countries are driven by a distinct logic, the existing 
discretionary spaces allow political interference. The next section develops in 
more detail this comparison. 
 
 
                                                        
1123 GESOC represents one of the most active NGOs interested in evaluation. They systematically 
use evaluation reports to perform their own analysis. For example, GESOC uses evaluation 
outputs to build an Index of Performance of Public Programmes with the purpose of 
communicating this information to the general public. See: GESOC, A.C. 2014. "Índice de 
Desempeño de Programas Públicos Federales 2014 (Performance Index of Federal Programmes 
2014)." Mexico City. 
1124 Tépach, R. 2014. "Federal Budget Project for the Health Sector 2014-2015." Mexico City: 
Chamber of Deputies. P. 24. 
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6.3 Comparative Analysis 
The understanding of the political context that underpins evaluation in the UK 
and Mexico provides a series of elements for the analysis of the way in which 
the institutional framework relates to this phenomenon. The formal rules set for 
evaluation in both countries have shown that important differences arise, not 
only in the definition of mechanisms to shape the behaviour of stakeholders 
involved in this activity, but also in the way evaluation is conceptualised as a 
tool of governance. 
The hidden politics of evaluation represents a useful means for grasping the 
relationships established among stakeholders and the balance of power 
inherent to this interaction. The findings of the four case studies point out those 
similarities and differences in the institutional framework that affect the nexus 
between evaluation and politics. This section discusses with more detail the key 
findings of the empirical evidence obtained and its connection with the 
theoretical framework (see Chapter 2). 
6.3.1 Implications for the Institutional Framework 
It seems necessary to look more carefully at the differences found in the case 
studies. For this purpose, this section discusses five elements of the institutional 
framework that are affected by the political context in which policies, 
programmes, and organisations are evaluated or audited in both countries 
(Table 6.1).  
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Table 6.1 The Connection between the Institutional Framework and the Hidden 
Politics of Evaluation 
Case Distinctive Features of the 
Institutional Framework 
Elements Affected by Politics 
United 
Kingdom 
No formal integrated policy, 
general guidelines for evaluation 
Lack of enforcement mechanisms of 
evaluation generates opacity about the 
current state of this activity in central 
government and about the quality of the 
studies and the cost-benefit relationship. 
Wide space of discretion for 
departments to make decisions 
about evaluations 
Key decisions about evaluation depend 
on the agenda of departments, focusing 
on those areas that are considered a 
priority 
Evidence-based policymaking 
approach supported by 
specialised research bodies 
The inclusion of multiple stakeholders 
can be affected by their interests, in a 
positive way providing more resources 
for the analysis, but on the negative side 
it can also bias an evaluation  
Strong faculties given to the NAO 
to determine VFM of policies, 
programmes and organisations 
The NAO can play an important political 
role in the discussion of key issues about 
the performance of government 
departments. 
Mechanisms of follow-up of the 
NAO’s work by Select Committees 
The support of Select Committees provide 
important leverage to the work of the 
NAO and to promote the follow-up of 
recommendations 
Mexico 
Integrated and enforced 
evaluation policy 
The Executive holds control of the 
process key elements of the process that 
might interfere with independence and 
credibility 
Faculties given to public bodies 
for coordinating and overviewing 
the evaluation policy 
It generates political struggles that affect 
the level of influence that evaluation can 
have in policymaking 
Use of standardised frameworks 
for evaluation 
Limited space for evaluators to act 
outside the frameworks imposed 
centrally 
Formal follow-up mechanism for 
use of recommendations and 
dissemination of findings derived 
from evaluation 
Rigid frameworks generate incentives for 
programmes to comply the 
administrative obligations imposed but 
with little effect in the overall 
policymaking process 
Limited role of the SAO for the 
enforcement of recommendations 
Ineffective counterpart to the Executive, 
limited capacity to make government 
accountable 
The first element regards the existence of an evaluation policy understood as 
‘high level rules embedded in the legislation used to guide the practice of 
evaluation.’1125 The establishment of formal rules for evaluation give more 
rationality to this process by providing a structured identification of those core 
elements of this activity, e.g. methodologies, time frameworks, and resources. 
                                                        
1125 Mark, M. M., L. J. Cooksy, and W. M. K. Trochim. 2009. "Evaluation policy: An introduction 
and overview." New Directions for Evaluation 2009(123):3-11. P. 4.  
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The cases of the UK and Mexico suggest that evaluation can be a product of 
different conceptualisations. 
While the UK has a long tradition in terms of evaluation and auditing,1126 in 
Mexico the adoption of a formal evaluation process is quite recent and is 
derived from the establishment of regulation in this matter during the first 
years of the past decade.1127 In Mexico it is observably a more explicit effort for 
the institutionalisation of evaluation. The Federal Government has enforced, 
through regulation, the systematic evaluation of social development 
programmes, the adoption of a follow-up process for the recommendations, and 
the dissemination of evaluation reports.1128 In contrast, the UK has adopted a 
different approach. There is no integrated evaluation policy that explicitly 
structures this activity. Key aspects like the selection of programmes to 
evaluate, the methodologies to apply, and the timescales for studies are left to 
the discretion of government departments. 
The enforcement component of evaluation represents an obvious difference 
between countries. This can help explaining the different configurations of 
power that are built around evaluation and the institutional arrangements that 
can be established. As Jacob et al. recognise, ‘Evaluation can follow various 
designs, is embedded in different forms of institutionalization, and has widely 
varying usages within different sectors and on different levels.’1129 Nonetheless, 
the differences related to the enforcement of evaluation do play an important 
role in terms of the hidden politics of evaluation. Rules for evaluation determine 
the amount of power allocated to each stakeholder. In the Mexican case, for 
                                                        
1126 See Lonsdale, J. 2008. "Balancing Independence and Responsiveness: A Practitioner 
Perspective on the Relationships Shaping Performance Audit." Evaluation 14(2):227-48, Morris, 
S. 2005. "Evaluating Public Policy in the UK: History, Politics & Practice.", Pollitt, C. 1993. 
"Occasional Excursions: A Brief History of Policy Evaluation in the UK." Parliamentary Affairs 
46(3):353-62, Talbot, C. 2010a. "Performance in Government. The Evolving System of 
Performance and Evaluation Measurement, Monitoring, and Management in the United 
Kingdom." Washington D.C., US: The World Bank. 
1127 Castro, M. F., G. Lopez-Acevedo, G. Beker Busjeet, and X. Fernandez-Ordonez. 2009. 
"Mexico's M&E System: Scaling Up from the Sectoral to the National Level." Washington, D.C., 
US: The World Bank. 
1128 "General guidelines for the evaluation of the federal programmes of the Federal Public 
Administration." Mexico, "Social Development General Law." Mexico. 
1129 Jacob, S., S. Speer, and J. E. Furubo. 2015. "The institutionalization of evaluation matters: 
Updating the International Atlas of Evaluation 10 years later." Evaluation 21(1):6-31. P. 7. 
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instance, regulation concentrates the control of the evaluation policy in the 
Federal Government, specifically in the coordination agencies. In the case of the 
UK, most of the control remains within departments, while HM Treasury has a 
limited participation in the process.1130 
This relates to the existence of a specific body in charge of coordinating and 
implementing the evaluation policy. The Mexican case is an interesting example, 
because three different bodies participate in the implementation and overview 
of the evaluation policy (see Chapter 5, Section 5.1.2). Here, it is worth 
highlighting CONEVAL’s role as the organisation in charge of the evaluation of 
social policy. Its institutional design as ‘a Federal Public Administration 
decentralized public organization, with autonomy and technical capability to 
generate objective information on the social policy situation and poverty 
measurement in Mexico’1131 has been recognised as an effective way to give 
independence and credibility to evaluation.1132 
Despite CONEVAL sitting within the Federal Government structure, the risk of 
potential political capture is limited by two factors: ‘Operating costs (though not 
the evaluations) financed through a direct budget line in the National Budget; 
and second, it is governed by an executive board of six independent 
academics.’1133 Most of CONEVAL’s work presents a positive balance, but claims 
for more independence have been recurrent in the political debate. Reforms 
made to the Mexican Constitution in 20141134 modified key elements of its 
governance1135 and have raised concerns about the risk of political capture: 
The reform states that it is now […] the Chamber of Deputies, the 
                                                        
1130 This is only for policy evaluation, in terms of performance monitoring the HM Treasury has 
a much more active role. 
1131 National Council for the Evaluation of the Social Development Policy. 2012a. "About us." 
Mexico City. 
1132 Sturges, K. M. 2014. "External Evaluation as Contract Work: The Production of Evaluator 
Identity." American Journal of Evaluation 35(3):346-63. 
1133Gaarder, M. M., and B. Briceño. 2010. "Institutionalisation of Government Evaluation: 
Balancing Trade-Offs." International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie). P. 9. 
1134 Article 26. 
1135 In the past, Board members were appointed by a commission composed by social 
development ministers from the states of the Mexican Republic, the Executive and the 
Legislative; under new regulation, the Board will be appointed by the Chamber of Deputies. 
Rubí, M. 2014. "Coneval, sin consejeros y sin reglas para elegirlos ("Coneval, no counsellors and 
no rules for electing them")." in El Economista. Mexico City. 
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institution that will select the academics and this could party-politicize the 
election. If this happens and the election of counsellors is made based on 
party quota, the credibility of CONEVAL would be seriously damaged.1136 
CONEVAL is considered a distinctive feature of Mexico’s evaluation system as ‘it 
was the realization of an effort to institutionalize social policy and to give a 
rather technical than political approach.’1137 Consequently, potential threats to 
its independence and credibility are not a minor issue. As its current Secretary 
states: ‘The worst outcome of this political reform would be a totally party-
politicised election of counsellors.’1138 This shows that the establishment of 
formal rules does not guarantee in practice the elimination of discretionary 
spaces in the process nor the potential political intromission, as 
Contandriopoulos recognises: 
The institutionalization of evaluation […] is a prime component of 
rationalization policies in countries worldwide. It aims to enhance the 
performance of interventions by the public sector […]It is not enough that 
the demand for efficiency be perceived by public opinion as sufficiently 
legitimate to have evaluation institutionalized; rather, the various actors 
must incorporate this new social standard into their ways of conceiving 
their own responsibilities and those of others.1139 
In addition, in Mexico the power that the Executive has over key elements of the 
evaluation process, i.e. scope, periodicity, and methodology, influences greatly 
the outputs of this activity. This generates an unbalanced distribution of power 
even within the Executive itself. Coordination agencies hold more power than 
programme operators or evaluation units within ministries. Regardless of the 
lack of enforcement, the UK case shows that evaluation has been systematically 
commissioned or produced internally. However, the extent to which this has 
been made varies across central government. Recently, the NAO reviewed 
‘6,000 analytical outputs published on departmental websites between 2006 
and 2012.’1140 During 2014, for example, the DoH published 27 independent 
                                                        
1136National Council for the Evaluation of the Social Development Policy. 2014c. "Factual and 
legal autonomy: The challenges imposed by the political reform to CONEVAL." Mexico City. P. 4. 
1137 Jaime, E. 2014. "Goodbye CONEVAL?". Mexico City. 
1138 Martínez, N., and A. Rivera. 2015. "Less autonomy for CONEVAL." in El Universal. Mexico 
City. 
1139 Contandriopoulos, A. P. 1999. "Is the institutionalization of evaluation sufficient to 
guarantee its practice?" Cadernos de Saúde Pública 15:253-56. P. 253-254. 
1140 National Audit Office. 2013a. "Evaluation in government." edited by National Audit Office. 
London, UK. P. 7. 
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reports about a range of topics such as NHS staff engagement and care for 
vulnerable groups.1141 In Mexico, during the same year the Ministry of Health 
did not publish any reports—neither from compulsory evaluation nor ad hoc 
studies. This can be explained by two reasons: either there were no evaluations 
carried out during that year or the Ministry of Health failed to meet the 
obligation of making reports available.1142 
The existence of a structured evaluation policy contributes to a better control of 
the process and expected outputs, but at least in the UK’s health policy area its 
absence does not appear to affect the use of evaluation research as it is possible 
to identify several products commissioned or undertaken by the DoH or by 
other bodies for the generation of evidence, as well as for the development of 
guidelines for evaluation (capacity building).1143 However, it has affected the 
integration of a system of information about the nature and cost of evaluations, 
necessary to transparent the use of resources devoted to this activity.1144 
The institutional framework also determines the extent to which external 
stakeholders, i.e. NGOs, interest groups, can participate in the process of 
evaluation. The excessive centralisation of the Mexican evaluation policy leaves 
a very narrow space for stakeholders outside the governmental sphere to 
participate. Moreover, the limited market of evaluators constrains the range of 
options for including an external view. This generates a dynamic in which 
evaluators become too familiar with the functioning of the evaluation process. 
The UK case presents a different situation. Here, there is a broader market of 
evaluators, specialised research institutions, e.g. NICE, and a range of NGOs and 
charities actively engaged in the production and discussion of evidence about 
policy. This gives evaluation more leverage, as more stakeholders are keen to 
                                                        
1141 Department of Health. 2014c. "Publications: Independent Reports." London, UK. 
1142 In the cases of some programmes operated by this Ministry some monitoring record cards 
were published (including SICALIDAD and Health Caravans); however, this document 
synthetises information from internal records and does not constitute an independent product 
of evaluation. National Council for the Evaluation of the Social Development Policy. 2014d. 
"Monitoring Record Card." 
1143 Interesting examples are the guidelines for evaluation developed by the Nuffield Trust. See: 
Davies, A., C. Ariti, T. Georghiou, and M. Bardsley. 2015. "Evaluation of complex health and care 
interventions using retrospective matched control methods." Nuffield Trust. 
1144 National Audit Office. 2013a. "Evaluation in government." edited by National Audit Office. 
London, UK. 
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participate. This is also observable in the NAO studies and in the Select 
Committee inquiries. The existence of formal mechanisms to participate in these 
processes allows access to stakeholders. 
In relation to auditing, both countries have institutionalised systems based on 
an external body linked to the Legislative with clear rules that determine the 
characteristics and scope of their work. The role of the Legislative in terms of 
the follow-up and overview is also clearly established. 
The focus of the analysis of both audit bodies is mostly financial and directed to 
the identification of VFM. The most recent SAO report, for instance, ‘identified 
risks that affect the efficacy and results of public policies and programmes.’1145 
The NAO also establishes the aim of its reports as ‘to enhance the degree of 
confidence of intended users in the financial statements.’1146 This represents a 
point of convergence between both countries. Nevertheless, the most notorious 
difference relies on the political strength of the NAO derived from its 
relationship with Parliament, particularly with the PAC. These organisations 
‘are highly influential bodies with government and within wider society because 
of their high media profile.’1147 Reports generated through the audit system are 
an important part of the public debate, as was observed in the UK case studies. 
The political salience of the PAC gives important leverage to the NAO’s work 
within the public landscape; not only by influencing the audit agenda, but also 
by highlighting those key findings that are worth a deeper discussion. 
In contrast, the political support given to the SAO by the Chamber of Deputies is 
much more limited. Most of it remains at the discursive level and it is strongly 
linked to the political agenda of deputies. If an issue of their agenda can be 
supported by an SAO finding they would tend to consider it. However, most of 
the time the attention given to the work of the SAO is constrained by the 
momentum generated by the publication of its annual report. The institutional 
design of the SAO plays an important role here. The provision of more power 
                                                        
1145 Supreme Audit Office. 2014b. "General Public Account Report 2013." Mexico City. P. 15. 
1146 National Audit Office. 2015d. "Whole of Government Accounts 2013-14." London, UK. 
1147 Dunleavy, P., C. Gilson, S. Bastow, and J. Tinkler. 2009. "The National Audit Office, the Public 
Accounts Committee and the risk landscape in UK public policy." London, UK: The Risk and 
Regulation Advisory Council. P. 5. 
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and enforcement mechanisms to this body has been an issue of discussion in the 
public agenda for several years. So far, this has not transcended even though it 
directly affects the impact of its work. Findings produce very little effect on 
policymaking because the faculties given to the SAO do not comprise the 
imposition of sanctions. The institutional design of this body appears to be one 
of the main reasons for this lack of impact, along with its vulnerability to 
political influence. According to Ackerman: 
The SAO faces obstacles to perform its control tasks. Among these, it is 
worth mentioning those political, derived from the pressures of different 
parliamentary groups; and the economic reflected in an insufficient budget 
to perform its duties.1148 
The lack of resources and political support to the SAO has limited its capacity to 
make the Executive accountable. In the UK, as mentioned, the political strength 
of the NAO gives recommendations more notoriety, not constrained by the 
political interest in a particular issue. 
The last element to discuss about the institutional framework concerns the 
extent to which this promotes independence and credibility. Despite the fact 
that evaluation in the UK is not a structured process and its performance relies 
strongly on the discretion of departments, it was observed neither in the 
secondary analysis nor in the interviews performed; no questionings of the 
independence and credibility of evaluations. In the case of auditing, it was even 
more notorious that the reputation of the NAO and the PAC is quite strong. The 
participation of a wider range of stakeholders in these processes appears to 
have a positive effect in terms of the perception about these values. In the 
Mexican case, independence is strongly linked to the idea of external evaluation. 
The evaluation policy is underpinned by the idea that studies are performed by 
an external expert with an unbiased perspective and that this will generate 
objective and credible information. This is a core element of the government’s 
discourse. However, the independence of evaluators is constrained by the 
control exercised by the Federal Government at different stages of the process. 
                                                        
1148 Ackerman, J. M. 2007. "Hacia un sistema nacional de tranparencia, fiscalización y rendición 
de cuentas." in Finanzas Públicas para el Desarrollo, edited by J. L. Calva. Mexico City: Miguel 
Ángel Porrúa. P. 256. 
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The question that arises here is: To what extent can evaluators be independent if 
their work is constrained by the decisions made by commissioners? 
In this context, the role of CONEVAL is again relevant for addressing this point. 
This body has no statutory power, but its institutional credibility comes from its 
governance. As one of CONEVAL’s counsellors (MX-14) explains: 
CONEVAL […] has a lot of impact because of its institutional credibility, it is 
perceived as a technical qualified institution with academic independence, 
it has a body of researchers that are not civil servants who have majority in 
the Board […] the institutional design and the way it has operated is what 
has given CONEVAL its power. 
CONEVAL can be seen as an example of a ‘soft power’ organisation. It has no 
mechanism to enforce the use of recommendations but it is a respected 
institution in the public landscape. It is perceived as a highly competent 
technical body in the evaluation field.1149 This becomes particularly relevant at 
present because of the changes that this organisation will face in the next 
months. Changes to its institutional design can have a negative effect on its 
credibility if it is perceived that it has become party-politicised. 
These differences between cases show that the configuration of the institutional 
design does not necessarily isolate evaluation from political influence. Instead, it 
suggests that this influence can be manifested in different ways according to the 
rules established for the interaction of stakeholders. For instance, the control 
held by the Executive over the Mexican evaluation system gives more structure 
and rationality to the process, but it also interferes with its independence. The 
value given to evaluation as a mechanism to legitimate public policy gives 
independence and credibility a more political weight than in other contexts in 
which evaluation is seen more as a mechanism to support policymaking. This is 
also affected by the weakness of the SAO, which does not allow establishing an 
effective checks and balances system. The case of the UK presents an evaluation 
                                                        
1149 According to a recent study, ‘there is evidence that CONEVAL has achieved an important 
position as a body that generates information that is considered a fact when it is disseminated.’ 
Instituto de Innovación Educativa. 2013. "Evaluación Externa de los Resultados del Consejo 
Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social." Mexico City: Instituto Tecnológico y 
de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey. P. 169. 
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system more based on the discretion of departments, but at the same time 
embedded in a context in which external stakeholders play a more active role. 
Moreover, evaluation is not understood as an accountability mechanism. 
Instead, it is conceived as a tool for the generation of evidence to support 
decision-making. The work of NAO is the core element of the accountability 
system that heavily relies on the political legitimacy given by the PAC. The next 
section addresses in more detail the relationship between the political nature of 
evaluation and the institutional framework. 
6.3.2 The Hidden Politics of Evaluation: Key Elements of Analysis 
The analysis presented suggests that the particular conditions for the 
performance of evaluation impact on how this activity is undertaken and how it 
is affected by politics. In this context, it is necessary to look with more detail at 
particular variables that can explain the hypothesis proposed in this thesis. 
The differences observed in both countries related to the institutional 
framework appear to have an important influence in the way in which 
stakeholders engage with this activity. A clear example is the perception of 
stakeholders about the role of evaluation in policymaking. While in Mexico 
evaluation is seen as a mechanism for legitimising policy, the UK case 
understands it as an instrument for internal decision-making. Despite the 
dissimilarities in the purpose, logic, and process of evaluation, in both contexts 
evaluation does not seem to have transcended its managerial role to feed into 
the political debate about policy, which, on the contrary, has occurred in the UK 
with the work of the NAO and the scrutiny made by Select Committees. 
The relationship between the institutional framework and the access that it 
concedes to external stakeholders is a key element to highlight. In Mexico this 
access is limited and it has produced a biased judgement based on the variables 
imposed centrally. In contrast, the processes in the UK appear to be more 
inclusive, and commissioners seem to understand more clearly the advantages 
of incorporating other views, both for making studies more robust as well as 
more politically legitimate. This can be explained by the level of discretion 
allowed by the institutional framework and by the use given to these spaces by 
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stakeholders. Some of the key variables identified in the analysis are presented 
in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2 Key Elements of Analysis of the Hidden Politics of Evaluation 
Key Elements of 
Analysis 
UK Case Mexican Case 
Legal framework for 
the performance of 
evaluations/audits 
Evaluation is seen as a mechanism of organisational 
learning and there is a strong audit system for 
accountability purposes which is politically supported 
by the House of Commons. 
Evaluation is underpinned by a rigid institutional 
framework, strongly centralised and that promotes 
standardised mechanisms of assessment. The audit system 
is weak, it lacks mechanism of enforcement and there is a 
total disconnection between evaluation and auditing. 
Public sector actors 
involved in 
evaluation/audit 
In terms of evaluation, the HM Treasury establishes 
some guidelines, but most of the process is carried out 
by government departments on their own. In relation to 
audit, the NAO and Select Committees of the House of 
Common are the major actors involved. 
The evaluation policy is undertaken by three federal 
government agencies that guide most of the process and 
some coordination problems have arisen. Evaluation units 
within government ministries have a more operational 
function. The SAO is the main body that executes the audit 
process. 
Participation of non-
governmental actors 
The process of evaluation/audit implies the 
participation of various actors; mostly limited to 
evidence provision. 
The centralization of the evaluation policy limits the access 
to non-governmental actors and perpetuates the existence 
of a small evaluation community. 
Nature and scope of 
evaluation studies 
Evaluation studies cover a wide range of topics, mostly 
related to the improvement of services and the piloting 
of new approaches to policy. Regarding audit, this 
activity relies on the VFM approach which aim is to 
assess the effectiveness and efficiency of public policy. 
Most of the evaluation studies undertaken are based on the 
standardised frameworks promoted by the Federal 
Government, there is little space for innovation and the 
approaches to evaluation are mostly related to the 
implementation, cost-effectiveness and identification of 
results. The audit system is guided by the values of efficacy 
and effectiveness and its main target is the identification of 
deviations from the norm. 
Use given to 
evaluation/audit 
outputs 
Departments are expected to respond to the 
recommendations made by the NAO or the Select 
Committees, but there are not obliged to follow them. 
There is a formal mechanism for the follow-up of 
recommendations derived from evaluation; however, it 
lacks the strength to promote substantial changes in the 
policy process. Regarding auditing, the SAO has very small 
capacity to enforce the use of recommendations; most of 
them are followed but are not substantial. 
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Table. 6.2  Continued 
Key Elements of 
Analysis 
UK Case Mexican Case 
Market of evaluators There is a vast range of researches from different 
institutions (public/private) that compete for the 
tenders established for the performance of evaluations, 
but there are not established mechanisms to assess 
quality. 
It was observed a very small market of evaluators, most of 
them from public universities and research centres and 
there are no elements to discriminate in terms of quality. 
Perception of 
objectiveness and 
independence of 
assessment 
There is no questioning about the independence and 
objectivity of the assessment, the institutional strength 
of the NAO legitimises this process. In terms of 
evaluation, it appears that independence is not a critical 
issue. 
The Federal Government is emphatic on the idea of external 
evaluation with the aim of preserving the independence and 
objectivity of the assessment; however, the control over the 
evaluation process leaves little space for evaluators to make 
more independent judgements. The role of CONEVAL and its 
credibility has helped the process of adopting an evaluation 
model within the Federal Government. 
Openness of the 
evaluation process 
The audit process carried out by the NAO and the 
follow-up enquiries done by Select Committees establish 
mechanisms for the participation of different actors. 
There is a vast community of NGOs involved in the 
inquiries and individuals can also participate. 
There are few mechanisms of access for non-governmental 
actors, mostly promoted by evaluators but supervised by 
public agencies; there is almost an inexistent participation 
of the general public. 
Linkage to decision-
making processes 
According to the evidence collected from the field-work, 
it does not appear that evaluation is an important input 
in the decision-making; the outputs of auditing seem to 
have more impact in this area. 
Even though there is a formal mechanism for the follow-up 
recommendations, it is not possible to determine to what 
extent evaluation is an input in the decision-making process, 
some minor changes have been documented but other 
substantial modifications have not been identified. 
Effect on public 
opinion (media and 
politicisation) 
In terms of politicisation, the use of evaluation for this 
purpose is minimal. In the case of the CQC, the 
seriousness of its initial failures in events like 
Winterbourne View provided more notoriety to the 
scrutiny made to this organisation. 
The notoriety reached by some evaluations in the public 
opinion is related to the relevance of the programme 
assessed. Only Health Caravans reported some events in 
which the press focused on some negative features of the 
programme.  
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These elements are useful for supporting the hypothesis of this thesis and for 
answering the secondary questions established (see Chapter 1). The dynamic 
that is created as a consequence of policy evaluation reflects the different 
configurations of power among stakeholders, considering the restrictions 
imposed by formal and informal rules. Taking this into account, the level of 
maturity that is reached by the evaluation policies in both countries exceeds the 
formality given to evaluation through the establishment of rules, procedures, 
and institutions for this purpose. 
The existence of institutional channels for the participation of stakeholders and 
a more solid checks and balances system has generated more favourable 
conditions for the blooming of evaluation and auditing in the UK, regardless of 
the lack of an integral and central evaluation policy. In the Mexican case, it is 
observable that important efforts for institutionalising evaluation and for 
generating capabilities in this matter have been made, both by the Federal 
Government as well by others, i.e. international organisations. Despite this, the 
way in which this process is controlled centrally has limited the utility of 
evaluation to a programmatic level that does not reflect completely its 
contribution as a tool of governance. 
In both cases, the analysis of these countries uncovers the relationship between 
evaluation and its political context and those key elements of evaluation in 
which political influence is observable. The final section of this chapter 
elucidates the connection between the empirical findings and the theory. 
6.3.3 Empirical Evidence about the Hidden Politics of Evaluation: The 
Connection with the Theory 
The relevance of studying the relation between evaluation and politics is 
contributing to the existent knowledge in this field. The empirical evidence 
obtained allows looking at the different ways in which stakeholders establish 
political linkages in evaluation. Considering the intangibility of politics and the 
multiple factors involved, this research has shed new light on some key 
variables of this process in which politics intervene, but also on the way in 
which institutional frameworks lead to different configurations of power. In this 
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context, it seems necessary to identify the linkage between the empirical 
evidence and the theoretical knowledge about the hidden politics of evaluation 
to make more explicit the contribution of this thesis. 
According to the theoretical framework (see Chapter 2), the core ideas about 
the political nature of evaluation are essentially related to the interaction 
between stakeholders and the pursuit of their interests. One of the most 
distinctive features is reflecting upon how stakeholders (particularly 
evaluators) can cope with the political context in which this activity takes place. 
The approach of this research has allowed broadening the scope for analysing 
this phenomenon in a more holistic way. The discussions presented in this 
chapter are not constrained to the role of evaluators and their interaction with 
other actors, but to the understanding of the effect of the institutional 
framework. 
Beyond the negative connotation given to politics, this research has, from its 
inception, acknowledged the idea that evaluation and politics cannot nor should 
be separated. With this in mind, the theoretical and empirical analysis has 
demonstrated that the emphasis should not be on developing new ideas about 
how to cope with politics in evaluation (considering it as a menace to values like 
independence and credibility), but to find new ways for grasping this 
relationship and its meaning for the role of evaluation in governance. 
The empirical evidence is consistent with the theory by showing that the control 
of an evaluation policy relies largely on the capacity of stakeholders to use their 
resources towards an end and the different degrees of influence they can 
exercise. Consequently, formal and informal rules for shaping the behaviour of 
stakeholders will affect their interaction. The institutionalisation of evaluation 
demands transcending the establishment of procedures to a more clear 
comprehension of the roles that stakeholders will have, and the potential 
gains/losses of power that might take place. 
Considering governance conditions, stakeholders could see more clearly the 
potential benefits of evaluation as a tool for strengthening their position in the 
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political debate about the effectiveness of public policy. Here, the empirical 
evidence obtained is relevant because it shows that even though institutional 
arrangements differ, the use of evaluation as a governance tool is modest in 
both cases. 
The Mexican case, for example, suggests that the isolation of the evaluation 
process and its excessive centralisation keeps the political struggle within the 
public sector. The most evident struggle can be found in the resistance of 
programme operators to be evaluated and to disclose information for 
evaluation. Disagreements produced are mostly resolved by the statutory 
power of the Federal Government to enforce cooperation. Consequently, the 
relevance of evaluation as a political tool is limited and stakeholders mostly 
perceive it as a managerial tool. 
The values promoted through evaluation are another empirical element worth 
highlighting. Although these values are not always explicit, there is a clear bias 
towards the identification of the effectiveness of policy in both countries, based 
on the relationship between inputs and outputs. The values promoted by each 
stakeholder, according to the theory, can be diverse and at some point 
contradictory. It was observed in the case studies that efforts of 
audit/evaluation aim to obtain evidence about the cost-effectiveness of policy, 
even when other actors, e.g. charities and NGOs, consider that other values 
should be assessed. The rationality of evaluation in terms of politics concerns 
the capacity of stakeholders to pursue the predomination of their interests. In 
both cases analysed, the strongest actor was the one with enough political 
power to control the process. In the UK case, the role of the NAO is associated 
with accountability. Its work in the identification of the VFM of government 
programmes is acknowledged as relevant evidence for discussion in the political 
arena. In the Mexican case, the control of the evaluation process is concentrated 
in the Federal Government. In contrast to what happens in the UK with the NAO, 
the control exercised by the Mexican government is more perceived in the 
rigidity of the norms and procedures established for evaluation, rather than in 
its political strength and legitimacy, and also this control is affected by power 
disputes among coordination agencies (see Chapter 5, Section 5.1.1). 
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Regarding the rationale of evaluation, the evidence suggests that there is a 
different conceptualisation of the role of evaluation. In the UK it is seen as a 
mechanism to strengthen the decision-making (organisational learning), for 
example, through the performance of pilot schemes for a new policy. In Mexico, 
evaluation is more related to the identification of goals achieved and this is 
strongly associated with an idea of legitimisation of public policy. The Federal 
Government aims to make explicit the external nature of evaluation to underline 
the independence and objectiveness of the process, even though the assessment 
is strictly controlled internally. 
As the theory suggests, there is no possible way to abstract evaluation from its 
political context. Evaluators and practitioners must operate in an environment 
in which stakeholders are constantly struggling for their interests. The findings 
from the fieldwork show that the role of evaluators becomes especially 
important in the selection and analysis of evidence based on their capacity to 
detect when stakeholders are willing to bias the process. The case of the CQC 
illustrates this point. The controversial events in which this regulator was 
involved during its first years provoked a more intense scrutiny of its 
performance and more public attention. The inquiries made by Select 
Committees showed that the prioritisation of evidence to be discussed by MPs is 
an area subject to the discretion of the actor that selects it. 
In addition, the access to participation channels in evaluation processes is also a 
political matter. There can be different levels of inclusion of stakeholders in 
evaluation. While most of the evaluation processes imply the participation of 
different actors, this does not mean that they have an active role. Consequently, 
not all relevant views are considered. The four case studies showed that there is 
still a long way to go in terms of the democratisation of evaluation. Although 
there is a more open access in the UK for external stakeholders than in Mexico, 
their participation is still limited. Mostly, it is reduced to the provision of 
evidence with little room for debating. 
An interesting finding related to the theory is the interaction between 
stakeholders. In the UK case, for example, the relationship between the NAO and 
348 
 
departmental officials reinforces the idea about how actors can take advantage 
of discretionary spaces in the process. VFM studies imply the interaction of 
people in the audited body and staff from the NAO and this cannot, nor should 
be completely normed by the institutional framework, and it is natural to find 
some discretionary spaces. A more concrete example is the idea about how VFM 
studies are built around ‘agreed evidence’. This does not mean de facto that 
there is an express intention to manipulate the assessment, but stakeholders 
can affect the outputs. In this context—data-collection—the timing for 
evaluation and the methodology represent only some examples of decisions that 
can be negotiated (generally informally). 
The political component of evaluation does not refer to the obscure and 
negative image associated to partisan politics, it concerns the interaction 
between stakeholders that takes place during evaluation, constrained by the 
resources available and the conditions set by the institutional framework. This 
connection between theoretical and empirical evidence demonstrates that it is 
not possible to abstract evaluation from its political context. However, the core 
element of discussion is the way in which politics is managed. One of the most 
relevant findings produced by this research is the influence exercised by the 
institutional framework in this politics/evaluation relationship. Different 
contexts can generate multiple configurations of power, the level of access can 
produce different outputs, and the dynamics in which evaluators and 
commissioners relate can also affect the way in which evaluations are 
conducted. 
The next chapter synthetises and presents the most relevant conclusions of this 
research, as well as some recommendations for coping with the political nature 
of evaluation.  
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Chapter 7. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
This research has elucidated the way in which politics and evaluation interact. 
The careful study of two different contexts produced an important range of 
findings worth highlighting in this final chapter. In both countries (UK and 
Mexico) evaluation has become an instrument with multiple applications. In all 
case studies, the production and use of evidence for judging different 
dimensions of policy has been a common element. However, the characteristics 
of this evidence and its level of utility are aspects that differ between countries. 
Yet, the core issue of this thesis is not the instrumental use of evaluation in 
government, but its political nature, i.e. the way in which it manifests in the 
public sphere and its consequences for the governance model. Uncovering the 
hidden politics of evaluation through the case studies has enlightened the path 
for understanding this phenomenon. The negative connotation given to politics 
(in the partisan sense) contrasts with its potential benefits as an instrument for 
fostering changes and reaching (negotiating) collective goals. 
As discussed, the rules and procedures established for evaluation and auditing 
shape the behaviour of the stakeholders involved in these processes. This 
becomes particularly relevant in terms of the dissemination of responsibilities 
and obligations in this matter among different actors. These conditions affect 
the different configurations of power that stakeholders establish in the pursuit 
of their interests. The potential impact that evaluation outputs can have on their 
interests might help explaining how they engage with this activity. Nonetheless, 
the institutional architecture of evaluation is unable to eliminate completely the 
discretion of stakeholders in the process. In this sense, as a political instrument, 
evaluation relies on the capacity of stakeholders to take advantage of power 
spaces found in the process for pursuing their agendas. This last chapter reflects 
back upon the findings obtained to make explicit the theoretical and empirical 
contributions of this thesis. For this purpose, it is divided into three sections. 
The first one presents the main conclusions derived from the analysis in both 
countries, emphasising the most notorious differences found. The second 
section explains the theoretical contribution of this research: To what extent has 
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this thesis expanded the frontiers of the existing knowledge about the hidden 
politics of evaluation? Finally, a series of recommendations about how the 
political nature of evaluation can be addressed in the theoretical and practical 
domains are presented. These reflections aim to explain to what extent the use 
of evaluation has made the state smarter, in the sense of making the most of this 
managerial and political instrument—in other words, adopting evaluation 
mechanisms, taking into account the challenges associated with the interaction 
among the participants of this activity. 
7.1 General Conclusions of the Research 
At a broader level, the study of the hidden politics of evaluation shows that the 
evidence obtained in both countries presents some common characteristics. 
Considering that the socio-economic and political characteristics of each 
country have promoted a different approach to policy evaluation (see Chapter 3, 
Section 3.2.3). There are some major elements of the discussion of the political 
nature of evaluation that transcend these differences. This section presents 
some mainstream arguments that concern fundamentally the role of the 
institutionalisation of evaluation as a variable that can predict (partially) the 
political behaviour of the stakeholders in evaluation. 
The first argument to highlight is that despite the differences in the institutional 
design for evaluation, the formalisation of this activity in both contexts 
addresses key issues in this matter: Who will perform evaluations? Which 
instruments will be applied? How will funding be allocated? The degree of this 
formalisation differs in terms of the rigidness or flexibility of the norms (or 
guidelines) for this purpose. From an overall perspective, the perks of giving 
evaluation more structure are mostly constrained to the managerial aspect. The 
political nature of evaluation seems to be hidden behind the technical and 
rational dimensions associated with this activity. 
Another interesting element in common refers to the disconnection between 
monitoring, evaluation, and audit systems. There are systems in place operating 
simultaneously; yet its complementarity (and perhaps overlapping) has not 
been analysed in depth. For this reason, it is complex to determine the extent to 
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which these activities are contributing individually and collectively to the 
improvement of policymaking.1150 This matters in terms of how evaluation 
feeds into accountability systems. Its contribution needs to be explicit, for 
example by stating how policymakers will use evaluation outputs to inform and 
justify their decisions. This resonates with the discussion about evaluation 
contributing to the reduction of the democratic deficit (see Chapter 2, Section 
2.1.1). The promotion of evaluation approaches that promote transparency and 
participation of other stakeholders can help narrowing the gap between citizens 
and government. Moreover, it highlights the link between evaluation and 
auditing. The description of the institutional framework for these activities in 
both countries suggests that the differences between them are not only 
procedural but also epistemological. Auditing has a political value related to its 
contribution to accountability, while evaluation is perceived mostly as a 
managerial tool. These different conceptualisations are reflected on; the extent 
to which the institutional framework promotes the use of outputs derived from 
this activity, i.e. follow-up inquiries by Select Committees. 
Quality is an issue that stands out in both contexts. However, the effect of this 
variable differs. The rules and procedures set for evaluation do not appear to 
determine (at least not explicitly) clear criteria to verify the quality and 
robustness of evaluation. Despite this, the questionings to credibility seem to be 
more perceivable in the Mexican case. This leads to reflecting about how power 
and control in an evaluation system should be allocated. In both scenarios, 
government has a predominant position in relation to other stakeholders. This 
imposes important challenges because it limits their participation in key issues, 
like assessing the quality of evaluation. What is more, in terms of credibility and 
independence, the dissemination of the control of the evaluation process might 
increase the trust on it and its utility for stakeholders. 
A related concern regards the value given to external evaluation seen as a 
safeguard for independence and objectivity. The discussion presented about the 
internal versus external evaluation models shows that independence relies on 
                                                        
1150 In the Mexican case, for example, the fact that three different organisations conduct the 
evaluation policy has generated disputes among them that affect the conduction of monitoring 
and evaluation systems. 
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more variables other than this choice. Nevertheless, the cases analysed show 
that there needs to be more explicit criteria for the commissioning of a study to 
justify the rationale of selecting an in-house or an external approach to 
evaluation. 
Lastly, the acknowledgement of evaluation as a risk-reduction mechanism 
requires reflecting about what this means for the stakeholders involved. From 
an instrumental perspective, this would refer, for example, to giving 
policymakers evidence to design and implement policies in a more controlled 
environment. And yet, the connection to the interests to other stakeholders is 
not that straightforward. Politicians, for example, do not seem to be completely 
aware of the potential of evaluation outputs for the development of their 
political manifestos or for the identification of political priorities. In governance, 
this reveals that evaluation needs to expand the boundaries of its rationale to 
incorporate the needs and expectations of actors beyond the governmental 
sphere. It is certain that the governance model demands recognising the 
existence and influence of other actors and, in this sense, evaluation can be 
adopted as a mechanism for helping them gaining new spaces of power in the 
public sphere, for example by giving civil society a more visible position in the 
debate about the effectiveness of government policies (democratic evaluation). 
Also, this could mean increasing the influence of evaluation bodies (not 
necessarily governmental) as entities devoted to the production and analysis of 
evidence that can be used for political purposes. This would mean recognising 
evaluation as a tool of power and influence and reflecting on who should lead an 
evaluation policy. 
7.1.1 Conclusions about the Hidden Politics of Evaluation 
The case studies analysed allowed establishing a series of conclusions about 
how politics and evaluation interact in two different contexts. These findings 
highlight those keys elements of the research that contribute to generating new 
knowledge in the evaluation studies field. As stated, the hidden politics of 
evaluation can be perceived in both contexts as the exercise of power and 
resources by stakeholders to influence the evaluation process, according to 
their interests. The political nature of evaluation might not be explicitly 
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recognised by the institutional framework, but it is easily identifiable in the 
formal and informal arrangements that take place in the conduction of this 
activity. 
In relation to the control of the process of evaluation, an interesting finding is 
the existence of a predominant actor with the capacity to shape the process 
according to his interests. Under the light of the thematic framework proposed 
in this thesis, this suggests that the control over key elements of the process, e.g. 
purpose, resources, etc., is what allows this actor to maintain a more favourable 
power position. While in Mexico this actor is clearly the Federal Government, in 
the case of the UK, evaluation lacks a predominant actor as responsibilities in 
this matter rest at departmental level. Nonetheless, this is not the case in 
auditing, for which the NAO, and in a broader sense, Parliament, are the leading 
organisations. These differences can be explained at some level, because of the 
asymmetries in the political leverage given to evaluation and auditing. 
Regarding the institutional design for evaluation, it is possible to observe that 
this has been the result of the political arrangements that finally led to the 
establishment of rules and procedures. In the Mexican case, for example, the 
role of CONEVAL stands out as an evaluation agency with which legitimacy is 
based on its technical expertise and on the ‘soft power’ that it exercises. Despite 
this, the political changes that recently occurred in Mexico will eventually 
promote a new configuration of power and political arrangements that can 
undermine the legitimacy of this body and that will need to be carefully studied. 
This contrasts with the UK, where the role of the NAO and the PAC in the public 
landscape are more intrinsically recognised and trusted as scrutiny bodies. 
The political nature of evaluation, contrary to intuition, has little to do with the 
manipulation of outputs or the use of evidence to pursue particular interests. 
What this research suggests is that the politicisation of evaluation is mainly 
manifested in the influence exercised by stakeholders during the process in the 
control of key stages of evaluation, i.e. data-collection and method-selection. 
This relates to the struggle for dominating the ‘evaluation space’ and the 
outputs of the relationships produced in it. The resulting outcome of this is the 
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predomination of the interests of the actor that holds more power, i.e. the 
Federal Government in Mexico. Considering the relevance of the institutional 
framework, this influence reveals that stakeholders take advantage of those 
spaces of discretion (not formally regulated) to exercise their power. 
Another important conclusion is that neither in Mexico nor in the UK has 
evaluation reached a level of notoriety to promote its inclusion in the political 
debate about the effectiveness of government. This relates to the technocratic 
value given to evaluation which seems to have constrained it mostly to the 
managerial sphere. As a consequence, its potential as a political tool seems 
underestimated. The depoliticisation ideas discussed in the theoretical 
framework (Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1) are useful for underlining the relevance of 
the rationality label given to evaluation in the aim of detaching it from its 
political nature. This can be perceived, for example, in the way in which the 
Mexican Federal Government emphasises the ‘external’ nature of its evaluation 
policy. 
As a tool of governance, evaluation seems to be still at an immature stage. More 
specifically, its utility for making more informed decisions, generating better 
conditions to negotiate with stakeholders, and identifying those responsible for 
public policy is unclear in the cases analysed. It could be expected that this 
utility would increase according to the level of influence that stakeholders can 
exercise over the process. For instance, as a political tool for avoiding blame, the 
utility of evaluation will depend on the capacity of stakeholders to participate in 
the process of evaluation without this being perceived as an open attempt of 
manipulation. What arises from these reflections is that the control over the 
‘evaluation space’ implies cooperation among stakeholders, for the preservation 
of the legitimacy of the evaluation process. Undermining the credibility of the 
evaluation system represents a threat for all stakeholders involved, regardless 
of their individual agendas. The relationship between the ‘evaluation space’ and 
Dubnick’s concept of ‘accountability space’ serves the purpose of highlighting 
the importance of studying how control mechanisms interact with the political 
context from a more holistic perspective. This means looking in detail at the 
relationships that emerge among different actors in the design and 
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implementation of evaluation processes.  
These conclusions provide the necessary basis for reflecting back on the 
research questions (Table 7.1). The hypothesis proposed in this thesis is that 
the institutional framework designed for an evaluation policy can determine the 
degree of political influence in evaluation and may affect the consequences for 
the utility and legitimacy of this activity. The evidence discussed here suggests 
that the institutional architecture for evaluation defines the configurations of 
power that are created. This can be observed in the way rules and procedures 
determine the degree of independence that evaluators have; the prerogative for 
commissioning evaluations and the mechanisms for the dissemination of 
findings, among other core elements of the process that affect the outputs and 
outcomes. 
The conclusions of each one of the cases discuss these issues in more detail. 
However, the point to highlight here is that the political nature of evaluation 
was observed in both countries. The major difference was the way in which this 
nature manifests due to the conditions provided by the institutional framework 
and how this shapes and constrains the behaviour of stakeholders. 
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Table 7.1 Linkage between Core Questions of the Research and the Conclusions Obtained 
Research Questions Main Conclusions 
Core 
Question 
What is the relationship between 
politics and evaluation? 
It was acknowledged that evaluation is a political activity per se. The implications of this were observed 
through the analysis of the case studies. In different stages of the process of evaluation/audit there were 
political issues at stake. Most of these issues were related to the control of the process and the 
predomination of the interests of the actor in this position. 
Secondary 
Questions 
Are there efficient institutional 
frameworks that assure an effective 
assessment of public policy? 
In both countries there are institutional arrangements for the performance of audits and evaluations. Even 
though important differences arise (e.g. departments’ freedom to evaluate), there are formal processes 
related to the evaluation of public policy. The main conclusion is that in both scenarios there are spaces for 
stakeholders to act with discretion which is where the politics manifest more clearly (see Chapter 6). 
Which values are promoted by the 
different stakeholders involved in 
evaluation? How do these values 
interact? 
The values underpinning evaluation and auditing identified in both countries are related to efficiency, 
effectiveness and economy. These values are aligned within the formal structures in which these activities 
take place; however, from the perspective of external stakeholders other values should be put at the core of 
evaluation and audit processes. In the case of health policy, for instance, equity and access were some of 
the values underlined by these actors. 
Does the evaluation policy, in both 
countries, produce in a systematic way 
relevant and convenient information 
that can be used for the policymaking 
process? 
In both countries there is a systematic production of evaluation outputs derived from the work of different 
actors. In the UK cases, for example, it was observed a more plural participation of actors in the production 
of new knowledge, while in Mexico this is an activity mostly monopolised by the Federal Government. 
When the outputs of evaluation are 
used, is there any effect on the 
improvement of policymaking? 
In the four case studies it was identified a series of evaluation outputs and some follow-up processes. 
Specifically in the Cancer Strategy, the use of evidence is a recurrent practice due to the nature of this 
policy issue. In the rest of the cases, the influence of the information derived from assessment processes is 
difficult to quantify, some examples were provided but there is no unquestionable way to determine the 
effect of evaluation into the policymaking process. 
Which is the role of policy evaluation 
in order to consider it useful for the 
policymaking process? 
Here an important difference arises between the two countries. While in Mexico the Federal Government 
has given evaluation a primary role as a mechanism of legitimisation, in the UK the use of evaluation 
research is more perceived as a tool for policy improvement and organisational learning, while the audit 
system that operates exercises important accountability functions.  
In terms of ‘good policy’ and ‘good 
politics’, which of these issues 
predominate in the evaluation agenda 
of both countries? 
In both countries evaluation plays an important role in public management; but it has not transcended to 
political discussions. Consequently, the politics of evaluation are mostly constrained to the use of power 
and influence in different stages of the process, rather than to the use of evaluation as a systematic input 
for the construction of political arguments. 
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7.1.2 Conclusions of the UK Case 
Most of the differences in relation to the Mexican case regarded the set of 
conditions and rules established by the institutional framework. The existence 
of a parliamentary system—as opposed to the Presidential regime in Mexico—
promotes a more plural and inclusive political landscape (checks and balances). 
In the UK, there is a more equitable allocation that impedes—at least formally—
an excessive concentration of power in one actor. The strength of the UK audit 
system represents another important distinctive variable. Considering this, the 
way in which the political nature of evaluation is manifested varies importantly 
in respect of the Mexican case. 
The rationale for evaluation in the UK is perceived more as an organisational 
learning asset than as a means for policy legitimisation. The lack of enforcement 
mechanisms for the performance of evaluation gives government departments 
discretion to carry out studies according to their needs and resources. Most of 
these studies are considered inputs for the internal decision-making and a tool 
for constantly reflecting upon possible courses of action. This finds echo in the 
discussion about the need for risk-reduction and control instruments demanded 
by governance. In this sense, a more informed policy aims to reduce the 
controversy around government decisions and to generate more political 
support. In particular, this is the case of the Cancer Strategy, as a policy strongly 
based on scientific evidence, the effectiveness of which focuses on the values 
being prioritised by key stakeholders, while the instruments for the 
implementation of governmental action are less controversial because of its 
evidence-based nature. 
Another interesting conclusion of the UK case concerns the power held by the 
NAO. This is perhaps one of the most substantial differences between evaluation 
and auditing that can help explaining the gap existing between these activities 
in relation to their effect on policymaking. The political support provided by the 
PAC gives the NAO the strength to effectively scrutinise how government 
departments are delivering services and to identify the VFM that they are 
producing. In addition, its institutional design favours the construction of 
credibility in the NAO and the statutory power to promote changes in the public 
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sector. 
The fact that there is more freedom in the way evaluation is performed in the 
UK does not mean de facto that there is more discretion in this process. Core 
elements like the commissioning of evaluations are regulated and this removes 
from commissioners the decision to select evaluators in a discretionary way. 
Moreover, the guidelines produced by HM Treasury allow government 
departments to adjust evaluation to their particular needs; this might help 
incentivising the use of social research as an aid for policymakers. This 
flexibility might be explained by the fact that in this country the perception 
about the independence and objectivity of evaluation is not a major issue. As a 
result, more discretion is not perceived negatively. 
The existence of an active research community, charities, NGOs, think tanks, and 
other actors increases the plurality of policy evaluation. The way in which the 
institutional framework allows the participation of these actors favours the 
inclusion of different views about a particular policy issue, and yet, the extent to 
which they are able to participate is limited. In line with this, the 
democratisation of evaluation could be seen as way to open this process and 
incorporate other views. This could even imply a collaborative design of 
evaluation instruments. 
In more specific terms, the analysis of the Cancer Strategy case provided 
evidence about how the participation of stakeholders can become political. For 
example, different disease groups will intervene, driven by their particular 
interests. Although cancer is considered a highly technical policy issue, there are 
spaces for stakeholders to seek the predomination of their interests, e.g. more 
funding for a particular type of cancer. The political notoriety of the Cancer 
Strategy and its inclusion in the political agenda of the government and MPs 
give more salience to its evaluation findings and the political use given to these, 
e.g. for the development of political manifestos in electoral times. 
The case of the CQC offers a different perspective about the hidden politics of 
evaluation. The widely known shortcomings in its performance at the beginning 
359 
 
of its operation increased the pressure for the evaluation of this organisation. 
According to the evidence collected, the scrutiny for the CQC has been more 
strict and the follow-up more persistent. This reflects that the drivers for 
evaluation can be highly political. If there is a public negative opinion about an 
organisation, scrutiny bodies are keen to be more critical, to promote the 
adoption of changes and to make sure that recommendations are being heeded. 
The accountability function of evaluation in governance refers precisely to the 
identification and acknowledgement of the expectations created around an 
organisation. Considering this, the political relevance of the evaluation of the 
CQC, after its troubled first years of operation, generated momentum for the 
adoption of this activity as a core element of its organisational behaviour. 
The use of the evidence produced by the NAO, the PAC, and the Health 
Committee about the CQC shows that an evaluation can become politicised for 
several reasons. In this case, the failures in addressing key events and the 
organisational differences between members of the Board led to a more severe 
scrutiny, more public attention, and the distortion of the main focus of the CQC. 
Here, evaluation can become a counterpart for the potential blame-avoidance by 
providing robust evidence about the performance of this regulator. 
7.1.3 Conclusions of the Mexican Case 
The explicit promotion given to evaluation by the Federal Government in 
Mexico has led to the development of an evaluation policy with which 
implementation has generated important outcomes in a relatively short period 
of time (see Chapter 5). The Mexican case presents interesting findings about 
the institutionalisation of evaluation in the context of a country with an 
important legitimacy crisis of public trust. 
Despite the fact that the Federal Government has strongly promoted the 
adoption of an evaluation policy, the institutional framework underpinning it 
seems weak and still at an emerging stage. The audit system currently operating 
shares some of the same problems observed in evaluation. The scope of audits is 
fundamentally procedural. Consequently, the changes and modifications that 
can be produced through this system are minor. In addition, the lack of 
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enforcement mechanisms and the political power of the SAO to promote the 
adoption of more substantial reforms or to sanction the underachievement of 
goals has limited the impact of this activity. The rigidness of the evaluation and 
audit systems does not allow other stakeholders to access the ‘evaluation 
space’; they are constrained to a passive role that limits also the utility of 
evaluation outputs for them. 
The role given to evaluation in Mexico is more related to its use as a legitimation 
tool; not entirely as a mechanism for the adoption of reforms. This can be 
mostly observed through the emphasis given to the idea of ‘external evaluation’. 
Although the Federal Government strongly controls the evaluation process and 
limits the tasks of evaluators, it seems very important to this actor to make 
explicit the fact that external parties are the ones providing the judgement. This 
is helpful for discussing the pertinence of giving evaluation more political value. 
Especially in the Mexican context, in which credibility and independence are 
core issues at stake, giving more political salience to evaluation might generate 
costs associated with the perception of a biased judgement of policy. The 
technocratic value given to evaluation seems to fall into conflict with the 
promotion of a more explicit political approach to evaluation. 
As stated, Mexico’s excessively centralistic evaluation policy leaves very little 
room for the participation of non-governmental actors or even actors within the 
government that are excluded from key decisions, e.g. operators. This manifests 
the influence of the institutional framework in the distribution of tasks in the 
evaluation process and the rationale behind it. For instance, removing 
commissioning decisions from ministries and transferring them to coordination 
agencies (depoliticisation) aims to establish distance between evaluators and 
evaluands. However, this distance seems also to affect the utility of evaluation 
for programmes. 
This can be observed in the case of the Health Caravans Programme, with which 
disagreements about the scope of evaluation between decision-makers and 
operators have occurred. The distance perceived between those who set the 
evaluation agenda and the knowledge about the operation of the programme 
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was reflected in the perception about the lack of utility of evaluation. 
Programme operators, for example, are perceived as mere executors of a 
decision taken outside the core sphere of the programme. Health Caravans 
demand an important amount of information from the field which cannot be 
obtained through the desk-based evaluations that are constantly performed. 
This case is also relevant for discussing the relationship between the political 
notoriety of the programme and the political use of evaluation outputs. The 
promotion of the achievements of the programme and the validation of political 
decisions like the modification (reduction) of budget can be supported by the 
evidence produced by evaluation. 
In relation to SICALIDAD, the ideas around the hidden politics of evaluation are 
linked to the use and sharing of information. As it constitutes the main input for 
the evaluation, the control of the information is a way to influence the process. 
Evidence suggests that in line with the theory, evaluation can be perceived as a 
potential threat for the interests of stakeholders. Consequently, there is a 
patrimonial vision of the information in the aim of diminishing the risk of a 
possible negative output. This, in the context of governance, can be linked to the 
need for cooperation and the generation of incentives for aligning the behaviour 
of stakeholders. This cooperation might only be achieved through the flexibility 
of the evaluation process and the delegation of some of the functions from the 
Federal Government to other stakeholders. 
SICALIDAD also illustrates how discretionary spaces found in the process of 
evaluation can be used by stakeholders in the pursuit of their interests. This 
does not necessarily imply an explicit intention to manipulate the process, but it 
can certainly affect the output of an evaluation, e.g. by modifying the selection of 
a sample that can lead to different findings. This makes evident that although a 
rigid process is implemented for the design, commissioning, and supervision of 
evaluation, rules, and procedures cannot completely predict and control the 
decisions of stakeholders. 
What the Mexican case shows is that the actor (Federal Government) that 
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controls most of the process can subtly shape it according to its interests, while 
at the same time it can control the rationale of evaluation for the legitimisation 
of public action. 
7.2 Contributions to the Theory 
The theoretical contribution of this thesis to the knowledge about the hidden 
politics of evaluation is relevant for two main reasons. The first one is that 
obtaining empirical evidence about politics helps identifying some new areas of 
study in the field. Secondly, as most of the theoretical production about the 
political nature of evaluation has focused on the struggle of interests among the 
stakeholders, it seems necessary to expand these boundaries in relation to how 
the role of evaluation in governance can be affected by politics. The aim of this 
thesis has been to push the boundaries of the existent knowledge by looking at 
how the conditions established by the institutional architecture affect the 
relationships that take place in the ‘evaluation space’. 
The ideas about evaluation as a completely objective and apolitical instrument 
were reconsidered later by the scholars as the evidence showed that it was not 
possible to abstract evaluation from its political context. These ideas were 
mostly based on the fact that the objects of evaluation are the result of political 
decisions, when the people involved in evaluation (practitioners, operators, 
evaluators, or politicians) have political values to defend, and the consequences 
of the assessment would eventually lead to a new set of political arrangements, 
e.g. distribution of resources, focus expansion, or programme termination. The 
way in which the evaluation is embedded in a political dynamic became an issue 
of interest for the scholars, to understand how this might affect evaluation. 
The potential contributions of this thesis to the theory are addressed in this 
section, taking into account the theoretical pillars that guided this thesis. 
7.2.1 Governance, Policy Analysis, and Performance Management 
The new functions acquired and developed by governments around the world 
are strongly related to the new challenges imposed by the reality. The 
adaptability of governments to these changes demands the adoption of new 
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managerial models for policymaking. One of the main findings of this research is 
the use of evaluation processes as a mechanism to respond to two major 
demands: the development of more effective policies and for more 
accountability. 
In this context, this thesis has generated empirical evidence about the 
interaction of the different stakeholders involved in evaluation. Through this 
evidence, it is possible to understand to what extent governments have been 
forced to rethink their roles, due to the external pressures. Moreover, evaluation 
and auditing have also had an important effect within public organisations, i.e. 
resistance to evaluation, that show that the participation of non-governmental 
actors is not passive. Instead, they are taking new positions of power that allow 
them to promote their interests. The main theoretical contribution of this 
research to the governance and policy analysis can be summarised into two 
major arguments: the first one is that the transformation of the state goes 
further in the implementation and adoption of new models, e.g. NPM, in which 
evaluation has the potential to transcend its role as a managerial tool to become 
an instrument for the construction of political arguments. The 
acknowledgement of the politics of evaluation can be seen as a process for 
developing new institutional arrangements that can broaden the participation 
of non-governmental actors. This view is based on the argument that the rise of 
new stakeholders’ demands has promoted thinking about their participation, 
not only in evaluation but also in the whole policymaking process. Likewise, the 
changes in the conceptualisation of the role of evaluation are now more directed 
towards the inclusion of multiple views (democratisation). Consequently, a 
more inclusive approach to evaluation might fit better into the context of 
governance, not only because of its benefits for the robustness and credibility of 
evaluation, but also in terms of its capacity, to contribute to the reduction of the 
democratic deficit. 
The other argument is that looking at evaluation as a stage of the policy cycle 
whose main function is to verify the accomplishments made by a programme, 
dismisses its potential as a key element for the generation of evidence 
susceptible to be used at any other stage (agenda, implementation). Therefore, 
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understanding evaluation merely as a component of the policymaking process 
limits the possible benefits to be derived from this activity. Its 
institutionalisation needs to take into account not only its role as an aid for 
policymakers, but also its potential as a political tool within and outside the 
governmental sphere. The technocratic nature of evaluation needs to be 
transformed, in order to build its political legitimacy. As a tool of governance, 
evaluation demands to adapt its approaches to a new dynamic, which entails a 
more intensive use of this mechanism. This implies understanding how 
stakeholders engage in the evaluation process and how they take advantage of 
the spaces found in the institutional architecture. 
In relation to performance management, the findings derived from this research 
resonate with the theory behind this model, at least in three different ways. 
First, the interaction of performance-management systems and other control 
mechanisms, i.e. evaluation and auditing, implies the coexistence of values that 
are not always aligned. This generates fragmentation that makes difficult the 
identification of the overall contribution of these instruments to policymaking, 
and the extent to which these activities are complementary or supplementary. 
Secondly, the necessary conditions for the operation of these performance-
management systems are not produced automatically. For example, 
decentralisation of government, through the creation of arm’s-length bodies, 
might be driven by the idea of increasing efficiency as well as promoting 
specialisation or independence. However, it creates some other distortions that 
cannot be ignored, such as the difficulties associated with establishing effective 
mechanisms of control. This becomes even more complex when the institutional 
framework is ambiguous, as in the case of the coordination agencies in Mexico. 
Finally, the evidence generated by this research shows that the simultaneous 
application of control instruments does not guarantee an effective appraisal of 
policy. The theoretical issue to discuss here is the extent to which the 
coexistence of different assessment systems can produce more harm than good. 
Designed and underpinned by a different logic, it is worth reflecting on their 
role in the broader context of governance; particularly, in terms of how the 
365 
 
politics embedded in these activities is recognised and addressed. As an input 
for evaluation, for instance, performance indicators might imply a bias not 
explicitly identified but that can affect the overall judgement. 
7.2.2 Evaluation Studies 
Looking at evaluation studies as a broader field of knowledge, the development 
of this thesis has also discussed different arguments about the theory and 
practice of evaluation that can guide future studies in this field. On the one hand, 
this thesis synthesises the most recent discussions about the conceptualisation 
of evaluation and its utility for policymaking. On the other hand, it has also 
elucidated the relevance of taking into consideration the different rules and 
institutions that are created for the performance of this activity in the public 
sector. 
In line with this, a contribution of this thesis to the evaluation studies field can 
be seen in the identification of the institutional framework as a core element of 
evaluation practice that affects substantially this process. Moreover, the 
multiple ways in which formal and informal rules can shape the performance of 
evaluation can lead to different results. This is especially evident in the 
arrangements made among stakeholders, for instance in the way they agree to 
heed recommendations. 
Another contribution is the recognition of core elements of the process of 
evaluation that are affected by the interaction among stakeholders. Evaluation 
is not a unilateral activity; it involves the participation of stakeholders within 
and outside the governmental sphere whose interests can determine how this 
activity is conducted. The practice of evaluation seen from the political 
perspective demands reconciling the interests involved in this process and 
identifying which areas need to be formally regulated to guarantee its 
robustness, credibility, and utility.  
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7.2.3 Theory about the Hidden Politics of Evaluation 
Scholars in the evaluation studies field have made an important contribution 
acknowledging the political nature of evaluation and the implications for the 
field.1151 In particular, these discussions have concerned the way in which 
politics can affect the work of evaluators and how they can cope with it to 
preserve the integrity of their work.1152 Although the challenges faced by 
evaluators and practitioners are of great importance, this research has aimed to 
go further by understanding the relationship between evaluation and politics 
through the lenses of the institutional framework in which this activity takes 
place. 
The main contributions of this thesis can be identified in three main issues. The 
first one is the development of a thematic framework (see Chapter 2) whose 
purpose was to provide an analytical tool to grasp a complex and intangible 
topic like politics. This framework identified five variables (purpose, resources, 
process, outputs, and outcomes) considered crucial for guiding the research. 
Through this tool it is possible to establish some basis for a more structured 
comprehension of how politics and evaluation interact. It is neither exhaustive 
nor fixed, so it can be improved and adapted according to the needs of new 
objects of study. 
The second contribution is the empirical evidence about the hidden politics of 
evaluation that allowed the identification of new variables to explore (see 
Chapter 6, Section 6.3.2) to reach a more specific level of analysis and more data 
that can feed into new research models. 
Finally, the identification of key themes of the hidden politics of evaluation that 
                                                        
1151 For example: Chelimsky, E. 1995. "The Political Environment of Evaluation and What it 
Means for the Development of the Field: Evaluation for a New Century: A Global Perspective." 
American Journal of Evaluation 16(3):215-25, Palumbo, D. J. 1987. The Politics of Program 
Evaluation. California, US: SAGE, Weiss, C. H. 1973. "Where Politics and Evaluation Research 
Meet." American Journal of Evaluation 14(1):93-106, —. 1993. "Politics and Evaluation: A 
Reprise with Mellower Overtones." American Journal of Evaluation 14(1):107-09. 
1152 Lipsky, D. B., R. L. Seeber, A. C. Avgar, and R. M. Scanza. 2007. "Managing the Politics of 
Evaluation: Lessons from the Evaluation of ADR Programs." Pp. 116-29 in Proceedings of the Fift-
Ninth Annual Meeting of the Labor and Employment Relations Association, Morris, M. 1990. "A 
Nightmare in Elm City: When Evaluation Field Experiences Meet Organizational Politics." 
Evaluation Review 14(1):91-99. 
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are related to different stages of this process, i.e. design and commissioning, 
promotes a more holistic understanding of the relationship between evaluation 
and politics. In the context of governance, broadening the scope of evaluation as 
a tool for reducing risk and uncertainty and controlling a more fragmented 
government structure demands acknowledging the role of all stakeholders 
involved. 
The next section is guided by a more empirical approach. Its purpose is to 
present a series of practical recommendations for each case study and to outline 
a possible future research agenda. 
7.3 Public Policy Recommendations and Future Research 
Agendas 
An important element of a PhD thesis relies on its capacity to generate new 
knowledge that can be translated into practical applications in the field of study. 
This section develops a group of recommendations directed to foster the 
positive aspects of politics in evaluation and reducing its negative effects on this 
process. The recommendations presented concern each one of the case studies 
analysed. 
7.3.1 Recommendations for the UK Case 
The institutional framework described for the performance of evaluation in the 
UK (Chapter 4) showed a strong audit system that coexists with a fragmented 
and irregular evaluation policy. The case studies analysed allowed observing the 
conditions in which stakeholders interact and the discretionary spaces at their 
disposal for the pursuit of their interests. In this context, what it is observed is a 
diminished role of evaluation in policymaking and unclear evidence about its 
utility. Therefore, in terms of the hidden politics of evaluation, the conditions 
established by the institutional framework influence the dynamic in which 
evaluation takes place. In the idea of aligning in a better way evaluation with its 
political nature, the following recommendations are made: 
a) The disconnection between parallel process of assessment (evaluation, audit, 
and performance measurement) reduces the capability of evaluation to impact 
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policymaking. Consequently, it is advisable to identify mechanisms of 
interaction and complementation between these instruments. 
b) The hidden politics of evaluation is related to the asymmetries of power and 
influence among stakeholders. Therefore, more structured mechanisms of 
participation in these processes could help identifying those stakeholders that 
are more active and weigh their influence according to their characteristics. 
c) Even though there are mechanisms for participating in evaluation/audit 
processes, these are mostly limited to the provision of evidence. A broader 
approach to the democratisation of evaluation implies thinking of those key 
areas of the process that can be enriched by the inclusion of stakeholders, 
without putting at risk the independence and objectivity of the assessment. 
d) Without compromising the necessary freedom required by departments to 
design and conduct evaluation according to the needs of their programmes, a 
more structured evaluation policy could reduce the asymmetries existent in 
terms of the quantity and quality of evaluations performed in central 
government. In addition, this could generate relevant information about the 
way in which this activity is undertaken and the areas of improvement. 
e) The discussions about the effectiveness of policy should considerate the 
political values around a particular issue. For example, acknowledging the 
sensitiveness of a policy issue like cancer can promote a more holistic 
understanding of how ‘success’ can be interpreted, considering different views 
and going beyond the mere interpretation of data. 
7.3.2 Recommendations for the Mexican Case  
The conditions of the evaluation policy found in Mexico were quite different to 
the case of the UK. Policy evaluation has been promoted and implemented 
under a highly centralised scheme controlled by the Federal Government. The 
evaluation policy has mostly developed a series of instruments and methods to 
apply in a standardised way to federal programmes, particularly those 
belonging to the social sector. Furthermore, the audit system operating lacks the 
political support and technical capacity to effectively hold the government to 
account. This scenario shows that even though the institutionalisation of 
evaluation has been strongly promoted, the evaluation policy is still at an early 
stage in which its effect on policymaking is not very clear. In this context, some 
recommendations for the Mexican case are exposed: 
a) One of the main issues regarding the hidden politics of evaluation is the need 
for a more developed and open market of evaluators. This could be beneficial 
for the independence and legitimacy of evaluation and it could avoid negative 
incentives produced by the closeness between evaluators and commissioners. 
b) The lack of flexibility produced by the standardisation of evaluation should be 
reconsidered in the aim of conducting evaluations that might be more ad hoc to 
the particular needs of programmes. 
c) The involvement of external stakeholders could improve the capacity of 
programmes to conduct more sophisticated and complex studies. For example, 
the inclusion of NGOs and civil society in the evaluation of the Health Caravans 
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Programme could generate more specific information about its operation and 
its impact on the population. 
d) In the pursuit of making explicit the independence of evaluation through the 
use of external consultant, the evaluation policy is excessively centralised and 
monopolised by the Federal Government. A more open and flexible model 
could allow a more systematic and incremental incorporation of external 
views. 
e) It is advisable to rethink the role and the faculties given to the SAO; without 
more institutional mechanisms to hold the government to account, auditing 
will generate only marginal changes in policy. 
These recommendations developed for both cases aim only to highlight some 
general issues that could be worth a deeper analysis. The implementation of 
each recommendation is constrained by multiple factors and by the political 
support of the stakeholders involved. In addition, each one of the 
recommendations requires a full and detailed development. 
From an overall perspective, this thesis has shown that despite the development 
and adoption of evaluation and audit mechanisms in the public sector that has 
gained relevance during recent years, the state has not been capable yet of 
taking full advantage of these tools, particularly in the political sphere. This 
means that the state can be considered more informed, more open, even more 
cooperative, but not necessarily smarter as there is still a long way to go in the 
understanding of the role of evaluation in the context of governance. 
7.3.3 Future Research Agendas 
The process of undertaking this research has shed new light to new potential 
areas of research. These issues are mostly related to the political nature of 
evaluation but also to the relationship of this activity with other mechanisms of 
assessment. In broad terms, six areas of future research were identified: 
1. The relationship between the use of evaluation and the level of public trust in 
institutions. 
2. The complementarity of audit and evaluation approaches for the improvement 
of public policy. 
3. The use evaluation outputs for the construction of political arguments. 
4. Evaluation as a mechanism for strengthening the legislative process. 
5. The influence of international organisations in policy evaluation and the 
implications for independence and objectivity. 
6. Due to the political reform occurring in Mexico, it would be relevant to analyse 
the changes in the role of CONEVAL as an autonomous agency in charge of 
evaluating public policy. Important discussions are taking place in relation to 
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the consequences of modifying its governance and the implications for its 
credibility in the political landscape. 
In many ways, the discussions presented in this research and the findings 
obtained through the case studies highlight the relevance of giving more 
attention to the role of policy evaluation within and outside the governmental 
sphere. The identification of its utilisation as both a managerial and a political 
instrument allows reflecting upon multiple future research agendas. 
Undoubtedly, the hidden politics of evaluation have exposed different potential 
streams of research about both its implications for academicians and 
practitioners.  
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Appendices 
A. Main Differences between the Political Systems of the UK and 
Mexico 
The institutional framework for evaluation and auditing in the UK and Mexico is 
influenced by the economic, cultural, social and political characteristics in which 
is embedded. Regarding the latter, it seems relevant to highlight the main 
differences that arise between these countries. The UK is a constitutional 
monarchy1153 based on a parliamentary democracy, while Mexico is a 
democratic republic that operates within a presidential system. The differences 
between these constitutional designs have been pointed out by Søberg (Table 
A.1).  
Table A.1 Main Differences between Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies 
“Pure” Parliamentary Democracy Presidential Democracy 
1. Executive authority, consisting of a 
prime minister and cabinet, arises out of 
the legislative assembly; 
2. The executive is at all times subject to 
potential dismissal via a vote of “no 
confidence” by a majority of the legislative 
assembly. 
1. The Executive is headed by a popularly 
elected president who serves as the “chief 
executive;” 
2. The terms of the chief executive and the 
legislative assembly are fixed, and not 
subject to mutual confidence; 
3. The president names and directs the 
cabinet and has some constitutionally 
granted law-making authority. 
Source: Based on Søberg Shugart, M., 2006. “Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations” in 
Rhodes et al., The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions. Oxford University Press. P. 348 
These differences matter from a comparative perspective for a number of 
reasons. One of the most transcendent for the purposes of this research is 
because it allows understanding how powers are allocated between the 
Legislative and the Executive. Also, because the political system also shapes how 
government rules and institutions are established. In this context, the work of 
Heady is relevant because he studied in detail political differences between the 
UK and developing countries, in which the Mexican case can fit. According to 
this author, in the UK (and also in the US): 
political culture and political structure are congruent, the political 
system is relatively stable and its legitimacy well established… 
                                                        
1153 This refers to ‘a form of government in which a king or queen acts as Head of State’. The 
British Monarchy. "What is constitutional monarchy?". London, UK. 
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high ranking bureaucrats play substantial roles in governmental 
decision-making… 
External controls over bureaucracy are extensive and adequate in 
both Great Britain and the United States… 
Legislative oversight over administration relies in Great Britain on 
the doctrine of ministerial responsibility and makes slight use of 
specialized parliamentary committees…1154 
In contrast, this author states that in developing countries it is perceived a 
contrasting reality … 
Political instability is [a] prominent characteristic... 
Political leadership is concentrated in a minute segment of the 
population in most developing countries…  
The bureaucracies are deficient in skilled manpower necessary for 
developmental program […] The shortage is in trained 
administrators with management capacity, developmental skills, and 
technical competence… 
Corruption, on a scale ranging from payments to petty officials for 
facilitating a minor transaction to bribes of impressive dimensions 
for equally impressive services, is a phenomenon so prevalent as to 
be expected almost as a matter of course…1155 
In terms of bureaucracy, for instance, the differences exposed here show the 
existing culture and the way in which this element affects the adoption and 
internalisation of rules.1156  
                                                        
1154 Heady, F. 2001. Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective. New York, US: Marcel 
Dekker. Pp. 198-210. 
1155 Ibid.Pp. 249-274. 
1156 Peters, B. G. 2001. The Politics of Bureaucracy. London, UK: Routledge. 
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B. Main Approaches to Policy Analysis  
Analytical 
Approach 
Basic Premises Principal 
Authors 
Advantages Disadvantages Is it suitable for 
this research? 
Public choice 
This approach derives from the 
rational choice theory and seeks 
to analyse public policy through 
the use of economic principles. 
The unity of analysis is the 
individual who is characterized 
as rational and self-interested 
beings. 
This approach studies the 
decision making process in the 
public sector focusing on 
variables such as uncertainty 
and asymmetric information. 
Public choice theory developed 
the concept of public goods as a 
result of the activity of public 
agencies. 
Elinor Ostrom 
Vincent Ostrom 
Mancur Olson 
Douglass C. 
North 
 
This approach allows 
understanding how public 
agencies work by studying 
the behaviour of individuals 
but mostly by identifying 
how individuals make 
decision in a context of 
uncertainty. 
 
In addition, public choice 
has provided a 
conceptualization of public 
goods and how the 
decisions are made within 
the public sphere and the 
impact on this kind of 
goods. 
The economic approach 
limits the analysis of the 
whole dynamic of the 
policy making by ignoring 
other variables such as the 
effect of collective action. 
This kind of 
approach is not 
suitable for this 
research because 
it doesn’t provide 
enough 
theoretical tools 
to understand 
public action as a 
result of the 
interaction of 
different actors. 
Garbage can 
model 
 
This approach has as unit of 
analysis the organization. The 
basic premise is that within an 
organization, there is a set of 
problems and solutions, like in a 
garbage can, generated by the 
participants of the organization. 
The analysis made by this 
approach seeks to understand 
how a choice is made according 
to the conditions of the garbage 
can, the problems and solutions 
identified, the participants, the 
timing, among others. 
Michael D. 
Cohen 
James G. March 
Johan P. Olsen 
This approach provides a 
useful framework to 
understand how choices are 
made and how the context 
affects this decision. 
 
The garbage can model 
enables to understand how 
organizations work, 
particularly the way in 
which problems are 
categorised and solutions 
are allocated.  
Even though the garbage 
can model attempts to 
analyse decision making 
within the organization, it 
fails in understanding and 
assuming the complexity 
of the collective action and 
the influence of external 
variables. 
 
This model is not 
suitable for the 
research due to 
the fact that the 
research aims to 
understand in a 
more specific 
way how public 
problems are 
identified and 
how solutions 
are designed. 
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B.  Continued 
Analytical 
Approach 
Basic Premises Principal 
Authors 
Advantages Disadvantages Is it suitable for 
this research? 
Constructivist 
approach 
The constructivist approach 
analyses how public policy is 
affected by the discourse, not 
only in a rhetorical way but also 
in other areas. 
 
This approach states that the 
discourse influence in all the 
process of policy making, 
particularly in the promotion of 
issues in the public agenda.  
 
Jürgen 
Habermas 
Vivien Schmidt 
Joseph 
Schneider  
Giandomenico 
Majone  
This approach is useful in 
explaining the role of 
discourse and the 
construction of arguments 
to achieve an objective in 
policy making.  
 
An approach of this nature 
is convenient due to the fact 
that there are political 
issues that affect policy 
making. Therefore, a 
constructivist approach 
helps to understand how 
the logic behind public 
policy is transmitted. 
As a new approach the 
theoretical framework, as 
well as the methodology 
do not seem very clear. 
 
In addition, the analysis of 
the discourse seems 
limited to understand the 
policy making process as a 
whole. 
The limits in the 
methodology of 
this approach, as 
well as its limits 
to understand 
relevant issues of 
the policy making 
process such as 
the institutional 
framework and 
the 
organizational 
context. 
Policy 
networks 
Analysis 
Policy network analysis focuses 
on the study of the interactions 
between the different actors 
that participate in the policy 
making. 
This approach seeks to explain 
how these actors are dependent 
on others in order to achieve 
their goals. 
In addition, this approach 
analyses the interaction within 
the context of the institutional 
framework and, consequently, 
how actors respond to the rules 
established.  
R.A.W. Rhodes 
Tanja A. Börzel 
Maurice Wright 
The policy networks 
analysis approach is a 
useful to understand a 
specific policy issue by 
observing and documenting 
the interrelation of the 
actors and their decisions 
during the process. 
A disadvantage of this 
approach is basically that 
the complexity of the 
reality overpasses its 
premises, as the 
interrelations of the actors 
are not always open to the 
external observers. 
This research 
focuses on the 
analysis of policy 
outputs and 
outcomes, even 
though the 
understanding of 
the interaction of 
the actors is 
important, this 
approach is not 
completely 
suitable for the 
research. 
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B. Continued 
Analytical 
Approach 
Basic Premises Principal 
Authors 
Advantages Disadvantages Is it suitable for 
this research? 
Organizational 
analysis 
Approach 
The need for understanding how 
organizations work has become 
a recurrent issue in policy 
analysis. This approach seeks to 
study some organizational 
challenges and their implication 
in policy making. Some of these 
challenges are related to 
information problems, 
hierarchies, control, and 
communication. The study of 
public organizations has become 
a relevant topic within policy 
analysis, particularly after the 
implementation of strategies 
taken from the private sector. 
Thomas 
Christensen 
Michel Crozier 
Niklas Luhmann 
Phillip Selznick 
 
The study of organizations 
has become useful for 
understanding those 
elements that affect policy 
making. In addition, the 
organizational approach has 
developed different tools to 
analyse the behaviour of 
organizations, for example, 
the response to change and 
the adaptability. 
The organizational 
approach is limited 
because it does not 
consider the external 
factors that affect policy 
making. Also, the study of 
organizations has focused 
on the implementation 
stage, leaving the rest of 
the stages less developed. 
For this research, 
the 
organizational 
analysis is useful 
to understand 
some possible 
failures during 
the policy cycle, 
as well as some 
relevant issues 
regarding policy 
evaluation. 
Policy cycle 
approach 
This approach conceptualizes 
public policy as a series of 
“steps” or “stages”, as a useful 
framework to understand how 
policy making works. 
In this cycle it is identified a 
problem to be solved followed 
by a series of actions directed to 
obtain a result to be assessed. 
Wayne Parsons 
Peter Knoepfel 
Paul Sabatier 
 
 
 
This kind of approach is 
useful for the identification 
of the actors and main 
issues of each of the stages, 
providing a deeper 
knowledge of how policy 
making works. In addition, 
this approach allows 
disaggregating the 
components of the process 
and enables the analyst to 
study in an individual way 
each of the elements of 
policy making. 
The main disadvantage 
identified for this 
approach is that it is a 
rigid framework that 
might not suit the reality. 
Due to the fact 
that the research 
focus on policy 
evaluation, the 
policy cycle 
approach is 
suitable for the 
research as it 
allows 
understanding 
the impact of 
every stage in the 
policy outputs. 
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C. List of Interviewees 
ID Description ID Description 
UK-1 CQC Official MX-1 
Academician/Evaluator 
UK-2 Health Committee Staff MX-2 
Ministry of Function Official 
UK-3 NAO staff MX-3 
Ministry of Health Official 
UK-4 NAO staff MX-4 
Ministry of Health Official 
UK-5 Analyst NCIN MX-5 
Ministry of Health Official 
UK-6 
Researcher at Social Care 
Charity  MX-6 
Ministry of Health Official 
UK-7 Former Clerk PAC MX-7 
Ministry of Health Official 
UK-8 DoH Official MX-8 
Ministry of Health Official 
UK-9 DoH Official MX-9 
CONEVAL Official 
UK-10 Former CQC Official MX-10 
Evaluator/Former CONEVAL Official 
UK-11 
Director at Cancer 
Charity  MX-11 
Health Caravans Operator 
UK-12 MP/PAC Member MX-12 
SAO Auditor 
UK-13 
NHS Official 
MX-13 
Researcher at Legislative Policy Analysis 
Centre 
UK-14 Evaluator MX-14 CONEVAL’s Board Member 
UK-15 
Researcher at policy 
think-tank MX-15 
SICALIDAD Evaluator 
UK-16 Evaluator MX-16 Public Policy NGO Director 
UK-17 
Public Administration 
Select Committee staff MX-17 
SICALIDAD Operator 
UK-18 
Researcher at 
independent charity 
involved in government 
and public affairs 
MX-18 Ministry of Finance Official 
MX-19 Ministry of Finance Official 
MX-20 Ministry of Finance Official 
MX-21 
Researcher at Legislative Policy Analysis 
Centre 
MX-22 Former CONEVAL staff/Evaluator 
MX-23 Former Deputy 
MX-24 Evaluator/ Former CONEVAL Official 
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D. Performance Management Systems in the United Kingdom  
Financial Management Initiative 
Launched in 1982 with the white paper Efficiency and Effectiveness; 
underpinned by the concept of Management by Objectives first outlined by Peter 
Drucker in 1954 in his book ‘The Practice of Management’. The initiative was 
designed to promote inter alia: 
(a) A clear view of the objectives, and the means to assess performance against 
them; and 
(b) Well defined responsibility for making the best use of their resources. 
 
Next Steps Agencies UK 
Launched in 1988 by Sir Robin Ibbs –Director of the Prime Minister’s Efficiency 
Unit. The idea was to separate the policymaking work of government 
departments from the work of implementation, which was delegated to 
Departmental Agencies. Each agency set up with a Framework Document, 
agreed by the responsible Minister, setting out: 
-Clear tasks 
-Key Performance Indicators 
-Annual Performance Reporting 
Private Finance Initiative 
This initiative […] involves payment rewards and penalties according to 
performance against targets throughout the period of the contract. 
Public Service Agreement targets 
Introduced in 1998, as part of the first Comprehensive Spending Review. 
Comprehensive Spending Review were designed to set out the resources each 
department would get over the next three years, and the targets that they would 
have to achieve with them. Public Service Agreement targets address the 
medium-to long-term priority outcomes of government policy. Each major 
government department agreed them with HM Treasury as part of each 
Spending Review. 
Best Value Performance Indicators (BVPIs) 
Introduced as part of the wider Best Value initiative under the Local 
Government Act 1999. Under the initiative, each local authority had to establish 
a set of authority-wide objectives and performance indicators. New 
performance targets were to be brought together with other service targets in 
the authority’s annual Best Value Performance Plan. 
Local Public Service Agreement targets 
The Government announced in the Spending Review 2000 that it would 
introduce local Public Service Agreements (LPSAs). LPSAs were piloted with 20 
authorities starting in late 2000 and a rollout to all upper tier authorities began 
in September 2001. Individual authorities sign up to targets to deliver key 
national and local priorities in return for operational flexibilities and financial 
rewards for success. 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment 
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Announced in the December 2001 White Paper, ‘Strong Local Leadership-
Quality Public Services’, the first Comprehensive Performance Assessments 
were conducted in December 2002. Comprehensive Performance Assessment is 
a standardised assessment framework that generates a single rating for each 
local authority. The two key elements of a council’s activities that CPA seeks to 
measure are its core service performance and its ability to improve. 
Performance Partnership Agreements 
Performance Partnership agreements are Agreements between the Head of the 
Civil Service and the head civil servant of each department. They summarise the 
programme of civil service reform within each department –what is to be done, 
why and how; and how the centre will help. 
Efficiency targets 
Following the review by Sir Peter Gershon of public sector efficiency, the 
Spending Review of 2004 announced the introduction of departmental 
efficiency targets to realise the Government’s ambition of achieving efficiency 
gains across the public sector on £21.5 billion and reducing 80,000 civil service 
jobs by 2008. 
Local Area Agreements 
Local Area Agreements represent a new approach to improve co-ordination 
between central government and local authorities and their partners, such as 
charities and non-governmental institutions, working through Local Strategic 
Partnerships. They focus on a range of agreed outcomes shared by all delivery 
partners locally. 
Departmental Capabilities Reviews 
Starting in October 2005, the Reviews are led by the Prime Minister’s Delivery 
Unit and examine capacity within Department to achieve their objectives. The 
reports are to include clear assessments of current departmental capability and 
key actions to be taken to improve.  
 
Source: Bourn, J., 2007. Public Sector Auditing: Is it value for money?. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 
Chichester, UK. Pp. 326-328.   
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E. History of the National Audit Office 
Early 
years 
1314. Auditor of the Exchequer Earliest surviving mention of a public 
official charged with auditing government expenditure 
1559.Queen Elizabeth I established the Auditors of the Imprest 
1780. Commissioners for Auditing the Public Accounts were appointed by 
statute 
1834. Commissioners worked in tandem with the Comptroller, who was 
charged with controlling the issue of funds to the government 
1860-
1870 
 
1860. First major steps towards proper financial accountability to 
Parliament were taken 
1859-1866. William Ewart Gladstone initiated major reforms of public 
finance and Parliamentary accountability 
1866. Exchequer and Audit Departments Act required all departments to 
produce annual accounts known as appropriation accounts, it also 
established the position of Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) and an 
Exchequer and Audit Department (E&AD) 
The 1866 Act established a cycle of accountability for public funds. The 
House of Commons authorizes expenditure. The Comptroller and Auditor 
General controls the issue of funds 
The results of the C&AG’s investigations are considered by a dedicated 
parliamentary committee, the Committee of Public Accounts (PAC), 
established in 1861 by Gladstone 
1870. PAC took evidence from senior officials, normally Heads of 
Departments, who were designated as Accounting Officers by the Treasury 
1921-
present 
 
1921. The 1921 legislation allowed the C&AG to rely in part on 
departmental systems of control and thus examine a sample of 
transactions, rather than all of them 
1960. Concerns were expressed by Parliamentarians and academics that 
the scope of public audit needed to be modernized to reflect the significant 
changes in the role of government over the course of the twentieth century 
1983. The National Audit Act 1983 was issued, under the Act, the C&AG 
formally became an Officer of the House of Commons, was given the 
express power to report to Parliament at his own discretion on the 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which government bodies have 
used public funds 
2000. Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000 introduced resource 
(accrual) based accounting and budgeting for Department Accounts 
2006. The Companies Act 2006 
Established that the C&AG is able to compete for the audit of public bodies 
established as companies 
2011. The Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011 Act 
established the NAO as a corporate body led by a Board consisting of four 
executive members (including the C&AG as Chief Executive) and five non-
executive members (including a Chairman) 
Source: National Audit Office, 2013. History of the NAO.
416 
 
F. Key Findings of the Evaluation in Government Report 
 
Source: National Audit Office, 2013. Evaluation in government. 
 
 
 
Coverage of 
Evaluation 
Evidence 
Quality of 
Evaluation 
Evidence 
Use of Evaluation 
Evidence 
Production 
Resources and 
Barriers 
Government 
guidance sets outs 
the expectation that 
all policies, 
programmes and 
projects should be 
subject to 
‘proportionate’ 
evaluation; however, 
not all departments 
follow government 
requirements. 
Departments’ own 
assessment varies 
regarding the 
overall quality of 
their evaluation 
evidence. 
Our review of the 
documents 
provided to HM 
Treasury by three 
departments 
during the 2010 
Spending Review 
found limited 
references to 
evaluation 
evidence, which 
underpinned only a 
small proportion of 
resources that they 
sought from the 
Treasury. 
Government 
departments use a 
wide range of 
models to 
commission and 
produce 
evaluations, but the 
rationale for this 
variation is not 
clear. 
It is difficult to 
establish the 
coverage of 
evaluation evidence, 
but it does not 
appear to be 
comprehensive. 
Our assessment of 
the fitness of 
purpose of a 
selection of 34 
evaluations from 
four departments 
finds significant 
variation. 
Impact assessments 
of policies under 
consideration 
rarely include 
relevant learning 
from evaluation 
evidence. 
Information on staff 
time and budget 
spent on evaluation 
by departments is 
incomplete, so it is 
difficult for the 
government to take 
a view on whether 
the resources 
allocated are 
appropriate. 
Departmental chief 
analysts recognise 
that gaps exist, but 
few departments 
have plans in place 
to evaluate all of 
their major projects. 
We found some 
evidence that 
evaluation reports 
that are weaker in 
identifying 
causality tend to 
be more positive in 
assessing what the 
intervention 
achieved. 
Public Accounts 
Committee and 
NAO reports have 
criticised 
departments for 
absent or poor-
quality evaluation. 
 
There is little 
systematic 
information from 
the government on 
how it has used the 
evaluation evidence 
that it has 
commissioned or 
produced. 
Independent 
evaluators outside 
the government 
experience 
difficulties 
accessing a range of 
official and 
administrative data 
that can be used to 
evaluate the impact 
of government 
interventions. 
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G. The Cancer Strategy Reform (CRS) 2007  
The Cancer Reform Strategy (CRS) developed presented by the Department of 
Health in 2007 derives from the NHS Cancer Plan issued in 2000. It is a five-year 
plan to improve services provided to cancer patients in the country. This 
document “sets out a programme of action across ten areas: six areas of action 
to improve cancer outcomes and four areas of action to ensure delivery” 
(Department of Health, 2007). These actions are listed below: 
Actions to improve cancer outcomes  
 Preventing cancer    
 Diagnosing cancer earlier 
 Ensuring better treatment 
 Living with and beyond cancer 
 Reducing cancer inequalities 
 Delivering care in the appropriate setting 
Drivers for delivery 
 Using information to improve quality and choice 
 Stronger commissioning 
 Funding world class cancer care 
 Building for the future by reassessing the progress made in tacking cancer 
 
Source: Department of Health, 2007. Cancer Reform Strategy.  
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H. Key Findings of the Delivering the Cancer Reform Strategy Report 
Source: National Audit Office, 2010. Delivering the Cancer Reform Strategy. 
  
Improving the Quality of Information on 
Cancer 
Strengthening the Commissioning of Cancer 
Services 
Better Use of Resources 
The National Cancer Intelligence Network 
(NCIN) has linked clinical, demographic and 
performance data from a range of sources and 
provided new analyses and reports on key 
cancer statistics, in addition to the development 
of a Cancer Commissioning Toolkit. 
Many commissioners lack understanding of 
what drives costs and have not focused on 
improving value for money. 
The Department has not monitored the cost of 
implementing the Strategy and the data it 
collects on expenditure on cancer services 
include unexplained variations from one year to 
the next within and between Primary Care 
Trusts (PCTs). 
The Department has improved information on 
cancer by establishing a national baseline on 
levels of cancer awareness and undertaken a 
Cancer Patient Experience survey with 
responses from 67,000 patients. 
Commissioners do not link cost and activity 
data to incidence, prevalence and survival data. 
Significant reductions have been made in 
inpatient hospital bed days for cancer. 
There is incomplete and inconsistent data on 
how advanced patients’ cancers have become at 
the time they are diagnosed limit 
understanding of variations in outcomes and 
the effective allocation of resources. 
Expenditure on cancer services is structured 
around complex payment mechanisms which 
largely fund activity in hospitals. 
Poor coding of outpatient activity makes it 
difficult to measure follow-up activity after 
treatment. 
There is duplication in the publication of cancer 
data which leads to confusion […] this leads to 
inefficiency in the publication of cancer data, 
and confuses commissioners about which data 
to use. 
Chemotherapy and radiotherapy, two of the 
main treatments for cancer, are excluded from 
the national tariff and there is poor 
understanding of costs and activity. 
The Strategy expected emergency admissions 
for cancer patients to be minimised and, while 
the rate of increase has been reduced, 
emergency admissions are still increasing. 
Commissioners have made progress in 
supporting the delivery of key commitments to 
improve cancer services, but shortcomings 
persist. 
Challenging existing resource use can deliver 
savings, especially in the use of radiotherapy 
machines, in earlier diagnosis of patients, and in 
the reduction of length of stay for cancer 
patients. 
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I. External Scrutiny to the Care Quality Commission 
Year 
Scrutiny 
Body 
Report 
Main Findings 
2011 
Health 
Committee 
Accountability 
hearing with 
the Care 
Quality 
Commission 
1. The most striking and concerning aspect of the CQC’s operation over the past year is the decision to 
divert resources from inspection and review activities towards meeting the demands placed on it by 
the process of registering providers, to the extent that the number of inspections fell far below usual 
levels. 
2. The Committee concluded that the bias in the work of the CQC away from its core function of 
inspection and towards the essentially administrative tasks of registration represented a significant 
distortion of priorities. 
3.  We are extremely concerned that CQC’s compliance activity fell to such low levels in the course of 
2010-2011. 
4. The long-standing vacancies for CQC inspectors are a further cause for concern. 
5. The CQC should have identified the difficulties inherent in the regulations early in the registration 
process and made clear to the Government that unless modifications were made it would not be 
able to adequately to fulfil its duty to monitor and inspect providers. 
6. The CQC must seek to address growing inspector caseloads through recruitment and should also 
bolster the support provided to inspectors to allow them to focus on their core frontline duties. 
7. Quality and Risk Profiles have the potential to be a useful auxiliary tool for inspector, but in the 
present form the quality of data is limited in its reliability and coverage. 
8. Action in the case of Winterbourne View was woefully inadequate: the CQC failed to ‘actively follow-
up’ the local authority process, or conduct its own assessment, or even contact Mr Bryan for further 
information. 
9. The CQC must accept responsibility for its poor handling of registration and adapt its processes 
accordingly. 
10. The information currently provided by the CQC on adult social care providers is unhelpful and often 
out of date. 
Source: Health Committee, 2012. Annual accountability hearing with the Care Quality Commission. 
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I. Continued 
Year 
Scrutiny 
Body 
Report 
Main Findings 
2011 
National 
Audit 
Office 
The Care 
Quality 
Commission: 
Regulating the 
quality and 
safety of health 
and social care 
1. The regulators for health and adult social care have been subject to considerable change in the last ten 
years. 
2. The proposal to extend the Commission’s role into new areas risks distracting the Commission from 
its core work of regulating health and adult social care. 
3. There is a gap between what the public and providers expect of the Commission and what it can 
achieve as a regulator. 
4. The Commission’s budget is less than the combined budget of its predecessor bodies, although it has 
more responsibilities. 
5. Responsibility for funding the regulation of health and adult social care is falling increasingly on the 
providers of these services rather than the Department. 
6. The Commission underspent against its budget for 2009-10 and 2010-11, partly because it had a 
significant number of staff vacancies. 
7. The timetable for registering health and adult social care providers, set by the Department, did not 
allow time for the registration process to be tested properly and the process has not run smoothly. 
8. The Commission is seeking to learn lessons for the registration of GP practices, which has been 
deferred by a year. 
9. Compliance review and inspection work fell significantly during 2009-10 and 2010-11. 
10. The Commission has a systematic approach to assessing the risk that providers are not meeting the 
essential standards of quality and safety, but it depends on good quality information which is not 
always available. 
11. The Commission has strengthened its whistleblowing arrangements in the light of the Winterbourne 
View case.  
12. The Commission’s performance management is constrained by gaps in data and reporting is mainly 
against quantity-based measures of activity. 
Source: National Audit Office, 2011. The Care Quality Commission: Regulating the quality and safety of health and social care.  
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I. Continued 
Year 
Scrutiny 
Body 
Report 
Main Findings 
2012 
Public 
Accounts 
Committee 
The Care 
Quality 
Commission: 
Regulating 
the quality 
and safety of 
health and 
adult social 
care 
1. The Department is ultimately responsible for the effective regulation of health and adult social care 
but has not had a grip on what the Commission has been doing. 
2. The Commission has been poorly governed and led. 
3. The Commission’s role is unclear and it does not measure the quality or impact of its own work. 
4. The information provided to the public on the quality of care is inadequate and does not engender 
confidence in the care system. 
5. The registration of GP practices must involve a meaningful assessment of compliance with the 
essential standards of quality and safety. 
6. There are inconsistencies in the judgements of individual inspectors and in the Commission’s 
approach to enforcement. 
7. The Commission must strengthen its whistleblowing arrangements. 
8. The Commission should not take on the functions of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority at this time. 
Source: Public Accounts Committee, 2012. The Care Quality Commission: Regulating the quality and safety of health and adult social care.  
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I. Continued 
Year 
Scrutiny 
Body 
Report 
Main Findings 
2012 
Health 
Committee 
2012 
accountability 
hearing with 
the Care 
Quality 
Commission 
1. The CQC has been subject to sustained criticism in the period 2011-2012. 
2. CQC Board member Kay Sheldon identified serious failings within the management, 
organisation, functions and culture of the CQC. 
3. The CQC has developed a much keener focus on patient safety and has a better 
appreciation of what it exists to do, but we remain to be convinced that the CQC has 
successfully defined its core purpose. 
4. The Committee concluded that the CQC’s primary focus should be on ensuring that the 
essential standards it enforces can be interpreted by the public as a guarantee of 
acceptable standards in care. 
5. There are indications that the CQC is developing its regulatory model to try and address 
this failing […] the inclusion of clinical expert advisors to support the inspection process is 
a positive step and we are confident that this will enhance the inspection process. 
6. We were told that the CQC has learned from serious failings it had previously experienced 
in relation to whistleblowing […] we believe that the CQC can do even more to support the 
most vulnerable workers to come forward and report their concerns. 
7. Primary care registration is a major challenge for the CQC and will test the degree to which 
the CQC has managed to implement learning from its previous experience with dental 
registration. 
 
Source: Health Committee, 2012. Annual accountability hearing with the Care Quality Commission. 
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I. Continued 
Year Scrutiny Body Report Main Findings 
2014 Health Committee 
2013 
accountability 
hearing with the 
Care Quality 
Commission 
1. The CQC’s new approach to registration and inspection was established in their revised strategy 
published in April 2013. 
2. Lack of clarity and direction has previously undermined the CQC’s attempts to establish itself as an 
authoritative regulator. 
3. The Committee welcomes the fact that the CQC has now set out its objectives in clear terms. 
4. The CQC has appointed three Chief Inspectors to oversee the inspection of Hospitals, Primary and 
Integrated Care, and Adult and Social Care. 
5. The CQC has announced that it will now assess the quality of hospitals against a range of standards 
which are divided into three groups: Fundamentals of Care, Expected Standards and High Quality 
Care. 
6. The evidence provided to the committee shows that the CQC has an ambitious timetable for reform 
registration and inspection […] however, some witnesses have expressed concern that the new 
model for registration and inspection will focus too closely on hospitals, primary care and social 
care at the expense of community, ambulance and mental health services. 
7. The CQC plans that future inspections will be informed, and on occasion prompted, by an ongoing 
surveillance process. 
8. The CQC plans to apply its methodology so it can provide an accurate assessment not only of the 
theoretical establishment of a provider but of the actual number of staff working. 
9. The process of inspection is changing significantly as the CQC adopts a model of differentiated, in-
depth inspection, the new model abandons generalist, generic inspections and from 2013-2014 the 
CQC intends only to operate “teams of inspectors who specialise in particular types of care”. 
10. In oral evidence David Behan provided an overview on how the CQC workforce will be 
restructured, telling the Committee that the role of every member of staff is likely to change, this 
will include creating specialist inspection teams and recruiting additional inspectors, a process that 
could take up to 18 months. 
11. The CQC proposes a rating system for NHS hospitals comprising four separate classifications: 
Inadequate, Requires improvement, Good, and Outstanding. 
12. The CQC’s budget has risen rapidly in the last year and is likely to rise further […] it is no longer 
their objective to phase out grant-in-aid funding. 
Source: Health Committee, 2013. Annual accountability hearing with the Care Quality Commission.  
 
